How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Combatintman]

Reference the 'stans, somebody else was playing in that space recently ...

READOUT: U.S. CENTCOM Commander meets with Tajikistan President, Defense Minister, and Chief of General Staff, June 17th, 2022 > U.S. Central Command > Statements View

I wouldn't make too much of the Taliban being around the corner - they have plenty of their own problems to deal with right now.  With their "Pashtunization" policies, all they are doing is alienating the non-Pashtuns in their support base.  These non-Pashtuns would be the vehicle by which the Taliban would stir up trouble on its northern borders so the capability is just not there. 

In terms of intent, deeds speak louder than words.  Both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are being courted by the Taliban for trade, in fact there is an Afghan trade mission in the latter now. 

The outlier is Tajikistan with which the Taliban has a cool relationship because of a number of reasons.  Tajik fears over one of its 'troubled' regions Gorno-Badakhshan which sits on the Afghan border.  Massoud's National Resistance Front, although not overtly encouraged by Tajikistan, are using the country as a safe haven.  Tajik President Rahmon likes to play the defender of the Tajiks card to whip up domestic support as well as spout ludicrous claims for the number of Islamic militants in Afghanistan's north east to get security assistance from China, Russia and the CSTO.  In reality, Rahmon is faced with a tricky balancing act which does not involve actually stoking up tension and this is shared by the bearded folks here in Kabul.

Russian weakness as a result of its 'special military operation' certainly has changed the dynamics in its relationship with the 'stans as it is clear that Russia is no longer the 'go-to' security backstop that Russia heavily promoted itself as in the aftermath of Kabul's collapse last year.  It is certainly true that all three of Afghanistan's northern neighbours have security concerns about the regime here in Kabul but current reporting does not support the assertion that hordes of Taliban-sponsored jihadists are going to swarm northwards.  For a start, they're not in Afghanistan in those sorts of numbers, the latest UN estimate puts the number at about 9,700 of which a large proportion are Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan and therefore not interested in going 'oop north.'

Rather than worry about expanded Chinese influence or a mythical Taliban-sponsored Islamic wave, the US should see this as an opportunity to ratchet up pressure on Russia by parking in its backyard and to reestablish an intelligence collection footprint in Central Asia.  By the looks of the June 17 CENTCOM visit, this is an opportunity that is being pursued.

[Taranis]

 

"A Su-25 fighter jet fires rockets during a mission at an undisclosed location in Ukraine, July 2, 2022. RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY PRESS SERVICE / AP"

[Slaughterhouse-Five]

I read here our local analysts and there is an opinion that one of the sides is deliberately provoking everyone else to the active phase of the Third World War with the involvement of an increasing number of participants in these deliberate attacks on residential buildings with many human casualties. (I hope you do not need to explain which side).

Thus, perhaps the side is trying to destroy the rest of the competitors in this fire of war, because it cannot remove them in any other way. "Soft power" is a too complicated concept for this side.

(I will be forced to write "this side", "that side" because of the arbitrary interpretation of the criminal law in my country. Sorry.)

[Kinophile]

https://twitter.com/mdmitri91/status/1542639879749832710?t=J2zLZIqnUc3vtpZdKCrB0A&s=19

 

[Grigb]

14 minutes ago, Slaughterhouse-Five said:

Thus, perhaps the side is trying to destroy the rest of the competitors in this fire of war, because it cannot remove them in any other way. "Soft power" is a too complicated concept for this side.

Interesting point of view, because right now RU nationalists are discussing why RU is bad at applying "Soft Power" approach. 

[Slaughterhouse-Five]

12 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Interesting point of view, because right now RU nationalists are discussing why RU is bad at applying "Soft Power" approach. 

"Russian nationalism" is oxymoron. There is no such thing like "RU nationalists". There is a concept of Russian imperialism. This will be much closer to the truth and includes all russian nationalists.

[Grigb]

51 minutes ago, Slaughterhouse-Five said:

"Russian nationalism" is oxymoron. There is no such thing like "RU nationalists". There is a concept of Russian imperialism. This will be much closer to the truth and includes all russian nationalists.

Good to hear RU propaganda talking point. I mean only RU propaganda could argue that Girkin and co does not exist or that Putin himself does not like to flirt with nationalism.

You can create a separate topic where we can discuss the issue of RU nationalism in length but in this topic I am not going to discuss it with you as it is waste of time.

 

 

 

[Huba]

13 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Good to hear RU propaganda talking point. I mean only RU propaganda could argue that Girkin and co does not exist or that Putin himself does not like to flirt with nationalism.

You can create a separate topic where we can discuss the issue of RU nationalism in length but in this topic I am not going to discuss it with you as it is waste of time.

 

 

 

I agree that discussing the subject in depth would be almost as derailing as talking about old Polish TV shows  But from outsider and layman's perspective it sound really interesting. I'm quite sure that both Russian nationalism and imperialism are things, and although from foreign  POV both manifest themselves more or less in the same way, maybe there's indeed a discourse between the two inside Russia?  As a rule of thumb, hardcore nationalism focused on ethnicity and/ or race might be quite in opposition to imperialism, which always seems to be at least a bit universal ( are the Buryats Russians? Tricky question I guess...).

I'll be happy to see this discussed.

[Grigb]

interesting comment from RU volunteer about local residents from recently captured areas.

Quote

It is difficult for local residents to adhere to any ideology, since absolutely nothing has changed for them for decades. They don't see the point. [This is eastern UKR region. It is historically home of pro RU corrupt authorities] Many immediately took the side of the DPR, hoping that Russia would finish everything quickly and their cow would not come under fire. 

People in the villages are bitter. There is no light, communication in certain places, there are no pensions, humanitarian workers are not coming. The front is nearby, so they are very careful when they talk. The spoken language is surzhik. [Surzhik is local dialect which is mix of UKR and RU words unlike RU southern dialect of UKR border areas. Not sure why he mentioned it but I think he implied that RU forces reached the border area between allegedly friendly RU population and hostile UKR one.] 

[Letter from Prague]

 

[Letter from Prague]

8 minutes ago, Huba said:

I agree that discussing the subject in depth would be almost as derailing as talking about old Polish TV shows  But from outsider and layman's perspective it sound really interesting. I'm quite sure that both Russian nationalism and imperialism are things, and although from foreign  POV both manifest themselves more or less in the same way, maybe there's indeed a discourse between the two inside Russia?  As a rule of thumb, hardcore nationalism focused on ethnicity and/ or race might be quite in opposition to imperialism, which always seems to be at least a bit universal ( are the Buryats Russians? Tricky question I guess...).

I'll be happy to see this discussed.

I'm going to say I am interested in this as well. The concept of nation / people / "narod" for lack of better word in English in Russian Federation must be pretty complicated given the scale and number of nationalities involved. Kamil Galeev has a lot to say for it, but quite a few people commented he's wrong on some stuff, so I'd be interested in other opinions.

If only from "know your enemy" perspective.

[Battlefront.com]

I typed the following in an off-Forum discussion about Ukraine's current withdrawal strategy in the Donbas.  I think it's a good topic for here, so...

Russia’s new (very old) way of fighting is to mass artillery, blow the crap out of everything in its path, then flood on through the gap.  Right?  Right.  Well, Russia so far has only demonstrated it is only capable of doing the first part (blow stuff up), not the second part (exploitation).  The clued in experts seem to understand this, which is why they (like me) didn't get all hot and bothered by things like Izyum and Popasna.  These penetrations are obviously not good for Ukraine's ability to hold a line long term, but there's no sweeping pincers that create immediate threat to Ukrainian units.  Since Ukraine's goal is to retain forces, not retain land, this is a problem for Russia since its goal is to destroy Ukraine's ability to fight. 

Why can't Russia do exploitation in this war?  Lots of reasons, none of which Russia is capable of overcoming:

• lack of mechanized forces.  The ones being used as battering rams against Ukrainian lines are too depleted, poorly led, poorly trained, and poorly supported to do deep penetrations into Ukraine's LOCs
• lack of fresh forces.  Russia's manpower is stretched so thin it simply doesn't have the forces necessary to flood and hold whatever it takes.  Instead, Russia is obligated to take it's breaching force and have it act as the backbone of any exploitation.  These forces are bloodied and spent from the breakthrough phase, therefore of limited value in exploitation
• Ukraine doesn't need to hold territory once it's immediate military value (i.e. killing Russians)  At the command level there's no political or emotional decisions being made about what ground to hold and how long to hold it
• Ukraine is showing a real knack of knowing when to withdraw.  They stay only as long as they think the balance of casualties is favorable to them
• Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated that it is very good at withdrawing "in good order" under pressure.  This is partly because Ukraine has figured out the mechanics of such maneuvers, partly because Russia lacks the forces to exploit faster than Ukraine can withdraw
• the terrain in the Donbas favors a defender

There's one more reason why Russia is failing, and it's worthy of being noted separately:

• TIME

This "new" strategy of Russia's is not only resource intensive, but also time intensive.  These are two things that Russia is desperately short on.

Even after Russia makes a massive investment of limited resources and time it can't do more than obligate Ukraine to withdraw from a narrow sector of frontage.  Russia lacks the ability to advance faster than Ukraine can withdraw.  Not only does this deny Russia big bags of POWs, but it also means that by the time it gets into contact with Ukrainian forces again they find them organized and dug in.  More importantly, this new line of defense seems to be calculated to be just out of effective range of the accumulated Russian breakthrough artillery, thus obligating the Russians to repeat the whole bloody breakthrough strategy all over again. This is not sustainable for Russia because it lacks the resources or the time to keep this up.  Or as the old saying goes, "a few more victories like this and we'll be totally defeated".

More troubling for Russia is that Ukraine has figured out some pretty good ways to counter this half assed Soviet breakthrough strategy.  And that is wait until Russia has concentrated it's breakthrough assets and nail them with newly acquired long range weaponry.  Massed artillery doesn't do much if the massed ammo supply is blown up.  Russia might respond by decentralizing its supply points., but that most likely means slowing down the buildup process and greatly complicating sustained massed fires.  This gives Ukraine more time to dig in, more time to build up capabilities, more time for Russia's domestic problems to get worse.

In summary, Russia's "new" way of fighting this war isn't working already and it's going to get worse as this drags out.  If this is Russia's answer to it's earlier maneuver failures, it had better be working on something to replace it with.

Steve

[Slaughterhouse-Five]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

I am not going to discuss it with you as it is waste of time.

Okay, I’ll keep that in mind, Grigb.

[Grigb]

Khodorkovsky [Vostok battalion commander] quote about recent fighting and the current situation

Quote

Despite the differences between the political and military Ukrainian headquarters, the tactic of staying in the boilers (imposed by politicians), as long as the opportunity allows, partially justifies itself. This requires us to concentrate resources, and with the general limitations of our contingent, other directions are forced to rely only on their own forces, which are often not enough for an offensive.

It is not even about lack of personnel, but about lack of support without which the work of the infantry will not be effective and will only lead to increased losses with questionable results. Yesterday we explored our right flank: we linked up, studied the terrain, approaches, the potential of our neighbors - we ended up dissatisfied. The stretch is held by units of different subordination, represented by a weakened personal without proper support, and the enemy has seized the initiative. He keeps drones in the air almost constantly and reacts to almost any movement with impunity, and neither our electronic warfare nor our artillery can prevent him, because there are very few of them in this direction. The second day we are puzzling over how to help our neighbors, despite the fact that we ourselves have enough spirit, but only it, in fact, is what we have enough.

On the left flank, things are more stable - there the neighbor [looks like RU regulars] is monolithic and better supplied, but has the task of holding the line and waiting for the arrival of reserves, and here for the first time differences were revealed in the approach [to fighting] of us, local and irregular militia of the [two thousand] fourteenth year, and cadre guys from the regular army, subordinate to the [other] orders [from above]. We have been sitting head-on with the enemy for eight years and are determined to drive him away from our land as soon as possible, but we have to follow the logic of the moment and wait, while focusing on local tasks. [Last paragraph wording is bit strange. It looks like he does not want to openly admit the fact of RU regulars low motivation. But it really hurts him so he cannot not mentioned it in some ways]

[Huba]

There's a new update from UA General Staff, and it includes information of RU finally crossing Donets in Bilohorivka, and taking Zolotarivka, which basically means that pincers around Lysychansk are closed now. There's no mention of what's going on in the city though, so it's unclear if UA fully retreated, or if any significant forces were cut off in there.

What is really strange is the UA communication strategy regarding this - UA seems unable to admit they tactically withdrew from Lysychansk. I guess they know better how to handle that from the internal PR perspective, but for me it's a bit annoying.

Quote

In the direction of Kramatorsk, the enemy has forced the Siverskyi Donets River, is trying to develop success and take possession of Bilohorivka. Fire continues to influence units of our troops in order to constrain their actions. Artillery shelling was recorded near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka.
In the Lysychansk direction, the enemy is shelling from barrel artillery in the areas of Zolotarivka and Verkhnokamyanka settlements. It led an assault in the direction of Zolotarivka and took control of the settlement.
In the direction of Bakhmut, the occupiers are shelling the districts of Soledar, Pokrovske, Bakhmut, and Klynove with artillery.

Link to the whole report

And Zelensky's announcement:

Edit: Just as I published my rant, UA GS made a second announcement about retreating from Lysychansk:

Quote

After heavy fighting for Lysychansk, the Defense Forces of Ukraine were forced to withdraw from their occupied positions and lines.

In the conditions of the multiple superiority of the russian occupying forces in artillery, aviation, MLRS, ammunition and personnel, the continuation of the defense of the city would lead to fatal consequences. In order to preserve the lives of Ukrainian defenders, a decision was made to withdraw.
We continue the fight. Unfortunately, steel will and patriotism are not enough for success - material and technical resources are needed.
The defenders of Luhansk oblast and other oblasts of our country heroically perform their civil and military duties.
We will be back and we will definitely win!

 

Edited July 3, 2022 by Huba

[Vanir Ausf B]

7 hours ago, Haiduk said:

I don't know what hit Belgorod, but over Kursk Russian AD shot down two old Soviet jet UAVs Tu-141.

Tochka-U, it seems.

 

[FancyCat]

Bravo to Slovakia, they have according to wiki, 9 to 11 MiG-29s, while not all will probably be sent, anything to replace losses is great. Apparently for security reasons from both Ukraine and Slovakia, elaboration will not be provided.

 

Edited July 3, 2022 by FancyCat

[panzermartin]

I don't have the deep tactical understanding some posters here demonstrate but just wondering. If Kramatorsk and Slavyansk fall inside July with a repeat of Siverodonetsk pattern (quite possible given the momentum now) , do you believe Ukraine can still challenge Russian dominance in Donbas. Seems almost a finished case to me. These are the most well prepared and dug in lines UKR had and there are no significant terrain features beyond these. I see Russians sealing the ground all the way in SE until Dnipro before winter comes. Russia can't achieve a big superiority in infantry numbers but so far it doesn't really matter when your hammer is really big (arty) and you only need to clear shattered force remnants and isolated pockets. 

Ukraine is also in a transition phase and soon it will be relying solely on western systems but you can't build a truly effective army in few months with random systems getting into the fight bit by bit. (And also getting destroyed bit by bit before making a difference). You have to use a big solid force at once to achieve big gains. No significant tank force and no air power is also a very limiting factor.

From what I can tell at least UKR has been using its new arty systems very carefully and I haven't seen many reports of destroyed m777 or Ceasars, or someone can enlighten us on this. This might be encouraging for UKR side as it could gradually acuumulate a sizeable arty force with preserved and newly trained units and suddenly present this at the battlefield. 

 

[Aragorn2002]

3 hours ago, Letter from Prague said:

 

Food for thought. Very interesting. Thanks!

[dan/california]

6 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

I don't have the deep tactical understanding some posters here demonstrate but just wondering. If Kramatorsk and Slavyansk fall inside July with a repeat of Siverodonetsk pattern (quite possible given the momentum now) , do you believe Ukraine can still challenge Russian dominance in Donbas. Seems almost a finished case to me. These are the most well prepared and dug in lines UKR had and there are no significant terrain features beyond these. I see Russians sealing the ground all the way in SE until Dnipro before winter comes. Russia can't achieve a big superiority in infantry numbers but so far it doesn't really matter when your hammer is really big (arty) and you only need to clear shattered force remnants and isolated pockets. 

Ukraine is also in a transition phase and soon it will be relying solely on western systems but you can't build a truly effective army in few months with random systems getting into the fight bit by bit. (And also getting destroyed bit by bit before making a difference). You have to use a big solid force at once to achieve big gains. No significant tank force and no air power is also a very limiting factor.

From what I can tell at least UKR has been using its new arty systems very carefully and I haven't seen many reports of destroyed m777 or Ceasars, or someone can enlighten us on this. This might be encouraging for UKR side as it could gradually acuumulate a sizeable arty force with preserved and newly trained units and suddenly present this at the battlefield. 

 

HIMARS has only been in action ten days. I am firmly convinced if it had come on line two weeks earlier Ukraine could have held the salient for a thousand years. As is it was the ONLY place the Russians could conveniently attack from three sides. Now they have to redeploy all that artillery under the HIMARS flail, and then supply it. I am not at all convinced the Russians will make more than trivial gains anywhere going forward. The next question is what can the Ukrainians do when they park NASSAM along a section of the front of their choosing and have to worry a lot less about Russian aviation.

[Huba]

1 minute ago, dan/california said:

HIMARS has only been in action ten days. I am firmly convinced if it had come on line two weeks earlier Ukraine could have held the salient for a thousand years. As is it was the ONLY place the Russians could conveniently attack from three sides. Now they have to redeploy all that artillery under the HIMARS flail, and then supply it. I am not at all convinced the Russians will make more than trivial gains anywhere going forward. The next question is what can the Ukrainians do when they park NASSAM along a section of the front of their choosing and have to worry a lot less about Russian aviation.

Exactly that. One thing that is slightly worrying is if RU might've gained momentum to break through Siversk straight away. I don't think they will, and when front stabilizes RU will have to start preparing their siege works basically from the scratch and if very unfavorable conditions. And then there will be second line before Slovyansk, if they take Siversk. And then the 2 fortified cities. At current tempo they won't manage to break through it till fall.

BTW, As I was studying the map of Donbas I noticed a nice little terrain feature - take a look at the photo map below. The red line is a canal that delivers water from Donets all the way down to Horlivka. It's about 20 meters wide. This region is an absolute hell for the attacker.

[Grigb]

40 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

I don't have the deep tactical understanding some posters here demonstrate but just wondering. If Kramatorsk and Slavyansk fall inside July with a repeat of Siverodonetsk pattern (quite possible given the momentum now)

I would say that Kramatorsk-Slavyansk agglomeration is the main UKR defensive belt. Everything what we have seen so far was just a delaying phase before main defensive engagement - Girkin quote: The AFU, slightly counterattacking in places, continue to strengthen with their main forces on the approaches to the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk fortress and along the Slavyank-Barvenkovo line, hoping to give a decisive defensive battle here if the command of the Russian Armed Forces decides to storm this fortified area head-on.

I cannot find Girkin quote (probably it was video, not post) where he says he hopes there will no assault of Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration because it will require too many people. Given acute manpower issue storming Slavyansk-Kramatorsk fortress is not the smartest idea. 

[Bulletpoint]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Massed artillery doesn't do much if the massed ammo supply is blown up.  Russia might respond by decentralizing its supply points., but that most likely means slowing down the buildup process and greatly complicating sustained massed fires.

Yes, it seems much more trouble for the attacker to split all ammo dumps up in, say, 5 different locations than for the defender to target five times more ammo dumps.

At least in a modern conflict such as this, where the Ukrainians have very good intel and drone-targeted artillery.

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

Major Alexander Shevstov, helicopter (probably Mi-8) squadron commander:

 

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

Exactly that. One thing that is slightly worrying is if RU might've gained momentum to break through Siversk straight away. I don't think they will, and when front stabilizes RU will have to start preparing their siege works basically from the scratch and if very unfavorable conditions. And then there will be second line before Slovyansk, if they take Siversk. And then the 2 fortified cities. At current tempo they won't manage to break through it till fall.

BTW, As I was studying the map of Donbas I noticed a nice little terrain feature - take a look at the photo map below. The red line is a canal that delivers water from Donets all the way down to Horlivka. It's about 20 meters wide. This region is an absolute hell for the attacker.

Very good natural feature.  There is also a line of built up areas from Sloviansk to Kostyantynivka behind that feature that could be fortified.  I strongly suspect this entire area operation is to draw in as much of the Russian forces as possible to open up opportunities elsewhere...but we will have to see if that long anticipated UA operational offensive actually occurs or are they also counting on good old mother-attrition.

Edited July 3, 2022 by The_Capt