The_Capt

So I tell my students, “look at the first 15 years of the Cold War”. They were by far the most dangerous. Largely because the “rules” had not been written or normalized. We were in a disruptive time with every player still trying to figure out the equilibrium through which to compete but not completely destroy each other. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, things pretty much smoothed out and both sides dug in for a long haul on established lines. We had close calls, particularly in 1983 but we were also saved then by these “norms”. We are entering into a new era and it will require new rules and norms that we have not figured out yet. Warfare is not the only thing changing. Leading us are at least two political generations who know nothing but the post-Cold War Great Peace. They were raised in academic schools that embraced this whole “end of history” stuff and then entered government and political arenas all designed for exploiting that peace. What they forgot was the faces of their fathers and grandfathers (nod to King). That post-Cold War peace came at great sacrifice and cold-blooded calculation. As we enter into this new era, the shortfalls of these schools of thought are just as dislocated as the western military schools who grew up assuming air supremacy. The rules are being re-written in front of our eyes…the only real question left is, “do we want our hands on the pen?”

We may not always agree but this one is right on point.

Well, yes…but we have also forgotten. Anyone who really knew how to deal with this sort of stuff from the last Cold War is long retired or dead. I was speaking to an old French officer who was looking at mandatory retirement this year (he is 65) and the French military extended all senior serving officers for 8 more years. He told me a major reason is that the 60+ crowd actually remember how to prepare to fight WW3. National security and Intelligence-wise, we have been CT bug hunting for 30 years and were resourced tailored for that. Terrorism was one small part of the Cold War conflict, we simply have not built the apparatus to the scale and depths needed to really play in these games. And frankly shame on us because the signals have been in the air for at least 15 years.

We simply have forgotten how to play hardball against another great power state. We certainly have shown an ability to do so with terrorist groups, or crappy little states that support terror (Iraq and Afghanistan). But Russia was in the big boy club - G8, UNSC etc. Now it has gone full rogue, after years of general shenanigans and we can’t seem to really pin down how to box it back up, Meanwhile China sits back and takes notes.

This is the problem with these sort of sh#tty plays. Attribution is hard, even though everyone knows. Damage is small and largely symbolic. It projects un-decision pressure onto an opponent as it simply becomes too hard to come to a decisive response, so invariably nothing gets done. Proportionality is difficult - should France light fires in Russia? The damn game basically plays in the cracks and seams of our own laws and uses them against us. And we seem incapable of playing dirty back. So a bunch of FSB hires are lighting fires. Arrest them, pin some fake evidence on them that makes them a terrorist group and links directly back to Russia. Declare Russia a state sponsor of terror - which they are, even if not in this case. But no we will flop around and play legalities.

If we are talking about this, it is not an attack: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-destroys-25-38-drones-russian-attack-air-force-says-2024-07-25/ Russia may play around on the margins and of course do subversive jackery but they are still deterred by NATO collective security. If they were not, we would see zero restraint from the Russian military. They would be striking into Poland to disrupt supply lines and very likely would have happily crossed the tac WMD threshold. As to Ukrainian long range strike…how would that work exactly? First off we know Ukraine has been waging long range strikes into Russia, hell they are clipping RA soldiers in Sudan…do we see Russia backing off? Russia is a massive country so for Ukraine to truly threaten and pursue a strategy of exhausting, we are into ICBM territory. No, wild escalation is a sure way for this thing to get completely out of hand. NATO containment, continuous support and slowly ratcheting escalation is likely the best strategy here. Not some weird Harold game of chicken with an unstable nuclear power. Bash NATO all you want but they are a big part of keeping Ukraine in the game right now and keeping Russia in some form of restraint.

Considering it was MAGA Republicans that damn near choked off aid to Ukraine at the height of the RA offensive last year…I remain highly skeptical. Conditions for this thing to end: Ukrainian territorial integrity re-established - final lines on map subject to negotiations. Ukrainian long term security guaranteed (and not by Russia…they will try that one again). This sets conditions for: Long term reconstruction of Ukraine in a western facing orientation Rapid entry for Ukraine into NATO (the only thing that appears to keep Russia in check). Without Article 5, Russia is free to do long range missile buggary. Plan for renormalization with Russia, which will likely take: Regime change War reparations War crimes investigations and prosecution At a minimum there should be a Korean Peninsula solution, complete with western troops on Ukrainian soil. Russia under Putin will never agree to these conditions so we keep breaking Russian hands until they do. We should widen deep strike campaigns (note: while avoiding nuclear tripwire infra…sheesh), secure long term aid programs, streamline that aid to fewer types of equipment but deeper capacity. Logistical and supporting roles for western forces in western Ukraine is not off the table but will need to be done carefully. Military contractors might be a good solution, which I am sure is already happening. Now if Trump and his hand flapping admin can come up with that…and carry it off…well we are in a different reality.

Wait..what? So if infantry/AFVs concentration is no longer feasible…then tanks are no longer feasible…so what is doing Direct Fires? All that is really left is unmanned systems shooting at each other. I guess an FPV is technically “direct fire” but that is stretching just to win a semantic point.

We have seen numerous reports from senior UA leadership, field reports and analysis that have all spoken to a fully illuminated battlefield. We have repeatedly seen evidence on this thread of tactical ISR doing exactly what I describe. We have not seen any real substantial surprise flanking or envelopments since very early on in this war. This battlefield is not fluid or one where manoeuvre in any meaningful sense is occurring. Why? Because any force concentrations are detected early and engaged, be they mechanized, air, or sea for that matter. You cite a single source who believes it was a shift in an RA axis of attack…after months of hammering on this town and repeatedly noted UA losses…that suddenly surprised the forces there and led to the loss. Of course there was no envelopment or scooping of UA PoWs, the withdrawal was fairly orderly and did not lead to a full collapse of the line. The evidence is staring us in the face. You somehow also seem to think that all ISR is drone-based…this is not true. The ISR complex being employed in this war is layered from ground to space. We have seen the RA repeatedly employ smaller unit packages to try and get around this and fail. The “all seeing eye” is a fusion of ISR from all these sources, including open source that has made manoeuvre and surprise pretty much impossible. You basically explain to Tux here how this is happening: Now there is always room for human error but other than this single point of data, which frankly is pretty weak, you are basically arguing against a mountain of evidence we have seen unfold on this thread and social media for nearly two years. A theme I have heard repeatedly at military conferences and symposiums. A theme we saw before this war and will see after it. In fact what evidence do you have of operational surprise in this war? Tactical? Haiduk just posted a perfect example of what we have seen again and again…RA attack detected early and engaged. Now some sources: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-return-of-the-tactical-crisis/ “As Zaluzhnyi described, “Modern sensors can identify any concentration of forces, and modern precision weapons can destroy it.” This has prevented both sides from concentrating into sufficiently large formations to achieve a breakthrough in the traditional sense. Instead, it forces units to disperse, dig in, or both, further expanding the empty battlefield.” https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf (pg 53 - No Sanctuary) The capacity to detect and strike targets at ever-greater distances and with ever-growing precision increases the vulnerability of dense troop concentrations, and therefore limits the ability to conduct large-scale sequenced and concentrated operations. As such, in order to enhance survivability, current battlefield conditions are forcing military units to disperse into smaller formations, dig in, or both, unless these conditions are effectively countered. As a result, the battlefield tends to become more fragmented, offering more independent action to lower tactical formations as the depth of the front is expanding to a considerable extent. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-russian-way-of-war-in-ukraine-a-military-approach-nine-decades-in-the-making/ https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/back-trenches-technology-warfare Even Kofman gets it: ”First, you have to deal with cheap persistent high fidelity ISR, which is when it comes to maneuver warfare, it's very hard to achieve surprise, and it's very hard to concentrate. This force this war shows that both sides have had to substantially disperse both on the offense and the defense, and you see this increasing tenancy of terrain being held by much smaller unit sizes. This was a trend already observed long before this war. But this war is a really interesting case of a large-scale conventional war with relatively high density of forces where very few units are electing to hold terrain because of the persistence of means of intelligence, surveillance and recons and why it's so difficult to mass either on offense and defense.” https://schoolofwar.substack.com/p/ep-132-michal-kofman-on-the-battlefield So the burden of proof is not on me, it is on you. First, explain the notable lack of surprise in this war. Second, the continued trend towards dispersion and lack of conventional concentration. Third, how deep strike has been so effective. And fourth, why manoeuvre above company level is effectively dead. Now try to explain all that without turning to the ISR situation that is shaping these battlefields. Further, let’s take it beyond the land domain. Explain sea and air denial, if not for pervasive ISR. Finally, ask yourself “what happens if the US withdraws all to ISR support?” The impact of that alone should give you a pretty good idea of where we are at. [Edit: And I call utter BS on Adiivka. This was a 4 month grinding nightmare that fell due to old fashion attrition…not some bizarre “surprise” theory. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Avdiivka_(2023–2024)]

Next step to my mind is distribution of autonomy. EW jams up the signal from human to machine which can be extended out to kms. Jamming the chirping these things can do to each other is much harder to do, and impossible for low energy short range laser comms. Once a swarm of UAS are talking to each other you basically have airborne distributed AI buzzing around and able to self-synchronize. The only link back to a human is ISR and basic barrel space management commands “go there and kill”. This flying brain has much more powerful processing power than any single unit. Making able to sense and target while plotting evasion patterns much more viable. Nano is terrifying but we will likely see it in much more practical applications before it turns into Grey Goo. The enhancement of explosives with nano-materials such as aluminum looks like it can do dramatic things in the weight to yield department. https://www.mdpi.com/2079-4991/13/3/412 https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-26390-9 HEAT power can go up pretty dramatically without any real additional weight. This means that a 1kg round treated with nano-additives can yield what a 1.5-2kg round normally does. Add this to autonomous air and ground systems…and you get the picture. I find this pining for the old days perverse to be honest. Is best idea to go back to spending billions on human-centric systems that also cost thousands of lives? Is that the dream? Why would we not embrace unmanned systems as a natural and logical evolution in the nature of warfare. The bulk of the problem of warfare is the human being. Most of Clausewitzian friction is based on human factors, we spend billions on trying to keep humans alive and functioning in warfare, and billions more on salaries and benefits over their careers…and we always pay political costs when we take casualties. Why on earth would we ever want to go back towards this as a primary methodology in fighting wars?

Looks like the tests were out in the desert…probably Yuma. [damn, Steve already picked up on this] They are going to have to move to complex terrain to do any final testing. My honest opinion is still that the best counter to a bunch of cheap autonomous strike drones is a bunch of autonomous CAP drones intercepting 2-3kms out. Point Defence is last resort SHORAD in case something gets through. Of course this will change ground manoeuvre fundamentally as we move away from DF centric firepower. Next we will need UGVs out in a screen. The next question is “what happens when two bubbles collide?” BTW the level of OPSEC on this is an indicator just how seriously the US military is taking this.

Ok, now I want one with lasers and dazzle lights that hypnotize the enemy into thinking they are ducks…c’mon Internet….

When did I forget about arty mines. Problem is numbers. We never had that many systems back in the day and no one is really mass producing those types of systems, may change but considering we are having trouble keeping up on basic HE, FASCAM systems have to be getting rarer. The advantage of drones is that they can basically take any mine - which there are still millions of - and deploy them 10 - 15 kms deep, no need for a cargo shell or special design. I don’t believe for a second the MLRS or artillery are not maintenance intensive. No large conventional system is hands free maintenance and logistics. A drones is next to zero in comparison.

This right here encapsulates what is happening in this entire war at the tactical level. Conventional military mass concentration spotted well out…processed…struck by artillery, FPV, ATGMs…add mines…mechanized manoeuvre stopped cold. We can (and have) argued about tanks-no tanks, drones-not drones, mission command/training/NCOs, Russia sucks, not enough infantry…round and round the tree, but this right here is what we actually keep seeing. This is the evidence right here…and this is not a “biased sampling” we have seen this same pattern many times. This is the new normal as of at least last summer.