How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, Huba said:

I wonder how much of an impact will new UA ability to interdict RU LOCs have on the next stage of fight in Donbas. Russians will adapt, but if they will withdraw their main storage areas (and railheads!) outside the endangered zone, the toll on the logistical system will be horrendous, comparable perhaps to the situation from first weeks of the campaign.

Worth pointing out that broke the Russians completely, twice.

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

Speaking of the end of summer, who do we think the fall mud season helps/hurts more?

Guess it depends where the sides are at.  It will hurt a UA c-offensive or further RA offensives, but mech really has not made an appearance in this thing since Feb-Mar (and it did not go well).  As we saw armor and mech tend to get stuck to roads.  This effects logistics as well.  Both sides are going to need some really decent engineer support.

Not sure when the leaves drop but that makes targeting easier - more for RA, as I suspect the UA has multi-spectral ISR in play.

Defence in the mud is also hell but for different reasons.  Non-combat casualties increase as during morale takes a hit.  If the RA is in defence they will need to do more unit line rotations, which I am betting they have zero plan for.

And past the fall we get into winter warfare…how nasty do Ukrainian winters get?  Of course this might be over by then, depends how long the RA can hold it together and if the UA can upscale offensive effectively.

[Machor]

Amateur hour social media use and news report reveal Russian smuggling operation:

Turkey detains Russian-flagged grain ship from Ukraine

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62010113

Quote

 

A cargo ship carrying grain from a Russian-occupied region of Ukraine has been detained by Turkish customs authorities, according to Ukraine's ambassador to Turkey.

Vasyl Bodnar says "We have full co-operation. The ship is currently standing at the entrance to the port, it has been detained by the customs authorities of Turkey".

We've tracked the Russian-flagged ship, the Zhibek Zholy, on its route from the Ukrainian port of Berdyansk, to Karasu on the Turkish Black Sea coast.

It is not clear where its cargo came from or how it was obtained, but Russia has been accused of stealing grain from areas of Ukraine it controls - allegations Russia denies.

Berdyansk is in Ukraine's southern Zaporizhzhia region, on the Sea of Azov.

News of the ship's departure from Berdyansk was announced on social media app Telegram by Yevhen Balytskyi, who was recently appointed by Russia as governor of the occupied areas of Zaporizhzhia.

Mr Balytskyi said 7,000 tonnes of grain would be sent to "friendly" countries.

He added that ships from Russia's Black Sea Fleet would be "ensuring the security" of the journey, and that the port had been cleared of sea mines.

He later edited the post, taking out references to the ship's cargo and destination.

A video news report about the departure of the ship has also been shared on several pro-Kremlin Telegram channels showing it along with a Russian naval vessel in a harbour, which was identified as Berdyansk by the reporter.

Comparing the video footage with satellite imagery of the port, we have been able to confirm that it was filmed in Berdyansk.

The weather conditions in the video and the angle of the shadows along the harbour suggest it was filmed on the morning of 28 June.

Some features along the ship's hull, such as its name, were blurred out in the video. But we have confirmed that the ship that left Berdyansk is the same one now lying off the Turkish coast, based on images from the Telegram posts as well as eyewitness accounts given to a Ukrainian shipping expert.

We have also been able to track the earlier movements of the Zhibek Zholy as it made its way towards Ukraine to pick up its cargo.

On 22 June it travelled from Turkey, dropping off its cargo at the Russian port of Novorossiysk. As it then approached the Ukrainian coast, its tracking signal was lost - suggesting it had been switched off.

The signal only reappeared on 29 June as it headed back south away from the Ukrainian coast. This tracker also reports the depth at which the ship lies in the water - and it indicated that the ship had taken on cargo.

 

 

[Calamine Waffles]

  

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

Kherson has been showing heavy fire. Wonder if it's another localized push or a actual offensive. If I were Zelensky (you know, I dunno what Zelensky decides, does he do a lot of input or control over the military?), I would want Kherson before the fall mud. Give Russia and the separatists something to ponder as they wait for the next offensive

I honestly doubt Zelenskyy has that much input in what the ZSU does. Pretty sure it's mostly General Zaluzhnyi who would be making these decisions.

[Offshoot]

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

Kherson has been showing heavy fire. Wonder if it's another localized push or a actual offensive. If I were Zelensky (you know, I dunno what Zelensky decides, does he do a lot of input or control over the military?), I would want Kherson before the fall mud. Give Russia and the separatists something to ponder as they wait for the next offensive

From the old Time interview with Zelensky:

"Such outings were rare. Though he received frequent updates from his generals and gave them broad instructions, Zelensky did not pretend to be a tactical savant. His Defense Minister was seldom by his side. Nor were any of Ukraine’s top military commanders. “He lets them do the fighting,” says Arestovych, his adviser on military affairs."

https://time.com/6171277/volodymyr-zelensky-interview-ukraine-war/

[sross112]

FIRMS is totally lit up in the south around Kherson:

https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@33.0,47.1,9z

Then this twitter post says UA is within sniper range of Kherson suburbs. Not sure if it is correct or not but sure am hopeful.

And if the above isn't true, at least there is good news with CanadianUkrainian finally being outed as an airsoft poser. His account is now gone from twitter. 

 

[Der Zeitgeist]

7 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Which raises the question of: why did the RA waste the month of Jun at Severodonetsk?  They were in Popasna at the end of May and instead of putting all this weight on that axis to do exactly what they are doing now, they smashed their face against Severodonetsk - which has zero operational value.

I think from the Russian perspective, it's pretty simple. Taking Severodonetsk and Lysychansk completes the political objective of "liberating" the entire "Luhansk People's Republic". With the entire Oblast now taken, they can move towards setting up administrations, hold elections or whatever else they might want to do with it.

Edited July 4, 2022 by Der Zeitgeist

[panzermartin]

Life in the frontlines is tough . I wonder how many more fake accounts exist. 

[Huba]

1 hour ago, Der Zeitgeist said:

I think from the Russian perspective, it's pretty simple. Taking Severodonetsk and Lysychansk completes the political objective of "liberating" the entire "Luhansk People's Republic". With the entire Oblast now taken, they can move towards setting up administrations, hold elections or whatever else they might want to do with it.

One more thought @The_Capt - after Mariupol, they might actually prefer pushing UA out slowly to encircling both cities and then laying siege to them. Yes, the inflicted defeat would be greater, but it might take more time and cost them more own losses, especially with UA just few kilometers away on the other side of the encirclement ring.

If the objective at hand was "liberation" of the Lugansk oblast, it was the faster way to achieve perhaps. It would also explain why they didn't push harder to complete the Lysychansk encirclement, and what the Chechen spokeperson openly admitted that they are waiting for UA to leave instead of attacking.

 

[Bulletpoint]

3 hours ago, sross112 said:

And if the above isn't true, at least there is good news with CanadianUkrainian finally being outed as an airsoft poser. His account is now gone from twitter. 

 

Good job exposing this fraud. I wonder what his motivations were. Just a grab at fake fame, or was the profile some kind of Russian propaganda tool?

Possibly intended to start out all enthusiastic to gather followers and later the guy would suddenly become "disillusioned" and start to reveal Ukrainian "warcrimes" etc.

[Grigb]

I found the source of claim that RU captured Caesar.

 

Quote

Despite the active denial from the French, Rybar confirms the purchase of two CAESAR self-propelled guns from the AFU for a "ridiculous" $ 120 thousand. Initially, Ukrainian negotiators asked for $1 million for each [gun] system.
Now the Russian side is looking for AFU willing to sell HIMARS

It is RU internal propaganda aimed to dehumanize URK. Make them seen as flawed corrupt people who do not deserve to live (similar to how German Nazis portrayed Jews).

[Grigb]

11 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

 Just a grab at fake fame, or was the profile some kind of Russian propaganda tool?

Did not look like RU propaganda tool. More like kid with imagination. 

[Taranis]

5 minutes ago, Grigb said:

I found the source of claim that RU captured Caesar.

 

It is RU internal propaganda aimed to dehumanize URK. Make them seen as flawed corrupt people who do not deserve to live (similar to how German Nazis portrayed Jews).

They boast of having CAESARs but we still haven't seen any photos or videos of them. It's funny how the narrative evolved, at the beginning it was "We captured 'cause we are strong!" and now it's "The Ukrainians are corrupt, we bought some...". There's a hell of a difference between buying vehicles and capturing them. Ridiculous !

[Taranis]

"Ukrainian platoon commander Mariia rests in a trench at a position in the Donetsk region, Ukraine, Saturday, July 2, 2022. EFREM LUKATSKY / AP"

[Grigb]

Fresh Girkin assessment part 1

As per previous question regarding RU offensive toward Slavyansk-Kramatorsk he does not expect it.

Quote

A brief overview of the situation at the front. With forecast

1. The "Border" front (from the borders with Belarus to the Kharkiv region):
Without significant changes. The situation is gradually but continuously heating up. Artillery skirmishes, actions of the DRG [Recon Diversion Groups]. The enemy is increasing shelling and drone attacks deep into Russian territory. The goal is to force the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to maneuver with existing air defense units to cover cities, weakening the cover of troops at the front and in the near rear + "additionally raise the prestige of the Russian government and the president personally among the population of the shelled settlements."[sarcasm, yes] Both sides are gradually pulling troops to the border. I predict that by the end of the summer (if not earlier) this front will also become quite active - which - in the absence of mobilization measures in the Russian Federation - will be beneficial only to the enemy, due to its mobilization, which will soon be able to field a much larger number of "linear" units and formations, even if they are light infantry.

2. Kharkiv Front - without significant changes. Artillery skirmishes, aviation actions, local battles. Forecast - could potentially become the main one in the upcoming "battle for initiative". We'll see how it will be in reality. In any case, the stretched configuration of the front will inevitably lead to attempts by one or the other (or both) sides to conduct offensive operations with decisive or local goals.

3. "The Izyum-Slavyansk direction".
The transfer of almost all combat-ready artillery and infantry forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of the LDPR near Lisichansk led to a local superiority of the AFU over our troops, as a result of which a number of attacks on the locality of Krasnopolye and in this direction in general were unsuccessful. The enemy, having strengthened its front (despite the battle at Lisichansk) with fresh reserves, managed to regain lost tactical positions in several places.
Forecast: the grouping of the AF RF and the AF of the LDPR in this direction will certainly be strengthened due to the forces released after the victory at Lisichansk, however, I do not expect an offensive on the Slavyansk-Barvenkovo line (at least - successful), since the enemy troops are well fortified on the ground, quite numerous, active. And the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (and the military-political leadership) attaches special importance to the retention of the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.

4. Donetsk Front. Seversk-Ugledar-Bakhmut section (Artemovsk):
Currently, the advancing units of the AF of the LDPR and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are trying to advance in the Seversk area "on the shoulders of the retreating enemy." However, the enemy has prepared here in advance and occupied new lines of defense with fresh troops, continues to dig in. Forecast: unfortunately, I do not expect significant successes and a breakthrough of the AFU front in this area. A gradual fading of the fighting is likely.

5. Donetsk Front. The Avdiivka-Maryinka section.
Positional battles with a preponderance of the AFU (the superiority is achieved due to good artillery support and the activity of unmanned aerial vehicles - both reconnaissance and light strike). There may be attempts by the command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to develop the previously achieved success north of Avdiivka, which will now be much more difficult than with the initial breakthrough of the front (which was sacrificed for the transfer of forces to Severodonetsk-Lisichansk).

6. Donetsk Front. The southern section. - No changes. The same picture, in general, as to the north. I predict purely positional battles in the near future.

7. Zaporozhye front. Positional battles, artillery skirmishes. The increasing activity of the AFU DRG in the near and far rear of our troops. Potentially - one of the likely directions of the enemy's offensive.

8. Kherson front. Without changes. On the front line - gradually increasing shelling of the AFU artillery. The line of contact is not formed everywhere, in some areas - the defense of both sides is of a focal nature (in settlements). One of the most likely directions of the "Battle for initiative". 

 

[Huba]

5 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Fresh Girkin assessment part 1

As per previous question regarding RU offensive toward Slavyansk-Kramatorsk he does not expect it.

 

More or less what he's been saying for some time now - Russians have culminated and are too spent to continue at the same level of intensity that we saw in battle of Seversky Donets salient. Let's hope he's right

[Grigb]

Just now, Huba said:

More or less what he's been saying for some time now - Russians have culminated and are too spent to continue at the same level of intensity that we saw in battle of Seversky Donets salient. Let's hope he's right

Not quite. If I got it right (as per his previous explanations), he expects the last one offensive - so called Battle of Initiative. As far as I understood RU command is in denial stage and do not want to stop offensive operation for fear of losing initiative. So, they are preparing a new one for the sake of keeping UKR from starting big push anywhere else.

Meanwhile he rants about sudden RU warehouses explosions.

Quote

The factory in Snezhnoye is destroyed, ammunition is all "in the air". Yes, I was also informed about it.
Interestingly, the Plywood Marshal [Shoigu] reports to the commander-in-chief that in two weeks the UKR have already destroyed FOUR of the largest used warehouses in the Donbas? (Not to mention other regions where there are also a lot of  warehouses are done).

Artillery adds dignity, to what would otherwise be an ugly brawl.

[panzermartin]

Does anyone else get a feel that Girkin behaves like a hurt narcissist being rejected and ousted from what he would love to take part in.

He sounds really bitter and while his points are valid he is constantly painting a very grim picture of the battlefield for RA even now that a major hub was conquered. Not that he couldn't be right, it is just the vibe I get from him. 

 

[Huba]

8 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Not quite. If I got it right (as per his previous explanations), he expects the last one offensive - so called Battle of Initiative. As far as I understood RU command is in denial stage and do not want to stop offensive operation for fear of losing initiative. So, they are preparing a new one for the sake of keeping UKR from starting big push anywhere else.

All right, perhaps I should've worded that differently. RU might try keep the intensity for now, but they won't be able to up it to a level where initiative lies undoubtedly on their side, as it was since the beginning of the conflict. Not that they'll go on the defensive, but won't be dealing the cards anymore. AFAIK it still fits the definition of "culmination", please correct me if I'm wrong.

Edited July 4, 2022 by Huba

[Grigb]

Part 2

Quote

General points:
1. The enemy.

• Over the past month, the AFU has continuously increased the number of troops and military equipment in all directions - both  "active" and "sleeping", creating a steady superiority in manpower, artillery and armored vehicles on many of them. At the same time, the enemy continued to form strategic reserves, limiting their entry into battle even in the midst of the battle for Severodonetsk-Lisichansk.
• As a new element of the tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, special attention is paid to the destruction by rocket artillery and unmanned aircraft of important rear facilities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of the LDPR, first of all - large ammunition depots that were not covered or poorly covered by air defense forces.
• Local superiority in manpower allowed the enemy to occupy previously abandoned territories in many areas without a fight, complicating the tactical situation of our units operating in these areas.
• Apparently, the emphasized defensive nature of the battle for Severodonetsk-Lisichansk on the part of the AFU command was deliberate. The battles were only delayed in order to gain the most time and inflict maximum losses on the Russian strike group. After the loss of the main positions was a foregone conclusion, the AFU command managed to withdraw the core of its defending troops, avoiding encirclement of even a small part of them - both in Severodonetsk and in the area of Lisichansk and Zolotoye-Gorskoye. At the same time, however, most of the equipment of the defenders was irretrievably lost.

Conclusion: The AFU is completing preparations for its own active actions in one or more directions. Whether the enemy will pre-wait for a new attack by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or will take its actions in a proactive manner, I will not undertake to predict.

2. Our troops.

• The offensive potential of the strike group that took Lisichansk is almost exhausted. To continue the offensive without an operational pause necessary to replenish and rest the troops is fraught with additional heavy losses without significant results. It requires regrouping and determining the next offensive targets, as well as taking measures to repel possible enemy attacks.
• Russian troops are experiencing increasing difficulties with the confrontation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the tactical level due to the growing superiority of the enemy in manpower, as well as the increase in modern military equipment at his disposal.
• The lack of replenishment and the impossibility of rotation (especially for those staying on the front line for 3-4 months without changing the mobilized units of the LDNR Armed Forces) - it leads to a slow but constant decrease in the actual combat readiness and morale of our units and formations on the defensive (while the morale of the advancing units remains high despite heavy losses).
• The military-political and military leadership of the Russian Federation will not be able to afford to "gain a foothold in positions" by giving the initiative completely into the hands of the enemy, since the prolongation of hostilities in these conditions only leads to an increase in enemy forces while weakening its forces. Therefore, I expect the prepared reserves to be put into battle in a new offensive operation as part of the "Battle for Initiative" immediately after some operational pause.

General conclusion for May-June:
The "second stage of the SMO" ended without fully achieving the stated goals. The AFU grouping in the Donbas has not been defeated and has not been completely thrown off its territory. It was only possible to break up and oust part of the enemy group from the "bulge" along the Seversky Donets, completely liberating the territory of the LPR and the cities of Popasnaya, Krasny Estuary, Severodonetsk, Lisichansk, a number of smaller settlements.
The operation demonstrated that the "peacetime army" of the Russian Federation, significantly reinforced by the LDPR Armed Forces and "surrogates" of various PMCs, is no longer able to solve the task of completely defeating the AFU and victorious completion of the so-called "SVO".
Procrastination with mobilization measures in the Russian Federation itself may cause a crisis in certain sections of the "Ukrainian front" in the coming months, and further ignoring the above-mentioned inability may negatively affect the situation in the strategic scope.

 

[Grigb]

7 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

Does anyone else get a feel that Girkin behaves like a hurt narcissist being rejected and ousted from what he would love to take part in.

Partly yes. He started as the guy running the show with a degree of success in 2014 and ended as a military pensioner who is watching a train wreck in slow motion.  

 

7 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

He sounds really bitter and while his points are valid he is constantly painting a very grim picture of the battlefield for RA even now that a major hub was conquered. Not that he couldn't be right, it is just the vibe I get from him. 

He is bitter because while the majority of RU is living in denial, he is a smart guy with connections who already suffers pain of coming defeat. Keep in mind that in his imagination UKR and NATO are coming to rape and kill RU. So, it is an excruciating pain.  

From a military point of view RA did not achieve anything of military significance. It wasted time, bodies and ammo it cannot replenish. He knows it and it hurts him.

[Huba]

 Can Ukraine Win?

A long article about what's next. It was quoted partially in various tweets, but it's the first time I read it as a whole. Let me just quote the three general predictions the author makes:

Quote

1. First, a priority for both sides is now to take out enemy capacity.

2. Second, the Ukrainian tactics will not replicate the Russian when it comes to taking territory.

3. Third, the Russians are unlikely to keep on fighting should it become clear that they are likely to be defeated.

 

[Grigb]

32 minutes ago, Huba said:

All right, perhaps I should've worded that differently. RU might try keep the intensity for now, but they won't be able to up it to a level where initiative lies undoubtedly on their side, as it was since the beginning of the conflict. Not that they'll go on the defensive, but won't be dealing the cards anymore. AFAIK it still fits the definition of "culmination", please correct me if I'm wrong.

Pretty much what I think as well but unfortunately, we do not know the last piece of puzzle - what reserves/reserve tricks they prepared. It could be nothing or could be something. 

Kremlin acts now as if it is either in deep delusion or has some kind of joker card to push UKR toward peace deal. So, it is entirely possible tomorrow we will wake up to the news of RU new push toward Kiev and Belarus entering war. Obviously, it will end up as an even bigger defeat but for the couple of days we will be subjected to a sky is falling panic.  

Edited July 4, 2022 by Grigb

[Taranis]

↓ A sum up video for May fightings (to remember or to come back to in the future)

 

[FancyCat]

8 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

Does anyone else get a feel that Girkin behaves like a hurt narcissist being rejected and ousted from what he would love to take part in.

He sounds really bitter and while his points are valid he is constantly painting a very grim picture of the battlefield for RA even now that a major hub was conquered. Not that he couldn't be right, it is just the vibe I get from him. 

 

Galeev had a recent thread that was interesting, where he talks about the banning of aid to the separatists by Russians akin to the civil society efforts to support the war effort by Ukrainians we have seen. Galeev's thread is a bit too long and rambling but he suggests something I wanted to highlight. Russia seeks to prevent any civil society from developing, even positive pro-war ones like aid networks to pro-Russian units in Donbas since it bypasses existing power networks and can be beyond the government's influence. Also I guess we shouldn't underestimate the importance of skimming off the top of the military shipments to the republics from Russia that would be harder thru informal networks like aid groups.

I think the point made by many that mobilization is a significant destabilizing factor is important here, destabilization could allow the empowerment of suppressed groups more easily, including people like Girkin who want to go hardline on Ukraine, but the Kremlin found them hard to leash so purged them in the Donbas.

Certainly Girkin would have a better chance of attaining a position of authority when Russia is mobilized then right now.