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Combatintman

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Everything posted by Combatintman

  1. It might have something to do with how the core units file for the campaign was structured and the designer had to leave elements of certain units off the map in order to include the ones he needed. Anyway - I'm sure P-T will be along at some point and explain.
  2. Final Blitzkrieg, when the module comes out, might be a better option rather than CMFI because it would be a reasonable assumption that it will include all the late Shermans and the Pershing for the US and Commonwealth forces. Germans could be used as the North Koreans - Panther = T-34. The Brits led a Commonwealth division in Korea so people on this side of the pond probably wouldn't mind seeing them in your project although I'm not sure how you'd cook up a Centurion because I very much doubt it will appear in the module as it just missed being fielded by the time the war ended.
  3. That would be the same mod that I tried to make a scenario based on an actual battle set on real terrain that had so many trees and elevation changes on it that it would not load once I got to the point of starting to lay buildings down. So yes it is an issue. My actual scenario for that title (Ap Bac - again a real battle) worked because I halved the map size, it didn't have that many trees and was an almost entirely flat map.
  4. Apparently coincidence according to a thread of many many many years ago which I cannot find. However, what you do in your description above is exactly what I do when my vehicles bog. Sometimes I get lucky, sometimes I don't.
  5. Yes mate - very good indeed, you captured the essence of the place in your map brilliantly.
  6. It's okay mate I have saved your a55 - so you can concentrate on a true British military icon of the early war period for your 1940 efforts ... Jones's van (Dad's Army) - Wikipedia
  7. @Aragorn2002 I actually deleted the Schirwindt images from my hard drive a few days ago but pm me if you need any help and I can revisit this and either step you through the process or knock up some overlays.
  8. Unless - as was discovered in another thread - troop quality is set to fanatical, the AI will auto-surrender when about 65% of casualties are suffered which is possibly the set of circumstances that you discovered in the Road to Nijmegen Campaign. To achieve your desired effect you may need to add reinforcements that never arrive or orchestrate the AI plan to ensure that the Germans hit that 65% figure.
  9. Check your spam email box - the email from Battlefront might be lurking there.
  10. Correct a Rhodesian stick was four guys - stick leader, two riflemen, and a MAG gunner. Why - That's how many people fitted into an Alouette III G-Car. However, that stick would be at least one of three and or possibly four dumped onto the ground. Later in the conflict, para sticks were deployed from a Dakota adding another five or six sticks to the mix. The key factors were however: An Alouette-III K-Car with a commander on board who could see the battlefield and a 20mm cannon. That would orbit the contact zone and target the enemy accordingly with the 20mm while the commander could see for himself where his own troops and the enemy troops were located and issue orders appropriately. A Lynx light strike aircraft would also be orbiting the contact zone and would either initiate the contact or strike as directed by the commander in the K-Car. Superior training. High motivation. Close cooperation generated by familiarity with working with each other. Numbers are not the be-all and end-all by any stretch of the imagination - well-trained troops, used to working together, commanded by someone who knows what they're doing with good situational awareness having support assets on call will always deliver out of proportion to their physical numbers.
  11. Thanks mate - every day's a school day and all that ...
  12. A month or two for a decent scenario, let alone a campaign, is ambitious mate ... I wish you luck though.
  13. 42 CDO RM's assault on Mount Harriet in the same conflict was about as flanking as flanking gets so it's not like that generation of commanders either didn't know of or didn't buy into the concept of flanking. I can't speak for Wireless Ridge but I've been to Goose Green and finding a flank there is somewhat challenging - 2 PARA managed it after a while but probably had to start with the assumption that the Darwin Hill position more or less required battering through frontally. I don't recall what information was available for planning at the time but a quick swatch at the map would immediately lead to the assumption that Darwin Hill would be held and that there wasn't a whole lot of room for fancy flanking stuff let alone very few covered/concealed approaches ...
  14. In which case you'll have to ask @Paper Tiger who made the scenario and the campaign as to how he managed to create this situation. All I can say is that never arriving reinforcements is a well-known trick employed by scenario designers to prevent an early auto surrender. When I started making scenarios - early auto surrenders were a frequent problem that needed a workaround to solve. The 65% ish figure I quoted is what testing showed me to be the there or thereabouts threshold. Building extra non-arriving reinforcements around that threshold has always worked as a solution. Probably the easiest way to test it is to just play a few QBs to get a sense of the whole thing and then knock up some tailored tests from that. It all depends on how much detail you really want to know. Personally, for my scenario design purposes, I'm happy with my understanding of how it all works.
  15. Flak vests were widely worn in Northern Ireland but didn't get taken to the Falklands in 1982. I never saw one the whole time I was in Germany in the 1980s. They just weren't a thing. Why? I have no idea. The first time I got issued one outside of Northern Ireland was during Gulf War 1 in 1991.
  16. Cohesion, cohesion, cohesion is the general rule - one of those soft factors that is generally overlooked. As a result, best practice is for each battalion to be kept together and those at lower levels of combat effectiveness pulled out of the line or kept as a reserve rather than breaking it up to bring other battalions to 100%. Of course, desperate times sometimes require that rule to be broken but most swept-up armies try to avoid getting into that situation. If you want a good example of what happens when you dump a whole bunch of odds and sods from various units onto a battlefield and hope that you'll win through superior numbers - the Argentine forces in the Falklands War in 1982 demonstrated that it wasn't the greatest of ideas.
  17. I'm a rubbish player to be honest - mainly because I spend more time in the editor than actually playing scenarios. I am very much like you - I totally get the theory, planning and tactics piece but never seem to be able to convert that into anything other than scraping victories with huge losses if I'm lucky. What I will say though is that many players from what I see on the forum chats just struggle with the concept that people get killed in combat and get fixed by trying to avoid them altogether. This leads to a paralysis in both planning and execution. I think there's an element of that on show here and personally I wouldn't worry too much about it - as you say, sometimes "you just have to get on with it." There are ways in which you can reduce the risk of course - suppression via direct and indirect fires, covered approaches, feints/deception (which only work when playing a human), obscuration, attacking from an unexpected direction, attacking a weak point or all of them combined. Which ones you use all depend on the detailed ground and the resources you have available or the resources you are prepared to commit to that particular part of the operation/plan/scheme of manoeuvre. In the tutorial, I used suppressive fire on Objective FRITZ to allow my force to cross the gap that I assessed would be covered by fire from that position and the whole scheme of manoeuvre from there on in was to use manoeuvre along a mostly concealed approach in order to attack the position from an unexpected direction. The close assault piece in the woods was assisted by the concealment provided by the woods and me employing fire and manoeuvre using direct fire from the dismounts leapfrogging forward and their parent half-tracks. It was one of my few CM triumphs.
  18. Nope - it is as @IanL has explained. If I don't want one side to surrender in a scenario I am making then I bung in reinforcements that do not arrive. It has nothing to do with point values it is about the number of troops and auto surrender is triggered when the side in question loses about 65% of its starting head count.
  19. Yes - lots of quirks like that across the British Army and the Household Division in particular.
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