How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

Capt. Alexander “North” Miroshnik, commander separate tank battalion (4th Separate Tank Battalion “August”?), 2nd AK, LPR:

Maj. Nikolai Balyatin:

 

[Harmon Rabb]

Beautiful.

[Grigb]

Little bit about RU difficulties with SEAD. First quote from Kramnik

Quote

In our case, the suppression of air defense does not stand out as a separate task for specialized units, it is part of a general strategy, and its priority is ultimately low in the eyes of combined arms commanders who set tasks for their aviation, artillery and special units. This complicates the task, since insufficient priority does not always allow you to hit targets in a timely manner, even if there is an actual target designation. A separate problem is the shortage of modern "large" RER [radio electronic reconnaissance]/RTR [radio technic reconnaissance] aircraft and attack drones. All this together slows down the fight against air defense, reduces its effectiveness and increases the risk to aviation in the course of performing basic tasks. Separately, I will note the indifference of the combined arms command to a task that does not directly concern them – the risks of the VKS and their probable losses are a problem of the VKS. "No one seriously thinks even about the increasing composition of forces and weapon systems. Until the Buk starts shooting at tanks, they won't give a f*ck about the air crews, but will demand the result" - (c) the opinion of the user of the Russian Aerospace Forces combat aircraft.

 

Now Rybar clarifies what has happened after the month (nothing)

Quote

About the problem of Ukrainian air defense in the Donbas and the method of its solution

In June, our colleague Ilya Kramnik raised the issue of necessity of the Russian equivalent of SEAD — the Western military concept of highly specialized integrated suppression of enemy air defenses. The reason was the activity of Ukrainian air defense systems in the Donbas, limiting the actions of Russian aviation.

What has changed in this matter a month later?

We cannot speak for all sectors of the front, but we have data on the situation in the Izyum-Slavyansk direction:

There is no systematic work on disabling Ukrainian air defense systems. What is striking in this situation is not the lack of data on the positional areas of enemy air defense: for several months intelligence regularly provides important information  and monitors [UKR air defense] actions.

The main reason lies in another: the command "on the ground" does not show proper interest in the targeted destruction of anti-aircraft missile systems of the Armed Forces of Ukraine of the [ Izyum-Slavyansk] direction. The approach to the problem is best characterized by the statement of one of the participants:

"Until the Buk starts shooting at tanks, they [Ground Forces] will not take any measures, but they will not stop demanding results."

How else can this be explained?

On the one hand, this can be partly explained by the absence of free unused units in the Izyum-Slavyansk direction, which can be assigned to the group of forces to perform special tasks.

But in other sectors of the front, such work was actually carried out even in conditions of great numerical superiority of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. For example, one unit of the Russian Armed Forces in the south managed to destroy four launchers of the S-300 complex in a short time. [could it be during David Brode assault?]

Why are the tasks of targeted air defense defeat vital?

Now the AFU has pulled most of its air defense systems to Donbass. They are not able to completely stop the flights of the Russian front-line aviation, but they limit its action to the operational depth. In particular, bombers have recently been using guided air-to-ground missiles at targets from a distance of a couple of dozen kilometers to decrease presence in the enemy air defense zone.

Yes, these precise strikes also cause significant damage to the AFU. But clearly less than what the tons of high-explosive fragmentation bombs dumped on the locations of the Ukrainian troops in one flight could do.

And most importantly: it is the freedom of action of aviation and air superiority that largely ensures combat stability. The smaller the air defense system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the further the aircraft will bomb and the fewer losses the ground forces will have.

The allocation of a detachment of forces for the tasks of searching for and destroying the Ukrainian air defense command in the Izyum-Slavyansk direction, even in the short term, will greatly help the command to increase the pace of the offensive. And also, to bomb the bridges across the Dnieper [they blame these bridges for number of arty shells UKR are dumping on them], which are incomparably more powerful in comparison with the "arrivals" of cruise missiles.

Otherwise, the air defense capabilities of the AFU in the Donbas will gradually increase, which will limit the Russian Aerospace Forces  actions and lead to additional losses.

 

[Battlefront.com]

Let's take a step back and summarize what we're seeing with the artillery fight in Ukraine.  This sound about right to you guys?

 

Russian Artillery

At the beginning of the war Russia totally dominated Ukraine with its artillery, however it wasn't used all that often.  Most likely a result of Russia's general lack of preparedness for fighting a real war.

When it became clear that Ukraine was going to fight, Russia switched to destroying civilian infrastructure in an attempt to terrorize Ukraine into surrender.  Artillery was used primarily for this purpose.

Starting with the Easter offensive in the Donbas, Russia once again switched its strategy and reverted to traditional Soviet massed fire to eliminate or otherwise tie down defenders.  In critical sectors it was massed and employed to wipe out Ukrainian defenders prior to ground assaults.  In non-critical sectors of front it seems the tactic was to mostly keep the Ukrainian defenders from being able to mount counter attacks.  We are still in this phase.

 

Ukrainian Artillery

In the very beginning of the invasion Ukrainian artillery seems to have been mostly absent except in the established Donbas front.  The theory is that Ukraine deliberately kept them out of the expected path of Russian forces so that they weren't overrun.  Given we later see as much artillery as one would expect from prewar accounting, it seems safe to assume that for whatever reason they weren't in the vulnerable areas.

Once Russia's forces had stalled out, Ukraine moved in its artillery and laid into both concentrated "tip of spear" ground forces as well as LOCs.  The slaughter of Russian forces around Kyiv and Kharkiv were repeated over and over again, indicating very deliberate strategy on Ukraine's part.

After the target rich environment of the early part of the war subsided, Ukraine had to choose how to employ its limited and inadequate number of artillery pieces to cover the entire front.  For the most part it decided to spread the artillery thin and have them operate as "snipers", reserving heavy concentrations for select sectors of front.  This worked very well in part due to long standing experience with decentralized targeting and fire control.

Ukraine's primary problem was not loss of artillery due to combat, but loss due to wearing out barrels and exhausting ammo (including shipments from former Warsaw Pact countries).  This required Ukraine to further restrict it's use of massed fire and rely upon sniping to attrit Russian forces.  This is the same time we saw concentrated effort by Ukraine to acquire NATO standard systems.

Now the strategy has changed yet again.  Ukraine has significant NATO artillery and ammo on hand, but it's still a fraction of what it needs to maintain it's prewar tube count.  These systems are being employed in more operational and even strategic uses, such as the recent strikes on Russian ammo dumps.  Remaining long range rocket stocks are also being used for this purpose.  Some Soviet legacy systems appear to still be in use, though it is unlikely they have enough tubes or ammo to do much more than snipe.

 

Does this seem to capture what we've seen in the war thus far?

Steve

[Grigb]

Civilian "Girkin" (Nesmyan) reports Putin publicly gave orders for the Army groups in Ukraine. I will check it myself later.

Quote

Vladimir Putin said that the Vostok [East] and Zapad [West] groups participating in the special military operation should continue to fulfill their tasks. The units of the Center group that took part in the battles for the LPR should rest and increase their combat capabilities.

Translated into understandable language: an operational pause is announced in the direction of the Center group for regrouping and rest. The very moment comes when the AFU may try to use this position and counterattack — most likely, on some other section of the 1000-kilometer front, since the largest and strongest grouping of the Russian army will be temporarily withdrawn from combat operations. It is clear that it is not going anywhere, but it will also be problematic to transfer it to other sites in the event of a crisis.

By the way, this direction has already been determined — the AFU is gradually approaching Kherson. They are located a few kilometers from the city, and they may well try to strike here.

[UPDATE] I checked and it is just that (plus report about UKR losses and RU heroes). I think this is video with translation.

Edited July 4, 2022 by Grigb

[Calamine Waffles]

I think for the Ukrainians they are probably relying on mortars to do the bulk of the infantry artillery support in order to reserve the heavier pieces for more important tasks.

[Battlefront.com]

Regarding Russian ammo stocks...

It's simple math that every X shells fired/lost is probably X that can't be replaced during this war.  Even under perfect conditions this would be true, but with the constraints on Russian industry the lack of ability to manufacture replacements is even more acute.  I have no idea what the numbers might be, but I'd suspect it's something like for every 20 shells fired/lost Russia is able to replace perhaps 1 with new production.

The news that Russia is raiding Belarus for shells indicates two things.  First, that it feels its stock are getting uncomfortably low.  Second, that it doesn't see much hope of getting ammo from other countries (in particular China).  Why would Russia take ammo away from its most important military partner at a time when it seems it is still pushing it to go to war with Ukraine?  The alternative is that Russia expects to lose Belarus and is raiding its stocks of ammo while it still can.  Either way, Russia is sensing it will run out of ammo and it is looking to address that in any way it can.

Ukraine is not in the same boat at all.  While it is difficult to get ammo to Ukraine fast enough, it is coming and it is theoretically endless.  Even if the West's stock levels reach some sort of critical point where countries don't want to go lower, the sum of Western production, if diverted to Ukraine, is certainly greater than what Russia can do domestically.  Meaning, Ukraine wins the ammo contest no problem.

Unlike Ukraine, Russia has staked everything on artillery.  Taking that away from them means Russia isn't able to do much of anything.  It can't take ground, it can't kill Ukrainians, it can't respond to Ukrainians killing Russians, etc.

Because Russia's current strategy is so dependent upon artillery, doing anything to complicate Russia's ability to use its artillery will have positive impacts on the war from Ukraine's standpoint.  The destruction of the dumps not only removes large quantities of forward deployed ammo from the war effort, it also puts a strain on Russia's overstretched LOCs to keep up the volume of fire its doctrine requires in order to be effective.

Ukraine's new ability to reach beyond Russia's artillery means that Russia now has to stage it's ammo significantly to the rear of its batteries.  This requires longer trips by truck or a lot more trucks.  If it is to increase the truck capacity it is going to have to take that away from somewhere else as they don't seem to have extra to spare.  So even if Russia is able to maintain a volume of fire in Area X, it means Area Y is going to be left with inadequate supply capacity.  Not just for artillery shells, but for everything frontline forces need to fight.

The war continues to be quite interesting

Steve

[Calamine Waffles]

According to Tom Cooper, Ukrainian partisans have been attacking the railway lines in occupied territory, among other things.

https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-1-2-3-and-4-july-2022-4947588c9b71
 

Quote

East of Dnipro: there are several reports about a ‘big battle’ over Polohy, the last 2–3 days, but no details. A railway bridge on the line from Melitopol to Tokmak used by the Russians to haul supplies for their troops on the frontline was blown up, on 2 July. A train was derailed as a consequence.

He also thinks Russia may have used up their operational Kh-22s

Quote

Considering how many Kh-22s it has deployed over the last three weeks, and the series of strikes by these missiles of 29–30 June 2022, it is actually unsurprising if now it looks like the VKS has run out of operational missiles of this type. At least it seems there were no new strikes of that kind since 1 July, when one hit a recreation centre in Bilhorod-Dnistrovsky district, killing three civilians (including one child) and injuring one.

 

[Huba]

53 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Let's take a step back and summarize what we're seeing with the artillery fight in Ukraine.  This sound about right to you guys?

 

Russian Artillery

At the beginning of the war Russia totally dominated Ukraine with its artillery, however it wasn't used all that often.  Most likely a result of Russia's general lack of preparedness for fighting a real war.

When it became clear that Ukraine was going to fight, Russia switched to destroying civilian infrastructure in an attempt to terrorize Ukraine into surrender.  Artillery was used primarily for this purpose.

Starting with the Easter offensive in the Donbas, Russia once again switched its strategy and reverted to traditional Soviet massed fire to eliminate or otherwise tie down defenders.  In critical sectors it was massed and employed to wipe out Ukrainian defenders prior to ground assaults.  In non-critical sectors of front it seems the tactic was to mostly keep the Ukrainian defenders from being able to mount counter attacks.  We are still in this phase.

 

Ukrainian Artillery

In the very beginning of the invasion Ukrainian artillery seems to have been mostly absent except in the established Donbas front.  The theory is that Ukraine deliberately kept them out of the expected path of Russian forces so that they weren't overrun.  Given we later see as much artillery as one would expect from prewar accounting, it seems safe to assume that for whatever reason they weren't in the vulnerable areas.

Once Russia's forces had stalled out, Ukraine moved in its artillery and laid into both concentrated "tip of spear" ground forces as well as LOCs.  The slaughter of Russian forces around Kyiv and Kharkiv were repeated over and over again, indicating very deliberate strategy on Ukraine's part.

After the target rich environment of the early part of the war subsided, Ukraine had to choose how to employ its limited and inadequate number of artillery pieces to cover the entire front.  For the most part it decided to spread the artillery thin and have them operate as "snipers", reserving heavy concentrations for select sectors of front.  This worked very well in part due to long standing experience with decentralized targeting and fire control.

Ukraine's primary problem was not loss of artillery due to combat, but loss due to wearing out barrels and exhausting ammo (including shipments from former Warsaw Pact countries).  This required Ukraine to further restrict it's use of massed fire and rely upon sniping to attrit Russian forces.  This is the same time we saw concentrated effort by Ukraine to acquire NATO standard systems.

Now the strategy has changed yet again.  Ukraine has significant NATO artillery and ammo on hand, but it's still a fraction of what it needs to maintain it's prewar tube count.  These systems are being employed in more operational and even strategic uses, such as the recent strikes on Russian ammo dumps.  Remaining long range rocket stocks are also being used for this purpose.  Some Soviet legacy systems appear to still be in use, though it is unlikely they have enough tubes or ammo to do much more than snipe.

 

Does this seem to capture what we've seen in the war thus far?

Steve

The bolded part is one that I don't completely agree with, at least as far as future prospects go. While NATO artillery is increasingly important, and will be doing most of the heavy lifting, the soviet types are there to stay, and I expect their mean usage to increase in the future from the low point we're seeing now.

What I mean is that ammo production in the former Warsaw Pact countries is being restarted, and there will be steady stream of ammunition available. There was talk about production lines being restarted in Bulgaria and Romania not long ago. Mesko, main Polish arty ammo manufacturer (whose offer includes basically everything UA uses save for heavy MLRS and Giatsint/ Msta ammo) signed a contract with UA on Eurosatory. Details are unknown but rumors have it they are working at full capacity lately. And I'm sure the same goes for Czech and Slovak manufacturers too. And then there's Finland...

As for tube availability, at least in SPG department there's a lot of equipment available in WarPac countries. Nothing was delivered lately cause of the lack of ammo, but if the tubes themselves were to become the limiting factor, it can be alleviated easily.

 

Edited July 4, 2022 by Huba

[Grigb]

Regarding real public support of the RU army - from the article How "moms" provide the Russian army instead of the Ministry of Defense from Important stories

Quote

Volunteers are trying to convince the military that the whole country supports them. But in fact, this is not the case, Anastasia [volunteer] admits: "We are for you," we tell them. They talk with volunteers, and they have an understanding that people support them. But in fact, 85% of the population does not care at all. But we don't talk about it."

 

[ASL Veteran]

58 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Let's take a step back and summarize what we're seeing with the artillery fight in Ukraine.  This sound about right to you guys?

 

Russian Artillery

 

When it became clear that Ukraine was going to fight, Russia switched to destroying civilian infrastructure in an attempt to terrorize Ukraine into surrender.  Artillery was used primarily for this purpose.

 

 

[Slaughterhouse-Five]

58 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Простая математика: каждые X выпущенных/потерянных снарядов — это, вероятно, X снарядов, которые невозможно заменить во время этой войны.

One comments from one russian site about RU amount of shells for artillery : 

"The Soviet Union spent 50 years without stopping ****ing shells and guns, every ****ing factory with pots and pans was producing cartridges, tanks or something other than countless factories that didn’t mess with pots and pans. 

Plus, for the past many years, the share of the defense industry in the budget of the Russian Federation has been about 40%. This is even if 80% is stupidly stolen, and it turns out to be about mother ****ing.

In short, the Russian Federation has weapons and ammunition to the ass".

 

[Grigb]

2 minutes ago, Slaughterhouse-Five said:

Простая математика: каждые X выпущенных/потерянных снарядов — это, вероятно, X снарядов, которые невозможно заменить во время этой войны.

...In short, the Russian Federation has weapons and ammunition to the ass".

Glad to know, that you are Russian, comrade.  

Regarding the ammo, not every Russian is agreeing with you. Let's look together at the attached screenshot (I will translate it below).

 

Quote

The ninth warehouse [explosion] in a little over a month. There are zero conclusions [from HQs].
Yes, those who think that our stocks of shells are limitless are very mistaken. Two Chechen [wars], 30 years of current combat training and the disposal of a BP [ammo] with an expired shelf life (at least 4 million tons over 10 years) have led to the fact that there are only a little more than 2 million tons in storage now. That's all, not just shells.

 

[Bulletpoint]

If Russian stocks of shells are indeed limited and increasingly difficult to bring to the front, we should see Russian advances begin to stall shortly.

[Slaughterhouse-Five]

5 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Glad to know, that you are Russian, comrade.  

Glad to know, that using the word "comrade" in every comment gives you very special pleasure. Сomrade.  

[Calamine Waffles]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

Mesko, main Polish arty ammo manufacturer (whose offer includes basically everything UA uses save for heavy MLRS and Giatsint/ Msta ammo) signed a contract with UA on Eurosatory.

Msta-B/S can use standard 152 mm ammunition. Only Giatsint-B/S uses its own 152 mm ammunition.

[Slaughterhouse-Five]

And everyone can find an RU increase in the military budget over the years on the Internet himself, so that I do not declassify top-secret information.
I am not writing this to defend the position of one side. Just to have another point of view, if you don't mind of course. I'll be glad to be wrong. 

[Calamine Waffles]

Yes, but the Russian military budget is not just for shells. There is some evidence they have been underinvesting in traditional artillery (all those hypersonic/stealth/nuclear Wunderwaffe don't come cheap)

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR3000/RR3099/RAND_RR3099z1.appendixes.pdf

 

Quote

The Russian indirect fires industry has been troubled by irregular business and limited gov-
ernment support throughout the post-Soviet period. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the
country’s main manufacturers of MRLs and artillery depended upon export business for their
survival. Much of the Soviet-era industry collapsed, and what remained was consolidated into
two firms: Uraltransmash, which makes self-propelled guns, and Splav, which makes tube
artillery along with its subsidiary Motovilikhinskie Zavody. At present both firms have been
incorporated into the state holding company Rostec. The 2014 economic crisis hit these enter-
prises particularly hard, due to a loss of both domestic and export business as well as misman-
agement of some of the enterprises. While the Russian government eventually intervened to
help bail them out, its relatively slow and stingy support suggests that indirect fires are a lower
priority than other areas of defense procurement.

 

Quote

There is a contradiction between the centrality of indirect fires in Russian operating concepts
and the relatively low priority they have received in recent defense investments. Several plau-
sible explanations for this mismatch are possible. One possibility is that the inventory of indi-
rect fires inherited from the USSR is considered sufficient for Russia’s contemporary needs,
particularly with a modest number of next-generation systems supplementing them. Another
possibility is that Russian tactics and operating concepts for ground warfare are in flux and
that Russian military leaders have either failed to reach a consensus that new indirect fires are
needed or they have concluded that indirect fires will be less important in future wars. A final
possibility is that Russian military thinkers believe additional spending on indirect fires is nec-
essary but they lost out to other interests in the competition for defense investment under the
2020 SAP. These possibilities are not mutually exclusive, and all could be true to one degree
or another.

 

[Huba]

9 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

Msta-B/S can use standard 152 mm ammunition. Only Giatsint-B/S uses its own 152 mm ammunition.

Thanks, I got it wrong. I guess that's one less logistical problem for RU (and UA!). 

[Grigb]

3 minutes ago, Slaughterhouse-Five said:

Glad to know, that using the word "comrade" in every comment gives you very special pleasure. Сomrade.  

So, you are not denying the comment about ammo I showed, comrade. Now you need to check carefully my comments to see that I use "comrade" in very specific circumstances and far from your "every comment" claim. I mean it is obvious that in last several comments you pushed two RU propaganda talking points, quote:

• There is no such thing like "RU nationalists"
• In short, the Russian Federation has weapons and ammunition to the ass"

On top of that you tried to hide the fact you are Russian, quote I'm ordinary man in one Eastern-european dictatorship. 

Russian who tried to hide that fact he is Russian and produces RU propaganda talking point... Ok, may be you are Belarus Luka supporter but it the same **** basically. So, my use of "comrade" is logical and factual based. Unlike your propaganda activities.

[hcrof]

13 minutes ago, Grigb said:

So, you are not denying the comment about ammo I showed, comrade. Now you need to check carefully my comments to see that I use "comrade" in very specific circumstances and far from your "every comment" claim. I mean it is obvious that in last several comments you pushed two RU propaganda talking points, quote:

• There is no such thing like "RU nationalists"
• In short, the Russian Federation has weapons and ammunition to the ass"

On top of that you tried to hide the fact you are Russian, quote I'm ordinary man in one Eastern-european dictatorship. 

Russian who tried to hide that fact he is Russian and produces RU propaganda talking point... Ok, may be you are Belarus Luka supporter but it the same **** basically. So, my use of "comrade" is logical and factual based. Unlike your propaganda activities.

To be fair, I think English speakers like me can make our own decisions based on the multiple russian speaking sources here. I am personally interested in what the pro russian arguments are so I know how people think (and also to feel like I am not in an echo chamber!)

[Slaughterhouse-Five]

11 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Так вот, Вы не отрицаете комментария по поводу патронов, которые я показал, камрад. Теперь вам нужно внимательно проверить мои комментарии, чтобы увидеть, что я использую слово «товарищ» в очень специфических обстоятельствах и далеко от вашего заявления о «каждом комментарии». Я имею в виду, очевидно, что в последних нескольких комментариях вы выдвинули два пропагандистских тезиса RU, цитата:

• Нет такого понятия как "РУ националисты"
• Короче у РФ оружия и боеприпасов под зад"

Вдобавок ко всему, вы пытались скрыть, что вы русский, цитата  Я обычный человек в одной восточноевропейской диктатуре. 

Русский, который пытался скрыть тот факт, что он русский и ведет пропаганду РУ... Хорошо, может быть, вы сторонник Беларуси Луки, но это то же самое **** в основном. Итак, мое использование слова «товарищ» логично и основано на фактах. В отличие от вашей пропагандистской деятельности.

Oh God, I'm exposed! What should I do? This Grigb is at least Sherlock Holmes. Now they'll leave me without vodka and dancing with a bear, damn it! I need to be more careful now. Grigb is so smart, unbelievable!!! I'll go prepare for propaganda better!((

[Grigb]

11 minutes ago, hcrof said:

To be fair, I think English speakers like me can make our own decisions based on the multiple russian speaking sources here. I am personally interested in what the pro russian arguments are so I know how people think (and also to feel like I am not in an echo chamber!)

He is not providing you with any source. He repeats propaganda points.

[Slaughterhouse-Five]

5 minutes ago, hcrof said:

Мне лично интересно, что такое пророссийские аргументы,

Where are my pro-Russian arguments, God?! If my premise does not say that Russia will surrender and fall tomorrow, then I am a spy? Seriousl? This is just a waste of time proving that I'm not a camel. That's bull****! If I need to do so, excuse me, I have something more interesting to do.

[Grigb]

7 minutes ago, Slaughterhouse-Five said:

Oh God, I'm exposed! What should I do? This Grigb is at least Sherlock Holmes. Now they'll leave me without vodka and dancing with a bear, damn it! I need to be more careful now. Grigb is so smart, unbelievable!!! I'll go prepare for propaganda better!((

Indeed comrade. For example, compare your statement about RU army budget with reality.

Quote

How "moms" provide the Russian army instead of the Ministry of Defense.

The shortage of household and technical items  in the Russian army, which most often appear in volunteer lists, is also confirmed by military experts. Some of the equipment, such as thermal imagers and quadrocopters, are not required by most units according to the field manual, while they are necessary in battles, explain Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) analysts Kirill Mikhailov and another who wished to remain anonymous. "Equipping a soldier by TOE is like we are still living in the last century. Now [in the Russian army] the Field Manual of 2000-2010 is in force, it is somewhat outdated. The most recent experience that is included in it is the experience of the Chechen wars. When they wrote the manual, the commanders did not think that quadrocopters would be wide spread, a thermal imager during the Chechen wars was something unimaginably expensive," experts from CIT told Important Stories.

... The Russian army has had other priorities all this time: it needs a lot of tanks, it needs large divisions, missiles threatening everyone — something that rides on parades. Thermal imagers are difficult to show at parades. They have never been such a symbol of military power as tanks were, for example," analysts say.

There are also not enough personal protective equipment: helmets, bulletproof vests, armor plates for them. "Many went to the "exercises", leaving these plates in the location of the [homebase]: they are heavy, what is the point of them in the exercises?" — CIT analysts give an example.

According to them, there is a separate problem with the means of communication: there are not enough walkie-talkies, most of them are lost or in a faulty condition, and no one knows how to fix them, because in peacetime they were not used in training. If the walkie-talkie failed in class, the military used civilian communication channels: they could, for example, create a group audio chat in one of the messengers in the phone.

Experts also confirm the lack of household items and problems with the uniform: "Each form has a period of wear, for example, for contract soldier it is three years. They gave out one set and no one cares that the boots, in fact, will last only one season. The new kit will be available only through a trial in which the soldier will be punished for the fact that his uniform was spoiled ahead of schedule. But in fact, a contractor in a spoiled uniform will hear from the commander: "Go to the store, buy, you get a salary." A contractor who has made his choice in favor of the Ministry of Defense will usually go to the store in silence. Another question is that in the zone of their [special military operation] they have nothing to buy [with] and nowhere to go [to buy]," CIT analysts say.

Russian soldiers on the battlefield do not even have enough food. "Field kitchens are undersupplied, money has been defrauded at warehouses all this time. Dry rations were developed so that they were as cheap as possible, and now we see Ukrainians who record videos of how they captured Russian positions, try these dry rations and spit," CIT analysts explain.

Another problem is poor medical care. "Apart from banal pills — paracetamol and analgin — they have nothing. Medics have stretchers for evacuating the wounded, and they are not allowed for ordinary troops, but now we are faced with the fact that it is not medics who evacuate the wounded, but ordinary soldiers," CIT analysts say. — The equipment of field hospitals is terrible. It cannot handle current number of wounded [as now], no one could imagine that the simple dropper would run out of life time resource. And now, as we understand, there is an artillery war, it means a large number of shrapnel wounds."