Vanir Ausf B

I would, and I'm pretty sure the Pentagon would be as well.

I'm curious to see if there will be any more M1 tanks in this package. 5 of the original 31 have been lost.

Zelenskiy says the Trypilska thermal power plant was destroyed because there were more missiles incoming than interceptors outgoing. "There were 11 missiles flying. We destroyed the first seven, and four (remaining) destroyed Trypillia. Why? Because there were zero missiles. We ran out of missiles to defend Trypillial" https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-says-ran-missiles-stop-103157624.html

Mick Ryan's take on the war after returning from Ukraine. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ukraine-war-how-check-russia-s-momentum Russia is now a more dangerous adversary than it was two years ago. This calls for change in how the war is fought. There is a compelling and urgent need for NATO to change from a “defend Ukraine” policy to one of “defeat Russia in Ukraine”. At the same time, Ukraine needs to develop and share with its supporters its theory of victory. One official in Kyiv told me there is no clear vision of how Ukraine will win. A new Ukrainian theory of victory must be a foundational element of any revised Western strategy.

I don't know if anyone has posted this yet, but RUSI just published a paper on the present and near future state of drone warfare. Mass Precision Strike: Designing UAV Complexes for Land Forces by Justin Bronk and Jack Watling Excerpt: Swarming capabilities are commonly touted as the most significant area of capability development in the small UAV defence sector. However, the requirement to swarm introduces significant hardware and software complexity, which in turn drives cost growth and reduces the number of individual assets that can be fielded for any given budget. Massed UAV groupings, as seen regularly in light shows at civilian displays, rely on a ground control station tracking the position of all UAVs in a formation at all times and a central mission computer sending commands to each one to coordinate their movements. This allows large numbers of very simple small UAVs to fly in a coordinated fashion, but it is not a practical approach for military UAVs and weapons in a contested battlespace, due to terrain masking, EW, signal range and emissions control challenges – the ground control station would be struck, decapitating the whole swarm. Instead, for a mass precision strike complex to be capable of swarming tactics, the individual assets involved must have onboard sensors and low-latency datalinks that are resistant to hostile EW disruption. In addition, each asset must carry a mission computer powerful enough, and software complex enough, to fuse the information about terrain, threats and targets received from its own sensors and those of other UAVs in the formation through datalinks, and to react to that information dynamically in real time. These capabilities are not inherently new, nor are they reliant on advances in AI or complex machine learning models. However, what the requirements for sensors, datalinks and advanced software do is raise component costs, even if used with an inherently cheap airframe/engine combination. Furthermore, if a mass precision strike system is premised on swarming tactics for its effectiveness against its core target sets, then the number of assets required to use it in a sustained fashion will be increased, due to the need to consistently project sufficient assets into the target area to swarm. In conjunction with the increased hardware and software complexity required, this requirement to sustainably field swarming UAVs in large quantities over time means that fielding this sort of system as more than a ‘Night One’ theatre entry tool is likely to be uneconomical. In terms of where swarming capabilities are likely to add value commensurate with the additional cost implied by their inclusion as part of a precision strike complex, the primary application will be to improve the capability to overwhelm air defence systems... Other advantages of swarming capabilities are that they can help reduce wasted warheads by deconflicting target selection so that multiple assets do not hit the same target. However, doing so in a way that can differentiate between a target having been hit and successfully disabled versus a target having been hit ineffectively and thus requiring a repeat strike with another asset requires significantly more advanced sensor and processing capabilities than simple deconfliction. Ultimately, for target deconfliction and strike optimisation, the value added question will come down to whether the additional efficiency against defended and undefended target sets gained from functional swarming capabilities outweighs the strike weight foregone by the increase in individual asset cost and the resultant reduction in quantity.

I'm not sure this is the way for China to take back Siberia. https://www.ft.com/content/ba524406-ee6c-4c39-9ac2-110a2549569a

He references Cannae and Marathon, but the front was IIRC something like 2700 km long. Pocketing some fraction of the Russian army (he never explains exactly how or where) while allowing them to advance in other areas doesn't sound like a war-winning strategy to me given the Russian ability to reconstitute formations.

On-map self propelled guns and howitzers are not allowed indirect fire in CM. IIRC the rationale is that ranges for on-map fire would typically be too short for their trajectory to hit.

Except for the attacker in attack/defend-type battles. Some people also allow it in meeting engagements but I prefer not to. As always, prior communication is the key.

More RUSI analysis from Justin Bronk. Getting Serious About SEAD

There is an EFP version of the Lancet.

I think that is correct for the commander's sight. The gunner's daylight sight on the T-64B is the 1g42. It's magnification and field of view are variable from 3.9x/20° to 9x/8.5°. By comparison the TZF 9 gunner's sight on the Tiger is 2.5x/25° and 5x/14°, so the T-64 has stronger magnification at the cost of a narrower field of view. Which of these would be better at spotting a machine gun team 450 meters away is anyone's guess. If we were talking about nighttime spotting or first shot accuracy the T-64 should be much better but I don't know that there would be a dramatic difference in daytime spotting. I agree with other posters that the OPs test is worthless for demonstrating anything at all.

It's the EU elections in June. Macron isn't a candidate but his party has candidates and they are trailing in the polls.

Pretty sure it's for realz. https://www.asterslaw.com/press_center/legal_alerts/draft_law_on_mobilization_and_military_record/