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kinophile

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kinophile last won the day on May 24 2018

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  1. Artsakh War feels potentially indicative of future war, but also not really. For all the media/state propaganda fluff of THIS IS THE FUTURE OF WAR! RAWR! ...yeah all it is is a prepared, more future aware force kicking the crap out if an unprepared, lazy OF, who have had PLENTY of warning about about developing AZ abilities (see several clashes over the last 5 years). It would be a more useful example (for the purpose of this tread) if both sides have been equipped the same way with drones and information technology, training and doctrine. Then we would have seen comparable strike/casualty ratios and just what was involved in reducing enemy effectiveness vis-à-vis drone strikes. But all the Artsakh War shows really is that if you're unprepared you get slaughtered - and isn't that true of all war, ever? To my mind we still have not seen comparatively drone and information equipped forces duking it out over an extended (3 months+) time frame where we see the evolving tactics strategies used. The Donboss war is the closest we've gotten so far but Ukraine was still heavily overmatched in the drone and information sphere. Plus despite its heavy use of artillery Russia still held its punches a lot. However, a second round of the Donbass, I think, would be an entirely different affair. UKR is far better equipped and trained and experienced now. But the Russians are no slouches plus they have Syria under their belt (which gave valuable staff level combat experience).
  2. 100% agree. Thermals and drones are a ****ing NIGHTMARE.
  3. Unfortunately not yet. RL rudely intruded in 2019, then COVID, so my baby is currently still in the womb. It's short campaign tracing a single UKR battalion escaping encirclement. Some PvP testing has been done on the 1st map, which is VERY large and very dynamic. The following two maps are 80% mapped but not tactically "planned" or tested. One is a fighting retreat through a town, another is an assault into suburbs, the final one will be a full on city centre MOUTfest. I'm trying to keep the scenarios dynamic, so for example the Town Retreat has constant threats of cut-off, each scenario starts already in serious contact and there is no build up of action. You're straight in. And the Russians have a LOT of artillery. This experience is what spurred me to start this thread - the UKR and RUS casualties go crazy real fast if I build for the classic full contact, full assault fights. Readups of Donbass, plus notes like @Haiduks above suggest I'm assuming too aggressive a stance. But, Haiduk, how much of that low tolerance for casualties is a result of low reinforcement levels? WW2/GPW was a slaughter because both sides poured men an material in. In Fallujah 2, USMC and Insurgents poured/maintained numbers, so casualties mounted. Same with Mosul. Donbass War had Debaltsevo but that was no Mosul. My thesis(?) is that the relatively low casualties threshold, from unit contacts, of the Donbass would evaporate in a proper big city fight, if the city is strategically/politically important. I think...?
  4. Perfect,please do. It's perfectly possible to put build in the option of calling off an attack - put in exit zones. In my own UKR campaign most UKR battles revolve around escaping and/or fighting retreat/delaying actions., With concomitant exit zones on the players side and weight the OBJs appropriately. I have yet to build the counter attack battles but one will definitely have an exit zone on the far side if the map - ie break through.
  5. @Haiduk was that the battle for Savur-Moyhla? 6x11 km is the real determinant here. In CMBS , even on the larger scenarios, we're pretty "squeezed" in. For the various scenarios I put together for my personal UKR campaign I tried to justify that squeezing - eg. A battalion escaping encirclement through a closing gap. Haiduk, I know you've noted the disparity before, of men/km2 in CMBS vs Donbass. In a proper peer v peer, I would wonder if that spacing could, or would want to be maintained. In Donbass,it appears, to my limited knowledge, that RUS did not use it's deep strike doctrine, focussing instead on a limited theatre with limited aims. In a PvP fight that limiting would spell death, as modern war heavily favours the attacker - long range attrition is do effective and sustainable now that staying in place, putting down roots, even 100km+ back, opens you up to S2S strikes. Where as before it would have taken a complex aerial operation AD suppression, overwatch CAP, feint attacks in order to punch through a strike flight. Now, we can HIMARS the **** out of a corp level HQ, from our own deep rear. Stay put,even in rear/repair = vulnerable. Bunch up, even on the theatre LOC, = vulnerable. I wonder, once the the heavy shooting begins, if brigade level formations will rapidly reform/deform into more granular, self contained units, company size. A la the late WW2 German battle groups, but for somewhat dissimilar reasons.
  6. My impression from CMBS is that a full on, conventional modern peer v peer war would be insanely attritional to the initial forces - think early WW1 effects on the regular BA. Within an hour of gameplay, with just a battalion worth of material and FS I can wipe out an opposing force. 50%+ casualties are common. Retreating forces cannot physically move fast enough to escape the envelope and are attritted further. None of the above is particularly new in war, obviously the winning side causes more damage to the "losing" force. I'm curious what people think of just how survivable a modern PvP battle is, for the forces involved (not the lowly grunt), using CMBS scan "guide"... It *seems* that most forces now have the tech and ability to mutually inflict massive early casualties at the same rate and at the same time.
  7. @DMS Poke and poke, troll for reaction... Same crap, different thread. I like the new stuff but it's always fun to hear the classics @Haiduk you reviewed previously my question re amphibious attack into Meritpol. I'm curious - you didn't fully dismiss it (naturally, anything is possible in war) and noted it would probably take the form of infiltration /raids level. But this ignores airborne options... If a full contact war has blown up along the Donbass line, I'm curious could UKR actually resist a determined sea & air assault along that coast? Even the act of shifting units to defend against it could cause critical fault lines to open up on the main front,no?
  8. @Haiduk how sensible/feasible is a RUS amphibious attack towards Melitopol, and then seperately into Kherson? I don't know the terrain, UKR force dispositions or geographical obstacles, but it would look like a good move - use combat on the Donbas frontline to suck in UKR units, then strike behind at Melitopol. Then strike into Kherson; isolate and bombard all units between Melitopol and Kherson. No need to unite Donbass and this new bite,but use the two zones to force a retreat of UKR line to the Dniper. Ahhh, fantasy pipe dreams....
  9. Referring doc https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2563.html
  10. RAND report, various scenarios for Russian Ground Forces. Part of a series examine RGF as a discrete whole. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2563z1.html
  11. Those nighttime shots are great. But I've always found the CMBS tank/afv flashes to be a few frames too long. I investigated shortening them, by taking the pngs and literally replacing some frames at the end with empty files, but didn't work. Should be the correct approach, though...
  12. This would make a superb mission pack. New and Unique situation (for now...give it 5 years and this type of strategic concern will be way more prevalent...). That's interesting, how infrastructure improvement could be a harbinger of an attack. Although, as you note, it would make sense (given Russia's somewhat limited resources in the area?) to hold off construction or attack until absolutely necessary. Conditions driving that threshold could be increasing civilian unrest in Crimea due to water issues, although realistically the Govt will only truly care when the military starts to get affected. But it could an easy Blame Game to generate, to take the unrest (caused by local Govt incompetence) and blame it on UKR, "necessitating" local correction of the situation. Nothing particularly Russian about such a move, of course. All Govt's are bastards to some degree :).
  13. I'd be game to attempt that. I've some good friends who speak Ukrainian, here in Toronto. Do you have a list of those articles you consider good sources/coverage?
  14. Thanks @Haiduk This is one of the more "accurate" (?) or at least more detailed, Western accounts that I've seen publicly, but as you note there are discrepancies in timeline and particular events. Do you have a link to that official UKR account?
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