How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[TheVulture]

6 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

It also speaks to the quality of the Ukrainian chain of command.  Someone higher up figured they needed to be worried about a crossing and instead of guessing brought in an expert.  The chain functioned as it should to produce the right guy for the job.  The guy made his report, it went up the chain, and they officers in charge listened to him.  They probably had alerted some artillery to stand by for this specific need, which allowed the artillery to come up with a rough plan on what they wanted to do when the time came (fuse settings, number of guns, firing pattern, etc.).  And the chain had to communicate out to the squadies what they needed to keep a look out for and instructions for how to report back.  When they indeed noticed what they were told to look out for they reported it and the chain got everything going within 20 minutes of the initial tip off.

It also contrasts strongly with what appears to be going on on the Russian side here.

The first bridging attempt, fair enough, they've got to try and cross somehow. But once it it is obvious from what happened that the bridging area is under observation and that Ukraine have plenty of artillery set up to flatten the area, then they try it again. And again. In the same place.

It's back to the old Soviet style of expectations (and not for the first time). The order has come down to attempt the crossing again, regardless of the reality on the ground. At some point, someone in the chain of command knows they are sending another company or more to get whacked like the last lot did, but apparently doing that is better (at a personal level) than saying that it can't be done. So units keep getting thrown forwards in accordance with the plans laid out in theater command that require this BTG to cross the river, establish a bridgehead and advance on <insert town here> by such and such date.

The Soviet-style system has its uses, to be sure, but this looks like a situation where it is its own worst enemy, in stark contrast to the communication and flexibility of the Ukrainian side.

[Pete Wenman]

From this thread,

 

 

[SeinfeldRules]

You have to remember that the reports state they had at least a company with armored vehicles on the far bank of the river. I'm sure the subsequent bridging attempts were an attempt to either reinforce them or get them back across the river. I'm sure not all Russian commanders are heartless bastards who would leave a whole company to die.

And don't forget it took almost 3 days to finish the fight. Not like they tried doing this all under constant artillery fire and were wiped out in a couple of hours. Maybe they had been conducting effective counter battery and felt there was still an opportunity to complete the bridges, amateur attempts aside. The engineer mentions aviation having to come in to destroy the second bridge. Not everything is an example of incompetence, sometimes we have to do dangerous things to gain a tactical advantage (ie, the 82nd crossing the Waal river in canvas boats in broad daylight to capture the Nijmegen Bridge).

Edited May 12, 2022 by SeinfeldRules

[c3k]

I'm a few hours behind, so forgive me for bringing up the bridge again. 

 

Here's an image of the bridge site, with solid blocks from Steve from what he (and others, @The_Capt included) seemed to be saying happened.

 

Obviously, that is a level of of incompetency that I could not believe. So, what I wrote above reflected how I thought it really went. Which looks like this (my bridges are outlined, not solid):

 

Well, then Steve posted a closup:

 

All I can say is, I will never again assume even the basest level of competency when looking at any Russian military activity in this war.

Stunning. Simply stunning. Basic combat engineering. Or so I'd thought...

 

[chuckdyke]

It's always funny how history repeats itself. Here Napoleons withdrawal over the Berezina near Studienka. 

At least he pulled off his withdrawal. 

 

[Taranis]

 

Quote

La Russie met en garde contre la menace d’une adhésion de la Finlande à l’OTAN
En cas d’adhésion de la Finlande à l’OTAN, la Russie sera « obligée de prendre des mesures réciproques, militaro-techniques et autres, afin de mettre fin aux menaces à sa sécurité nationale », a dit jeudi après-midi, dans un communiqué, le ministère des affaires étrangères russe.

Accusant l’OTAN de chercher à créer « un autre flanc pour la menace militaire contre notre pays », la diplomatie russe a ajouté qu’« Helsinki doit avoir conscience de la responsabilité et des conséquences d’une telle décision ».

Pour le porte-parole du Kremlin, Dmitri Peskov, qui s’est exprimé face à la presse, la réponse de la Russie dépendra « des retombées pratiques de ce processus, de l’avancée des infrastructures militaires vers nos frontières ». « Tout cela constituera les éléments d’une analyse spécifique et pour l’élaboration des mesures nécessaires afin d’équilibrer la situation », a-t-il ajouté.

"Russia warns of threat of Finnish NATO membership
If Finland joins NATO, Russia will be "obligated to take reciprocal military-technical and other measures to put an end to threats to its national security", said Thursday afternoon, in a statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Accusing NATO of seeking to create "another flank for the military threat against our country", Russian diplomacy added that "Helsinki must be aware of the responsibility and the consequences of such a decision".

For Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, who spoke to the press, Russia's response will depend "on the practical fallout of this process, on the advance of military infrastructure towards our borders". “All of this will constitute the elements for a specific analysis and for the development of the necessary measures to balance the situation,” he added.  "

 

* In short, they will do nothing

 

Edited May 12, 2022 by Taranis

[Taranis]

 

[LongLeftFlank]

36 minutes ago, chuckdyke said:

It's always funny how history repeats itself. Here Napoleons withdrawal over the Berezina near Studienka. 

At least he pulled off his withdrawal. 

 

LOL, barely visible on that black line....  Before / After

 

Edited May 12, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Huba]

Del

 

Edited May 12, 2022 by Huba

[Kinophile]

Fascinating maps of how old history holds over even into the present day.

The English possessions in 100 years war vs. modern French electoral returns is incredible.

https://twitter.com/Valen10Francois/status/1524040715352817665?t=qtSf6xKyMMmESqNxNjC-AQ&s=19

 

[Huba]

7 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Fascinating maps of how old history holds over even into the present day.

The English possessions in 100 years war vs. modern French electoral returns is incredible.

https://twitter.com/Valen10Francois/status/1524040715352817665?t=qtSf6xKyMMmESqNxNjC-AQ&s=19

 

Sorry for off-topic, but I have to post it:
So it's a map of railways in present day Poland. Based on that, find the late XIX century border between German/Austrian and Russian Empires:

[LongLeftFlank]

9 hours ago, dan/california said:

Steve you clearly think Ukraine even seriously threatening even a feint on Russian territory is a very bad idea. Do you think Belarus enjoys the same "political immunity" for lack of a better term. I can envision a scenario where all Russian forces outside of the 2/24 lines have been smashed or left, Ukraine is liberating the Donbas, and Putin STILL won't stop launching cruise missiles at random civilian targets or lift the Black Sea blockade. Do you think Ukraine has an option to threaten Belarus if Putin doesn't stand down? 

 

I would love to copy-replace Finland and Karelia above. Long live the Greater Finnic Elvish Uralia! Linux Imperium!

[EDIT. Wow, right in step with the Zeitgeist of the previous 4 posts!] 

(speaking of Black Swan events btw) 

 

Edited May 12, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, SeinfeldRules said:

You have to remember that the reports state they had at least a company with armored vehicles on the far bank of the river. I'm sure the subsequent bridging attempts were an attempt to either reinforce them or get them back across the river. I'm sure not all Russian commanders are heartless bastards who would leave a whole company to die.

And don't forget it took almost 3 days to finish the fight. Not like they tried doing this all under constant artillery fire and were wiped out in a couple of hours. Maybe they had been conducting effective counter battery and felt there was still an opportunity to complete the bridges, amateur attempts aside. The engineer mentions aviation having to come in to destroy the second bridge. Not everything is an example of incompetence, sometimes we have to do dangerous things to gain a tactical advantage (ie, the 82nd crossing the Waal river in canvas boats in broad daylight to capture the Nijmegen Bridge).

You are more forgiving than I am on this one.  First those F ech vehicles should have been able to bounce back across, or worst case dismount and swim back - Ukraine is littered with abandoned Russia equipment since Day 1 of this war, so that was an option.

Second, a pontoon bridge is a divisional level asset, no commander should be willing to sacrifice it for a tactical unit.  That is harsh calculus but if it was the situation, then it applies here.

Finally, and most bafflingly, suitable crossing sites on any obstacle are finite and one has to assume your enemy - whose home turf you are invading - knows that.  These are like doorways and if you get caught trying to come through one, it is a really bad idea to follow up by trying to come through the same door you know is already covered - that is how you lose important assets, and the better part of a BTG, apparently.

On military engineering.  

In my assessment, military engineering is one of the biggest losers in the sort of war we are seeing waged here in Ukraine.  An ability to "hide" was always a challenge for battlefield engineering but now it is made worse by "eyes everywhere" and the ranges of weapons systems is also making very hard to establish things like bridgeheads.

So assault engineering, or close support, is likely impacted the least, however, armored engineer vehicles are easy to spot and hit.  But sappers supporting infantry, close and personal, is not the issue.  We have seen mine warfare; however, I am not sure at what scale.  I suspect this will happen as the lines stabilize and the Russians try to dig in. But here minelaying vehicles and troops are going to be very exposed without a very effective screen.  

Support engineering must be nearly impossible.  The F ech stuff can bounce crossing employing amphib and snorkeling, almost all Russian equipment is built for that.  It is the logistics and artillery that need LOC bridging and major obstacle crossing in order to keep the big machine in motion and here military engineering is in real trouble.  Unlike logistics, which has thousands of vehicles and redundancy, support engineering equipment is always a very low density capability.  No army has thousands of pontoon bridges readily available, in fact any commander will complain that like ISR, there are never enough.

The other major problem is that support military engineering is in fact "mobile transportation infrastructure".  It is big, heavy and highly visible.  I bridge train can run dozens of vehicles and site prep and maintenance is highly visible.

In the old days, we would conduct a combat crossing in phases, establish a bridgehead far enough out to protect the crossing sites and then bring up the heavier stuff to get things moving again.  The bridgehead and c-batty, along with air superiority would ensure a safe-ish bubble for the bridges to be built, cross over follow on echelons and the offence resumes.

Problem now is, as we have discussed at length, ISR and range.  The enemy can strike with numerous systems, some man portable, at ludicrous ranges.  That and ubiquitous ISR.  The enemy already has an idea of where you can and cannot cross, assuming they have done recon, so now trying to bring up large, heavy LOC bridging, in the face of satellites, UAVs, self-loitering and really long range arty/missile systems is starting to look like a suicide mission.

We would need bridgeheads of 50+kms to secure a crossing, but we need the crossing to get enough forces to secure the 50+kms...another dilemma.  The only way around it that I can see is a lot more self-sufficient F ech...and we are back to mass vs light.

 

[sburke]

On 5/11/2022 at 5:14 AM, akd said:

What it’s like being a Chinese reporter covering the sports competition in Ukraine:

 

 

 

Totally mis understood.  This is part of the Russian space program.

 

Edited May 12, 2022 by sburke

[The_Capt]

Found this interesting:

It hits on how the UA is fighting better and less on how the Russian's suck.

Edited May 12, 2022 by The_Capt

[LongLeftFlank]

....And since I used the word 'Zeitgeist' already, let me provide you a little palate cleansing schadenfreude....

[as surely as Sibelius must follow GWAR]

Greater Russia cheerleader and contrarian nutjob extraordinaire John Helmer has been defenestrated from Moscow for all his strenuous efforts on behalf of the Comintern.

For those who are strangely fascinated by the amazing mental contortions of otherwise intelligent human beings....

https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2022/05/exile.html

He's basically one of those zealots whose last words in the Lubyanka basement were 'Long Live Sta--!'  Except for the pistol round at the base of the skull part. He's rather fortunate to have been born a couple of generations late....

Edited May 12, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Combatintman]

Back to the bridging ... there was talk of current and drift so I figured it was worth finding this out ...

[FancyCat]

73 vehicles, Jesus.

 

Edited May 12, 2022 by FancyCat

[dan/california]

4 minutes ago, Combatintman said:

Back to the bridging ... there was talk of current and drift so I figured it was worth finding this out ...

Opposite to my visual impression, thank you sorting that.

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, c3k said:

All I can say is, I will never again assume even the basest level of competency when looking at any Russian military activity in this war.

Yeah, every passing day it's getting harder and harder to steer clear of simply concluding "Russia sucks at war".  I keep extending them reasonable doubt and they keep confirming I'm too kind hearted.

Still, it is dangerous to presume everything they do will be incompetent.  Much better to assume they are going to be smart and act accordingly.

2 hours ago, c3k said:

Stunning. Simply stunning. Basic combat engineering. Or so I'd thought...

I'm willing to cut them a tiny bit of slack here.  I think there's something very bad about the section of bank that they obviously didn't use for YELLOW, RED, and swimming.  It could be too steep and they didn't have a dozer available to cut a ramp into it.  This is consistent with what The_Capt was saying about no signs of reworking the near side of the bank in any meaningful way.  If they couldn't do it on the near side then that could explain why they went with what they did.

But after YELLOW and RED were lost, and the easier landing spot filled with debris, they had to shoot for what looks to be the logical place to land the bridge.  Maybe they abandoned that attempt because they got started hoping they could locate a dozer and found they couldn't?  Whatever the case is, they abandoned the attempt before it got to the point of dealing with what might be wrong with the bank.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

11 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

73 vehicles, Jesus.

 

Thanks for that post.  It's been saved along with all the rest of my materials.  This is one we are sure to refer back to for years to come!

I am thinking a fair number of those destroyed vehicles had been lined up to cross, got burned up, and were dragged out of the way.

Can you imagine how demoralizing it would be to drive up to a river crossing and see all of that already there?

Steve

[akd]

Brimstones:

 

[billbindc]

3 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yeah, every passing day it's getting harder and harder to steer clear of simply concluding "Russia sucks at war".  I keep extending them reasonable doubt and they keep confirming I'm too kind hearted.

Still, it is dangerous to presume everything they do will be incompetent.  Much better to assume they are going to be smart and act accordingly.

I'm willing to cut them a tiny bit of slack here.  I think there's something very bad about the section of bank that they obviously didn't use.  It could be too steep and they didn't have a dozer available to cut a ramp into it.  This is consistent with what The_Capt was saying about no signs of reworking the near side of the bank in any meaningful way.  If they couldn't do it on the near side then that could explain why they went with what they did.

Steve

It's hard not to get the impression that the lack of preparation and slapdash nature of the bridging operation must at least in part be due to the fact that the Russian commanders are trying to operate in the knowledge that their moves are effectively transparent to the enemy give or take 12 hours. Drones are just the beginning. Commercial satellites alone would be bad enough but it's clear Ukraine is getting the fully panoply of American earth bound and space borne ISR. So sure...inept...but also probably conducted under the feverish knowledge that the rounds are going to start dropping any second.

[The_MonkeyKing]

14 minutes ago, akd said:

Brimstones:

 

always wondered how they were used. Apparent fire and forget and also can find their own targets from designated area.

[Battlefront.com]

45 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

You are more forgiving than I am on this one.  First those F ech vehicles should have been able to bounce back across, or worst case dismount and swim back - Ukraine is littered with abandoned Russia equipment since Day 1 of this war, so that was an option.

Second, a pontoon bridge is a divisional level asset, no commander should be willing to sacrifice it for a tactical unit.  That is harsh calculus but if it was the situation, then it applies here.

Finally, and most bafflingly, suitable crossing sites on any obstacle are finite and one has to assume your enemy - whose home turf you are invading - knows that.  These are like doorways and if you get caught trying to come through one, it is a really bad idea to follow up by trying to come through the same door you know is already covered - that is how you lose important assets, and the better part of a BTG, apparently.

Russia is, if nothing else, consistent.  If it's bad at doing one thing, it's probably bad at doing anything similar to it. Combined arms planning is pretty clearly one of the things it does consistently bad.

45 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

On military engineering.  

In my assessment, military engineering is one of the biggest losers in the sort of war we are seeing waged here in Ukraine.  An ability to "hide" was always a challenge for battlefield engineering but now it is made worse by "eyes everywhere" and the ranges of weapons systems is also making very hard to establish things like bridgeheads.

I agree.  Add to this HQs, forward supply points, and other things that have always relied upon a certain degree of "anonymity" in order to function.  Some of these things can be moved back, such as forward repair facilities, with some tradeoffs, but not if the distance between front and rear isn't very far.  I mean, real time ISR capabilities can extend for hundreds of KMs... so if you know roughly what you're looking for and roughly where to look, nothing is safe.  Anywhere.

However, some things are just fooked completely because the only place you can do the activity is in the place that is most likely to get spotted.  Bridging is likely the worst of all of them due to the amount of equipment needed to affect a crossing.  Destroy enough of the equipment and the effort fails for no other reason than "sorry, we don't have that to work with any more".

45 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Support engineering must be nearly impossible.  The F ech stuff can bounce crossing employing amphib and snorkeling, almost all Russian equipment is built for that.  It is the logistics and artillery that need LOC bridging and major obstacle crossing in order to keep the big machine in motion and here military engineering is in real trouble. 

In a sense there's nothing special about this when thinking about the problems present for other frontline activities, such as massing for an armored assault, digging in to hold a newly taken position, etc.  The special problem with engineering is that they are fixed to a very specific location.  And that location can be, as was the case with the bridging here, obvious to the enemy before the first piece of engineering equipment shows up.  That is kinda akin to an existing civilian river crossing... anybody can guess that the attacker is going to try for existing bridges and existing bridges are all known locations.

What this means is that frontline engineering tasks require the same level of new equipment and tactics that pretty much all frontline units need.  Primarily a defense against "eyes in the sky" and inexpensive, easily deployed aerial threats (e.g. one homemade drone bomber could have set a crossing back by an hour at least by zapping a vehicle mid crossing).

45 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Unlike logistics, which has thousands of vehicles and redundancy, support engineering equipment is always a very low density capability.  No army has thousands of pontoon bridges readily available, in fact any commander will complain that like ISR, there are never enough.

Russia has lost a LOT of this equipment, visually confirmed, since the start of the war.  Not only have they deployed it improperly, but they've also subjected it to the same sorts of destruction as regular line units.  Initially it was because they stuck to a plan that presumed little resistance, so the early examples could be "excused".  The also lost a lot of bridging equipment around Kyiv to buy them more maneuver room in an otherwise very tight area.  The long term cost of that has to be adding up.  Could be why they weren't able to address the bridge ingress/egress areas.

Steve