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SeinfeldRules

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Everything posted by SeinfeldRules

  1. I personally doubt this is actually in Ukraine. The name on the barrel appears to be 1SG Conrad Schmidt, a Medal of Honor recipient from the 2nd Calvary Regiment. 2nd Cavalry Regiment is on of the the permanent Army units in Germany and their howitzers have been seen before in training videos for Ukrainian artillerymen. Other 2CR howitzers also have MoH winners painted on their tubes: This howitzer being in Ukraine would imply that we took actively serving howitzers off one of the few active duty units we have permanently stationed in Europe and sent them straight over the border into Ukraine... when there seems to be plenty of stockpiled M777s from various unit closures that would probably would have sent first. I also highly doubt we would have done that without stripping them of our identifying marks. Some other oddities: the spades are upright and you absolutely can not fire the howitzer in that position and it takes several minutes to dig them in correctly. Also, the massive camo net setup is very much an American artillery TTP (and hopefully one that will die, as it's terribly ineffective when you have the barrel pointing out the front. Easy to operate under but in today's battlefield makes you MORE obvious to ISR). Taking both into account, the howitzer is both not in position to fire and not in a position to displace quickly... which to me points that it's a training situation and not in a combat zone.
  2. This is absolutely incorrect, you can do no such thing. That rumor started because the official range is actually more like 84km. https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/ndia/2016/armament/Turner.pdf See slide 9.
  3. I mean considering the first half of this war was characterized by abandoned and destroyed convoys and a mass withdrawal of Russian forces I have no problem believing a large portion of their KIA ended up in Ukrainian hands. This isn't GWOT, not every body is going to come home. Besides, doesn't that match up with the supposed "disregard" Russia has for the lives of their citizens that we keep hearing about in this thread?
  4. So that's not how I read the translated tweet provided... it's claims RuAF suffered 37, 592 "irretrievable" losses, which includes 9,457 dead within that figure, and doesn't include any data on Russian PMCs (or DPR/LPR either, presumably). I'm assuming "irretrievable" in this case means all KIA, WIA, MIA and POW. At least that's how the English version reads, not sure if the translator messed up somewhere and the context of the "dead" number is wrong If that reading is correct, it lines up closely with Steve's post the other day on estimated casualties, once you include all branches and armies.
  5. Interesting twitter thread on Switchblade 300. Auto-translated the content below so you don't have to: "Switchblade kamikaze drones have been used in Ukraine for a long time. Today we will understand how they work and why they are not as effective as they might seem. And what is the best way to replace them. Short thread The United States has supplied Ukraine with 700 Switchblade 300 kamikaze drones. This is a lightweight disposable low-power drone designed to destroy enemy soldiers. In fact, this is not even a drone, but loitering ammunition The main advantage of the Switchblade 300 is its compactness. It is launched from a small pipe, like a mortar, using compressed air. The entire system can be carried and controlled by one soldier. It can be conveniently brought directly to the position. The main disadvantage of Switchblade 300 is disposability. Even without a goal, he cannot sit down. Either a fall, probably without the possibility of a restart, or a safe detonation. This imposes a great responsibility on the operator. The Switchblade 300 is a lightweight drone that carries the equivalent of a 40mm grenade grenade. In these frames we see the wreckage after the explosion. Judging by the state of preservation, the power of the explosion is close to that of a hand grenade. This means that they cannot destroy equipment. Look at an example of using a drone. Everything happens literally like in a computer game. A huge advantage of the Switchblade 300 is a high-quality camera, which, among other things, allows you to conduct reconnaissance in search of targets. But the Switchblade 300 cannot significantly strengthen the Ukrainian army and is generally not suitable for this type of conflict. All because of the high price. One drone (or kit) costs $6,000 dollars. Although Ukraine received them for free, we must take into account the price, because you can buy something else for it. For example, the 700 Switchblade 300 is $4.2 million. With this you can buy an M777 howitzer ($3.7 million) and there will still be money left for ammunition! Each launch costs a lot. In Afghanistan, the Switchblade 300 has been used to hunt down important militants, groups of bomb-planters for terrorist attacks. It was justified there, because a small drone allows you to attack from the air, while avoiding collateral casualties among civilians. But in Ukraine there is a regular army of Russia, the strength of which (like any regular army) is in its mass character and interchangeability. The destruction of individual soldiers is of course useful. But at $6,000, it becomes too expensive. A much more interesting option is a quadrocopter with hanging ammunition. The same 40-mm grenades from the AGS-17 grenade launcher. Ukrainians have learned how to equip mass-produced Mavic 3 drones with them by printing a bomb launcher and grenade stabilizers on a 3D printer. Videos of successful discharges of such grenades come across regularly. Here is one of the relatively recent ones. Yes, compared to the Switchblade 300, the accuracy is much lower, the wind can interfere. However, only a grenade is spent. The price of which is hundreds of dollars (or free). Drone may return Let's compare Switchblade 300 and Mavic 3. Range: 10 km (15 minutes) and 15 km (40 minutes) Ceiling: 150 m and 6000 m Price $6000 and $2000-$4000 (Amazon) At the same time, the Mavic 3 drone is a priori reusable if it is not shot down. As a result, it turns out that for the same amount you can buy about 2 times more drones with comparable and even reusable weapons. I think the price of a VOG-17 grenade with refinement should not exceed a couple of hundred bucks. At the same time, intelligence plays a much more important role than the destruction of individual Russian soldiers. And Mavic 3 drones (or equivalent) are better at scouting because they can stay in the air longer and have better cameras. And heavier drones can carry larger charges. The powerful Switchblade 600 with a warhead from Javelin is quite another matter. He is able to destroy expensive equipment, even if he costs much more. However, the supply of such drones to Ukraine is still only being discussed. Finally, another video of the Switchblade 300 launch in Ukraine. Still, it seems that launching a quadcopter is faster, quieter and safer for the operator, which means it can get much closer to the enemy" Fits in line with my expectations for the Switchblade in Ukraine.
  6. I have always viewed the published Ukrainian losses as absolutely ridiculous. If Russians truly have 90,000 casualties then there would be virtually no fighting forces left (not counting support units like artillery or logistics), and you then have to wonder how Ukraine is still struggling to gain momentum in places like Kherson or Kharkiv. Besides, since when has a nation EVER been able to accurately estimate an opposing nation’s casualties? It’s pretty much accepted as historical fact that governments and militaries always overestimate enemy casualty numbers. Plenty of evidence out there that one burned out vehicle doesn’t automatically equal 3+ dead soldiers and humans are hardier then is commonly believed by the public. I can buy 32,000 total casualties but certainly not 32,000 KIA.
  7. But how long will it take to step up production to that level? 20,000 represents a third of what they’ve produced over 15 years. The latest production figure I can find is an order for 9,000 GMLRS to be delivered over 2.5 years. Lockheed also has other priorities for manufacturing weapons for the US Army, so how will that effect things? It makes sense for countries in Europe to empty their stockpiles but the United States has many other interests besides Ukraine and there can be strategic implications to removing these capabilities from the military.
  8. Theoretically a fully digital system will calibrate on every round, to build up a historical database to help correct each individual howitzer.... in reality it can be more complicated then that, so units will typically conduct an eight round calibration with all their howitzers for their "base" lot (ie the one they have the most of), and can do inferred calculations with a single howitzer shooting subsequent lots to get all required muzzle velocity variations (MVVs) for a battery/battalion. For places like Iraq and Afghanistan this wasn't too complicated as you had all your ammunition on the firing point and knew well in advance what you were shooting. In the field it's much harder because who knows what the distribution unit will show up on their trucks... so it becomes more complicated. At the very least you can account for tube wear pretty reliably, and hope for the best when it comes to propellant efficiencies. Things like prop temperature is updated fairly regularly and I've seen evidence of both Russian and Ukrainian units doing this. I've also seen Soviet ammo with marking indicating that they are accounting for shell weight variations as well. As for rolling rounds down hill, it's not the best but realistically might not have much of an effect, as long as the obturating band is covered and the fuze well is protected. Most ammunition I've seen comes with all that covered in the packaging. We've had rounds fall off trucks and still shot them with no issues, artillery rounds are fairly hardy.
  9. Well his second thread isn't exactly accurate, as we absolutely have and account for manufacturing deviations between howitzers, and have several processes to identify these differences. We also have differences between the efficiencies of our propellants and the weight of our shells, which is why we segregate them into similar lots and track the differences between the various lots... that's probably the main difference between western and Soviet equipment, not necessarily purely a quality thing (though it plays a factor) but the fact that we more accurately account for those differences... looking at the Tabular Firing Tables of a Soviet D-30 and comparing it to ours, the amount of data they used was noticeably less. We have extremely detailed firing tables that account for many different variables, and I'm not sure if more recent Russian howitzers have improved, but I would argue that's a bigger factor then it being purely a manufacturing issue. Not every Russian howitzer is from the 1980s with completely shot out tubes, but if you have incomplete firing tables you will not be as accurate.
  10. While I can’t speak for Bear I can tell you my problems with the MATV: too small for everyone will full kit; no real covered storage on the outside of the vehicle which meant all your personnel gear got wet and snowy, or you looked like a hobo wagon with tarps and plywood strapped everywhere; impossible to conduct any sort of command or control functions inside of it (a must for survivability, as you need to avoid setting up tents); radios stored OUTSIDE the crew compartment, meaning you have to go outside to troubleshoot or change nets; small windows that are impossible to see out of; too high of a center of gravity which made it hard to maneuver on tough terrain; complex and hard to acquire repair parts; and an over reliance on civilians specialist to provide support for the various systems. It was universally hated by everyone in our battalion. It stayed in our motorpool and we used HMMWVs unless there was no other choice due to maintenance.
  11. This is a great piece, an absolute treasure trove of artillery and fire support related TTPs.
  12. A rare (recorded) example of combined arms executed by the Russians as well, if they had infantry so readily in support
  13. I believe that Severdonetsk is a fixing force for both sides. I doubt Russia will commit serious forces to take the city when there are much to easier ways to take the city, ie force them to withdraw by closing the supply lines. It seems the majority of Russia’s assaults occurring on the flanks of the salient support this theory. In regards to the picture, OPIR works both ways so that can be the actual battery locations doing the firing. Probably impossible to tell the difference with the civilian version.
  14. It’s always hard to gauge how a war is going from the perspective on the ground, especially when it’s the poor bloody infantry. I’m sure if you asked an American in the Huertgen Forest if they were winning the war they might have a difference of opinion from someone on another front. I still think it paints a bleak picture but remember that if the situation is this bad and the Russians are still struggling to achieve significant success - it probably means their forces are just as bad off as the Ukrainians. I wouldn’t be surprised if the Severdontesk pocket collapses - it does seem the Ukrainians officials are starting to telegraph that - but they may be leaving these forces on the vine to focus on building a second defensive line with other forces, instead of reinforcing a dangerous salient.
  15. It's an interesting article but I would like to see if it is supported by more then that one tweet, because that is all I've been able to find on howitzers having to go back for refit. I'm intensely curiously myself because I personally believe the M777 is a FOB Queen, well suited to supporting remote outposts in a static position but too mechanically fragile for continuous operations such as in Ukraine without extensive maintenance support. Expensive and fragile parts and an over reliance on the finicky hydraulic system (which operates everything from the closing of the breech, the tube elevation mechanism, and ability for the howitzer to displace out of position, as well as other functions) may render it out of combat more then is acceptable. These versions don't even have the digital systems, which can be their own level of burden. I am also interested in the performance of systems like the Caesar (thank you so much @Taranis for all your information on the system!) because the lack of manual or digitally degraded backups concerns me for very similar reasons, considering it may be a system adopted by the US Army. But I seriously doubt we will hear any information on that for a long time, at least from any sort of government sources. I'm not sure what issue you have with the article? In 2018 I worked on the Joint Staff for Operation Inherent Resolve and attended plenty of staff meetings where we pondered the intentions and plans of the Iraqi Army. They didn't keep us in the loop on everything they did, sometimes for valid reasons and sometimes not. They had no obligation to do so and neither do the Ukrainians. I can absolutely see Ukraine playing the same game, for exactly the reasons outlined in the article. I've read Pentagon briefing transcripts earlier in the war where the spokesman alluded to the very same thing. Another thing I learned being on such a high level staff is that it is extremely rare for the government (or at least the military) to outright lie on the record - there are many other ways to word things and "protect the truth" by bouncing around it, without risking it coming back around on you for lying to the public. So if people in the administration are coming out saying we don't have an accurate picture of Ukrainian forces, I believe it. Because beyond our space based capabilities (which can collect equally well on every system out there, Russian, Ukrainian, or otherwise), I highly doubt we are focusing assets on collecting within Ukraine itself. The risk of an American ISR asset going down in Ukraine and causing an escalation in the conflict is probably far too high for too little gain.
  16. Essentially, that is the benefit of the full digital system that the Caesar has onboard. Yes that is one of the rockets out of the pod.
  17. I don’t think Russia intends to turn Severodonetsk into Mariupol, they have a much better way to take the city by threatening the roads and forcing the units to withdraw. The fact that we’re seeing such dramatic swings in control in a matter of days leads me to believe both sides only have a limited “crust” of forces fighting for the city, trying to gain and maintain contact but not necessarily committing to digging in and holding. Yesterday the Russians were pushed back to their original defensive lines and now today the Ukrainians seem to have retreated back to the industrial area. Both sides need to contest the city in some way to prevent the reinforcement of other areas but I don’t think we’ll be seeing Mariupol levels of urban combat.
  18. I could not find anything in that video that supports that third tweet, although all I had to go off was auto-translated closed captions. Maybe I missed it, but it's a big claim so I'd love to see the proof.
  19. I am always skeptical of people claiming certain equipment or contributions will be war changing, I've heard that since February 24th and yet to see any of it pan out. There's also a lot of best-case-scenario type situations being bandied about with MLRS, and it may be strictly factual but often doesn't take into account reality. I think HIMARS or the M270 will be a good asset for Ukraine and give them a useful capability, but I doubt it will be war changing and there is still a lot that is contingent on what they actually will receive, and how much.
  20. Thank you, this is quite interesting and sounds ver similar to our systems. So can the howitzers in Ukraine receive Digital Fire commands with their upgrade or is the retrofit just to allow installation of Ukrainian radios? Also, does the howitzer have optical backups, where the crew can lay the gun using conventional means? Every unit I’ve been in has had at least one howitzer that had a degraded digital system for one reason or another and had to be operated conventionally, even while deployed. I’m always curious if these more advanced howitzers have that capability because it seems most don’t from the pictures and videos I’ve seen.
  21. Professional curiosity here, does the howitzer calculate its own firing data? Or does an FDC have to provide data and the crew punches it in to the howitzer. Or can it receive the data over a digital connection and lay automatically. I’m assuming it’s self laying and all the crew does is load and fire.
  22. I mean the T-62 was considered terrible when they were expected to fight large scale, high tempo tank battles against NATO forces. In Ukraine, I don’t think any tank out there could be considered survivable against modern ATGMs and we aren’t exactly seeing tank on tank gunfights. If you’re going to throw a tank into an village to support infantry, it might as well be something you can afford to lose. The Stuart light tank wasn’t exactly survivable compared to even a Sherman but they still had their place. Something like an IFV would be preferred but if you’ve got a ton of T-62s you might as well use (lose) them.
  23. Well as I said the M270 is a tracked vehicle and those always come with a significant logistical cost in fuel, spare parts and support vehicles. HIMARS is air transportable a glorified truck chassis, so easier to operate and supply. I don't believe I've heard of any Army units that had their M777s taken away for shipment to Ukraine. I believe it was all pre-positioned stocks and other reserves. Probably the biggest reason we gave them M777s over M198s is availability of parts in our supply chain. I have never been in a rocket unit so I am unfamiliar with the firing procedures, but from what I understand it's a fairly automated system, so not hard to train on.
  24. It’s not that simple to switch a weapon system, as now you have to also swap out the entire supply chain - the M270 is a tracked vehicle chassis and the HIMARS is a light wheeled vehicle. That includes parts and all the associated mechanics and such, and all the support equipment. That is not easy or cheap to do. You start running into second or third order effects if you start striping units like that. These National Guard rocket units are routinely deployed overseas.
  25. Wouldn’t be surprised if we only give them the shorter range, non-precision guided rockets that are around the 32-45km range. The longer range guided GMLRS was used heavily in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it’s contribution would signify a much greater risk to the US Army’s ability to project power. The HIMARS system was used at a level that basically makes it a strategic asset and I doubt we could supply a meaningful amount of the precision rockets without cutting into our own reserves. The unguided rockets have already been phased out of use however, and probably could be contributed with minimal impact from whatever war stock we had left. We’ll see how many of the systems we can even contribute however, my understanding is that a portion of the M777s came from the stockpile of Marine artillery units that were recently deactivated, and I don’t think we have dozens of these systems laying around. But I could be wrong.
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