How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[womble]

4 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

(quoting the NYT...) "...harder for Russia to reset its strategy and recover..."

This does seem to remain a particularly Russo-optimistic view on "getting their asses handed to them and barely getting out with enough of their hide to bother carrying on fighting" as seemed to happen around Kyiv and Kharkiv. I'm puzzled as to the influnces that seem to prevent the meedja from recognising these "setbacks" (to put it mildly) for the Russians as being significant successes for UKR. What is generating the disconnect here. You'd expect it to be the other way around, where the tiniest success by "the underdog" (UKR) who's pretty obviously fighting for Good and Right and Liberty against an Evil Oppressive Aggressor was hailed as the greatest military achievement since Dunkirk, but it seems to be the other way around: UKR major successes are ignored while trivial gains by RU are received as if they're fully accredited heralds of the Apocalypse.

What is going on here?

The "press" also seem to ignore the constant goalpost-shifting by the Russians, taking pronouncements from the Kremlins (they're like Gremlins but have nastier weapons) that "everything is going according to plan" as unassailable truth rather than the transparent Doublespeak that the record shows they are. Why are they doing this? Don't they remember 5 months ago? Who's pulling their strings to be this credulous in public? Is it Russian infowar success?

[Grigb]

14 minutes ago, OldSarge said:

It isn't too surprising, these machines likely have a lot of tough usage hours on them.  I would expect some priority being given to keeping them running and fully functional though. If that isn't the case it is fairly telling.

1. Lack of spare parts and preventative maintenance is Achilles heel of RU army. Keep in mind RU tanks crews consist of three men and we know that in this war RU army uses even two men crews - so no or little maintenance done. Plus add the usual low level of training and discipline and here we are.
2. Kherson guys says that Rembats (REME battalions) started to operate only recently.
3. So, it is mix of everything, but it has root cause in RU culture. RU culture is Warrior culture. Warrior fights and all these boring things are boring. So, all non-fighting activities are done more as afterthought only when you have no other options. Like you have no battle-ready tanks left.

[OldSarge]

7 minutes ago, paxromana said:

ISTR that T-62 ands T-72 (and probably T-64) engines were good for 250 running hours before they needed to be torn down and basically rebuilt -- and then they were good for another 250 running hours after which they were scrap.

Sounds like a lot - even at only a couple of hours a day for 160+ days those engines are likely stuffed - and I bet $$$ that the Russians simply do not have the technical crews needed to rebuild substantial numbers. A mobility kill due to engine problems is as good as an actual kill ...

I strongly suspect that the engines in their wheeled and tracked APCs aren't any better ... 

Thanks! That is very useful information! IIRC, the power plant on the T-64 has always been a pain point even in its heyday.

[danfrodo]

13 minutes ago, paxromana said:

ISTR that T-62 ands T-72 (and probably T-64) engines were good for 250 running hours before they needed to be torn down and basically rebuilt -- and then they were good for another 250 running hours after which they were scrap.

Sounds like a lot - even at only a couple of hours a day for 160+ days those engines are likely stuffed - and I bet $$$ that the Russians simply do not have the technical crews needed to rebuild substantial numbers. A mobility kill due to engine problems is as good as an actual kill ...

I strongly suspect that the engines in their wheeled and tracked APCs aren't any better ... 

So given that these engines are already old and many sat unused for a long time, do you think the 250 hours might actually be optimistic?  Parts like rubber seals degrade not just w usage but w time.  Of course, the fact that we are seeing ancient tanks on the battlefield already tells us much about the state things for RU.

[Ts4EVER]

20 minutes ago, womble said:

What is going on here?

 

They probably just got too used to covering colonial   anti-terror warfare.

[FancyCat]

Tbf Ukraine has not decisively demonstrated the ability to retake territory. Why Kherson is important for Ukraine is there isn't really much more important targets that Russia is defending that they cannot give up aside from the puppet republics themselves and the only cities that matter there are the oblast capitals. Once Kherson is retaken, your going to see a shift take place in news stories as a result.

[OldSarge]

15 minutes ago, Grigb said:

1. Lack of spare parts and preventative maintenance is Achilles heel of RU army. Keep in mind RU tanks crews consist of three men and we know that in this war RU army uses even two men crews - so no or little maintenance done. Plus add the usual low level of training and discipline and here we are.
2. Kherson guys says that Rembats (REME battalions) started to operate only recently.
3. So, it is mix of everything, but it has root cause in RU culture. RU culture is Warrior culture. Warrior fights and all these boring things are boring. So, all non-fighting activities are done more as afterthought only when you have no other options. Like you have no battle-ready tanks left.

Several valid points to be considered, thank you!

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Thanks for stitching that all together.  It sounds very logical and fits both the few facts we have from Pisky as well as how fighting plays out in other situations.  The basic story is much the same... Russians hammer a place with artillery, Ukraine is obligated to withdraw, weak Russian infantry forces advance until they meet some sort of resistance (small arms, tank fire, artillery, doesn't really seem to matter), Russian forces stop and dig in, Ukraine regroups.

I think your analysis of why Pisky "broke" now, after all this time, is spot on.  Ukraine's shortage of artillery combined with Russians desperate for SOME sort of advance produces conditions for the sort of battle I described above.

The shortage of Western artillery on the Ukraine side is very troubling for the West.  No nation, not even the US, planned for the possibility that it would have to rearm a significant sized military force on short notice.  They thought that either their own forces would be involved or that they'd have years to produce the necessary weaponry.  I'm not hyper critical of this lack of planning as nations can never plan for all eventualities and this situation is rather unique.  That said, with a looming Russian civil war a distinct possibility, the West might find themselves in a similar situation in the near future.  Something has to be done to not only deal with the situation we have now, but for those possibilities too.

Steve

I keep reading several Ukrainian sources that say the U.S. has a bunch of the older towed M198 155mm howitzers parked in the desert somewhere. Does anyone know if this is true? Are they in useable condition? Does the Pentagon consider part of some war reserve plan and doesn't want to let them go?

As with ten other issues this war has made clear that new factories need to be built, and what is is considered an adequate war reserve needs to be increased by a factor of ten.

And we have to get the Ukrainians some anti drone help. It is just to bleeping painful to lose this war because a few hundred Russians learned to use an XBox controller.

Edited August 4, 2022 by dan/california

[Battlefront.com]

28 minutes ago, Butschi said:

What makes you so confident? I mean, so far Ukraine has shown better judgement than Russia about what they are able to pull off but on the other hand they have yet to demonstrate their ability to conduct any operational level counteroffensive.

My thinking is based on Ukraine's caution.  When they go on the offensive I am reasonably confident that they'll have picked the right place with the right plan and at the right time.

It is also incorrect to say that Ukraine hasn't yet done anything operationally.  They have, though mostly defensive.  The basics at the operational level are the same whether it be offensive or defensive.  Emphasis and strain on systems, however, are what separates offensive logistics from defensive ones.  I think Ukraine has learned a lot about the basics that I have more confidence in them being able to pull this off now than I would have been 6 months ago.

That said, if you look at what Ukraine accomplished in 2014 under those circumstances... it was pretty impressive.  The *ONLY* reason that Ukraine didn't end this war in August of 2014, despite active Russian military involvement throughout, was the overt intervention by superior Russian forces from across the border towards the end of the month.  In fact, the pending total victory of Ukrainian forces was exactly why Russia invaded in August.

More recently the operation to clear out Russians from Kharkiv area went very well and only stalled at the end when Russia rushed in a lot of bodies to soak up Ukraine's attacks.  Ukraine has not been pushed back since with very small exceptions.

Now, we also have to keep in mind that there is another half of the equation... Russia's ability to counter an offensive.  This is where things get more speculative.

From what I've seen I do not expect that Ukraine will have that much difficulty in rolling up any specific sector of Russian frontage provided it brings the right forces into the fight.  Russia's infantry is just too thin and poorly motivated to withstand a significant push.  That's a general theory I have about anywhere on the front. 

However, practically speaking there are easier and harder places for Ukraine to set the conditions for success.  The Dontesk front is more difficult, the Kherson front easier.  Russia's ability to reinforce and even resupply forces there is constrained by factors outside of Russia's control (i.e. river crossings). 

More importantly, the geography is extremely bad for Russia.  There is roughly 30km between the frontline and the Dnepr, which means Ukraine can hit anything in Russia's rear that it wants to.  It also means that a concentrated push doesn't have to go far before it causes a ripple effect of problems for Russia's internal lines because there's only two main roads.

In short, if the question is "am I confident Ukraine can launch a counter offensive and be successful along the Donetsk front?"  I would answer "no".  But against Kherson?  Different story.  Zaporizhzhia is not looking all that bad either, but unlike Kherson there's a lot more distance to cover before a victory can be declared and I don't think that is within Ukraine's capabilities right now.

Steve

[Grigb]

Regarding RU army dealing with boring staff here is quote from report on LDNR militias state after RU MOD reorganized them.

Quote

The third period. “Paper Grave" 2015-2016 Completion of the formation of the People's Militia corps.

At the end of the Debaltseve offensive of the People's Militia corps, Russian advisers (who were completing the integration of armed units The “militia" into corps structures,) formed basic mechanism that determines the [current] technical and personnel status of the troops. 

The Russian army mafias built an extensive vertically integrated system of theft of fuel, spare parts for equipment and so on along the way from the Russian Federation to the Republic. A significant part of the supplies supplied from the Russian Federation did not even get into the units, and what got into a significant part was stolen and the income from sales “to the left” were divided between the steps/branches of the system.

As a result, there is an artificially created shortage of fuel and oil in general, a monstrous shortage of serviceable batteries for armored vehicles, tires for army vehicles, field communication cable and other supplies. In combination with the fact that for Russian advisers the equipment of training areas and exceptions was and still more important than real constant effective combat work of troops at the front (and their continuous training), there are no resources allocated "from the top", which leads to forced compensation of this with resources “from below”, from the pocket
of soldiers and junior command staff.

 

From the same report about RU manufacture of spare parts for vehicles

Quote

The real problem lies elsewhere. The war in Donbas has been going on for almost 5 years. 5 years old! During this time, it was possible to establish the production of any spare parts and ammunition in any quantities. This has not been done. Moreover, this was clearly not done either for delivery to Donbass, or for recruiting units The Russian army. During our activity, we also contacted official Russian manufacturing and repair plants in an attempt to purchase something. The general conclusion is this: it is almost impossible to buy anything, because everything that
it is made in small batches, goes to the acquisition of new equipment. The fact that after a while these new vehicles will also require repair is delicately forgotten.

The Russian inability to produce tens of thousands of relatively small-scale items of varying degrees of complexity is extremely disturbing. In the event of a significant war, we will face the problem of the First World War in 1915 at a new level. In contrast from those times, we will probably produce shells and bullets in the right quantity. But why would you need a bunch of military equipment that is not combat-ready because of thousands and thousands of missing little things.

 

[FancyCat]

Partly why this is a SMO, and why mobilization has not occurred, whatever the Russian PR, Putin does not feel safe enough to establish the conditions most likely to bring victory. If victory in the eyes of the Russian people was successful defense of Russia thru offensive actions in Ukraine, thereby warding away NATO from attacking Russia, he may have mobilized by now.

That he does not, that he refuses, illustrates that the opposite of Russian victory, is not the invasion of Russia by NATO from Ukraine. It's his ass getting overthrown by the people for sending them to a war they don't wanna fight. Hardly people fighting to preserve their values against a declining West. More like people who are content to let the war go on as long as minorities, the poor are the only ones dying and the war does not advance to their homes.

That brings up a good point, where are the false flags? Putin came to power on the apartment bombings, 300 people died.

One would think that Putin would bolster his regime support. Maybe for all the rhetoric, Russians are not likely to accept such behavior came from Ukraine? Oh wait, Putin wasn't in power, he was offering the solution to the problem.

If **** goes down here, he's the one getting blamed. Again, I also think that his risk calculation of being overthrown if he loses in Ukraine is outweighed by the risk of being overthrown losing the lives of Russians in mobilization.

Which is quite interesting that he thinks that. Maybe his confidence in suppressing elite coups is greater than public protest and mass unrest like that of the 90s?

[dan/california]

4 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

My thinking is based on Ukraine's caution.  When they go on the offensive I am reasonably confident that they'll have picked the right place with the right plan and at the right time.

It is also incorrect to say that Ukraine hasn't yet done anything operationally.  They have, though mostly defensive.  The basics at the operational level are the same whether it be offensive or defensive.  Emphasis and strain on systems, however, are what separates offensive logistics from defensive ones.  I think Ukraine has learned a lot about the basics that I have more confidence in them being able to pull this off now than I would have been 6 months ago.

That said, if you look at what Ukraine accomplished in 2014 under those circumstances... it was pretty impressive.  The *ONLY* reason that Ukraine didn't end this war in August of 2014, despite active Russian military involvement throughout, was the overt intervention by superior Russian forces from across the border towards the end of the month.  In fact, the pending total victory of Ukrainian forces was exactly why Russia invaded in August.

More recently the operation to clear out Russians from Kharkiv area went very well and only stalled at the end when Russia rushed in a lot of bodies to soak up Ukraine's attacks.  Ukraine has not been pushed back since with very small exceptions.

Now, we also have to keep in mind that there is another half of the equation... Russia's ability to counter an offensive.  This is where things get more speculative.

From what I've seen I do not expect that Ukraine will have that much difficulty in rolling up any specific sector of Russian frontage provided it brings the right forces into the fight.  Russia's infantry is just too thin and poorly motivated to withstand a significant push.  That's a general theory I have about anywhere on the front. 

However, practically speaking there are easier and harder places for Ukraine to set the conditions for success.  The Dontesk front is more difficult, the Kherson front easier.  Russia's ability to reinforce and even resupply forces there is constrained by factors outside of Russia's control (i.e. river crossings). 

More importantly, the geography is extremely bad for Russia.  There is roughly 30km between the frontline and the Dnepr, which means Ukraine can hit anything in Russia's rear that it wants to.  It also means that a concentrated push doesn't have to go far before it causes a ripple effect of problems for Russia's internal lines because there's only two main roads.

In short, if the question is "am I confident Ukraine can launch a counter offensive and be successful along the Donetsk front?"  I would answer "no".  But against Kherson?  Different story.  Zaporizhzhia is not looking all that bad either, but unlike Kherson there's a lot more distance to cover before a victory can be declared and I don't think that is within Ukraine's capabilities right now.

Steve

Ghirkin among others has repeatedly stated that RU aviation is what has halted previous Ukrainian attacks that were at real risk of breaking through. Do we think NASSM could cover a bubble big enough to let the Ukrainians effect a real breakthrough?

[danfrodo]

4 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

My thinking is based on Ukraine's caution.  When they go on the offensive I am reasonably confident that they'll have picked the right place with the right plan and at the right time.

It is also incorrect to say that Ukraine hasn't yet done anything operationally.  They have, though mostly defensive.  The basics at the operational level are the same whether it be offensive or defensive.  Emphasis and strain on systems, however, are what separates offensive logistics from defensive ones.  I think Ukraine has learned a lot about the basics that I have more confidence in them being able to pull this off now than I would have been 6 months ago.

That said, if you look at what Ukraine accomplished in 2014 under those circumstances... it was pretty impressive.  The *ONLY* reason that Ukraine didn't end this war in August of 2014, despite active Russian military involvement throughout, was the overt intervention by superior Russian forces from across the border towards the end of the month.  In fact, the pending total victory of Ukrainian forces was exactly why Russia invaded in August.

More recently the operation to clear out Russians from Kharkiv area went very well and only stalled at the end when Russia rushed in a lot of bodies to soak up Ukraine's attacks.  Ukraine has not been pushed back since with very small exceptions.

Now, we also have to keep in mind that there is another half of the equation... Russia's ability to counter an offensive.  This is where things get more speculative.

From what I've seen I do not expect that Ukraine will have that much difficulty in rolling up any specific sector of Russian frontage provided it brings the right forces into the fight.  Russia's infantry is just too thin and poorly motivated to withstand a significant push.  That's a general theory I have about anywhere on the front. 

However, practically speaking there are easier and harder places for Ukraine to set the conditions for success.  The Dontesk front is more difficult, the Kherson front easier.  Russia's ability to reinforce and even resupply forces there is constrained by factors outside of Russia's control (i.e. river crossings). 

More importantly, the geography is extremely bad for Russia.  There is roughly 30km between the frontline and the Dnepr, which means Ukraine can hit anything in Russia's rear that it wants to.  It also means that a concentrated push doesn't have to go far before it causes a ripple effect of problems for Russia's internal lines because there's only two main roads.

In short, if the question is "am I confident Ukraine can launch a counter offensive and be successful along the Donetsk front?"  I would answer "no".  But against Kherson?  Different story.  Zaporizhzhia is not looking all that bad either, but unlike Kherson there's a lot more distance to cover before a victory can be declared and I don't think that is within Ukraine's capabilities right now.

Steve

Most definitely the above.  UKR in most any sector on the front can retreat w/o facing disaster.  RU in Kherson cannot.  The thinner that front gets the more firepower UKR can bring onto rear areas that should be farther back but have no where to go.  what's the range of 82-120mm mortars, like 5-8km?  Not much retreat and UKR has mortars hitting nearly all the way to the river.  That's a disaster, when there's nowhere that's not under inexpensive enemy fire.

I would not want to be in this kessel, no no no.

[Battlefront.com]

48 minutes ago, womble said:

This does seem to remain a particularly Russo-optimistic view on "getting their asses handed to them and barely getting out with enough of their hide to bother carrying on fighting" as seemed to happen around Kyiv and Kharkiv. I'm puzzled as to the influnces that seem to prevent the meedja from recognising these "setbacks" (to put it mildly) for the Russians as being significant successes for UKR. What is generating the disconnect here. You'd expect it to be the other way around, where the tiniest success by "the underdog" (UKR) who's pretty obviously fighting for Good and Right and Liberty against an Evil Oppressive Aggressor was hailed as the greatest military achievement since Dunkirk, but it seems to be the other way around: UKR major successes are ignored while trivial gains by RU are received as if they're fully accredited heralds of the Apocalypse.

What is going on here?

The "press" also seem to ignore the constant goalpost-shifting by the Russians, taking pronouncements from the Kremlins (they're like Gremlins but have nastier weapons) that "everything is going according to plan" as unassailable truth rather than the transparent Doublespeak that the record shows they are. Why are they doing this? Don't they remember 5 months ago? Who's pulling their strings to be this credulous in public? Is it Russian infowar success?

I think it boils down to the reporters (and, sadly, some experts) not understanding cumulative effects of losses from combat and time.  Not just here, but with pretty much any conflict in history.

When one looks at the entire course of WW2 it is often overlooked that up to the invasion of the Soviet Union Germany had lost several hundred thousand casualties, more than a thousand aircraft, more than a thousand tanks, etc.  Moreover, it had to garrison massive amounts of territory with military units that could not otherwise be used for Russia.  Not to mention an increasing commitment in North Africa.  It's logistics were stretched to cover all of that, which in turn required a lot of fuel that Germany was already in short supply of.

Yet when people look to the seeds of defeat of Nazi Germany, the pre-Babarossa victories are looked at as if they were all positive for Germany.  No examination of the cumulative strain it had on future battles.  And it gets even worse as the war progressed.  People argue about Kursk as if there was really an option for German success (there wasn't) because they look at the battle without context.  They argue about this unit going here vs. there, starting earlier, etc.  All of minuscule importance compared to the cumulative losses and strains Germany was already under going into the 1943 campaign season.

I see the same poor contextual thinking here as with the above example.  Every single time Russia fails at something it loses resources that it isn't able to fully replace.  The more time that Russia fails, the further behind they get.  Considering they started the war woefully under resourced, these cumulative losses matter even more so.

Russia is already spent as an offensive force.  Whatever attacks it is still capable of mounting, they are not of a scale capable of changing the overall strategic picture.  And when you've chosen to invade another country and are stopped cold... changing the strategic picture is a requirement for victory.

Steve

[danfrodo]

7 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I think it boils down to the reporters (and, sadly, some experts) not understanding cumulative effects of losses from combat and time.  Not just here, but with pretty much any conflict in history.

When one looks at the entire course of WW2 it is often overlooked that up to the invasion of the Soviet Union Germany had lost several hundred thousand casualties, more than a thousand aircraft, more than a thousand tanks, etc.  Moreover, it had to garrison massive amounts of territory with military units that could not otherwise be used for Russia.  Not to mention an increasing commitment in North Africa.  It's logistics were stretched to cover all of that, which in turn required a lot of fuel that Germany was already in short supply of.

Yet when people look to the seeds of defeat of Nazi Germany, the pre-Babarossa victories are looked at as if they were all positive for Germany.  No examination of the cumulative strain it had on future battles.  And it gets even worse as the war progressed.  People argue about Kursk as if there was really an option for German success (there wasn't) because they look at the battle without context.  They argue about this unit going here vs. there, starting earlier, etc.  All of minuscule importance compared to the cumulative losses and strains Germany was already under going into the 1943 campaign season.

I see the same poor contextual thinking here as with the above example.  Every single time Russia fails at something it loses resources that it isn't able to fully replace.  The more time that Russia fails, the further behind they get.  Considering they started the war woefully under resourced, these cumulative losses matter even more so.

Russia is already spent as an offensive force.  Whatever attacks it is still capable of mounting, they are not of a scale capable of changing the overall strategic picture.  And when you've chosen to invade another country and are stopped cold... changing the strategic picture is a requirement for victory.

Steve

I'd say no one bothered to looked at the strain on Germany's military because of the elephants in the room:

1.  germany beat very powerful France/UK in 6 weeks

2.  Russian military showed itself to be a paper tiger against tiny Finland 

3. Stalin purged nearly the entire officer corps above rank of major

4.  Stalin's killing machine was hated and feared by much of the populace, who would not lift a finger to save Stalin

So based on the facts above, few thought Germany would have to fight all the way to Moscow.  Stalin's govt would collapse after devastating German blitz and Germany could install some nice puppet.  In retrospect we see the german weaknesses.  Like in Ukraine now -- the weaknesses only matter because the coup didn't work even though most folks thought it would (Steve excluded).

Kursk:  I remember when I was younger there were actually folks that argued that Germany won Kursk because RU losses were much higher.  Except that any time the outcome of a battle is that you spend the next month retreating +200km cannot exactly be considered a success.

Pisky will be another realtime test of the belief that RU is spent offensively.  If in another week RU is still stuck there, it's another data point in favor of the 'spent RU' camp (a growing camp).

[The_MonkeyKing]

 

some more special deliveries to Ukraine

[panzermartin]

3 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

 

some more special deliveries to Ukraine

The bottom picture is from March I think and according to a comment the plant got hit by kalibrs 24h after this post? 

[Battlefront.com]

Another good article in mainstream media.  This one is an OpEd piece by a think tank guy.  No paywall:

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3587600-putin-cant-control-his-ukraine-cataclysm-and-the-us-must-get-ready/

I want to emphasize that I just found this article.  I say that because one could look at my last few posts and think I copied and pasted out of this guy's OpEd piece   See this bit with my bolding at the top:

Quote

Manpower and logistical constraints prevent Russia’s military from regaining the operational initiative and make it severely vulnerable to even moderate Ukrainian pressure, which is building. Ukraine’s counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast is underway, although it remains in the “shaping” phase. It is dividing the Russian bridgehead on the Dnipro River’s north bank into segments and using long-range fire to disrupt logistics; over time, it will degrade Russian combat power. Ukraine’s hope is that Russia will cut its losses and withdraw, much as it did around Kyiv and from Snake Island. 

This was, basically, my response to Butschi.   However, the author thinks that Kherson will be too costly for Ukraine in the short term and it should instead shoot for driving down from Zaporizhzhia.  He makes some very good arguments and, honestly, I've been back and forth on this for months.  The logic of driving to the Sea of Azov makes a lot of sense and it effectively ends the Kherson occupation in the process.  However, I do not think Ukraine has the manpower to pull it off.  At least not yet.  So I'm thinking clean up Kherson (I think it won't be as tough a fight as the author does) and then redirect those forces to Zaporizhzhia to do that next.

Steve

[cesmonkey]

48 minutes ago, dan/california said:

I keep reading several Ukrainian sources that say the U.S. has a bunch of the older towed M198 155mm howitzers parked in the desert somewhere. Does anyone know if this is true? Are they in useable condition? Does the Pentagon consider part of some war reserve plan and doesn't want to let them go?

Maybe here?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sierra_Army_Depot
https://sierra.army.mil/

You can look in the Satellite view of Google Maps in the area north and see hundreds of parked armored vehicles and other equipment

[FancyCat]

10 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

The bottom picture is from March I think and according to a comment the plant got hit by kalibrs 24h after this post? 

I think that it's rumored the planes were moved before it got hit.

Didn't Russia send a bunch of forces to defend that approach Steve?

[MSBoxer]

56 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Every single time Russia fails at something it loses resources that it isn't able to fully replace.

Every single time they succeed at something they also lose resources that they aren't  able to fully replace.

Edited August 4, 2022 by MSBoxer

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

Col. Vasily Kleshchenko, Ka-52 pilot, deputy commander of the 344th Center for Combat Use and Retraining of Army Aviation Flight Personnel (presumably he was with a combat unit at time of death):

 

[akd]

Russian mine clearance tactics grow ever more sophisticated:

 

[Grigb]

3 hours ago, Grigb said:

RU Nats claiming that according to UKR some UKR units retreated somewhere at Bakhmut and Avdiyvka areas. But no RU reports of them capturing anything. 

 

And it is wrong. Or they said does not quite correspond to reality

 

[Haiduk]

10 minutes ago, Grigb said:

And it is wrong. Or they said does not quite correspond to reality

 

Our General Staff today confirmed a loss of Butivka position near Avdiivka and Semyhirya village on Bakhmut direction, so probably they meant this.

Edited August 4, 2022 by Haiduk