How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Taranis]

 

[Aragorn2002]

1 hour ago, BletchleyGeek said:

There's that, and there may be a further strenghtening of the resolve to see the Russian Federation decisively defeated. Enabling more action that you can see some countries in the EU reluctant to take.

So what kind of action do you suggest without risking a full scale war? Personally I'm in favor of decisive action too, like sending NATO air defence units into the Ukraine and stop using Russian gas with immediate effect, even if that means Europe will freeze (serves us right!). But I also understand that politicians in Europe are more careful about risking war than those in the US, or Australia for that matter.

Whatever the consequences, they will mainly be for Europe and God knows we already have enough problems overhere. That shouldn't stop us from doing more, but it puts  things more in prespective.

Edited April 9, 2022 by Aragorn2002

[Haiduk]

First visully confirmed shot down Russian UCAV Orion. Estimated number of produced items is about 30. It can carry up to 250 kg of payload: adjustable bombs KAB-20, KAB-50, guided bomb UPAB-50, usual bomb FAB-50, guided missiles Kh-50 (some sort of Hellfire)  

Edited April 9, 2022 by Haiduk

[CHEqTRO]

 

Yo @DMS, you were saying something about the dehumanization of Russian soldiers?

[Haiduk]

@sburke @Kinophile

+2

Mayor Denis Yagidarov, commander of airborne battlion of 31st separate air-assault brigade  

Lt.colonel Dinar Khametov, MLRS battalion commander of 200th motor-rifle brigade of 14th Army Corps of Joint Strategical Command "Northern Fleet". Probably killed in Kharkiv area, when BTG of 200th brigade was almost completely destroyed

 

[chuckdyke]

Here the animals from the same farm know how to deal with an invader.

 

[BeondTheGrave]

9 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

And this isn't just to bust on Russia.  US car manufacturers had to shut down entire factories, paying workers to sit home, because a tiny little chip or two made in ROK, China, or Taiwan didn't show up on time.  You can't just turn around and produce chips out of thin air.  As I said earlier, the US would have not much better luck producing it's primary weapons without chips and parts from other countries, and unlike Russia it does have the theoretical ingredients to do so.

I suppose I would just also add, again, that even if you could spin up production, in the west or elsewhere, producing crews and soldiers is as much a bottleneck as production. Take an S-300. Russia can produce all the S-300s it wants, but what good is it when its being operated by a conscript with 2mo basic + 1 mo MOS training? I absolutely guarantee you that the only two jobs on an S-300 team that can be filled by that soldier are 'truck driver' and 'coffee boy.' And now I know what you'll say, coffee is a war winning weapon. For sure. But I, with zero military training, could make a mean cup of coffee. I cant operate a radar with enough skill and precision to shoot down hostile aircraft. Maybe you could train up a tank crew or an infantry squad that fast, but they'd just die. 3 mo. training time (A number I totally just made up) isn't even enough to properly change someone's conditioning! The honest fact of the matter is when it comes to Russia and Ukraine or the US and China, the war will be won by the stocks of weapons that both sides have on hand, or can very quickly recondition for service. 

[Probus]

For @Haiduk and @kraze (Pink Floyd's new song):

 

Also a classic Pink Floyd song (Dog's of War) updated:

https://fb.watch/chd_ourCLx/

 

[akd]

More excellent reporting from The Guardian’s Shaun Walker:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/09/after-russians-retreat-scarred-ukrainian-village-recounts-month-of-terror

[LongLeftFlank]

On 3/1/2022 at 1:15 AM, The_Capt said:

War, all war, is a human social activity that is defined by a collision of certainties.  It is a theory with primary components of: a version of reality, communication, negotiation and sacrifice, all laid overtop a foundation of culture/identity and power. 

Right now this is a three way war (at least): Russia, Ukraine and the West (for want of a better word).  I include the West not only for the material and volunteer fighters but the incredible amount of information warfare being waged all pretty much in the direction of Russia.  Further the West also has a vision of reality and certainty stake in all this.

So what?  Well the versions of reality by all parties is pretty clear by now. Russia's is a still a little vague but it is hard not to see an overall aim here. 

Communication is literally happening live on YouTube and Twitter in all its forms.

Negotiation is ongoing in so many dimensions it would be impossible to see them all. 

Sacrifice, which is more than the obvious tragedy of loss of life, but what each side is willing to lose in order to win, is largely unknown outside of some really big rocks (e.g. The west is not willing to sacrifice New York for Kyiv). This war is definitely existential for Ukraine, may be for Russia and very impactful for the western based view of the world order. 

In summary this system is still in collision and it is almost impossible to tell where it will land; if you want to know how a war ends, you have to fight it first. 

So what can we tell so far?  Well for that I take a look at the deeper power frameworks:

If we take Power as Will, Strength, Relationships and Opportunity (there are other models but this one works):

- Opportunity.  The option space for a short sharp war, which probably served Russian ends, is pretty much closed.  And here I mean for all sides.  Ukraine has dug in and I am not sure they would listen at a local level if the Ukrainian government begged them to put down arms.  Russian military operations have not gone according to plan.  There is too much evidence of stalls, logistical screw ups and frankly disturbing losses....  The Russian quick definitive war options spaces have likely collapsed unless they are willing to escalate to the WMD level.  The West has swung the other way, dramatically.  Soft support and kinda weak signals have been galvanized in a manner I find shocking to be honest.  This, and the fourth party in this fight, the people of the global community, is also something I am not sure anyone was ready for.  So what?  Opportunity-wise Russia is facing one of two spheres of options: negotiate a "just enough win" or dig in for a long hard grind. Ukraine is... pretty much "hey Russia go f#ck yourself" and wage a hybrid war for the history books (we are talking Iberian Peninsula "war to the knife" type stuff).  There have been zero signs of regional Ukrainian splits beyond the Donbas (and even there), so while Balkanization is likely on the table there is a lot of space between initial bargaining positions.

- Relationships.  This could not have gone better for Ukraine if they actually sat down and workshopped it as a movie script.  Russia is isolated and villainized to a point I am not sure even the most optimistic western planner could hope for.  China and India are basically staying out of this as far as I can see, while Russia's allies are Belarus and Chechens (modern day Cossacks)....  Only the most delusional Russophile could describe this as anything but a total relationship disaster for Russia and enormous victory for Ukraine, at least so far.

- Strength.  Well this is a deep rabbit hole but I am pretty sure most experts will (and are) saying that Russia still has an enormous military advantage (even subtracting the nuclear equation).  Their economy is crashing a lot faster than many thought so unless those "military contractors" on the Russian side are being paid in USD, it is going to hurt eventually.  But Russia is a big machine that will take a long time to choke out economically - at least that is the theory. I am beginning to wonder. So if this turns into a long grinding war we will likely see urban sieges (wow that takes me back) and a brutal insurgency that is really not good for anyone.  Russians will bleed, heavily and Ukraine will take decades to recover.  In the end, neither side is showing an inability to muster and project military power, at least for now.

- Will, the church of warfare, and it definitely applies here. Whose will break first? 

Not the West, our stakes are much lower and we are pretty much all in for the little guy, plus we are not hurting.  Putin really has only one option space wrt to western Will and that is nuclear war; however, he will likely suffer a 9mm headache if he tries to go that far. 

Ukrainian Will, well... it seems pretty clear that Ukrainian will to fight has escalated in the last 5 days, not diminished.  Compare the Ukraine to the Afghan National Army vs Taliban last Aug. if one wants a stark contrast of the concept of Will.  

Russia, hoo buddy, lets sit down and have a conversation.  So things have definitely not gone according to any sane plan.  The Ukrainians are really pissed off and are digging in hard, they own the ground and are being supplied by the best the west can give them and that cheque is pretty close to blank.  So, how bad do you really want the Ukraine? I mean really want it?  This is making that little misadventure to Afghanistan back in 79 look pretty benign.  You can probably "win" this militarily but it may very well break your nation trying to do it.  Russian Will is right now the center of gravity for this whole thing and time is not on its side.

Seems like a good time to repost (part of) this great comment from early in this thread (and very early in the war).

While no doubt the author will refine it further in time, I find 'Collision of Certainties' has held up a lot better as a basic 'theory of the war' to date than the Who's Winning 'discounted he-said-she-said' scorekeeping approach in the video posted above. And I mean no disrespect to the analyst - his observations make sense but don't truly capture what's driving this conflict.

Atrocities notwithstanding, this isn't (yet) a total war or a vernichtungsschlacht, so pure winning-losing metrics don't apply.

[TheVulture]

From April 8, the EU countries stopped, the passage of vehicles registered in the Russian Federation and Belarus, - the Federal Customs Service of Russia

https://t.me/rian_ru/157949

(Sorry for the big text - can't find an easy way to change font from copy-pasted text on mobile)

Edited April 9, 2022 by TheVulture

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, CHEqTRO said:

Yo @DMS, you were saying something about the dehumanization of Russian soldiers?

Yes, hard to not dehumanize the Russian soldier when they have done such an excellent job of dehumanizing themselves.

This is to DMS specifically and to any other unapologetic Russian poster lurking with an idea of posting...

In theory you could offer some insights and points for discussion that don't reinforce what we've seen so far (denial, "whataboutism", "alternative facts", etc.) so I'm going to give you that option.  However, we are not interested in the regurgitation of Kremlin talking points or any kind of twisting of reality to justify a textbook example of a war of aggression.  That's easy enough to find elsewhere.  Therefore, if you post only to refute the obvious, excuse the inexcusable, and attempt to derail the train of logic the rest of us are on then you'll find yourself off the Forum permanently.  

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

I short but interesting post from a verified volunteer's Twitter account:

Unlike the north, the terrain around the Kherson area is a lot harder to conduct "hit and hold" operations if the enemy has general control of the area and sufficient mobile forces to respond to incursions.  Just like traditional airborne ops, unless larger scale friend ground ops are launched to link up or otherwise obligate the enemy to withdraw, such tactics aren't going to work out so well for the friendly forces. 

"Hit and run" can still work, but if there's fewer places to run to and/or the distances between them are significant, operations against an enemy with sufficient control and mobile forces is going to be difficult to do at much beyond the "lone wolf" level.  Even a few dozen partisans operating together risk getting pinned down and eliminated.

Partisan movements have always done better in rough terrain, always had a more difficult time in open terrain.  If we look to Afghanistan we can see that whenever the insurgent forces massed in the open they were fairly easily eliminated even if they initially scored a success.  The Taliban succeeded mostly because the occupiers did not have sufficient forces available to counter each threat or attack in all places at all times over many years.  The Taliban did not win by force of arms, they won politically through force of arms.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

I think this one has already been recorded, but a name search in this thread didn't pop up a hit so maybe new?

 

[Haiduk]

3 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I think this one has already been recorded, but a name search in this thread didn't pop up a hit so maybe new?

 

I've written about lt.colonel Khametov in previous post )

[Battlefront.com]

This would seem to be somewhere on the coast of the Sea of Azov in the Mariupol sector, but I could not geolocate it on a map.  It seems that the southern port facilities fell to the Russians yesterday.

 

[Battlefront.com]

3 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

I've written about lt.colonel Khametov in previous post )

Sorry, I didn't see that post!  And my search of the thread failed because Google Translated his name as "Khametova" and I forgot to take the A off the end.  I should have caught that mistake.

Steve

[acrashb]

39 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The Taliban succeeded mostly because the occupiers did not have sufficient forces available to counter each threat or attack in all places at all times over many years.  The Taliban did not win by force of arms, they won politically through force of arms.

The two key factors in the Taliban win are a) gross corruption in the Afghan government (perhaps reflecting societal issues) and, more critically, b) support from, AFAIK, every geographically neighbouring country (especially Pakistan). A tertiary, but tipping-point, factor would be the abrupt withdrawal of the occupying forces that buffered against the first two factors.

Many - more than 30K - Afghan security forces lost their lives defending an ideal (or making a living with a dangerous job, or both).  When their only effective support system abruptly left and their corrupt government fled, unsurprisingly most of the security forces just gave up.  What else could they do?

I suppose one could call that a political victory, as it wasn't decided on a battlefield.  So I guess I just made your point.  I wanted to adjust the narrative about sufficient occupying forces - the Afghan soldiers and police paid a high price to try to save their country and they should be acknowledged.

[Harmon Rabb]

Boris Johnson paid a surprise visit to Kiev today.

I wonder if anti-ship missiles were among the topics discussed at that table?

[TheVulture]

39 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Unlike the north, the terrain around the Kherson area is a lot harder to conduct "hit and hold" operations if the enemy has general control of the area and sufficient mobile forces to respond to incursions.  Just like traditional airborne ops, unless larger scale friend ground ops are launched to link up or otherwise obligate the enemy to withdraw, such tactics aren't going to work out so well for the friendly forces. 

In the Kherson area I'd have thought that taking ground for the saken of it has less value.  Obviously you want to try and be in range to pose some kind of threat to the airport and the two main Dneipr crossings, but beyond that I'd have imagined the goal is more to bleed the Russians and put continual pressure on their logistics,  manpower and morale to the point that it all breaks down in a collapse,  or Russia decides that the cost of maintaining a bridgehead on the west bank isn't worth it. 

We all know that Russia has no realistic prospect in advancing out of Kherson in the forseeable future, and aside from the politcal optics of giving up Kherson, the only military reason to keep the bridgehead is if they plan to expand it in the future. If ambitions have been scaled back to the land bridge and more of the Donbass, it would surely make more sense for Russia to defend on the east bank could be held at lower cost with fewer forces. 

[TheVulture]

Smoke visible from Kherson, apparently in the Bilozerka direction where there has been fighting in recent days. 

 

 

[danfrodo]

4 hours ago, chuckdyke said:

Here the animals from the same farm know how to deal with an invader.

 

This is what Aragorn and I have been saying from the start.  The chickens are fighting back but if you bring a goat to a bird fight you win right away and a lot less chickens die.  So unleash the goat (NATO, that is).  There's enough war crimes here to justify it.  They hawk can choose to flee or get trampled by the goat.  'course best outcome is if the hawk looses all his feathers (heavy weapons) while fleeing.

[Holien]

8 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Boris Johnson paid a surprise visit to Kiev today.

I wonder if anti-ship missiles were among the topics discussed at that table?

I doubt it, more a distraction to help Johnson back home rather than to help Ukraine.

I hope the #ucking lack of visas to Ukrainian refugees was on the table, people in UK want to help but the Government is asking for paperwork even for cat's being brought into the UK. 

I am glad we have sent weapons but we could be doing more to help the refugees. 

[danfrodo]

17 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

I wonder if anti-ship missiles were among the topics discussed at that table?

What are you thinking here Harmon Rabb? 

I've been wondering about this myself -- could anti-ship missiles be provided that could somehow reach Russian ships out of sight of shore?  Guided by drones?  This is one of my favorite dreams, where UKR unleashes a surprise anti-ship missile attack and knocks out a large number of Sauron's naval forces in the Black Sea.

My other dream is to wake up and see headlines like "gunfire and fighting going on at the kremlin". 

[akd]

128th Mountain Assault Brigade fighting in forest near Kreminna: