BeondTheGrave

I maintain very fiercely that one cannot use math to describe human behavior, which is illogical and anarchic in even regimented institutions. And so the push to 'model all the things' ultimately leads to an intellectual dead end and the wrong kind of solutions. Math, data, modeling is good for examining how to make small changes to systems (what weapons should we send to Ukraine, what will produce the most effect in the shortest time). But it cannot lead in a strategic sense (how does Ukraine protect its independence) because you cant properly factor every variable. Take Afghanistan. You can do all the wonderful calculations you want about how to win the war. Except what does winning look like? How do you even describe the word? Is it democracy? If so what kind, one led by elites in Kabul or one that works for every community at the expense of the center? One that we can control or one that may make its own choices? Or is just killing the Taliban and keeping China and Russia out? All of this reflects the uncertainty, variability, and contingency of our own thinking but the same is also true of the other side, who always gets a vote and is constantly reevaluating their vote. You can count things, bodycount, ammunition expenditure, relative strengths. But ultimately even Clausewitz himself dismisses this mathematical approach to war. Because at its heart the Soviets were wrong and the Germans were right: war is an art first, not a science first. Math and numbers sing you a siren's song of certainty, but war is uncertain because humans are in turn noble, courageous, inventive, stupid, cowardly, and lazy. And so the whole affair is more like a sports match or a game of poker than it is like running a Walmart or manipulating the stock market. All this is to say that this line of thinking, at least in the US, predates powerpoint and really goes back to the 60s. But I find its durability in the defense system quite disheartening. There is the constant pressure to manage war and the DoD like a business, when really it should be run like a military (duh!) But making change is next to impossible thanks to a whole host of factors not worth digging into.

Ive been thinking about this a bit. 1mil people is a lot of people. If they go whole hog well really put to the test what I've always said about mass mobilization in the precision guided age (that is, its not feasible). I think Putin could put 50k people in uniform a month and get them into Ukraine. I bet Ukraine could kill half of them and render the other half totally incapable of fighting, resulting in a net drag on Russia's capability to continue fighting. Drafting 800k people is also going to be massively expensive. My thought was that the draft may not be the 'everyone but the infirm' kind were used to. I dont really know much about how the Russian reservist system works, but I could see the draft being a bit of a stick to get older unwilling vets back into uniform. Maybe your 30yo contract soldiers who served out a term or two then decided to go home and farm cabbages or work for 1C in a city? Ive often thought that, in terms of drafting and mobilization, thats the way to go if you need to return to a broader based conscription system. Use the draft not to hoover up every yokel on his farm, but to instead draw up lists of people with skills or past experience and then force them into uniform to make up for some shortage you have. Not really sure if thats possible in the Russian system, or indeed necessary. IIRC the USArmy has some mechanism to recall someone to active service at basically any time, if its really hit the fan. Maybe Russia has already been doing this? Well anyway my track record on predictions is poor, I am a historian after all. This is just something I had thought the other day.

The whole NATO expansion argument has this exact energy. "If you just listened to me and did what I told you we would have been okay. But you had to run off to the other guy, now I have to teach Ukraine a lesson." Its really important when discussing NATO expansion to consider that A) Russia did not want to let Eastern Europe go politically and economically during the collapse of the USSR. Eastern Europe forced Russia out by threatening them with the prospect of a civil war (let us go or start killing us in the streets, or, let us go or repeat 53/68 yet again). B ) During the collapse of Russia's periphery it started a half dozen wars and invaded several of former republics. Conflicts which continue to this day in Transnistra and Georgia. This is just to say again that this argument about the USSR/RusFed coming back and trying to reestablish some sphere of influence in Eastern Europe wasn't a theoretical concern, it wasn't a concern blown up by western propagandists, rather it was a realistic concern held by people who had already spent most of their lives trying to rid themselves of the USSR. Russian behavior from 1945 to 1995 created the push for NATO expansion. And in the hypothetical, had NATO not expanded I think we would have seen other regional and continental security arrangements grow up in place. Perhaps the EU would have become far more militarized than it currently is as a result. If Russians are so upset at NATO expansion they should ask themselves why its former allies ran so quickly to the other side. Its not like Eastern Europe has been buying that much western surplus, until fairly recently Poland was still armed with domestically upgraded Soviet surplus! These countries are not the free riders most Americans complain about, but rather people who are armed for their own defense. Because they see real risk emanating from their neighbor. Because the Russian government has spent the last 80 years trying to colonize eastern & central Europe for their own ends. You dont see Canada running of to join an EU anti-American alliance, but then the US and Canada have (despite ups and downs) maintained a rather stable and respectful relationship for the last 200 or so years.

https://www.kyivpost.com/eastern-europe/kremlin-to-family-members-of-moskva-cruiser-crew-ship-sank-by-accident-no-war-compensation.html The real reason why Russia declared Moskva an accident?

Hello, hello? I dont know why you say goodbye I say hello.

As I recall the Berlin Brigade only have 12 howitzers for the entire brigade as well, so very limited re support assets.

Related: Also related:

The one thing I would add to this is that Russia was clearly betting that the West would not react, or if it did would do it so slowly as to not obstruct the invasion. They clearly bet right re: Germany, but had assumed that would be the dominant European narrative. Not a bad bet given recent history, Germany's leading role in the EU, and generally Europe's dependence on Russia economically. In many ways the West and the US are more fragmented and scattered than they ever have been. Atlantic-skepticism on both sides of the pond is at all-time highs. And without the west's blank check, who knows how things would have gone. But Russia also bet against history. No country in the world has done a better job of uniting Europe and the United States than Russia, and it was obvious the moment word of the invasion leaked that Europe would be in not out. Honestly I had thought at the time the biggest win for Putin possible would have been to extend his wargame an extra two weeks, threaten war, then pull back and demobilize. "look" he could have crowed "the west is pining for us to attack them, fabricating justifications for a war we never planned. The west hates us for doing exactly what they do." Instead he went all in. Idiot. Anyways regarding the fires:

By my rough math there were, what, 11 CAAs assigned to the start of the war? If you assume ~30% overall casualties for the Russians thats 3.3 CAAe worth of manpower removed. Wouldn't surprise me that the northern armies and Kharkov axis armies are basically shot and that everything in the south is running by eating what they can from the other directions. I mean we basically saw confirmation of this with the Kyiv pullout, right? Northern army was beaten and so it was redeployed to feed its manpower into the south.

I wish I had a grumpy face react I could give this post. Also in terms of grumpy face things: Also in terms of operational direction, Kherson is the most politically important. Without that city Russia cannot credibly hive off a new oblast, though certainly they could try. DR/LR are already, for now, lost to Kyiv. HOWEVER the greater military threat is in the east along the line from the DR/LR to Kharkov. Winning hear means beating the Russian field army, and will IMO produce a more durable victory. Assuming Ukraine must hold on all fronts to push one, driving the biggest grouping of Russian forces back over the border (or at least threatening supplies) seems the most useful.

I think this problem is a lot more common than anyone realizes, and it really crosses the lines of publication, media, party, ideology, and experience. My own personal theory, but I suspect a lot of this kind of analysis comes from the 'military studies' 'peace studies' 'international relations' crowd. When you try to flatten every war into a mathematical theory or a repetable and generalizable framework you get this kind of thinking. "Well Russia did it before, why not now." The military historical approach gives you rather the art side of it. War is filled with funny things called people, and people do unpredictable and often stupid things. No to events will ever be the same because if history teaches us one thing, its that human stupidity is truly limitless. But still the numbers scholars will sit there with their calculators, quote Clausewitz, and the proceed to ignore exactly what he said on this issue. "# of tanks x # of Aircraft + # of drones / enemy GDP....."

There is no graceful exit for Putin, as much as we wish for there to be one. Russia is a dictatorship. There are only two ways Putin will give up power, if he dies or if he is driven to flight with only what he can carry. In the case of death, the goal is to go out like Stalin not like Nicholas. In the case of flight, well thats always a bad option. Putin will not step down. Nobody will ask him to step down. And if they do Putin will try to kill them as a warning to all others who think the same. This is the way of dictatorships. If there was some regular and formalized way to replace the man at the top when he failed it wouldn't be a dictatorship. Putin's sales pitch has always been 'I alone can fix it.' Just some food for thought, here is some basic napkin math of Russian leaders since 1900. Nicholas II -Abdicated in 1916 in favor the of provisional government, was murdered in less than two years. Alexander Kerensky-Driven to flight in 1917. Died in exile. Lenin- Relinquished power in 1922 due to a serious stroke, died in 1924. Stalin-Died in 1953 quietly in bed (or perhaps face down in a pool of his own piss, depending on when and how you think he actually died) Khrushchev- Kicked out in 1964, died in some disgrace in 1971 in Moscow Brezhnev- Suffered a serious stroke in 1975, replaced by a shadow cabinet. Died quietly in 1982. Adropov-Died in office in 1984 Grobechev-Blew the whole thing up, is still alive but lives abroad. Hated in Russia. Yeltsin- Tried to fix things, didnt, lives mostly abroad. Putin- Well see. Nicholas took throne in 1894. Since then, theres been a strong message. Either you die in office or bad things happen to you. Khrushchev is one counter example, but his successors hated him. He was basically a political pariah. He was mostly allowed to remain in Moscow at the edges of power because he himself had shown restraint dealing with Beria et al in the 1950s. But thats not an example of success, especially for Putin. Lenin/Brezhnev is an interesting second counter example. Its important to remember thought that after their strokes, both men were essentially incapable of leading. Lenin had a strong mind till pretty much the end, but Brezhnev was never a strong leader and whether he was in charge or in bed didn't make much difference. You could make a strong argument though that both men's death's signaled tremendous turbulence for the USSR. If youre Putin, I dont think you really want to step down. You dont want to give up to the hardliners because you may end up like Khrushchev. Exiled, out of power, and on a meager pension. And you dont want to give in to the leftwing democrats because at best youll end up living abroad as a pariah like Gorbechev, at worst youll end up gunned down in a basement in Yekaterinburg like the Tsar. Russia is not kind to its failures.

Thanks I appreciate it as well. I understand what you mean about the time of it all. I have three or four more half made maps, plus the almost finished campaign! Another few days of plinking away and I would be done, but something else always seems to come up one way or another. Indeed, more goals than the time to do them.

The problem here is that time is definitely not on Russia's side. It would probably a year or longer to set up a mass conscription service, run classes through it, and get up to a million soldiers. And it would cost billions to do. Billions on facilities, billions on weapons, and at least few billion on soldier pay. And what will the fight with? Will the T-62 go back into production? Because in terms of modern weaponry Russia is now basically unable to mass produce something like the Armata, probably not even the T-90/T-72B3. So youre hemorrhaging money and popularity to build an army qualitatively weaker than whatever Ukraine will have. Meanwhile Ukraine will only get stronger. The damage to their economy is tremendous. Incalculable, at least to my soft monkey brain. But basically the west wont run out of money in this fight and wont get tired of poking the bear. If the leading 10 members of NATO and the EU each gave Ukraine just $15b for recovery, theyd raise the entire estimated GDP of Ukraine. That would go a long way towards rebuilding those damaged cities. And with a constant influx of supplies, all Ukraine need do is keep men at arms and keep pushing. And of course every week that goes by more teams are trained on more toys. So while some poor Ivan is learning how to shift the gears in a T-64A with a hammer, Zelenskva across the border is learning how the rocked assisted laser guided cluster enema works. At some point the balance will shift to the point that without a peace Russia will not be able to hold even what it has, that even the DR/LR and Crimea wont be able to hold. And of course economically, the longer Russia is cut off the easier it is never to hook them back up again. If the war ended tonight, I have no doubt tomorrow Nordstream 2 would be at full capacity. But if it takes a year, by that time will Germany really still need Russian gas? Or will they have broken ground on some other project that solves the issue? The long war option looks attractive because it offers Putin a chance to readjust. But its, IMO, a horrible outcome for Russia (and I mean bad for Ukraine too, lets be honest). Horrible because even if somehow Russia were able to establish a new status quo in place, they would be locked into the sanctions regime, locked into a bleeding war on the border, locked into war footing, locked into draconian measures at home. In recent history Russia has not done well in long wars, especially long wars that its obviously losing. The only Russian leader since Napoleon to hold the country together in a long war is Stalin. And he did that with an ocean of blood.

Several reasons. First the reason why chemical weapons arn't really useful is because any modern-ish level of MOPP protection will keep a soldier safe. If Kyiv has been maintaining their NBC systems, their soldiers know how to properly use MOPP under pressure, and they have adequate numbers of suits placed forward, the impact is limited. In the first attack you might see a high casualty incident, essentially caused by the surprise of using the weapon, but casualties after that event would be more limited. So why use them at all? Well a couple of reasons: Fighting in MOPP sucks (ive heard). Its hot, its sweaty. If you wear it right your skin cant breath. The mask will limit your field of view, and most vehicles will have to fight buttoned up. Chemical weapons CANNOT serve as an A2/AD weapon, but it can serve as pseudo-A2/AD in that anyone fighting in a particular area will need to do so with an extra barrier to get over. As a result Chemical weapons can increase friction. Fighting in an NBC environment will always increase casualties. Maybe your suit is torn. Maybe you didn't blouse your boots right. Maybe a minor wound now turns into a deadly vector for gas or contamination. Maybe you took your mask off for some air and thats when the gas rounds come in. It isn't a game changer, but its a friction adder. Like pouring sand in the machine. The issue with this, though, is that gas is side agnostic. Its like a dumb mine. It effects both sides. And while that effect may not start out equal, gas can be unpredictable. A sudden wind change may roll the weapon from their lines onto yours. Or maybe unusual cold turns your weapon into an unexpectedly persistent chemical (such things supposedly happened with Mustard Gas in WWI. Below freezing, the gas turned into a mostly inert oil. If you got some on your coat say and then walked into a dugout and warmed up by the stove, once the gas vaporized youd kill everyone in the dugout). Gas is great against unprotected populations. That is, its great against civilians who you really cant protect from a gas attack. I mean sure you can issue masks to everyone but those kinds of policies have never really been tested and IMO a gas attack on a civilian population center could easily turn into a mass casualty event. Look at Saddam's use of gas against the Kurds. Or indeed his alleged use of gas against Iranian cities. Gas is a very easy and convenient weapon of terror, and if weaponized properly can be like a mini-A bomb. Sure the blast isn't as spectacular, but few things would protect Damascus better than a SCUD filled with Sarin pointed at Tel Aviv.