How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Ultradave]

8 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

(7) This shows up big in the lack of effective infantry support. BTG infantry cannot prevent Ukrainian mechanized and light infantry anti-tank hunter/killer teams from attriting their AFV, IFV, and SP artillery. This is the primary job of infantry in tank units.

(8) It is not clear if this is due to ineffective infantry forces or insufficient numbers of them in the BTGs; probably both are true....

8 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

What am I missing? (in your own good time, cheers, thanks for the many insights to date)

Rather than missing anything, I might just amplify on these couple of points. It's definitely true that their BTG scheme is not something new. Very similar ideas have been used for years. For the US, Company Teams, Battalion Task Forces, and Brigade Combat Teams are common. 

a. Ineffective infantry support seems to be a very large issue. The Russians apparently expected to roll on in, not have to dismount, wave at the newly happy liberated Ukranians  and take a victory lap. No need for the infantry to dismount and clear out ambush spots. Ineffective? They might be effective if any effort was made to utilize them. Severe lack of adapting to situations on the ground.

b. Another thing missing (to me) is serious artillery prep. While there is a lot of artillery in use, the artillery and air support seems to be doing more damage to cities than it is to suppressing likely AT ambush spots (treelines, etc). That fire support should be hitting the ground just ahead of the BTG movement and considering the way things have gone - to both sides as they move, since they are mainly keeping to roads in the north, from what I've seen. And not just called in when 2 or 3 vehicles get hit by ATGMs. By that time it's way too late. The suppression needs to be ahead of the BTG, to prep the way. It should all be preplanned and coordinated with movement, and not reacting to the enemy. Make THEM react, cover up, leave.

c. This part I don't know. In the US a Brigade Combat Team is a more or less permanent organization. Company Teams and Battalion Task Forces are designed to be flexible in their cross attachments, depending on objective and opposing forces. The Russian BCT seems to be more of a one size fits all organization designed specifically for movement and breakthrough. I'm not sure it's suited to the type of actions we've seen in the north. An infantry heavy/tank light TF with plenty of fire support would be more suited. 

For c., maybe someone who knows more about the Russian's organization can chime in and apologies if I've missed it. Sometimes I skim these pages to keep up. I know the infantry lack of usage has been discussed. I don't understand why after this time they haven't adapted better.

Dave

[Ultradave]

And another thing

If BTGs are short on manpower vs TOE, you can't short a tank crew without taking a tank of action. You CAN however, reduce the size of infantry squads being carried and nominally still have X number of infantry squads, carried by the TOE number vehicles.

Another check the box for ineffective infantry. 

Dave

[Lethaface]

3 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

Isn't this a bit of outdated thinking though?

In WW2, an infantry screen could prevent enemies from using magnetic mines or bazookas/panzerfäuste at quite close ranges, but with modern infantry anti-tank weapons hitting at several km range, you'd need a very big infantry perimeter and also to keep your tanks so far back they are essentially out of the fight.

Also, lots of tanks/AFVs I see in the videos are being knocked out by drones, aircraft, and artillery.

Perhaps, but a WW2 infantry screen would have had AT-guns for longer range. Of course ATGMs are much better, but tanks have also improved since WW2; FLIR optics for commander/gunner, hunter/killer capability, laser warning receiver, programmable HE rounds, etc (although it seems the majority of Russian tanks in Ukraine aren't the latest/greatest, while they go against many top of the line ATGMs). 

Conceptually I guess it's not that different for a platoon of WW2 tanks travelling in the open to be ambushed by a PaK front, compared to a group of MBTs in the open being ambushed by ATGMs.

Guderians push to the canal wouldn't have went so smooth if there'd been motivated and decently trained defenders everywhere along the route possessing AT weapons, or 'irregular' type forces being able to strike the supply lines. 
The perceived problem among German high command was that the mobile armored formations outpaced the leg infantry formations so much, that the tank formations would be vulnerable to getting cut off (although not everyone agreed with that).

The (at least by me) perceived problem with the Russian forces is that they don't seem to have any infantry formations that are supposed to be moving up the 'frontline' and clearing out any remaining pockets of resistance / bypassed defenses in the hinterland (or in short, security for their BTGs).

They just didn't have enough troops for what they were trying to achieve.

Not to say that all the other issues they have aren't interesting (whether they stem from their own lackings or from Ukrainian efforts), but it is a fundamental problem to begin with.

Edited April 12, 2022 by Lethaface

[LongLeftFlank]

Out of 'Likes' already, sorry, but great to see the CM tactical hive mind at work here.

So much more interesting IMHO than endless round-the-mulberry-bush ruminating on Will They? / Won't They? / They Must!  NATO intervention, or Putin's favourite freeking colour today....

[chuckdyke]

Here is Metro Kiev no good shelling it into rubble. You need the infrastructure; this city controls the Dnieper crossing. Ukraine needs it to send their reinforcements to the east. Russia will pay a heavy price for not taking it. The West need to provide aircover to the Donbass it is 1000 km.

Edited April 12, 2022 by chuckdyke

[Aragorn2002]

1 minute ago, chuckdyke said:

Here is Metro Kiev no good shelling it into rubble. You need the infrastructure; this city controls the Dnieper crossing. Ukraine needs it to send their reinforcements to the east. Russia will pay a heavy price for not taking it. 

I'm pretty sure everything the Ukrainian army can spare elsewhere is already marching, driving or crawling to the Donbass while we speak. 

[chuckdyke]

1 minute ago, Aragorn2002 said:

I'm pretty sure everything the Ukrainian army can spare elsewhere is already marching, driving or crawling to the Donbass while we speak. 

It will be ongoing for the next 6 weeks or so. It is like here 1000 km just to feed the population logistics are tremendous. We planned for isolated mining communities and that is in peace time similar distances. The Russians waged a scorched earth against the civilian population and the Ukrainian army is just about the only organization with sufficient rolling stock. 

[domfluff]

25 minutes ago, Ultradave said:

c. This part I don't know. In the US a Brigade Combat Team is a more or less permanent organization. Company Teams and Battalion Task Forces are designed to be flexible in their cross attachments, depending on objective and opposing forces. The Russian BCT seems to be more of a one size fits all organization designed specifically for movement and breakthrough. I'm not sure it's suited to the type of actions we've seen in the north. An infantry heavy/tank light TF with plenty of fire support would be more suited. 

For c., maybe someone who knows more about the Russian's organization can chime in and apologies if I've missed it. Sometimes I skim these pages to keep up. I know the infantry lack of usage has been discussed. I don't understand why after this time they haven't adapted better.

Dave

 

One of the problems the BTG formation is trying to solve is a lack of overall readiness in the brigade. The Brigade is intended to be able to produce two full strength BTGs out of their numbers, but clearly sometimes this number will be as low as one.

To do that implies that you're ripping platoons, squads or even single men out of other formations and jamming them together for the first time. It makes sense in a top-down, centralised sense, but from an actual low-level agility sense it has some very obvious problems.

In addition to that, this combined arms battalion ("Battlegroup" or "Task Force" are the equivalent) has significantly more support assets than might be expected. Having three batteries of 152mm artillery and a battery of rocket artillery would not be out of the question here.

The intention then is for a lean, high-readiness force, that's quick to manoeuvre, and has a ridiculous amount of firepower for it's size.

The downsides, and perhaps the reality, are that they lack sustainment, both in organisational depth, logistical support. They will also lack experience in working together and coordination.

I don't think the concept is inherently flawed - it's a plausible answer to a set of problems, and it might even be the least-worst available. I do think that it's showing, yet again, that a centralised command system is built on the fundamental assumption that your centralised command are competent, motivated experts, since so much is reliant on them.

For some more context - the main reason why the T-14 was the next big thing really wasn't whatever nonsensical capabilities were claimed, but that it was (will be?) a common platform, with the same chassis mounting an IFV, SPG, ambulance, recovery variants, whatever. *That* capability is clearly designed as a step towards solving some of the awful logistical problems that the Russian and Soviet armies have always had.

[The_Capt]

10 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Hmm, I'm a little surprised that this was your only take (or maybe it was just on O'Brien's tweet). Or did I miss a different point?

Because the Dupuy summary seemed to this layman to be pretty on the nose and tracking to prior anecdata....

(1) BTGs are simply battalion-sized, task organized combined arms teams. All major armies have done this since WWII....

(3) Russian Army BTGs and doctrine are built around firepower and mobility, at the expense of manpower...

(6) The Russian BTGs appear unable to execute competent combined arms tactics....

(7) This shows up big in the lack of effective infantry support. BTG infantry cannot prevent Ukrainian mechanized and light infantry anti-tank hunter/killer teams from attriting their AFV, IFV, and SP artillery. This is the primary job of infantry in tank units.

(8) It is not clear if this is due to ineffective infantry forces or insufficient numbers of them in the BTGs; probably both are true....

(10) The leanness of the BTG manning (~ 1,000 troops) means that they cannot sustain much attrition without suffering a marked decline in combat power and effectiveness.

(11) It will take a thorough analysis to determine if the performance of the BTGs is due to inherent flaws in Russian Army personnel and training or flaws in their doctrinal approach. Again, both are probably culpable.

(12) In any case, these problems are not likely to be remedied in the short term. Fixing them will take a major reform effort.

TL:DR, by design the BTGs don't have enough organic infantry (whether demographic reasons or 'cuz Russians suck' -- poor motivation, bad sergeants, nil situation awareness, hiding behind their armour) to do the jobs they need to do, or perhaps any other for that matter.

While the Ukrainians have, by luck or by design, created antifragile tactical forces that can neither be readily attrited by ranged artillery/air nor found and fixed by the land units (BTGs) themselves. And also seem to possess on average a degree of initiative and self suffiency reminiscent of Finnish ski troops or Ranger forces, and not readily subject to disruption up their own command or LOC chain....

What am I missing? (in your own good time, cheers, thanks for the many insights to date)

It is not my "only" take but it is the most prominent one that is in my mind.  @Battlefront.com and @Combatintman have described both the differences between Russian BTG and Western BGs, which has to do with the framework under which they operate, along with qualitative internal aspects.  Further, the one major sin that I have not seen mentioned is the lack on ISR sharing between BTGs, normally done in a centralized ASIC (or pick your name) at the Brigade/formation level.  This means that each BTG is likely only seeing their world in a small patch in front of them.

Ok, I think we got it: Russian's suck.

My issue with this is that we have seen multiple assessments on this all over the place (no fault on you personally for posting, my frustration is with the mainstream military analysis) to the point they have become a self-reinforcing echo chamber in the making, all designed to explain why the Russians have failed, and likely will continue to fail.  Why this is dangerous:

- It creates a very convenient narrative that what we are seeing is "all on Russia doing it wrong".  There is truth here, do not misunderstand me on that point; however, it completely misses the fact that the Ukrainian's made the Russians do it more wrong. 

- By limiting the analysis and assessment to how poorly the Russian tactical and operational forces are not doing, we are risking the creation of a schadenfreude bubble that conveniently pins the phenomena we are seeing all on the Russians while risking some potentially incredibly significant implications on what the Ukrainian defenders are doing.  

- Further this sets us up to a post-slide into "well of course the Ukrainians won, we trained and equipped them".  This further sets us up to feel really good about this whole thing and avoid confronting "what really may have happened". 

We have seen this sort of effect repeatedly in the past.  The US Civil War, particularly towards the back end saw the mergence of trench warfare as more modern weaponry made manoeuvre much harder, particularly for cavalry.  European observers went "well, sure but these are backward colonials who are doing it wrong."  Then again during the Boer war with smokeless long range Mausers chopping up British (and Canadian) formations at range - "well those are rabble, who lost in the end".  WW1 Austro-Hungarian complete failures - blame the ethnics in the ranks....the list goes on.  

So What Happened?

  I am not sure and will likely spend a fair amount of time over the next decade trying to figure it out but there are some alarming trends that western militaries cannot avoid:

- Russian had the mass, Ukraine did not.  Not saying the conventional UA sat out the first phase of this war but a 1300km frontage was largely defended by a hybrid force built on a foundation of irregulars...and it just butchered Russian mass.  To the point of operational collapse.  The Russians had knives, Ukraine had pillows, and Ukraine won; this is not small.

- The Ukrainians appear to have done something to friction and might not even realize it.  Through a combination of information superiority - built largely on civilian infrastructure no less, and a shift in weapons effects, they were able to hit the entire length of the Russian forces, all the way back to the SLOC nodes.  All of this using a lot of unmanned, which we have discussed.  More to the point, they appear to have projected friction onto the Russian forces (already brittle for reasons presented) to the point that the Russians collapsed under their own weight. 

- Russian concepts of mass are not that different from our own.  We still rely on roughly the same organizational concepts.  We call them "tactically self-sufficient units", Battlegroups etc.  And yes they are set up differently, but I am not sure that would have made a difference, our tanks need gas too (and gawd help us if the RedBull supply is cut).  But we have pursued Adaptive Dispersed Operations at the tactical level as well (awkward crickets) - "oh but we would do it right" - would we?  Our LOCs are just as long as the Russians, our armour just as vulnerable and out combined arms concepts not too far distant.   "Well the Russians didn't know what to do with their infantry...we do".  Ok, so our Battlegroups do not have that much more infantry than a BTG and those Javelin systems really mean that your BG screen now needs to sweep every bush and henhouse out to 4000m(!) along the BG frontage or you are going to be trading burning vehicles for every km you advance.  Surprise is pretty much dead.  Unmanned is likely going to be everywhere...the list goes on.  This is not another "tanks are dead" issue, it is "is mass as we know it dead?" issue.

- Information.  There will be new fields of study created in military education based on this war on what just happened with respect to information in this war, from tactical-to-political.  If I had to pick one factor that tries to explain a lot of this it is information. The implications are, again significant, to say the least.

And all of this is based on what already happened.  The Russians and UA can redo Kursk down in the SE, and I am sure many in the west will go "well there is the war we know and love" but shocking stuff has already occurred in the first 45 days we cannot un-see.  

I get these are early days but I see an "easy out" bubble forming, and it is dangerous in more ways than most understand. That is what I took away from that thread.

  

Edited April 12, 2022 by The_Capt

[Aragorn2002]

23 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

It is not my "only" take but it is the most prominent one that is in my mind.  @Battlefront.com and @Combatintman have described both the differences between Russian BTG and Western BGs, which has to do with the framework under which they operate, along with qualitative internal aspects.  Further, the one major sin that I have not seen mentioned is the lack on ISR sharing between BTGs, normally done in a centralized ASIC (or pick your name) at the Brigade/formation level.  This means that each BTG is likely only seeing their world in a small patch in front of them.

Ok, I think we got it: Russian's suck.

My issue with this is that we have seen multiple assessments on this all over the place (no fault on you personally for posting, my frustration is with the mainstream military analysis) to the point they have become a self-reinforcing echo chamber in the making, all designed to explain why the Russians have failed, and likely will continue to fail.  Why this is dangerous:

- It creates a very convenient narrative that what we are seeing is "all on Russia doing it wrong".  There is truth here, do not misunderstand me on that point; however, it completely misses the fact that the Ukrainian's made the Russians do it more wrong. 

- By limiting the analysis and assessment to how poorly the Russian tactical and operational forces are not doing, we are risking the creation of a schadenfreude bubble that conveniently pins the phenomena we are seeing all on the Russians while risking some potentially incredibly significant implications on what the Ukrainian defenders are doing.  

- Further this sets us up to a post-slide into "well of course the Ukrainians won, we trained and equipped them".  This further sets us up to feel really good about this whole thing and avoid confronting "what really may have happened". 

We have seen this sort of effect repeatedly in the past.  The US Civil War, particularly towards the back end saw the mergence of trench warfare as more modern weaponry made manoeuvre much harder, particularly for cavalry.  European observers went "well, sure but these are backward colonials who are doing it wrong."  Then again during the Boer war with smokeless long range Mausers chopping up British (and Canadian) formations at range - "well those are rabble, who lost in the end".  WW1 Austro-Hungarian complete failures - blame the ethnics in the ranks....the list goes on.  

So What Happened?

  I am not sure and will likely spend a fair amount of time over the next decade trying to figure it out but there are some alarming trends that western militaries cannot avoid:

- Russian had the mass, Ukraine did not.  Not saying the conventional UA sat out the first phase of this war but a 1300km frontage was largely defended by a hybrid force built on a foundation of irregulars...and it just butchered Russian mass.  To the point of operational collapse.  The Russians had knives, Ukraine had pillows, and Ukraine won; this is not small.

- The Ukrainians appear to have done something to friction and might not even realize it.  Through a combination of information superiority - built largely on civilian infrastructure no less, and a shift in weapons effects, they were able to hit the entire length of the Russian forces, all the way back to the SLOC nodes.  All of this using a lot of unmanned, which we have discussed.  More to the point, they appear to have projected friction onto the Russian forces (already brittle for reasons presented) to the point that the Russians collapsed under their own weight. 

- Russian concepts of mass are not that different from our own.  We still rely on roughly the same organizational concepts.  We call them "tactically self-sufficient units", Battlegroups etc.  And yes they are set up differently, but I am not sure that would have made a difference, our tanks need gas too (and gawd help us if the RedBull supply is cut).  But we have pursued Adaptive Dispersed Operations at the tactical level as well (awkward crickets) - "oh but we would do it right" - would we?  Our LOCs are just as long as the Russians, our armour just as vulnerable and out combined arms concepts not too far distant.   "Well the Russians didn't know what to do with their infantry...we do".  Ok, so our Battlegroups do not have that much more infantry than a BTG and those Javelin systems really mean that your BG screen now needs to sweep every bush and henhouse out to 4000m(!) along the BG frontage or you are going to be trading burning vehicles for every km you advance.  Surprise is pretty much dead.  Unmanned is likely going to be everywhere...the list goes on.  This is not another "tanks are dead" issue, it is "is mass as we know it dead?" issue.

- Information.  There will be new fields of study created in military education based on this war on what just happened with respect to information in this war, from tactical-to-political.  If I had to pick one factor that tries to explain a lot of this it is information. The implications are, again significant, to say the least.

And all of this is based on what already happened.  The Russians and UA can redo Kursk down in the SE, and I am sure many in the west will go "well there is the war we know and love" but shocking stuff has already occurred in the first 45 days we cannot un-see.  

I get these are early days but I see an "easy out" bubble forming, and it is dangerous in more ways than most understand. That is what I took away from that thread.

  

This is not the end, it is not even the beginning of the end, but....

[TheVulture]

I think it is worth considering how the Russia performance differs between being on the attack versus defence.

Look at the Kherson region. In the first weeks, the Russian behaviour there was much the same as elsewhere - lots of road-bound BTGs advancing more or less independently of each other, past Mikolaiv and towards Kryvyi Rih, and coming to a halt in a matter of 2 weeks or so. Then those BTGs with strung out and unsecured LOCs were pushed back up to 100km in another week or two to the villages and towns more immediately around Kherson.

What has happened in the two weeks since since then? Ukraine have made multiple attacks on at least 4 or 5 different axes. They've gained some villages here and there. Others have been gained and then lost again. Attempts to threaten the airport or the crossing point on the dam at Kozatske haven't produced any noticeable movement. To all appearances, there have been localised attacks and counterattacks with varying degrees of success, but Russia has managed to maintain a consistent perimeter around Kherson. Whatever deficiencies they may have had on the attack, the BTGs in the area, dug in to villages with their limited manpower but copious heavy weapons support, and with a relatively secure rear area and LOC (helped by the fact that the UA aren't about to start indiscriminately shelling Kherson city to hit Russian rear units) have apparently managed to create a stable situation of sorts.

Now it may be that this is a stalemate for now, or it may be that one side or the other is getting attrited to the point of being unable to function. Which would lead to either a Russia collapse on the west bank, if the Russians are getting the worst of it. Or a lessening in offensive action and Russia slowly pushing the perimeter a bit further out again if the UA is coming off worse when its trying to attack prepared Russian positions.

But this is looking like a situation where the the Ukraininan advantages that have served them well so far in, terms of information superiority and copious reliable anti-tank weapons, don't provide much useful leverage. And some of the big Russian weaknesses (lack of information and insecure rear areas) are, in this situation, not present.

[kraze]

2 hours ago, panzermartin said:

It's not a russian specific the conscription of poor, uneducated guys with no dads money. For many armies around the world this is the case I think.  Western countries just have the luxury of paying more their unfortunate sons. 

While Russia is relying on the bottom of the barrel as you say , Ukraine has embattled the best they have as they are defending their homeland, many educated young men, volunteers etc. It's no surprise they did so well in the ambush warfare and high tech stuff. 

conscripts in russian army in Ukraine are the minority, they are almost non-existent - there were few of them even before most of them began fertilizing the ground. Russians are just poor and uneducated as is.

They were eliminating intelligentsia for generations - it was bound to have consequences. Remember - every single achievement of USSR happened thanks to imprisoned and tortured guys, who got "lucky" and survived. Being smart is always on a scale from "outcast" to outright "life hazard" in russian society - depending on how much of a violent maniac their whatever czar is.

Because intelligent people do what they deem is best, not what they are TOLD to do.

Edited April 12, 2022 by kraze

[Ultradave]

1 hour ago, domfluff said:

n addition to that, this combined arms battalion ("Battlegroup" or "Task Force" are the equivalent) has significantly more support assets than might be expected. Having three batteries of 152mm artillery and a battery of rocket artillery would not be out of the question here.

And what seems to be missing is the lack of effective use of all that firepower, even locally within one BTG. 

The issue if each BTG operating in a vacuum with just its own assets precludes the massing or re-directing of fire support to where it is most needed.

Easy for me to criticize from here, but it’s hard to imagine why lessons like this weren’t learned and acted on in the first 2 weeks.

Dave

[Bulletpoint]

The Russians seem unable to continue their offensive.

But the Ukrainians also seem unable to conduct any real counteroffensive.

So I think we are going to see a very long, but low-intensity war of shellings along a more or less stable frontline.

Hopefully the Ukrainian Army will prove me wrong.

Edited April 12, 2022 by Bulletpoint

[Haiduk]

8 hours ago, sburke said:

nope, he's new.  Any details?

@akd @Kinophile

This is not a loss. Just an article about this lt.colonel, chief of field hospital, which could maintain evacuation of 25 wounded soldiers from shelled airfield. Necromancer666 just ironically asks where this can be. 

Probably Chornobaivka

[domfluff]

1 minute ago, Ultradave said:

And what seems to be missing is the lack of effective use of all that firepower, even locally within one BTG. 

The issue if each BTG operating in a vacuum with just its own assets precludes the massing or re-directing of fire support to where it is most needed.

Easy for me to criticize from here, but it’s hard to imagine why lessons like this weren’t learned and acted on in the first 2 weeks.

Dave

Yes. One of the core concept (as per The Russian Way of War) is that there was a major move towards integrated fires - indeed, the Zelenopillia rocket attack  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zelenopillia_rocket_attack ,which has informed a *lot* of thinking and development, seemed to suggest that this was exactly the capability that had been developed.

It's certainly a core capability that the concept would demand if it were to make any sense.

So, as per Warren, this is going to take years to unpick. I don't believe there's going to be a single answer to why this has turned out the way it has. Some of the problems are likely to be obvious, and some of them might well not be.

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

I don’t recall this charming face:

I think this guy is already on the list, but not sure if unit was listed:

 

[Kinophile]

37 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

The Russians seem unable to continue their offensive.

But the Ukrainians also seem unable to conduct any real counteroffensive.

So I think we are going to see a very long, but low-intensity war of shellings along a more or less stable frontline.

Hopefully the Ukrainian Army will prove me wrong.

I'm personally avoiding looking for UA offensives that are equivalent in type/look to RUS attacks.

To use a very silly metaphor, UA are very careful in their attacks, constantly eating with Smaller Wolf Bites, versus the RUS attempts at Great Big Bear Chomps. 

The Bear Chomps can do great damage if they connect, but they haven't (Kherson aside).

So they go all in RAWR, FULL BODY ASSAULT and...yet not equivalent damage for the amount of force put in. UA wolf is still there, still got both eyes, still got teeth.

UA bites are smaller but no less vicious. Plus they're going for the extremities, the eyes, the ears, the genitals. Absolutely no point going for the Russian body, it's mass.

Now with Donbass they're going RAWR all over again - but now theres two Wolves.

And they can bloody talk.

The UA not doing the same as RUS is a good thing. That's why they've won so far.

If they had done equivalent RUS defence in Wk 1, Zelensky would be a POW and Russia's border would be the Dniper.

Edited April 12, 2022 by Kinophile

[DesertFox]

You can´t make this up, can you?

 

 

[acrashb]

42 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

our armour just as vulnerable

On this point I disagree - our armour would have better APS and be fed better situational awareness from an info grid including on-board sensors such as infra optics and laser sensors (which the Russians have but seem to be largely absent through theft and/or incompetence and/or financial constraints); would be used much better tactically (not run down roads in close order; not parked in clumps 'safely' behind buildings; not run off roads and bridges in (as much) panic and fatigue; not driven like a row of ducks into swamps; not used independently in built-up areas; not abandoned for lack of logistics - fuel, recovery vehicles, etc.; not bereft of preparatory artillery fires and air support; and so on.

So it's a combination of technical reduction of vulnerability and usage / training reduction of vulnerability.  Terrain plays into this; if there are no terrain features screening movement, then the javelin effect gets much bigger.

 

47 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

have become a self-reinforcing echo chamber in the making, all designed to explain why the Russians have failed, and likely will continue to fail.  Why this is dangerous

Your thesis boils down to making an effort to understand what the UA is doing right vs. what the RA is doing wrong; I whole-heartedly agree the the "doing right" is critical.  In the public eye it's mostly just "ferocious UA resistance", and while this matters (morale), no amount of fighting spirit prevents casualties from well-place high explosive ammunition, so it's more than that.  Also, both in the public eye and here there is a good amount of, as you say, schadenfreude, which blinds or perhaps more accurately blinkers people to other critical information.  As someone once said, "Never hate your enemies. It affects your judgment."

I don't think the UA started "doing right" deliberately, in the sense that the UA senior leadership would need to be closed-lip geniuses to develop, train and execute on a new theory of warfare without having it be somewhat obvious per-war, given the close training links to western forces.  Although it's likely that they kept on "doing right" because it was so successful, and their command and control was up to the task.

So keeping a clear and wide-ranging eye - minus schadenfreude - is the key to understanding what the UA is doing right so that a) we can do it and b) we can guard against it being done to us in some future conflict.
 

17 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

To all appearances, there have been localised attacks and counterattacks with varying degrees of success, but Russia has managed to maintain a consistent perimeter around Kherson. Whatever deficiencies they may have had on the attack, the BTGs in the area, dug in to villages with their limited manpower but copious heavy weapons support, and with a relatively secure rear area and LOC (helped by the fact that the UA aren't about to start indiscriminately shelling Kherson city to hit Russian rear units) have apparently managed to create a stable situation of sorts.

Or the UA is deliberately conserving its force while attriting Russian force.  I don't know, and I'm pretty sure the UA isn't disclosing strategy.

[Haiduk]

5 minutes ago, akd said:

@sburke @Kinophile

I don’t recall this charming face:

I think this guy is already on the list, but not sure if unit was listed:

 

Khametov was repoted, should be in list

[acrashb]

2 minutes ago, DesertFox said:

You can´t make this up, can you?

A very effective strategy, either in one's personal life or in geopolitics, is "Admit nothing.  Then make counter-accusations."

[Battlefront.com]

16 hours ago, Kraft said:

There are prediction models from economists that say it would not at all result in the catastrophic way this is always painted in.

As I remember, SWIFT & Co was also called atomic bomb of finance, that would bring doom to all stocks and cause instant economic recession,.. yet here we are. 

SWIFT, debt default, and sanctions generally are very much like "atomic bombs".  Nobody wants to experience one (deterrence), when it happens there is a sudden shock that is not recoverable (initial explosion), over time a lot more destruction (radiation poisoning), and smart people staying very clear (radioactive contamination).

The main point to keep in mind is that a nuke does far more damage after it explodes than it does when it explodes.  This is similar to the things that are impacting Russia now.  There's immediate effects that can be measured, but the long term effects are not as easily seen or even predicted.

Steve

[Bulletpoint]

14 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

The UA not doing the same as RUS is a good thing. That's why they've won so far.

Yes, but at the end of the day, they need to move forward to kick the Russians out. If they fight a war of attrition, it will be a very long war.

[Haiduk]

4 hours ago, TheVulture said:

Russian authorities are saying that a railway bridge in Schebekyno (southern suburb of Belgorod) has been 'damaged' (initial report said 'destroyed' a few hours earlier,but initial announcements like that are often wrong, so take your pick which you believe).

Looks like Ukraine's Special Ops (or 'terrorists' as Russia would have it) are active.

Here the photos. In comment under twitter post, some of railroad personnel wrote this can be not a work of SOF, but coincidence of two factors: poor maintainanse of infrastrucure + violation of speed mode by trains, loaded with armored vehicles. This caused damage of bridge constructions

Edited April 12, 2022 by Haiduk