How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[FancyCat]

 

[FancyCat]

I want to point out, if western nations worry about escalating the conflict, Russian actions like below, ensure the advocates of de-escalation lose the argument. One reason why I’m not concerned about the West refraining from supplying more and better equipment is the clear slow positive progression of arms to Ukraine, and a continuous refusal by Russia to show de-escalation. Aside from breaking the spirit of the UN negotiated grain deal, continued Russian indications of annexing Ukrainian territory are also extremely escalatory actions, that will pave the way for further Western support.
 

 

Edited July 23, 2022 by FancyCat

[Haiduk]

@sburke @Kinophile

Mayor Aleksey Kalmykov, deputy commander of spetrnaz detachment. Killed 11th of April in Mariupol

 

Edited July 23, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

UKR S-300PT battalion has been marking own victories - 6 UAVs (БПЛА) and 21 cruise missiles (КР). On 5th of July they shot down 6 cruise missiles. Looks like this battalion defends Dnipropetrovsk oblast - according to official report on 5th of July Russians launched 7 missiles on this oblast and 6 were shot down on approach to Dnipro and Synelnykove

 

Edited July 23, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

UKR SPG-9 fire indirectly with OG-9 FRAG shells. 

It is noticeable that the loader of closest gun is novice and he is worried, probably this is his first combat work. He can't load the shell into the gun with proper speed, but platoon commander cheers him up and other guys.

Indirect fire for SPG-9 maintains PDAs with "Kropyva" battlefield info syatem and special soft for targeting

 

Edited July 23, 2022 by Haiduk

[Holien]

1 hour ago, panzermartin said:

Even this war caught them unprepared and they were clearly forced to conduct with a heavy heart. 

Would you like to expand on this point? 

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

I want to point out, if western nations worry about escalating the conflict, Russian actions like below, ensure the advocates of de-escalation lose the argument. One reason why I’m not concerned about the West refraining from supplying more and better equipment is the clear slow positive progression of arms to Ukraine, and a continuous refusal by Russia to show de-escalation. Aside from breaking the spirit of the UN negotiated grain deal, continued Russian indications of annexing Ukrainian territory are also extremely escalatory actions, that will pave the way for further Western support.

Yep, Finkel has very good points. Putin, being cloak-and-dagger man, not a military, is accustomed to working on psychology of western societies more than on military/diplomatic solutions. He probably still uses old KGB frameworks and techniques of control/distortion/blackmails applying them into international politics. That's why, among ohters, we have so many problems reading Kremlin's language. It's untranslatable to most Western public.

[Grigb]

4 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Yep, Finkel has very good points. Putin, being cloak-and-dagger man, not a military, is accustomed to working on psychology of western societies more than on military/diplomatic solutions. He probably still uses old KGB frameworks and techniques of control/distortion/blackmails applying them into international politics. That's why, among ohters, we have so many problems reading Kremlin's language. It's untranslatable to most Western public.

Yes, an extremely good point. 

[Beleg85]

That is why I whined so much several pages ago about "social contract" being not applicable to Kremlin (and Russian state broadly) mentality.

In the West, we are accustomed that deal is sacred/basis of all human interaction. But in Russian world (not all of course, I mean political) deal is just temporarly measurment of strength. It can immediatelly be broken/renegotiated if one side feels it can have a lavarage.

Putin just felt he had an upper hand.

Edited July 23, 2022 by Beleg85

[panzermartin]

12 minutes ago, Holien said:

Would you like to expand on this point? 

Forced because Ukraine was slipping away from them each passing day and was cleary not possible to reverse the situation with political intervention. NATO presence in Ukraine would be a direct threat to the existance of the current status quo in Russia. And ironically, its NATO aid and intel thats killing most russians right now.  

With a heavy heart, because they mistakenly hoped Ukraine will collaspe by a sudden show of force. I dont think anyone wished for a prolonged bloody war , one that would cost them thousands of losses. They still call this a "special operation" and are reluctant to mass mobilize. Apart from the extremists, I don't think the army had much will to do this. The first days with massed abandoned equipment were a clear indication.

Unprepared because they could never match the aid of a coalition of the most advanced western military powers in the long term. 

[Grigb]

14 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

Look, I find your posts interesting and well thought most of the time and I appreciate your contribution here. But a lot of times you all get carried away. As Haiduk noted its not a grainy video that proves nothing, they were actually multiple MLRS launchers hiding there and were destroyed.

The video is of relatively short-range drone from time when RU were close to Kiev. It has very little relevance for assessment of RU long range capabilities. In fact, we are well aware that RU does possess modest but adequate short range ISR and strike capability as well as weak long rage ISR with somewhat adequate strike capability.

 

21 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

What is left for us who want to challenge the dominant narrative line here? 

There is no challenge of anything. There is wishful thinking based on RU claims reinforced with irrelevant video.

it is unfortunate that a European who has never had genuine experience with RU simply cannot comprehend RU backwardness. And below is my proper challenging of European narrative regarding RU space capabilities.

Several years back RU decided to move Navy HQ from Moscow (where there is no sea) to S.Petersburg (where there is sea). Being RU they decided not to plan it properly [Spiritual Staples will carry you through anything. Art of RU War]. So, in the middle of the move, they discovered that their sat com system is total crap cannot handle the traffic between ships and HQ in S.Peterbirg. 

So, they had to buy UK Inmarsat and US Iridium terminals to communicate with their naval ships routing all traffic through Western Intelligence agencies.  True story.

Quote

— Now there are no direct channels. Figuratively speaking, we are trying to push 100 cubic meters of water into a pipe that passes no more than one," the [our] source complained.

According to Izvestia, the General Staff was aware of the problem of communications even before the Glavkomat [Navy HQ] moved, they warned that without the main communication node, the commander-in-chief was deaf and dumb. However, the then leadership of the Ministry of Defense did not take into account the reports of the signalers. Last year, the military department signed a service agreement with the international companies Inmarsat and Iridium. However, the sailors say that civilian and foreign telecom operators are not the best option for transmitting classified information of defense significance. You still need your own secure communication channels, and there are none in Russia.

Konstantin Sivkov, Vice-President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, believes that the actual lack of communications is a consequence of a rash decision to transfer the Navy Commander—in-chief to St. Petersburg.
— I don't want to think what will happen in case of war. There is no communication and control system, which means there is no fleet as a type of Armed Forces. Which, by the way, is part of the nuclear triad," Sivkov reminded.

 

47 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

But the actual degree RU has degraded UKR ability to fight is not clearly evident yet Imo. What we know is that most Soviet era stuff has been put out of action or is already expended. Some of it has to do with RU hitting targets deeply in UKR territory for those months. 

Except it is not true. RU could not destroy far more important and far more vulnerable UKR Air Force and Air Defence soviet equipment. They could not handle neither UKR AF nor AD nor HIMARS. But we must assume their long-range capabilities are strong. Just because there is video from relatively short ranged drone from times when they were close to target.

And again, RU did hit UKR Air Force and AD. They did. Nobody denies that.  But both UKR AF and AD still exists and still keep RU AF at bay with mostly soviet equipment.  All what you need to know about RU capabilities.

 

57 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

The moment of truth of whether the RU has inflicted a serious blow to UA ability to conduct major operations will soon come. Some  are overly confident that they will inevitably degrade and push back the occupiers but I guess we'll have to wait and see. 

No, it will not come soon. UKR are not going to push soon. RU is not going to collapse soon. For some time for us nothing will happen. Like there was nothing in Feb and most of March. But this time it will be longer because RU has run out of options.

We cannot say when RU pressure cooker will explode. But I am sure very quickly somebody will get tired to wait and will try to challenge the narrative here again.

[Beleg85]

2 hours ago, panzermartin said:

But the actual degree RU has degraded UKR ability to fight is not clearly evident yet Imo. What we know is that most Soviet era stuff has been put out of action or is already expended. Some of it has to do with RU hitting targets deeply in UKR territory for those months. 

True to an extent, except that not "most" Soviet era stuff is expended. It's mainly ammo problems- UKR still has many (probably majority) SPG's, towed artillery, artillery, rocket launchers, AA still operational but lacking ammo. At one point at battle of Severdonetsk artillery went almost totally silent because of that- it was still there, just have nothing to shot with before 152 mm pieces arrived.

Fast ammo expediture is actually testimony to Ukrainian ability to remain in the firefight, not the opposite.

[akd]

Looks like they tried a different technique with the Inhulets bridge: hits distributed regularly down the entire length of the bridge:

 

[acrashb]

3 hours ago, panzermartin said:

If the Russians were indeed in trajectory to clash with NATO all these years they should have invested more in this department.

[...]

This is a deadly disadvantage if accurate. 

[...]

From the state of their army to the sat thing, I have come to the conclusion that there was no actual desire to challenge US/EU hegemony 

1) should have, but could not.  NATO countries combined GDP ~18.4 Trillion, Russia GDP pre-war ~1.6 Trillion (and much of that consumed by corruption).

2) "if accurate"?  Of course it's accurate.  Readily  verifiable.

3) Bull**** (I mean this in the academic sense - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_Bull**** ).  Review the last twenty years of Putin's and other prominent Russian power-brokers statements.  It was a question of when, not if. 

But don't take my word for it: https://www.understandingwar.org/report/how-we-got-here-russia-kremlins-worldview

The "state of their army" and the "sat thing" was not a matter of choice or conflict avoidance, it was necessity driven by economics and social (corruption) factors.

At the outset of the war one could be excused for a shallow understanding driven by dominant (and shallow) media.  Now?  Not so much.

Edited July 23, 2022 by acrashb

[Grigb]

3 hours ago, panzermartin said:

From the state of their army to the sat thing, I have come to the conclusion that there was no actual desire to challenge US/EU hegemony

And it is wrong. Statements like this is why I do not believe that Europe security has to be only in European hands. Some Europeans will always try to challenge "the narrative" to give RU benefit of doubt.

• RU wanted, wants and will always want lebensraum where nobody like US/EU will block them from doing what they want - establish totalitarian regime to suck all resources then use what is left to conquer next country.
• Look at LDNR "republics" - with destroyed economy and rampant corruption they are nothing but literally cannon fodder to be used for conquering the rest of UKR. 
• Neither Putin nor RU elite desired to challenge US/EU for the sake of the challenge. What they desired was to force US/EU to back off from RU lebensraum. Destroyed UKR would be a powerful message to small countries - do not count on the West helping you, suck our d*ck and we might spare some of you..
• Also destroyed UKR would give reason for people like you to challenge the narrative about weakness of RU - I saw a video RU striking Kiev, RU capabilities on par with NATO, we must back off because RU have no actual desire to challenge West! 

 

3 hours ago, panzermartin said:

...the Ukrainian coup caught them unprepared.

They were expecting UKR rebellion. It was obvious. They just did not expect the UKR people would fight back and even death will not scare them. 

 

3 hours ago, panzermartin said:

Even this war caught them unprepared and they were clearly forced to conduct with a heavy heart. 

They thought they were ready and for the worst case of UKR resistance. They expected to crush even resisting UKR quickly. And Western intelligence tapping their coms was expecting the same. The problem was RU incompetence and corruption. With all their usual BS they missed poor state of their army and much better state of UKR army.

Also you need to understand that their judgment of reality is completely different from normal people. Some time ago I talked about RU gov cocaine problem. Maybe you thought I was joking. Well, here is clip with Maria Zakharova who publicly states that a) UKR are banning receipt books to hide receipt of Borsh b) they Nazis because of that.

Totally sane people.

[Haiduk]

Ukrainian strikes for today:

Lysychansk. Reportedly the building of local court, when LPR 6th cossack MRR seized as own bararcks was exploded. Unknown it was HIMARS or something other. This happened as far as 20th of July. The head of Luhansk oblast military administration Serhiy Haidai confirmed explosion and claimed about 50 casualties among LPR forces. There is no info about number of losses from oppose side, though they also confirmed the boom and losses.

Horlivka - industrial facilities were hit, were DPR etablished vehicle repairing and maintenance base. Also ammunition dump

Kyrylivka - the settlement on the shore of Azov sea, Zaporizhzhia oblast. Reportedly Russians moved here vehicles from own bases in Melitopol and Myrne, having a hope, that HIMARS didn't reach here, but... There is no information what happened - Tochka-U or diversion of resistance.

Stakhanov (Kadiivka), Luhansk oblast. Next HIMARS impact. Partially destroyed local technical college, which Russians or LPR forces used as barracks.

Edited July 23, 2022 by Haiduk

[billbindc]

3 hours ago, FancyCat said:

 

 

The bombardment of Odessa the day after signing the grain deal is a fairly bizarre move. It entirely supports those in the EU who say there's not negotiating with Russia when there's no favorable end to this war for Russia that doesn't involve negotiation. It undermines Erdogan who is attempting to use these moves to help survive the next election. When/if he loses, Russia will have a *much* tougher Turkish side to deal with. It pisses off the African and Asian countries that are dependent on the grain being sent out. 

It's easy to overthink the ways in which Putin may have gamed out this but Occam would have a different take:

It's just really stupid.

 

[MSBoxer]

13 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Well, here is clip with Maria Zakharova

I knew it was all about borscht!  Even as a young child I knew deep down in my very soul that beets were the true root of all evil!

[panzermartin]

44 minutes ago, acrashb said:

1) should have, but could not.  NATO countries combined GDP ~18.4 Trillion, Russia GDP pre-war ~1.6 Trillion (and much of that consumed by corruption).

2) "if accurate"?  Of course it's accurate.  Readily  verifiable.

3) Bull**** (I mean this in the academic sense - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_Bull**** ).  Review the last twenty years of Putin's and other prominent Russian power-brokers statements.  It was a question of when, not if. 

But don't take my word for it: https://www.understandingwar.org/report/how-we-got-here-russia-kremlins-worldview

The "state of their army" and the "sat thing" was not a matter of choice or conflict avoidance, it was necessity driven by economics and social (corruption) factors.

At the outset of the war one could be excused for a shallow understanding driven by dominant (and shallow) media.  Now?  Not so much.

What dominant and shallow media you are talking about. You mean the ones have been bombarding us with the evil Russia thing since forever. The ones that were claiming that Russians sold their fuel for vodka or they are running out of missiles or tires since week 1. Or that Russia executed the heroic defenders on snake island. Because these make the 95% of mainstream World news. Yes, thats shallow. 

I mostly rely on info here, some Twitter accounts and surprisingly some pro russian places . Sometimes, among their blatant propaganda, they have more accurate info on what's going on the battlefield like in 2014. They quickly proved the 2000 russian encriclement that circulated here, was not true, as Haiduk confirmed. 

The rules of this western dominated world are set by the most powerful. Russia is not there among them, it's actually the underdog. Their friends are Iran and North Korea ffs. Underdogs don't set the rules and don't have the initiative that's why I don't agree with the thought that Russia had some grande world domination plan apart from securing its national interests NEXT to its borders and in mostly russian dominated areas. We ll see how the energy powerplay will unfold, I think it's their only serious leverage, as their military is so backwards as you all agree. 

 

[Grigb]

Girkin ranted about Shoigu (not interesting) but added the following: 

Quote

P.S. According to reports from the Kherson front, the enemy has been "testing the strength" of our positions on different sections of the contact line almost every day since July 19. With mutual losses on both sides. But this is still a combat reconnaissance. The fighting are going on in the area of the localities of Belogorka, Andreevka, Vysokopolye, Arkhangelsk.. [looks like they are to North East from Kherson]

 

[Grigb]

Looks like Wagner linked volunteers are increasing their attention to quiet front on RU-UKR border. Here is quote

Quote

Shoigu recently ordered increased activity on the fronts. Stable sections of the front must certainly create IG (initiative groups), in order to burn the ground under enemy feets.

One unmanned [drone] detachment of two people and one gun [howitzer] may well cause more noise [pain] than a battalion that is engaged in nothing.

Once again, I am convinced of my rightness at the new location.

What is interesting though is the tactic of IG. it is not new. I already wrote about it in the past. But would like to stress that in few years RU Nats will transfer knowledge to (or will work as mercenaries for) bad actors (terrorists, cartels, insurgents). imagine 13 hours but mortar would be supported by a drone. It would be over in half an hour.

[The_Capt]

On 7/23/2022 at 5:27 AM, panzermartin said:

Look, I find your posts interesting and well thought most of the time and I appreciate your contribution here. But a lot of times you all get carried away. As Haiduk noted its not a grainy video that proves nothing, they were actually multiple MLRS launchers hiding there and were destroyed. (there was also a tiktok video that revealed that before the strike iirc) This is somewhat insulting to the counter argument that some don't even accept a filmed and proven fact. What is left for us who want to challenge the dominant narrative line here? 

I 80% rely on this thread to get my info about the war. I'm not so prone to russian propaganda as @Grigb says . Yes I sometimes visit some pro russian forums as well , but guess what, I challenge them the same way and get bashed "don't listen to UKR Nazi propaganda" . They are much worse than here to be honest

On your points I can't answer in a professional way as I'm not a military pro, as many people here. 

UA has definitely hurt RU logistics with newly acquired hardware no doubt. And it's much easier to do that when your opponent is on the offensive and in a hurry with predicted routes and command hubs. RU has demonstrated the ability to hit long range targets but I never claimed their effectiveness is on par with western standards. They have caused some serious damage though, the Mikolayev and Lviv barrack attacks comes to mind among others. 

But it's true Ukraine is still in the fight despite monthly everyday raids. AA is still up, Artillery is very much active, even UAF is active and this is a loud failure of RU. Lot of this has to do that UA has the huge advantage of having a big supermarket of NATO weaponry that can freely roam and pick what they want most of the times. RU can't compete on this but who can? 

But the actual degree RU has degraded UKR ability to fight is not clearly evident yet Imo. What we know is that most Soviet era stuff has been put out of action or is already expended. Some of it has to do with RU hitting targets deeply in UKR territory for those months. 

The moment of truth of whether the RU has inflicted a serious blow to UA ability to conduct major operations will soon come. Some  are overly confident that they will inevitably degrade and push back the occupiers but I guess we'll have to wait and see. 

So this post got me thinking and raises a really good set of points.  Right now we have been handing out a lot of fish on this thread.  We pull in the data, filter it, assess and then pull out analysis, which leads to some level of prediction.  What we (I) have not done is provide enough fishing rods.  Of course you guys are swimming around the internet and being exposed to all sorts of narratives, some good and some bad.  It may be helpful to arm you with some ways to do your own analysis so that while you are out there you can come at it better.

Everyone has got their own system, western military teachings all tend to cover the same ground (e.g. PMESII, OPP, whatever that thing Bil does, which must work because he keeps beating me).  Eastern approaches are different and take into account different criteria, I am not an expert on these so I will let someone else weigh in on them.  I will give you my personal system and the one I teach, see if it helps and if it does not keep looking around.

My system is pretty simply to be honest and focuses on two main areas: what is seen, what is not seen, but should be.  That first one is much easier, the second requires a lot more depth but we can walk to that.

What is Seen

I think I posted this before and @sburke lost his mind a bit.  Let me try a less-powerpointy version (seriously guys it is the message, not the medium).

Ok so this is a representation of what is essentially the western operational system.  It starts on the left with what is basically "Command" and works its way to a desired Outcome.  Everyone is focused on the "Boom"...of course you are...it is exploding!  The reality, however, is that the Target is really only in the middle of this whole thing.  It is an indicator - one of many - but it is not the only indicator.  I think everyone here gets that but they often do not know what else to look for (although some clearly do).

So the big red system on the left is often referred to as the "kill chain" (thanks for nothing Brose).  It is really the center of what we call a "targeting enterprise" and frankly we in the west are very good at this.  This is "cause" space that translates human will, through capability, into energy (and here it can get quite complex), through mediums (also crazy complex) and onto a target and foresaid "boom" (yay!).   Be it an ammo dump, shopping mall, tank or goose (I hate geese) the process is pretty much the same, and volumes have been written as to how to do this faster/better than an opponent.

The point of the big red circle is that when we see a "boom" it is important to analyze the entire Cause chain all the way back to determine 1) if that was the actual intended target or was it simply happenstance, 2) how well the chain is doing in competitive terms and 3) what is this all signaling about Will?  All of this also has to take into account context and the situation on the ground.

Cool. We now have a bead on Cause.  Effect is much harder and more important.  The big blue area is where the pay dirt really sits.  A lot of big booms are impressive, but trust me if they do not translate into that big blue space you are going nowhere loudly - and I speak from experience here.  

So the first question is "what effect is this actually happening?"  Here an effect is a "consequence of action", so for example the effect of all those HIMARS booms - who are at the end of their own kill chain - was (allegedly) to have the Russian logistics system tie it self in knots to get away from them.  Great, outstanding...but was it decisive?

Second is Decision.  I have written about the three types of decisions available in warfare (at least) - positive, negative and null.  Let's leave off the last two and just focus on the first one.  A positive decision is a "death of alternate futures".  There was a future where Russia pounded Kyviv into submission for two months in Mar-Apr 22.  The Ukrainian government tapped out because western support was being cut off from the west and Russia occupied half of Ukraine and the capital, set up a puppet government and then enjoyed an insurgency-from-hell that would last 20 years.  That future died in March when the Russians were held off and pushed back from Kyviv: it was positively Decisive.  The Russians may actually have a future where they are back at Kyviv but it won't be in Mar-Apr of 22, the reality will be very different.  The HIMARS are having an effect, that much is clear.  What is not clear is how decisive the sum of those effects are as yet.  If the Russians lose the ability for operational offensive for a significant duration (e.g. this "pause" never ends) then we can say it has been decisive, because there are dead futures on the floor.

Last are Outcomes.  "What is the difference between a Decision and an Outcome Capt?"  My personal definitions is that an Outcome is a death of options, normally strategic options.  The sum of decisions in western doctrine is supposed to lead to "Objectives" which are the "Deal Done" points in western military planning.  Frankly these have let us down in the past, so I go with Options.  If Options die, they kill off entire fields of futures....a future-cide if you will.  Here something like the entire collapse of the northern Russian front was an Outcome to my mind because the Russian strategic options space collapsed.  Same thing happened after the first week of this war as the strategic options spaces that led to a quick war also died - it is why we got all excited about it back then.  The most significant Outcome is the end of the war of course, but that Outcome is the sum of a bunch of other ones, that all loop back to Will.

So whenever something blows up, look both left and right on that spectrum, and ask a lot of questions.  How is the Cause chain doing comparatively? What is happening with Will? What is the problem with Russian Capability translating into Energy and Targets?  Really keep a close eye on the Blue circle, the indicators of the important stuff are there:  what is the actual effect?  Is this decisive?  what was the Outcome?

Ok, so that was the easy part.

What is not Seen, but should be.

While books have been written on the first part above, the second is the land of experience.  Here a deep understanding of history comes in very useful as it provides a lot of context.  This space (which I do not have a snazzy picture for) is essentially "what should be happening but is not..."  It is very tricky and takes a lot of experience to "see the blank spaces", it is where the effects should be happening but are not based on whatever time and space we are in within a given scenario.

For example, let's take the Russian cruise missiles (and this is not a beat up of @panzermartin, he is asking some good questions).  We know the Russians have a lot of missiles (https://missilethreat.csis.org/country_tax/russia/) and they had launched roughly 1000 of them in about a month at the beginning of the war.

And another report that they were at 2125 total "68 days into the war" (https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare#:~:text=Russia launched more than 1%2C100,68 days of the war.).  Now if we take "What we see" as the only indication, well this is a clearly functioning Cause chain.  Will, Capability all landing on targets.  A little shaky on the dud rate and "missing" military targets by many reports, and the Medium of UA AD has been pretty effective (then we get into competitive system effects which is a whole other thing - there are red and blue circles in collision); however, that is a lot of "boom".  The Effects we saw were a lot of damage, some of it military and the UA definitely had to react to defend itself by moving AD and C2 around.  I am not sure they have been Decisive, but we will get to that.

So that is what we saw, and on the surface 2125 incoming missiles all over the Ukraine is not small and frankly looks scary...but I only see what is missing:

A Ukrainian strategic center of gravity is the inflow of support from the western world.  We are pushing a lot of money and boom-boom over the border from Poland.  High on Russia's list of high value targets has to be to cut off that incoming support anyway possible.  They have done strikes in Lviv on training bases, so they clearly have the capability to hit.  But what are we not seeing?  I am not seeing rail infrastructure being crippled in Western Ukraine.  I am not seeing road infrastructure being destroyed faster than Ukraine can repair.  I am not seeing 30 Ukrainian ammo depots in western Ukraine being hit to cut off the supply of 155mm shells - it is what I am not seeing that is the biggest indicator something is going very wrong on the Russian side.  The Russians have the capability - range is no excuse as they could park missiles in Belarus, so why are they not using all them there 2125 missiles on what really matters?  First answer is that they are "dumb" but that is too easy.  Split Will, missiles spread across disjointed commands all lobbing on their own priorities much more likely.  Lack of ISR to consistently hit things when they need to be hit like UA ammo dumps and logistics nodes, which tend to move around...also very likely.

This is the same thing very early on in the war - why was I still seeing Ukrainian social media feeds 72 hours into this war?  All them tanks getting lit up, old ladies with balls of steel etc.  Rule #1 of country invasion: make it go dark.  Russian failed in this, it was missing and should not have been.

Wargamers have an advantage here as they play these problem sets all the time.  We have seen it a lot on this thread.  A wargamer can ask..."why did they not do this?  I would have."  

And this has nothing to do with an echo chamber either, but we do need to be careful.  For example, we have not seen UA operational offence yet, and nothing that looks like all traditional arms manoeuvre.  This one has me particularly puzzled and we are getting more data in on why this may be happening.

I will sum up by saying that in order to really filter the "reality" from opinion and BS, take all this and apply it to what we can actually see and not see.  We can build assumptions but they have to remain on speaking terms with the facts.  Once an assumption becomes a fact [edit for @Combatintman. “without sufficient validation”]  we are in trouble.  Enough facts put through the lenses of the two frameworks I give here become a trend, and it is those trends that told us that Russia was losing the first part of the war while most of the mainstream were figuring out how to deal with a Russian victory.

Good luck and surf safe.

 

 

Edited July 25, 2022 by The_Capt

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, akd said:

Looks like they tried a different technique with the Inhulets bridge: hits distributed regularly down the entire length of the bridge:

 

Holy crap that is some precise work.

[Letter from Prague]

I think if we want to predict how the war will continue, we should look at what happened to Russians near Kyiv and near Charkiv. They just melted. What made that happen? If logistics, then HIMARSing everything might make the whole Donbas melt. If something else, what was it?

It is funny but not surprising that pro-Russian people tend to completely ignore those failures. If Russians are doing so well and it's just a matter of time, why did they give up in so many places?

I think if Cherson goes, everything will fall apart. The Russian civil war is the best case scenario in my head, it would weaken Russia the most, and give Ukraine the most territory back, but it might also destroy the world (but hey, nuclear apocalypse might be at least faster end than climate change).

[Letter from Prague]

18 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Second is Decision.  I have written about the three types of decisions available in warfare (at least) - positive, negative and null.  Let's leave off the last two and just focus on the first one.  A positive decision is a "death of alternate futures". 

 

Capt, where can I learn more about this? Could you point me to something? I'm a corporate IT strategy dude and I'm sure it would make me way better at my job