How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Butschi]

3 hours ago, chrisl said:

The US really has to respond to a nuclear attack.

Post-Soviet Ukraine was born with the world's third largest nuclear arsenal.  They didn't have control over the launch/arming systems, but could have in a year or so.  Instead they voluntarily gave up the entire arsenal in return for assurances of security.  Failure to support Ukraine as much as possible (even now with conventional weapons) would basically toss out 50 years of work on non-proliferation. Not only would no state willingly disarm, but it will ensure a bunch of small (and less stable) states develop nuclear programs or work to buy nuclear weapons from other countries.  Letting even a tactical nuke go unanswered would make all that happen even faster, putting everyone on Earth at much higher risk overnight.  The current situation is already putting non-proliferation at risk - if Ukraine had kept and taken firing control of the nuclear weapons they inherited, none of this would be happening now.

How could the US respond though, apart from more drastic sanctions and arms deliveries? There is a slim chance that Russia wouldn't further escalate if the US intervened conventionally because MAD. But that would only even further make it obvious for everyone that they the US can only get away with this because they have nukes themselves. That wouldn't make it any less attractive to obtain nuclear capability, right?

[chrisl]

14 minutes ago, Butschi said:

How could the US respond though, apart from more drastic sanctions and arms deliveries? There is a slim chance that Russia wouldn't further escalate if the US intervened conventionally because MAD. But that would only even further make it obvious for everyone that they the US can only get away with this because they have nukes themselves. That wouldn't make it any less attractive to obtain nuclear capability, right?

Russia has a limited ability to escalate after they've used a nuke.  Could they use more of them?  Sure.  Would it be a good idea? Not at all - it would turn most Russia into radioactive glass.  We've already seen the asymmetry in the quality of equipment from Russia - do you think the nuclear situation is any different?  Nuclear weapons require maintenance, and there's orders of magnitude difference in the amount of money the US puts into making sure they'll work compared to what Russia spends.  And Russia has to deal with the corruption, lazyness, and brain drain factors on top of that.  Why would anybody responsible for going into a radiation environment to maintain Russian nukes bother, when they fully expect that they'll never be used?  Much easier to check the boxes and take the money.

And the US wouldn't necessarily have to respond with nukes - the response could be an overwhelming conventional strike on key Russian resources, including nuclear facilities and Putin's dacha.  Or eliminate the Russian air force?  There's a bunch of NATO stuff flying around on the Russian border - you can see the refueling tankers on ADSBExchange all the time, but you don't see the things that are being refueled.

Edited July 24, 2022 by chrisl

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

I would not be so sure. Syria was almost zero stakes, he could leave it by a whim and nobody would even notice in Russia. But here is different, he is already too deep into that swamp. You are right Russian subjects citizens would probably buy it (largely) but his power would not be stable anymore. And of course everything depends on question: what victory.

 

Worthy read from Timothy Snyder. @panzermartin may ba a good read for you, since you are clearly struggling whom to believe (not being personal here, I understand your urge to think critically); when comes to Belarus/Ukraine/Poland topics, Snyder is one of the best adressess you can find (less so on Russia, but still holds). His wife Marcy Shore also wrote great book about Maidan I cannot recommend enough, reconstructing mentallity of the Revolution of Dignity - good antidotum for "realist"/tankies guys who want us all think that every social movement is orchestrated by global powerhouses.

 

Great thread, worth the time.

 

[Butschi]

4 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Unused nukes are stabilizing because it's not worth it for adversaries to risk provoking their use. Using them has the opposite effect of constraining opponents because they were exercising escalation discipline and you went nuclear anyway. 

Sorry, I don't get that. Currently Russia is not using nuclear weapons, so it is obvious they don't just use them because they can. (In that case I would agree) If they use them to prevent imminent defeat that would not tell the Finns (to get back to that example) that they will get nuked no matter how they behave. It will only tell them that Russia not only has these weapons but is also willing to employ them. Nuclear deterrence only works if the other side knows that you have those weapons not only to look good at parades but is also willing to employ them.

[dan/california]

2 minutes ago, chrisl said:

Russia has a limited ability to escalate after they've used a nuke.  Could they use more of them?  Sure.  Would it be a good idea? Not at all - it would turn most Russia into radioactive glass.  We've already seen the asymmetry in the quality of equipment from Russia - do you think the nuclear situation is any different?  Nuclear weapons require maintenance, and there's orders of magnitude difference in the amount of money the US puts into making sure they'll work compared to what Russia spends.  And Russia has to deal with the corruption, lazyness, and brain drain factors on top of that.  Why would anybody responsible for going into a radiation environment to maintain Russian nukes bother, when 

I think this is a non trivial restraint on Putin using one. There is a real chance it might not work. That would be just a wee bit embarassing.

[chrisl]

Just now, dan/california said:

I think this is a non trivial restraint on Putin using one. There is a real chance it might not work. That would be just a wee bit embarassing.

you quoted me while my computer was having a fit and hit submit while it was freezing on me.

[Battlefront.com]

Video showing Ukrainians loving the PzH 2000:

 

[billbindc]

12 minutes ago, Butschi said:

How could the US respond though, apart from more drastic sanctions and arms deliveries? There is a slim chance that Russia wouldn't further escalate if the US intervened conventionally because MAD. But that would only even further make it obvious for everyone that they the US can only get away with this because they have nukes themselves. That wouldn't make it any less attractive to obtain nuclear capability, right?

The attractions of attaining nuclear capability are complicated but put very simply, it safeguards you from a large conventional attack. A US response to the Russian use of a nuke would vary depending on how one was used. A demonstration explosion somewhere? Probably only a diplomatic offensive to pare away Russia's last remaining sort-of-friends. A mass casualty strike on a Ukrainian city or a series of tactical strikes to destroy a Ukrainian Army? Then you could expect a conventional no fly/shoot down zone and the particular obliteration of whatever Russian unit was deemed responsible. Essentially, NATO can respond with overwhelming force conventionally to anything short of a theater nuclear launch and that's what it would do.

[Butschi]

4 minutes ago, chrisl said:

Russia has a limited ability to escalate after they've used a nuke.  Could they use more of them?  Sure.  Would it be a good idea? Not at all - it would turn most Russia into radioactive glass.  We've already seen the asymmetry in the quality of equipment from Russia - do you think the nuclear situation is any different?  Nuclear weapons require maintenance, and there's orders of magnitude difference in the amount of money the US puts into making sure they'll work compared to what Russia spends.  And Russia has to deal with the corruption, lazyness, and brain drain factors on top of that.  Why would anybody responsible for going into a radiation environment to maintain Russian nukes bother, when 

True, but would the US be willing to gamble with the lives of hundreds of millions of their citizens by intervening in the hope that Russian nukes are in a state of maintenance that prevents them from being used in retaliation?

[FancyCat]

I saw this on /r/credibledefense, a rundown of CIA director Burns' remarks recently, where he was much publicized as stating Putin was "too healthy". To be frank, those were the least interesting remarks. As referenced in the reddit thread, Director Burns previously served in the State Department, with long experience in Russia including as Ambassador, and up to Deputy Secretary of State, also led the Iranian nuclear talks that resulted in JCPOA, he is extremely experienced with Putin.

https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/cia-chief-putin-betting-attrition-ukraine-will-lose-his-bet-again

A few major points from Burns, he has a imperial mindset, and believes his own rhetoric on Ukraine.

Obviously a realist vs someone who believes in their destiny to reconquer Ukraine for Russia to regain imperial great power status, you will see differing approachs to dealing with them from the U.S. Might explain some of the seemingly endless U.S delaying on new and more powerful equipment.

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, billbindc said:

The attractions of attaining nuclear capability are complicated but put very simply, it safeguards you from a large conventional attack. A US response to the Russian use of a nuke would vary depending on how one was used. A demonstration explosion somewhere? Probably only a diplomatic offensive to pare away Russia's last remaining sort-of-friends. A mass casualty strike on a Ukrainian city or a series of tactical strikes to destroy a Ukrainian Army? Then you could expect a conventional no fly/shoot down zone and the particular obliteration of whatever Russian unit was deemed responsible. Essentially, NATO can respond with overwhelming force conventionally to anything short of a theater nuclear launch and that's what it would do.

And if that triggers Russia to do another nuke, the option for the US/NATO to nuke still exists.  Which means there's no downside to trying a massive conventional, cyber, economic, and diplomatic hit on Russia as the first response and see if that does the trick.

Steve

[chrisl]

2 minutes ago, Butschi said:

True, but would the US be willing to gamble with the lives of hundreds of millions of their citizens by intervening in the hope that Russian nukes are in a state of maintenance that prevents them from being used in retaliation?

If they don't respond they'd be facing a first strike anyway.  Non-response is an invitation to escalation.

[billbindc]

6 minutes ago, Butschi said:

Sorry, I don't get that. Currently Russia is not using nuclear weapons, so it is obvious they don't just use them because they can. (In that case I would agree) If they use them to prevent imminent defeat that would not tell the Finns (to get back to that example) that they will get nuked no matter how they behave. It will only tell them that Russia not only has these weapons but is also willing to employ them. Nuclear deterrence only works if the other side knows that you have those weapons not only to look good at parades but is also willing to employ them.

My take is based on the idea that Russia might use nukes to in some sense 'win' in Ukraine...whether that's to force capitulation or retain conquered ground. I think in either case my point stands. I think it's vanishingly unlikely that Ukraine will attempt to attack into Russia and that the US would constrain that possibility completely so the home defense scenario of nuclear use won't come into play here.

[billbindc]

2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

And if that triggers Russia to do another nuke, the option for the US/NATO to nuke still exists.  Which means there's no downside to trying a massive conventional, cyber, economic, and diplomatic hit on Russia as the first response and see if that does the trick.

Steve

Precisely. NATO retains escalation dominance if Russia decides to go for a bigger war...which is probably the primary reason it has not.

[chrisl]

And it's worth keeping in mind the punch line to the joke that's been going around where the Russian soldier is listing to his GF or mom, depending on the version, all the losses the RA has suffered.  When asked about NATO's losses: "Oh, NATO haven't even turned up yet".  Putin really, really wants to avoid a direct conflict with NATO, especially now that he's gotten a taste.

And as far as whether Russian nukes will work or not, there are probably a bunch of analysts looking at things that The_Capt would describe as "what you don't see", like the price and availability of Helium-3 in Russia and how much power is going down the lines of whatever processing facilities who can give you a pretty good estimate of the status of the Russian nuclear arsenal.  Maybe even better than the Russians can.  Keep in mind that all those weapons were built in the Soviet years and the west went on a hiring binge from the former USSR in the early 90s.  There were physics departments adding more Russians than the Detroit Red Wings.  It cost them a couple generations of scientists and engineers - the ones who designed and built all that stuff and wanted out (and could share the details with the west) and the next generation who were in school or freshly out and came to the west.  So they lost the people with the knowledge and the people they were supposed to pass it to.

[dan/california]

Russia does NOT want a war with NATO, nuclear or otherwise. I say this with 98% confidence because even as a flood of Western weapons has resulted in somewhere between 20,000 and 50,000 Russian KIA, not one Russian shell or missile has landed in Poland, not one. Given that the Russian casualties to date are literally several orders of magnitude larger than most of the casus belli in history, my firm conclusion is that they don't want to fight.

Edited July 24, 2022 by dan/california

[Calamine Waffles]

Quote

My take is based on the idea that Russia might use nukes to in some sense 'win' in Ukraine...whether that's to force capitulation or retain conquered ground.

What exactly would they nuke? Kyiv? I doubt that would cause Ukraine to surrender. If anything it would harden resistance even more.

[asurob]

1 hour ago, Butschi said:

True, but would the US be willing to gamble with the lives of hundreds of millions of their citizens by intervening in the hope that Russian nukes are in a state of maintenance that prevents them from being used in retaliation?

yes

[panzermartin]

15 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So this post got me thinking and raises a really good set of points.  Right now we have been handing out a lot of fish on this thread.  We pull in the data, filter it, assess and then pull out analysis, which leads to some level of prediction.  What we (I) have not done is provide enough fishing rods.  Of course you guys are swimming around the internet and being exposed to all sorts of narratives, some good and some bad.  It may be helpful to arm you with some ways to do your own analysis so that while you are out there you can come at it better.

Everyone has got their own system, western military teachings all tend to cover the same ground (e.g. PMESII, OPP, whatever that thing Bil does, which must work because he keeps beating me).  Eastern approaches are different and take into account different criteria, I am not an expert on these so I will let someone else weigh in on them.  I will give you my personal system and the one I teach, see if it helps and if it does not keep looking around.

My system is pretty simply to be honest and focuses on two main areas: what is seen, what is not seen, but should be.  That first one is much easier, the second requires a lot more depth but we can walk to that.

What is Seen

I think I posted this before and @sburke lost his mind a bit.  Let me try a less-powerpointy version (seriously guys it is the message, not the medium).

Ok so this is a representation of what is essentially the western operational system.  It starts on the left with what is basically "Command" and works its way to a desired Outcome.  Everyone is focused on the "Boom" on both sides of this thing...of course you are...it is exploding!  The reality, however, is that the Target is really only in the middle of this whole thing.  It is an indicator - one of many - but it is not the only indicator.  I think everyone here gets that but they often do not know what else to look for (although some clearly do).

So the big red system on the left is often referred to as the "kill chain" (thanks for nothing Brose).  It is really the center of what we call a "targeting enterprise" and frankly we in the west are very good at this.  This is "cause" space that translates human will, through capability, into energy (and here it can get quite complex), through mediums (also crazy complex) and onto a target and foresaid "boom" (yay!).   Be it an ammo dump, shopping mall, tank or goose (I hate geese) the process is pretty much the same, and volumes have been written as to how to do this faster/better than an opponent.

The point of the big red circle is that when we see a "boom" it is important to analyze the entire Cause chain all the way back to determine 1) if that was the actual intended target or was it simply happenstance, 2) how well the chain is doing in competitive terms and 3) what is this all signaling about Will?  All of this also has to take into account context and the situation on the ground.

Cool. We now have a bead on Cause.  Effect is much harder and more important.  The big blue area is where the pay dirt really sits.  A lot of big booms are impressive, but trust me is they do not translate into that big blue space you are going nowhere loudly - and I speak from experience here.  

So the first question is "what effect is this actually happening?"  Here an effect is a "consequence of action", so for example the effect of all those HIMARS booms - who are at the end of their own kill chain - was (allegedly) to have the Russian logistics system tie it self in knots to get away from them.  Great, outstanding...but was it decisive?

Second is Decision.  I have written about the three types of decisions available in warfare (at least) - positive, negative and null.  Let's leave off the last two and just focus on the first one.  A positive decision is a "death of alternate futures".  There was a future where Russia pounded Kyviv into submission for two months in Mar-Apr 22.  The Ukrainian government tapped out because western support was being cut off from the west and Russia occupied half of Ukraine and the capital, set up a puppet government and then enjoyed an insurgency-from-hell that would last 20 years.  That future died in March when the Russians were held off and pushed back from Kyviv: it was positively Decisive.  The Russians may actually have a future where they are back at Kyviv bit it won't be in Mar-Apr of 22, the reality will be very different.  The HIMARS are having an effect, that much is clear.  What is not clear is how decisive the sum of those effects are as yet.  If the Russians lose the ability for operational offensive for a significant duration (e.g. this "pause" never ends) then we can say it has been decisive, because there are dead futures on the floor.

Last are Outcomes.  "What is the difference between a Decision and an Outcome Capt?"  My personal definitions is that an Outcome is a death of options, normally strategic options.  The sum of decisions in western doctrine is supposed to lead to "Objectives" which are the "Deal Done" points in western military planning.  Frankly these have let us down in the past, so I go with Options.  If Options die, they kill off entire fields of futures....a future-cide if you will.  Here something like the entire collapse of the northern Russian front was an Outcome to my mind because the Russian strategic options space collapsed.  Same thing happened after the first week of this war as the strategic options spaces that led to a quick war also died - it is why we got all excited about it back then.  The most significant Outcome is the end of the war of course, but that Outcome is the sum of a bunch of other ones, that all loop back to Will.

So whenever something blows up, look both left and right on that spectrum, and ask a lot of questions.  How is the Cause chain doing comparatively? What is happening with Will? What is the problem with Russian Capability translating into Energy and Targets?  Really keep a close eye on the Blue circle, the indicators of the important stuff are there:  what is the actual effect?  Is this decisive?  what was the Outcome?

Ok, so that was the easy part.

What is not Seen, but should be.

While books have been written on the first part above, the second is the land of experience.  Here a deep understanding of history comes in very useful as it provides a lot of context.  This space (which I do not have a snazzy picture for) is essentially "what should be happening but is not..."  It is very tricky and takes a lot of experience to "see the blank spaces", it is where the effects should be happening but are not based on whatever time and space we are in within a given scenario.

For example, let's take the Russian cruise missiles (and this is not a beat up of @panzermartin, he is asking some good questions).  We know the Russians have a lot of missiles (https://missilethreat.csis.org/country_tax/russia/) and they had launched roughly 1000 of them in about a month at the beginning of the war.

And another report that they were at 2125 total "68 days into the war" (https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare#:~:text=Russia launched more than 1%2C100,68 days of the war.).  Now if we take "What we see" as the only indication, well this is a clearly functioning Cause chain.  Will, Capability all landing on targets.  A little shaky on the dud rate and "missing" military targets by many reports, and the Medium of UA AD has been pretty effective (then we get into competitive system effects which is a whole other thing - there are red and blue circles in collision); however, that is a lot of "boom".  The Effects we saw were a lot of damage, some of it military and the UA definitely had to react to defend itself by moving AD and C2 around.  I am not sure they have been Decisive, but we will get to that.

So that is what we saw, and on the surface 2125 incoming missiles all over the Ukraine is not small and frankly looks scary...but I only see what is missing:

A Ukrainian strategic center of gravity is the inflow of support from the western world.  We are pushing a lot of money and boom-boom over the border from Poland.  High on Russia's list of high value targets has to be to cut off that incoming support anyway possible.  They have done strikes in Lviv on training bases, so they clearly have the capability to hit.  But what are we not seeing?  I am not seeing rail infrastructure being crippled in Western Ukraine.  I am not seeing road infrastructure being destroyed faster than Ukraine can repair.  I am not seeing 30 Ukrainian ammo depots in western Ukraine being hit to cut off the supply of 155mm shells - it is what I am not seeing that is the biggest indicator something is going very wrong on the Russian side.  The Russians have the capability - range is no excuse as they could park missiles in Belarus, so why are they not using all them there 2125 missiles on what really matters?  First answer is that they are "dumb" but that is too easy.  Split Will, missiles spread across disjointed commands all lobbing on their own priorities much more likely.  Lack of ISR to consistently hit things when they need to be hit like UA ammo dumps and logistics nodes, which tend to move around...also very likely.

This is the same thing very early on in the war - why was I still seeing Ukrainian social media feeds 72 hours into this war?  All them tanks getting lit up, old ladies with balls of steel etc.  Rule #1 of country invasion: make it go dark.  Russian failed in this, it was missing and should not have been.

Wargamers have an advantage here as they play these problem sets all the time.  We have seen it a lot on this thread.  A wargamer can ask..."why did they not do this?  I would have."  

And this has nothing to do with an echo chamber either, but we do need to be careful.  For example, we have not seen UA operational offence yet, and nothing that looks like all traditional arms manoeuvre.  This one has me particularly puzzled and we are getting more data in on why this may be happening.

I will sum up by saying that in order to really filter the "reality" from opinion and BS, take all this and apply it to what we can actually see and not see.  We can build assumptions but they have to remain on speaking terms with the facts.  Once an assumption becomes a fact [edit for @Combatintman. “without sufficient validation”]  we are in trouble.  Enough facts put through the lenses of the two frameworks I give here become a trend, and it is those trends that told us that Russia was losing the first part of the war while most of the mainstream were figuring out how to deal with a Russian victory.

Good luck and surf safe.

 

 

Great post thanks. 

[panzermartin]

5 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

I would not be so sure. Syria was almost zero stakes, he could leave it by a whim and nobody would even notice in Russia. But here is different, he is already too deep into that swamp. You are right Russian subjects citizens would probably buy it (largely) but his power would not be stable anymore. And of course everything depends on question: what victory.

 

Worthy read from Timothy Snyder. @panzermartin may ba a good read for you, since you are clearly struggling whom to believe (not being personal here, I understand your urge to think critically); when comes to Belarus/Ukraine/Poland topics, Snyder is one of the best adressess you can find (less so on Russia, but still holds). His wife Marcy Shore also wrote great book about Maidan I cannot recommend enough, reconstructing mentallity of the Revolution of Dignity - good antidotum for "realist"/tankies guys who want us all think that every social movement is orchestrated by global powerhouses.

 

Good read, thanks

[Lethaface]

19 hours ago, Grigb said:

And again, RU did hit UKR Air Force and AD. They did. Nobody denies that.  But both UKR AF and AD still exists and still keep RU AF at bay with mostly soviet equipment.  All what you need to know about RU capabilities.

To the critical observer, combined with knowledge of quantities, that indeed said enough about Russian Federation. Although the observation could be made months ago already. 

They (RU) indeed weren't prepared for their own war like @panzermartin said, because everyone was busy stealing.

Corruption rots and infects everything if left unchallenged for too long.

[Doc844]

So the war has ben going for 5 months and in that time Putler must have been able to put 2 and 2 together by now.  My army is not what I thought it was or told it was.  My navy is a waste of money, except maybe the submarine arm.  My airforce cant even accomplish its primary task.   So maybe, just maybe I had better find out the truth of whether or not my nuclear forces are in the state that the paper reports say they are.  There is a possibility that the answer he has received is, nyet comrade, a large portion of our nuclear forces are in the sh*tter, we could do some damage but we would be f*cked and all the world would see it and as said by others I would imagine that US/nato intelligence are doing their damndest to find this info out.  Putler may even think that Nato already know the state of their readiness. Food for thought.

[panzermartin]

4 hours ago, dan/california said:

Russia does NOT want a war with NATO, nuclear or otherwise. I say this with 98% confidence because even as a flood of Western weapons has resulted in somewhere between 20,000 and 50,000 Russian KIA, not one Russian shell or missile has landed in Poland, not one. Given that the Russian casualties to date are literally several orders of magnitude larger than most of the casus belli in history, my firm conclusion is that they don't want to fight.

But of course. It's like that from the beginning. All the official RU roars are empty threats. (Except maybe the final nuclear answer if they get cornered) Every time something bad happens to Russia from NATO intervention, they reply "the consequences will be severe" and nothing happens. This country was forced to fight a war nobody really wanted. It's really a tragedy what's unfolding. Can you imagine going to WW3 by mistake.

Btw given the claimed bad state of Russian weapons I was surprised that no missile landed in Poland by malfunction. (Lviv is very close to the border) So they must be doing something right

[panzermartin]

5 hours ago, Butschi said:

True, but would the US be willing to gamble with the lives of hundreds of millions of their citizens by intervening in the hope that Russian nukes are in a state of maintenance that prevents them from being used in retaliation?

I think Russia has been more active in the nuclear front than the West , with newer platforms, advanced warheads etc. So it might come as a surprise that they are in fact ahead of the competition in that macabre department. If I was Russia and I knew my conventional army can never be enough to counter NATO, I would keep a sizeable force enough for neighboring police (that came out not even enough to take Ukraine) and invest more in asymmetrical measures like nuclear than in my conventional army. So the state of their army might not be a 100% reflection on that. Plus they are famous for their reliable rocket tech. Nuclear are not a BTR that is left to rust, it is a deadly serious national security asset that demands strict monitoring. 

[Butschi]

5 hours ago, asurob said:

yes

Want to elaborate? I doubt it. Maybe we Europeans think in a different way and that is why I have a hard time believing such statements. And I don't want to hurt anyone's feelings. However, so far the US, just like every other NATO country have shown zero inclination to escalate too far, much less intervene militarily. Risking nuclear annihilation for the sake of a country they haven't given any guarantees? I mean, we are not talking about risking the lives of professional soldiers in a far off country here, we are talking about potentially massive civilian losses on the homefront. I don't think Biden would risk it and I doubt even Trump would. That kind of intervention, although it may be the right thing to do, just sounds too much like Hollywood and not like what happens in reality.