How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Grigb]

RU are discussing HIMARS vs RU AD

First RU liberal throws substance at a fan (calculating that neither Pansir or Tor can reliably protect against HIMARS)

Quote

Let's take, for example, the number of targets Pantsir-S1 ZRPC can engage simultaneously - four (in the ± 45° sector). The Tor-M2 air defense system, by the way, also has four, I think, during the development of the complex (1980s) this was considered sufficient.

Thus, a single "Pantsir-S1", as well as "Tor-M2", cannot intercept two complete packages of HIMARS (12 missiles) even theoretically - for this you need at least three complexes covering a single target.

Then the theory of probability comes into play - with the probability of intercepting one missile of 0.8 (the average value, the print shows probabilities of 0.65 ... 0.95, depending on the range and other conditions), the probability of intercepting four missiles is 0,8*0,8*0,8*0,8=0,4. That is, to achieve the probability of intercepting a packet at least equal to a single 0.8, the number of "Pantsir" must be doubled.

In total, to ensure more or less adequate protection of the object from HIMARS, it should be covered by a battery of six ZRPC "Pantsir-S1", since the possibility of working together up to six machines in one network is provided theoretically, while one of the battery machines serves as a command post.

Another thing is that the cost of such an point air defense becomes prohibitive, the Russian Federation does not have enough "Pantsirs" and "Tors" to cover all objects, and Ukraine can always "break through" such an air defense by simply pulling up the third HIMARS.

 

After some discussion RU Nats admitted they do have serious problem

Quote

In this version of the sword and shield (MLRS and air defense), the sword wins - two M270 (or three or four HIMARS)  is almost guaranteed to break through battery of six "Pantsir", the maximum possible TOE unit. In this regard, I agree with Dimitriev, about the advantage of the attacking side in maneuver [while RU have to concentrate AD in one place UKR can freely maneuver HIMARS and hit all other targets] 

[their recommended solution for the reference]

In my opinion, the best here would be a 57-mm autocannon [Derivation-Air Defense] with programmable projectiles - only such a system is able to switch from one target to another as quickly as possible, ensuring high performance.

Of course, such a system will have limitations when working on maneuvering high-speed targets, and it will most likely be used either in conjunction with the SAM, or as part of the ZRPC, but it will be much more effective than both 30-mm Tunguska and Pantsir automatic  guns firing unguided "slugs" and anti-aircraft missiles. with radio command guidance.

An alternative to a programmable 57-mm projectile can only be significantly more expensive anti-aircraft missiles with the principle of "fire and forget", or a significant complication of the radar of the anti-aircraft system, in order to increase the maximum number of simultaneously fired targets. Both alternatives, in my opinion, are inferior to programmable projectiles by the criterion of "efficiency / cost".

 

[poesel]

4 hours ago, Taranis said:

Yes, you are right, the French president is the suprem commander of the French Army forces.

But can he also send the army by his own will?
The German MoD (and by extension the chancellor) is also the supreme commander of the Bundeswehr. But neither can send it into a war (or anywhere else). That is the prerogative of the parliament. I guess it's obvious why it is like this in Germany. Similar to the US system, but without marines.

[akd]

This seems problematic:

Edited July 22, 2022 by akd

[Grigb]

6 minutes ago, akd said:

This seems problematic:

yes. Full translation of Girkin post

Quote

The only thing I don't quite agree with [he is referencing RU Nat article about desperate civilian situation at Donbas] is the words "the more UGIL[UKR ISIS] retreats". - At the moment, no one is retreating anywhere. They will be advancing soon.

And - as assured by intelligent and competent people who have information about the situation on our side of the front - we, alas, have almost nothing left to advance with. In every way. The army loses more people every day (mostly by the "five hundredth")[refuseniks]  than it receives replacements.

 

Edited July 22, 2022 by Grigb

[The_Capt]

9 minutes ago, Grigb said:

RU are discussing HIMARS vs RU AD

First RU liberal throws substance at a fan (calculating that neither Pansir or Tor can reliably protect against HIMARS)

 

After some discussion RU Nats admitted they do have serious problem

 

The AD problem with the HIMARS as I understand it is the high trajectory.  The ATACMS has a altitude ceiling of 160,000 feet according to wiki (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MGM-140_ATACMS).  And I have it an some authority that the GLMRS goes above 60,000 feet.  Trying to hit what is a basically a high trajectory ballistic missile on the way down is very difficult - an 80% intercept rate is pretty dubious.  I suspect the Russians have not bagged any GMLRS or Russian social media would be all over it.  In fact, have we seen faked HIMARS intercepts yet?  If the Russians were capable of intercepting at 80% there should be GMLRS missile parts all over the countryside. 

As to 57mm guns...good luck.  A quick calc here (https://www.omnicalculator.com/physics/terminal-velocity#:~:text=How do I find terminal,drag coefficient and projected area.) has the terminal velocity of a 500kg GMLRS (warhead is 500lbs alone so guessing on additional body weight minus fuel) in and around mach 2.4 (used streamlined shape and area of about .3m based on listed diameter of 24 inches - it is like they designed the thing to come in really fast).  More here, but I am always careful with these: https://jaesan-aero.blogspot.com/2022/03/few-ballistic-missile-analysis-w_18.html 

So basically you have (for ATACMS, GLMLRS is going to be slightly different) a very small diameter streamlined missile coming down from over 18-50kms up at a very high trajectory, and they want to try and hit it with another bullet.

[Huba]

A little update on the PL military porcurement ( and support to Ukraine). 

1. We are buing 48 FA-50. Very controversial purchase, should be OK as a bombtruck, air-policing machine and perhaps cruise missile killer. Perhaps we'll be more willing to part with remaining Mig- 29s...

2. At least 180 K2 ready from Korea, and a license to build them locally (hopefully the K2PL upgraded version, this isn't clear though...). For Ukraine: around battalion worth of PT-91s is already transferred to UA. We are not willing to transfer all 232 now, but it will probably happen at some point. 

3.SPGs - that is most interesting. We are to buy at least 50 ready K9 from Korea, and a license to build them locally. We are already producing the chassis, that is used in Krabs, but the license includes the turret as well, of the newest type with full autoloader. Krab uses the AS-90 turret, which is a liitle long in the tooth. The tracked ammo carriers are also part of the deal reportedly. For the time being, Krabs in the old configuration will still be produced, probably for UA only. It wasn't stated explicitly, but probably the remaining IIRC 36 Krabs from our active units will go to UA as well in some time. At the moment the requirement for tracked SPGs for heavy brigades and artillery brigades (we are enlarging the existing regiments) is around 600 pieces.

We also need around 100 unspecfified wheeled types for 3 AMV brigades (which have Dana at the moment). There was a cancelled program caled "Kryl", similar to CAESAR, but it's unclear how this requirement will be met. 155mm version of Zuzana looks great. No word on it now. 

Also, yesterday a contract for new AT vehicles was signed. Those will be based on  an armored 4x4 vehicle and fire Brimstone. Same missile will be used by the planned attack helicopters, and probably SPEAR3 will be bought for the F-35, perhaps to be integrated with F-16 and FA-50 too. It would be logical to produce the missiles locally, given how many we'll need, no details on it yet though. 

And an absolutely amusing notion: as AWACS aircraft seem to be too expensive,  MoD is entertaining a plan for radar equipped blimps to be integrated with the AD network... 

[The_MonkeyKing]

5 minutes ago, Huba said:

2. At least 180 K2 ready from Korea, and a license to build them locally (hopefully the K2PL upgraded version, this isn't clear though...). For Ukraine: around battalion worth of PT-91s is already transferred to UA. We are not willing to transfer all 232 now, but it will probably happen at some point. 

what where is the source?

[Grigb]

2 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I suspect the Russians have not bagged any GMLRS or Russian social media would be all over it.  In fact, have we seen faked HIMARS intercepts yet?  If the Russians were capable of intercepting at 80% there should be GMLRS missile parts all over the countryside. 

AFAIK, indeed, there were no any highly publicized interceptions or much celebration with photos. So far i see only claims of 100% interception. I would say RU decided to mitigate HIMARS with propaganda - some got meme to joke about it, some got memo to claim 100% interception.   

 

2 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So basically you have (for ATACMS, GLMLRS is going to be slightly different) a very small diameter streamlined missile coming down from over 18-50kms up at a very high trajectory, and they want to try and hit it with another bullet.

Well, they talk about 57mm gun because it is supposed to get AHEAD type rounds. Whether they will be able to produce them is an entirely different matter.

 

 

[Taranis]

26 minutes ago, poesel said:

Mais peut-il aussi envoyer l'armée de sa propre volonté ?
Le MoD allemand (et par extension le chancelier) est également le commandant suprême de la Bundeswehr. Mais ni l'un ni l'autre ne peut l'envoyer dans une guerre (ou n'importe où ailleurs). C'est la prérogative du parlement. Je suppose que c'est évident pourquoi c'est comme ça en Allemagne. Similaire au système américain, mais sans marines.

Article 35 of the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic defines the conditions for the implementation of war and the intervention of the armed forces abroad. In particular, it specifies the prerogatives of Parliament in this area

"The declaration of war is authorized by Parliament.

The Government* informs Parliament of its decision to call in the armed forces abroad, no later than three days after the start of the intervention. It specifies the objectives pursued. This information may give rise to a debate which is not followed by any vote.

When the duration of the intervention exceeds four months, the Government submits its extension to the authorization of Parliament. He can ask the National Assembly to decide in the last resort."

*(therefore the President)

[Taranis]

Explosions reported near Kherson and Chornobaivka
 

 

[Taranis]

"A sapper from the state emergency service inspects a wheat field for explosive devices, in the Mykolaiv region, Ukraine, July 22, 2022. STATE EMERGENCY SERVICE / VIA REUTERS"

[Huba]

35 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Well, they talk about 57mm gun because it is supposed to get AHEAD type rounds. Whether they will be able to produce them is an entirely different matter.

 

I wonder how vulnerable ATACMS would be to these in the frontal aspect. Old heavy RU anti ship missiles were supposed to be protected even from 20mm projectiles from CIWS. 

[Grigb]

Murz is preparing for the possibility of visiting a prison due to the recent complaint. What is really interesting is his link to the report about LDNR armies state he wrote with his colleague in 2019. FYI @Battlefront.com here is the page and link.

Quote regarding tanks (and why RU Nats in fact expected big tank losses)

Quote

Tank units of the People's Militia of the Republics are represented by a total of 2 separate tank battalions and 11 tank battalions as part of motorized rifle regiments and brigades with a total TOE strength of 400-450 vehicles. For the enemy, judging by his sabotage activity, this information, as well as the location of tank units, is no secret. There is no secret for the enemy and the number of really combat-ready vehicles, fully operational and equipped with running gear, weapons and communications. The average percentage of “full combat capability” in terms of materiel and operational skills of crews ranges somewhere between 25 and 30 percent of the total number. This deplorable state has two closely interrelated groups of causes – personnel and technical and supply.

Significant additional factors affecting the personnel situation in the tank units of the NM Republics are “tank phobia” and the passive role of the bulk of tank units during the Minsk agreements, that required withdrawal of heavy equipment, including tanks, to the deep rear, the non-participation of tankers in combat operations.

“Tank Phobia" as a fear of service in tank units and divisions, is explained, oddly enough, primarily by the successes of the Militia and then the” North Wind" [RU regular units] in defeating enemy tank-mechanized columns in the summer of 2014. Almost every adult resident of the Republic in the fall of 2014 had the opportunity to personally inspect a lot of burnt-out T-64 and T-72 belonging to the AFU with the turrets flying off to the side. The battles for Debaltseve with the participation of hastily equipped with the same T-64 and T-72 tank units of the NM Corps convinced many that “it works both ways” and that the tanks of both sides are a “helpless iron boxes”, “a mass grave for the crew”. All while reality of the existing conditions (open steppe terrain and the practical absence of active aviation operations), it would seem, to guarantee tanks a dominant role on the battlefield.

[poesel]

26 minutes ago, Taranis said:

This information may give rise to a debate which is not followed by any vote.

When the duration of the intervention exceeds four months, the Government submits its extension to the authorization of Parliament.

So the president can send the army by his own will but has to ask for authorization after 4 months?
Similar, but the devil is in the detail. In Germany, you would need the authorization for any amount of time (there is a fast track mechanism for emergencies, but the parliament must still be asked).

Getting these rules of engagement sorted out will be the hard job for an EU army (and money, of course). The technical aspects will be solved by NATO standards.

 

[Huba]

52 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

what where is the source?

This is from weekly video by Wolski and Kamizela, some of the more prominent PL. military journalists. MoD is not doing any official announcements lately:

https://youtu.be/Wpk3ERlK678

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

Maj. Dmitri Runev, Su-34 pilot?
 

 

[Calamine Waffles]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

The AD problem with the HIMARS as I understand it is the high trajectory.  The ATACMS has a altitude ceiling of 160,000 feet according to wiki (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MGM-140_ATACMS).  And I have it an some authority that the GLMRS goes above 60,000 feet.  Trying to hit what is a basically a high trajectory ballistic missile on the way down is very difficult - an 80% intercept rate is pretty dubious.  I suspect the Russians have not bagged any GMLRS or Russian social media would be all over it.  In fact, have we seen faked HIMARS intercepts yet?  If the Russians were capable of intercepting at 80% there should be GMLRS missile parts all over the countryside. 

As to 57mm guns...good luck.  A quick calc here (https://www.omnicalculator.com/physics/terminal-velocity#:~:text=How do I find terminal,drag coefficient and projected area.) has the terminal velocity of a 500kg GMLRS (warhead is 500lbs alone so guessing on additional body weight minus fuel) in and around mach 2.4 (used streamlined shape and area of about .3m based on listed diameter of 24 inches - it is like they designed the thing to come in really fast).  More here, but I am always careful with these: https://jaesan-aero.blogspot.com/2022/03/few-ballistic-missile-analysis-w_18.html 

So basically you have (for ATACMS, GLMLRS is going to be slightly different) a very small diameter streamlined missile coming down from over 18-50kms up at a very high trajectory, and they want to try and hit it with another bullet.

This is for Tor-M1, but I can't imagine the M2 being that much better at intercepting GMLRS (which has a terminal velocity of 850 m/s)

 

[Calamine Waffles]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

What is special about HIMARS is that they are linked into a western backed ISR/TA architecture.  The UA can see with very high resolution, we know the US has been feeding them intel, likely spaced-based, pretty much from day one.  The Russians, as was noted a few pages back, do not have anything near that level of resolution, likely why they are hitting large buildings they can see from G-earth.  While UA is hitting ammo dumps and logistical nodes faster than the RA can build them.

Western artillery had a similar effect - we actually do not know how well c-btty did at Severodonetsk - however their ranges were more modest.  UA has information superiority right now, and it has been decisive.  The RA cannot conduct operational manoeuvre as a result and has been forced into very high concentrations of mass to take very little real estate, very slowly- all at a burn rate it cannot likely sustain.

Finding beats flanking.

This is again one of those cases where, yeah, on paper Russia and the US/NATO have these two comparable systems, but the US/NATO ones are backed up by other synergistic things that act as massive force multipliers, while the Russian systems...aren't.

[akd]

More on refuseniks (from 7th Military Base in Abkhazia?):

And 100 tried to refuse from 810th Naval Infantry Brigade:

 

Edited July 22, 2022 by akd

[A Canadian Cat]

20 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

We have the same problem in all Western countries.  Think about the Q-Anon people.  You can find plenty of interviews with them rejecting all kinds of super crazy Q-Anon stuff (like Democrats eating babies), yet fundamentally believe that Q is real and that the mainstream media is a bunch of liars.  Selective cognitive activity is at work because it is necessary to maintain a belief structure.

Yep, good examples. It's the exact same problem. And frankly we all have issues with cognitive bias. It is something we all have to deal with and check ourselves for. Or at least we all should be.

What are the percentages like I wonder. Q-Anon believers (even only partial belief) seems to be under 15% (https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-its-so-hard-to-gauge-support-for-qanon/). What are the numbers like in Russia? I know polling is not very reliable so perhaps there is no way to know for sure. My question is, in the US (and other parts of the world) people have access to other points of view, how much access do Russian speakers in Russia have to other points of view and more accurate facts?

[Grigb]

RU Nat reports that RU plans to start offensive soon toward Mykolaiv and Odessa (land corridor to Transnistria) 

Quote

In the Kherson region, the Odessa brigade has completed combat coordination — offensive actions will begin in the near future in the Mykolaiv and Odessa directions

"In the near future, together with the allied forces, we will begin the liberation of the city of Nikolaev and the hero city of Odessa. There will be no mercy for the Ukronazis, mercenaries and any Bandera evil spirits from us," the representative of the brigade said.

Separately, we note that the brigade consists of immigrants from the south of Ukraine, Odessa and Mykolaiv regions.

It might be disinformation though - they have to create buffer zone in front of LDNR. Offensive toward Mykolaiv and Odessa does not help with that. Also, Odessa brigade looks like platoon with BTR and Tiger. Finally, I doubt they could get enough people from UKR to form battalion much less brigade. 

On other hand, offensive toward Mykolaiv and Odessa might serve as threat to a) force Zelinsky toward peace deal b) negotiate of 100 km safety zone.

We will see. 

[danfrodo]

4 minutes ago, Grigb said:

RU Nat reports that RU plans to start offensive soon toward Mykolaiv and Odessa (land corridor to Transnistria) 

It might be disinformation though - they have to create buffer zone in front of LDNR. Offensive toward Mykolaiv and Odessa does not help with that. Also, Odessa brigade looks like platoon with BTR and Tiger. Finally, I doubt they could get enough people from UKR to form battalion much less brigade. 

On other hand, offensive toward Mykolaiv and Odessa might serve as threat to a) force Zelinsky toward peace deal b) negotiate of 100 km safety zone.

We will see. 

Let me get this straight:  RU warhawk reporting offensives will begin out of the Kherson bridgehead.  This is hilarious.  The one supply route has just been shown to be vulnerable to destruction any time UKR chooses.  Of course, IMO this is great news.  Yes, RU, please place more stuff on the right bank. 

To even say such nonsense is really breathtaking.  this is a fascinating look at just how delusional folks can be.

[Calamine Waffles]

7 minutes ago, Grigb said:

RU Nat reports that RU plans to start offensive soon toward Mykolaiv and Odessa (land corridor to Transnistria) 

It might be disinformation though - they have to create buffer zone in front of LDNR. Offensive toward Mykolaiv and Odessa does not help with that. Also, Odessa brigade looks like platoon with BTR and Tiger. Finally, I doubt they could get enough people from UKR to form battalion much less brigade. 

On other hand, offensive toward Mykolaiv and Odessa might serve as threat to a) force Zelinsky toward peace deal b) negotiate of 100 km safety zone.

We will see. 

The only response should be the classic one: you and what army?

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, Grigb said:

Regarding whether refuseniks can leave or not and what motivates them to stay, it not a simple issue and it is evolving because RU command is trying to do something about it.

• In ideal world RU refusenik either draftee or contract solder can easily get away - as far as I know due to 1st Chechen War legacy a draftee has a lot of excuses to leave and contract soldier will get some issues but not serious. It is one of the reasons RU Nats are screaming for mobilization to change that.
• But the world is not ideal, and RU has certain cultural differences not only to westerners but to UKR as well. Basically, we are talking about young inexperienced males who are under peer pressure and who unlike Westerners are indoctrinated into RU infantilism. So, for them being responsible for your own life and doing something about it is difficult. They came to the army to live completely opposite life after all.
• Then we are getting RU command reaction. They are making it more difficult so only determined refuseniks can leave. Initially they tried to put peer pressure on refusniks with talks or the use of traitor stamps.  Then they started blocking leaving process by making it extremely inconvenient like losing request to leave documents, not providing transport, or even not accepting refusenik weapons (you cannot leave if you have weapons on hands and if you try then you will get much more serious consequences including shooting to death during arrest). Finally, as the problem got worse, they decided to illegally imprison at least some refuseniks, but I believe so far it is a scare tactic. Prison camp is a waste of manpower they cannot afford unless it serves as negative motivation for imprisoned.
• But i do believe that determined refuseniks are still able to leave at the end. Because as I said there are not that many legal problems. 

So, some refuseniks can leave, some cannot and for some it is too culturally difficult, and it is better to move with the flow hopping for the best.  

All this and yet there's still more

Unlike the West, Russia does not widely publicize the rights of its citizens.  Add to this the culture of "infantilism" (as you put it) and you also don't have much awareness that they even have rights!  Back in the Soviet days curiosity about ones rights was deliberately discouraged, so if it wasn't very apparent the chances are the individual would just go along with whatever the state did to them.  Lawyers weren't much use either as they were traditionally part of the state apparatus or were easily intimidated.

This is why various "mothers" groups arose from the Afghanistan war and persisted until very recently.  These groups provided many services, one of which was legal advice and representation.  Mothers would find out about this and they would take care of business.  This is both because of the "infantile" issue as well as the practical conditions in which the soldier is controlled by the state.  Can't go get advice if you aren't allowed to leave the barracks or make phone calls!

I said "until recently" about these mothers groups because the government has recently taken steps to make their work more difficult, including making some of the organizations illegal.  This is a pretty effective way to violate the rights of the soldiers without changing the laws.

What is interesting is that Russia started to clamp down on the mothers groups BEFORE the war started.  I do not think the timing was a coincidence.  Someone high up knew war was coming and that they didn't want the mothers groups causing problems for them.  Here's a short article from October of 2021:

https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/russian-soldiers-mothers-group-closes-pressure-80440100

Steve

[panzermartin]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

What is special about HIMARS is that they are linked into a western backed ISR/TA architecture.  The UA can see with very high resolution, we know the US has been feeding them intel, likely spaced-based, pretty much from day one.  The Russians, as was noted a few pages back, do not have anything near that level of resolution, likely why they are hitting large buildings they can see from G-earth.  While UA is hitting ammo dumps and logistical nodes faster than the RA can build them.

Western artillery had a similar effect - we actually do not know how well c-btty did at Severodonetsk - however their ranges were more modest.  UA has information superiority right now, and it has been decisive.  The RA cannot conduct operational manoeuvre as a result and has been forced into very high concentrations of mass to take very little real estate, very slowly- all at a burn rate it cannot likely sustain.

Finding beats flanking.

So, yeah, practically without the superior intel US provides the difference wouldn't be that big. I'm not sure RU sat are that primitive though, they have been tracking weapon delivery from Poland to Ukraine and hitting them with Kalibr for months now. Unless they more rely on spies for up to date info. Its a mystery though if all those thousand of strikes did anything, as Ukraine never reveals anything of storaged destroyed equipment. If hypothetcally it was Ukraine hitting for months with all these weapons aided by US intel, Russia would have no army left.