How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

Significant?

[chuckdyke]

4 hours ago, Cederic said:

without the UK getting involved.

It was the reason the UK was not involved in Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand were. 

Here is the link of the formal treaty.

ANZUS Treaty | National Museum of Australia (nma.gov.au)

[dan/california]

9 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Japan, 1930s?  Over 30% of GDP for quite a while, at least that's what I'd read.

I wold argue that is a very special case where GDP was rising rapidly as Japan industrialized. Peoples living standards were rising more slowly,  as opposed to being cut savagely. I would argue that makes a large difference.

[MikeyD]

I'm a bit surprised to see footage of 2S7 being fired. I was under the impression they had pretty much depleted  their ammo stockpile. I suppose their continued use is due to a *benevolent neighboring state* shipping them new ammo stocks.

[Cederic]

31 minutes ago, OldSarge said:

UA red legs

Whoa. The red legs are the bad guys :(

https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0075029/

[Kinophile]

@Battlefront.com why are you so certain "no plan would have worked"? If you mean with the given ridiculous war aims (take kiev, Donbass, Azov coast corridor, Kherson/Odessa) then yes; that insane stack of disconnected objectives and operations precluded any victory.

But There were many alternatives suggested by observers, even us. A limited offensive focussed on the Azov coast and Kherson would definitely have been achievable, with even Odessa as a possibility. And other options. Pretty much anything other than what they went with had a better chance...

Anyhow, you dismiss Kofman et al's conclusions as, well, "dismissive", but you also commit that "sin" , by stating the certitude of Russian failure. But its pretty clear a lot had to go right also for the Ukrainians.  Can you really be so certain? 

 

[OldSarge]

33 minutes ago, Cederic said:

Whoa. The red legs are the bad guys

https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0075029/

Different redlegs, these guys are the good guys. Its an old reference to US field artillery because their early 19th century uniform included scarlet piping on the trousers.

Edited June 7, 2022 by OldSarge

[keas66]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Kofman and a colleague just put up an OpEd in NYT today entitled "Russia Is Down. But It’s Not Out".  Paywall:

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/02/opinion/russia-ukraine-war-nato.html?action=click&algo=bandit-all-surfaces-shadow-lda-unique-time-cutoff-30&alpha=0.05&block=trending_recirc&fellback=false&imp_id=131177089&impression_id=6834b610-e5e1-11ec-9509-d5f4e3503faf&index=3&pgtype=Article&pool=pool%2F91fcf81c-4fb0-49ff-bd57-a24647c85ea1&region=footer&req_id=863518704&shadow_vec_sim=0.738009225925462&surface=eos-most-popular-story&variant=1_bandit-eng30s-shadow-lda-unique

 

Overall there's not too much to quibble with.  The overall point is that Russia still has a lot of things to keep the West worried about, such as nuke armed subs, cyber capabilities, strategic nuke armed airforce, etc.  None of these things have been directly harmed by the war and Russia certainly still acts like it is all powerful, so bad attitude still unchecked.

However, not surprising to any of you I find some of the arguments made in the OpEd a little odd.  Three points in particular:

This is our primary topic of discussion here, so I'm going to go out on a limb and say many here don't agree with this statement.  What I see here is the oft repeated excuse of why experts so badly misjudged Russia's ability to wage war.  It's a sorta "stabbed in the back" argument like the Germans had after WW1.  The thinking that the Russian military would have been able to successfully conduct a full scale war against Ukraine except for Putin's leadership is nonsense.  Russia military was simply not up to the challenge and no war plan would have led to success.  So yes, blame Putin for expecting his military to do something beyond its capabilities, but do not excuse the military for it's inability to perform even rudimentary military tasks on a bad battle plan.

This is part of the "Russia can fight a long war" argument that I find highly flawed.  Yes, this is how Russia has behaved.  But it's behaved like this when in a much better set of circumstance than Russia faces right now.  It is unclear if Russia can afford to continue lavish spending on the military at the expense of the people's well being.  It's been doing that for most of the last 8 years and there are signs even before this war that misappropriation of national priorities was starting to strain the social contract between Putin and the people.  In the past Putin got away with a lot of this sort of thing because many Russians saw some evidence that life for them was getting better.  That's unlikely to be the case from now on.

Further, in the past Russia has been able to spend new money to revise existing/old stuff because it found that it didn't have enough money to build up a brand new force from scratch.  And this was with a much better economy and far less problematic sanctions.  How is Russia going to build brand new stuff (the old stuff is either upgraded or destroyed already) with the realities of its reduced economic capabilities?  It would require Putin to spend more money (absolute terms) per year than any previous year and to do so for a number of years in a row.  Since the overall economy has less money available, this means record breaking percentages of the national budget will be needed for defense spending at a time when the overall budget is (likely) lower than it has been in decades.

At best Putin might be able to starve his people to rebuild an equally ineffective military. To do more than that he's going to have to steal even more money from the national budget!  Anybody know of a situation where a government has successfully spent 30% of its GDP on military spending to fight a war of choice?  I can't think of one.

This is very dismissive and, I think, one of their weakest arguments.  Part of the reason why the Russian military has performed so poorly in Ukraine is that the limitations and compounding problems associated with Russia's years of being forced to "work around sanctions".  And those sanctions were child's play compared to what is in place today.

Also, what is this going to do to their arms export business?  That's a big chunk of their GDP that's now in doubt.  Clients should already be thinking twice about buying Russia's best technology, so how enthusiastic are they going to be about buying even worse tech?

Steve

I'm finding my NYT subscription delivers less and less value as time goes on . One thing I really dislike is their hit and miss policy on items that you are allowed to comment on . The WP is generally better at opening up all articles  , opinion pieces or not - to be commented on by readers .

[Calamine Waffles]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

...

Further, in the past Russia has been able to spend new money to revise existing/old stuff because it found that it didn't have enough money to build up a brand new force from scratch.  And this was with a much better economy and far less problematic sanctions.  How is Russia going to build brand new stuff (the old stuff is either upgraded or destroyed already) with the realities of its reduced economic capabilities?  It would require Putin to spend more money (absolute terms) per year than any previous year and to do so for a number of years in a row.  Since the overall economy has less money available, this means record breaking percentages of the national budget will be needed for defense spending at a time when the overall budget is (likely) lower than it has been in decades.

At best Putin might be able to starve his people to rebuild an equally ineffective military. To do more than that he's going to have to steal even more money from the national budget!  Anybody know of a situation where a government has successfully spent 30% of its GDP on military spending to fight a war of choice?  I can't think of one.

This is very dismissive and, I think, one of their weakest arguments.  Part of the reason why the Russian military has performed so poorly in Ukraine is that the limitations and compounding problems associated with Russia's years of being forced to "work around sanctions".  And those sanctions were child's play compared to what is in place today.

Also, what is this going to do to their arms export business?  That's a big chunk of their GDP that's now in doubt.  Clients should already be thinking twice about buying Russia's best technology, so how enthusiastic are they going to be about buying even worse tech?

Steve

His argument is also highly flawed historically because the last few times this happened in the 20th century, the Russians had significant external help from the West.

In the build-up to World War I, after the humiliation of the Russo-Japanese War, the French invested heavily in Russia's arms industry and infrastructure (e.g. Schneider et cie. bought out the Putilov works, and French funding helped build the Trans-Siberian Railway).

After the Russian Civil War, American technical expertise practically built the Soviet industrial base from the absolute ruins of the Civil War, and Lend-Lease gave the Soviet industry the critical life support that it needed post-Barbarossa to produce basic things like explosives. Otherwise the Soviets would have run out of shells sometime in 1942/43. Furthermore, the actual military material help (tanks, aircraft, etc.) was also significant and started arriving during the most critical phases of the Eastern Front.

Who is going to do that after this war? China? They have no interest in rebuilding Russia, they just want it as a cheap oil and other resource extraction site. At best they want a Russia that can distract the Europeans.

Edited June 7, 2022 by Calamine Waffles

[sburke]

48 minutes ago, keas66 said:

I'm finding my NYT subscription delivers less and less value as time goes on . One thing I really dislike is their hit and miss policy on items that you are allowed to comment on . The WP is generally better at opening up all articles  , opinion pieces or not - to be commented on by readers .

why I remember the day when your news came on a piece of paper - you could write all the comments you wanted... but nobody could read them... you youngsters.  Then we'd started yelling at the TV....

Edited June 7, 2022 by sburke

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

Significant?

As I think you know, this guy has been pretty much discredited by now as a fabulist and fantasist, driving traffic to himself cuz social media.

It doesn't make everything he breathlessly retweets wrong of course, but when I see his stuff, I generally seek confirmation.

[LongLeftFlank]

12 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

DefMon3 map. Red = approx front, Green = key roads

 

Redeployment of combat capable forces....

[Thread] 61st Naval infantry brigade appears to have moved up from Avdiivka to Popasna, heading west. Can also spot 76th GAAD in the video heading east.

[Thread] 61 Naval Bde had some casualities at the begining of the war, but was re-deployed to Avdiivka. It seems they are sending more units in this front (or possibly replacing other Naval Bdes losses).

More....

 

 

 

Edited June 7, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[LongLeftFlank]

Ok, this article is worth it for gems like this:

Antiauthoritarian platoon is combined with anarchists of different backgrounds, antifascists and football hooligans. It is not a secret that relations between different constituents of this body were not always easy.

https://www.militantwire.com/p/defensive-war-as-an-act-of-popular?s=w

...I'll be deeply disappointed if they don't  have moustachios and fling round bombs 

 

Splitters!

 

[Battlefront.com]

NYT has another good article to dig into.  This is about the impact of sanctions against technology exports to Russia.  Some very interesting details that paint a VERY dire picture for Russia's economy as a whole, but especially defense industry.  There's ample evidence that the sanctions are already causing major problems (70% of their foreign commercial airliners are grounded due to parts issues), but experts are predicting it will take until the Fall to see the full impact as spare parts and already purchased manufacturing parts run out.

And what appears to be an obligatory downer note, there's a quote from Michael Kofman saying that nobody should be celebrating yet.  Heh. 

Anyway, here are some high points (my bolding):

Quote

The restrictions halt direct technological exports from the United States and dozens of partner nations to Russia. But they also go beyond traditional wartime sanctions issued by the U.S. government by placing limitations on certain high-tech goods that are manufactured anywhere in the world using American machinery, software or blueprints. That means countries that are not in the sanctions coalition with the United States and Europe must also follow the rules or potentially face their own sanctions.

Quote

Russia is one of the world’s largest arms exporters, especially to India, but its industry relies heavily on imported inputs. In 2018, Russian sources satisfied only about half of the military-related equipment and services the country needed, such as transportation equipment, computers, optical equipment, machinery and fabricated metal, according to data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development compiled by Mr. Klein.

The remainder of equipment and services used by Russia were imported, with about a third coming from the United States, Europe, Japan, Taiwan, Australia and other partner governments that imposed sanctions together on Moscow.

Quote

Maria Snegovaya, a visiting scholar at George Washington University who has studied sanctions on Russia, said the lack of critical technologies and maintenance was likely to start being felt widely across Russian industry in the fall, as companies run out of parts and supplies or need upkeep on equipment. She and other analysts said even the production of daily goods such as printer paper would be affected; Russian companies had bought the dye to turn the paper white from Western companies.

And about those sanction work arounds Kofman is so confident about:

Quote

In an interview last month, Ms. Raimondo said the United States was not seeing any systematic circumvention of the export controls by any country, including China...

 

“The world knows just how very serious we are, and our allies are, about prosecuting any violation,” she said. “There will be real consequences for any companies or countries that do try to get around the export controls.”

Chinese trade data also suggest that most companies are following the restrictions.

 

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/02/business/economy/russia-weapons-american-technology.html?action=click&pgtype=LegacyCollection&state=default&module=styln-russia-ukraine&variant=show&region=BELOW_MAIN_CONTENT&block=storyline_flex_guide_recirc

 

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, dan/california said:

Significant?

Unless I see it from someone other than this joker, no I don't think it is "significant".

For the most part he's been careful to repost stuff from reliable sources, giving the illusion that he's coming up with the info, so it could be true.  But because he's almost certainly NOT a volunteer in Ukraine I have to take anything he puts out with a pound of salt.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, Kinophile said:

@Battlefront.com why are you so certain "no plan would have worked"? If you mean with the given ridiculous war aims (take kiev, Donbass, Azov coast corridor, Kherson/Odessa) then yes; that insane stack of disconnected objectives and operations precluded any victory.

But There were many alternatives suggested by observers, even us. A limited offensive focussed on the Azov coast and Kherson would definitely have been achievable, with even Odessa as a possibility. And other options. Pretty much anything other than what they went with had a better chance...

You have to understand that Putin laid out some very specific goals and that is what the plan was designed to achieve.  The primary goal was the destruction of the Ukrainian state as a functioning country, not to grab a bit of land here or there.  The military drew up pretty much the only plan that could theoretically achieve Putin's goals.  Since that was all they could come up with, that's the one they went with.  It failed in execution in part because it underestimated Ukraine's ability to resist and in part because Russia's military was inherently incapable of pulling it off.

Anybody that says there was some way for Putin's war aims to be met, please show me what that plan is so I can point and laugh at it.  This is EXACTLY why I didn't think Putin was going to do a full regime change invasion until February 21st, because there was absolutely no way to make it work.  I gave him way too much credit for being smart/informed enough to know that.

Now, had Putin had far more modest war aims in mind, there are a couple of scenarios I can think that would have worked short term at least.  However, this is like arguing that Nazi Germany could have won WW2 if it had not invaded the Soviet Union or had done X or Y or Z at given times.  The fact is that things could have gone better, but long term were still doomed for many very complex reasons.  One of those reasons being that the dictator on top insisted on pursuing goals that weren't realistic.

3 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Anyhow, you dismiss Kofman et al's conclusions as, well, "dismissive", but you also commit that "sin" , by stating the certitude of Russian failure.

I'm not dismissive.  I just don't feel like repeating what I've said in a couple hundred posts over the last 3 months.

3 hours ago, Kinophile said:

But its pretty clear a lot had to go right also for the Ukrainians.  Can you really be so certain?

Yes

I predicted Russia would fail at such a war years before it started.  Within the first 3 days I predicted that Russia had failed to achieve it's goals.  By the end of the 2nd week I predicted that Russia would lose the war.  Around the same time I predicted Russia would have to pull back from the north or collapse, which they did.  I predicated that they wouldn't take more ground in the south, which they haven't.  I didn't give their Izyum offensive much chance of success before it petered out and died.  I predicted that their great big offensive in the east failed in the first 5 days after it was launched, even though it is still kinda grinding on.  I've more recently predicted that Russia would not be able to exploit Popasna, which they haven't done.  I've now stated that Russia has ceded its strategic initiative to Ukraine.  From here on out Ukraine is in the driver's seat unless Russia decides to fully mobilize.

For more than 3 months I have spent upwards of 6 hours a day following this war and have repeatedly debated and ground under my heal all the arguments made by casual commentators and "experts" that Russia could still somehow win this. The war is not yet over, but so far I don't see any reason why I should second guess my fundamental understandings of this war or the conclusion that Russia will lose it.

Steve

P.S.  my gut conclusions that Russia would lose the war before it started were my own.  Since the war has started I've benefited by facts on the ground and insightful perspectives from lots of people (including some here) who are viewing this war as it is instead of how others thought it would be.  Therefore, when I "toot my own horn" I am by definition tooting theirs as well   I'm absolutely not the only one that's been calling things correctly so far.

[Artkin]

American Volunteer James Vasquez: "We had infinite javelins" 

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=5pqqnPwXQ_k

[Battlefront.com]

From June 6th ISW report:

Quote

Russian forces likely retain control over most of Severodonetsk as of June 6, despite Head of the Luhansk Regional State Administration Serhiy Haidai’s June 5 claims that Ukrainian counterattacks retook considerable ground and drove Russian troops to the eastern outskirts of the city.[9] Haidai issued another statement on June 6 expanding on his previous statement and said that the situation had “deteriorated” and that Ukrainian troops are fighting in the industrial zone of the Azot plant.[10] Ukrainian journalist Yuri Butusov additionally reported on June 5 that claims of Ukrainian counterattacks were untrue and that Ukrainian forces only hold the Azot plant and surrounding neighborhoods.[11] The reason for the conflicting reports on June 5 is unclear and ISW cannot independently confirm if Ukrainian forces did indeed retake large parts of Severodonetsk at the time of Haidai’s statement and subsequently lost the terrain by June 6, or if Ukrainian forces did not make these counterattacks at all. The information environment in Severodonetsk remains dynamic and control of terrain is likely changing hands frequently as Ukrainian and Russian troops are locked in close-quarters urban combat.[12] Haidai cited intercepted information that Russian forces have been tasked with completing the capture of Severodonetsk by June 10, though no other sources have reported this deadline and ISW cannot confirm it at this time.[13]

Fog of war in Severodonetsk to an extreme.  Butusov is generally reliable, but theoretically Haidai has more/better information about the big picture.  All we can pretty much say for sure is that Russia has not taken the city or all of its outskirts yet.

Whatever the case might be, I'll restate again that Ukraine does not need to retain Severodonetsk, but Russia sure feels that it needs to take it.  Anything that Ukraine can do to screw around with Russia's ability to legitimately claim victory is good only if it does not come with too high a price.

Steve

[sburke]

huh  kind of a play on the whole Stalingrad sniper battle?

Sniper. The White Raven (2022) - IMDb

Might have to check this one out as well

Cyborgs: Heroes Never Die (2017) - IMDb

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Some very interesting details that paint a VERY dire picture for Russia's economy as a whole, but especially defense industry

Totally worth it!  the shattered cities Putin has conquered and all the oil & natural gas they can't get to are definitely going to make this whole thing turn a profit! 

On the "what military plan would've worked" I still go back to it never being a military plan.  It was coup backed up by a military invasion via armored columns and airborne insertions.  Once the coup failed it was a disaster no matter how he decided to run the invasion.  He could've concentrated force in the donbas but Ukraine would've known that and moved their own forces accordingly.  RU couldn't really advance very far due to the logistics mess. 

Reminds me of how I used to always like to visualize how Germany could've won during Barbarossa.  As I got older and read more about the logistical end, I realized Germany needed Russia to give up by the time Germans reached Smolensk since they knew they'd have to stop to do major logistical pause (Paulus actually calculated this well beforehand and it's well documented).  And sure enough, they made it to Smolensk then had to pause. 

So Severodonetsk does now appear to be a target of opportunity for tying down & degrading RU forces.  Interesting and clever move.

[Taranis]

9 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

3:07

Why is the interface in English?

It's not the software I used. I think it's the export software (unless there is massive software update since I left). Nexter is written in large on the software which could well show that it is indeed an export version. This would explain why the software is in English. The time that an update in Ukrainian would have taken (and the money above all...) may explain why this was not done.

 

8 hours ago, Fenris said:

Thanks, that was interesting (even though I don't speak French).  Did she say they were able to shoot and scoot in 4 minutes?

Yes, that's what it says. Basically, they say that the CAESARs are effective, that they are precise and caused panic in the enemy ranks (moment with the drone videos) then once the CAESARs have fired, they quickly leave the position to avoid counter battery. It is also indicated that transfers from base to base are carried out only at night so as not to be spotted and that the position of the unit is kept secret because it would be a priority target for the Russians.

[Huba]

Let me just leave it here:

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

7 minutes ago, Huba said:

Let me just leave it here:

 

I think it is just stupid to exchange 1:1.

[Taranis]

9 hours ago, SeinfeldRules said:

Essentially, that is the benefit of the full digital system that the Caesar has onboard.

 

Yes that is one of the rockets out of the pod.

@Vanir Ausf B @Fenris @SeinfeldRules

Thinking back to the video and some additional information. It is stated in the video that the commander seen towards the end commands 6 CAESAR (battery?) and that his unit allegedly destroyed 80 Russian guns.

From a professional point of view (which interests you), we see on the video that the coordinates of the target are indicated manually on the gun calculator (the computer at the front, the CALP) (3: 05). The gun then automatically calculates its angle and direction of fire based on its coordinates thanks to the inertial navigation system. In the French army, there is no need to enter them manually because the coordinates are transmitted automatically. A nod to the previous exchanges we had regarding integration (radio etc)

PS : by continuing and with a bit of luck, I will be able to sell a CAESAR to Steve

Edited June 7, 2022 by Taranis

[Huba]

It makes sense I think, there probably wasn't enough time to integrate CAESARS with upper level artillery management system that UA  uses, hence the digital system is operated in "manual mode". 

Reportedly Germans are integrating their Pzh2000, as was claimed by some article I linked few days ago (although I't might've been de-bunked by users here IIRC). I'd think that having it integrated directly gives you some time advantage, but is it really that significant? I'd think you save seconds, maybe a minute that way?