How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[danfrodo]

wow, what a great batch of posts I see this morning.  I am nearly out of likes and it's only 9:30AM. 

On the "weapons game changer" conversation:  excellent views.  My two cents is that what matters most now is to take away the one advantage RU has, which is artillery.  They use it for their 'offensive' actions and are counting on it to defend what they want to hold.  Those low quality troops might hang on w artillery on their side.  Without it, they'll actually have to fight, which they aren't going to do for long or be very good at.  So the ability of UKR to severely diminish RU artillery is a game changer. 

And more videos of UKR troops in training.  Training the troops is a luxury that RU doesn't seem to have, clearly indicating which side is desperate and which is thinking longer term (meaning ~July?). 

One thing I didn't see much comment about:  what is up w the RU 90 contract thing?  Will this cause mutinies when troops that have been counting the days suddenly are told that their legal contract is null & void?  Does anyone here have any insights into this?

[Cederic]

12 hours ago, SeinfeldRules said:

I think HIMARS or the M270 will be a good asset for Ukraine and give them a useful capability, but I doubt it will be war changing

Range + accuracy + real-time spotting would give Ukraine the ability to start eliminating Russian artillery. That would cripple and largely prevent further Russian aggression and make assaults on Russian positions far less costly.

Western MLRS deliver the first two of those, it's whether they can be married with the third.

Of course, I may be being hopelessly and naively optimistic here, in which case (especially given your direct experience here) don't feel you need to be diplomatic in saying so :)

 

[FancyCat]

uh, pretty unbelievable if we are thinking this is a local shaping offensive, but i guess this might count as a deeper offensive? I mean it could mean simply Russia withdrew forces but Ukraine isn't nearby, but I doubt that Russia would withdraw from a town unless it was under threat from a Ukrainian advance. 

 

 

edit: nvm, theres two Mykolaivka in Kherson Oblast, probably this one: https://goo.gl/maps/aSbF5mmGTGTN4TYH7

this was the one suggested by O'Brien: https://goo.gl/maps/NRtQ2rfk6YngxSu56

 

 

Edited May 30, 2022 by FancyCat

[billbindc]

2 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

The keys go up an' down, the music goes round and round (wo-oh-woah) an' it comes out.... here!

 

Schneider's cynicism is a bit weird given that we've just witnessed the most effective integration of intelligence, diplomacy and military initiative since WWII. Are there bumps on the road with allies? Sure. But in the end, the intelligence is driven by the US and there's not an ounce of slack in that system right now. NATO? Well sure...but that's not where the real game is happening.

[Bearstronaut]

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

But lighter, personal protection gear - body armor, boots, medical gak - the US has oodles and oodles of that stuff that could be easily (and I believe is fully in process) sent without affecting active or reserve forces. 

Almost everybody in the US Army buys their own boots after basic training anyways. Issue boots are not very comfortable at all. I once had a commander who wore issue boots and I thought he was a weirdo for doing so.

[FancyCat]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

Another statement by Biden that really requires clarification. Does he mean ATACMS? Or MLRS in general?

 

Not too worried, isn't ATACMS in very short supply?

[LongLeftFlank]

5 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Schneider's cynicism is a bit weird given that we've just witnessed the most effective integration of intelligence, diplomacy and military initiative since WWII. Are there bumps on the road with allies? Sure. But in the end, the intelligence is driven by the US and there's not an ounce of slack in that system right now. NATO? Well sure...but that's not where the real game is happening.

I may have overdosed on Chomsky/McLuhan and misread, but I think he's discussing the tendency of the public messaging to become a self referential maelstrom, as opposed to the SCI decision information and analysis.

...Although the PR tail can certainly wag that dog at times too (e.g. the monomaniacal focus on enemy body counts in Vietnam, or Coalition casualties in Iraq/Astan).
But I also agree, the US natsec apparatus seems to have performed quite creditably to date.

[Haiduk]

15 hours ago, Harmon Rabb said:

UKR soldiers on the video, where they are training on Wolfhounds, have chevrons of 46th air-assault brigade. Like 45th air-assault they are both "ghost" brigades, which were established in 2016-17, but almost hadn't own personnel, except HQs and some minimum of contractors in some units. They participated in JFO, but "leasing" personnel in other air-assault brigades. I think, both brigades were "brigades of cadre" and were fully deployed only after the war begun. Though, I didn't hear about their participation in the war. 

45th brigade dislocates in Bolgrad, Odesa oblast (Bessarabia), 46th - in  Poltava city.  

[sburke]

interesting knock on effects and competition for Russia in thee "sanctioned oil producing countries" markets.

Ukraine war threatens Iran's last economic lifeline (msn.com)

[cesmonkey]

Interesting, thoughtful discussion:

https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/what-the-experts-got-wrong-and-right-about-russian-military-power/

[Haiduk]

6 hours ago, Taranis said:

Kherson area :
"Ukrainian paratroopers engaged Russian 104th assault airborne regiment"

https://t.me/ukrpravda_news/18408

Popasna area )

[billbindc]

46 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

I may have overdosed on Chomsky/McLuhan and misread, but I think he's discussing the tendency of the public messaging to become a self referential maelstrom, as opposed to the SCI decision information and analysis.

...Although the PR tail can certainly wag that dog at times too (e.g. the monomaniacal focus on enemy body counts in Vietnam, or Coalition casualties in Iraq/Astan).
But I also agree, the US natsec apparatus seems to have performed quite creditably to date.

Chomsky and his ilk tend to see the messaging that confirms their priors or see messaging as having a malign intent almost by definition. Did the Biden administration shape public opinion in both Europe and the US before Russia invaded? Sure. By making sure that a truthful account of what was happening out competed the propaganda emanating from Moscow. Is that 'manufacturing consent'? I'd argue not. It's leveling with your voters. 

PS: I should add that what Schneider is specifically discussing is the coordinated messaging that was being done before the war began. That made sense then because it was necessary to actively escalate attention to Russian actions that were indicating what was coming. Now, it's here. Russian misdeeds are dominating the news every day and thus the need for what he's describing has waned. Not offense to Schneider but what he's describing is a fairly banal reassessment of need and action.

 

Edited May 30, 2022 by billbindc

[Harmon Rabb]

Pretty neat footage from what I'm guessing is the rear ramp of an Mi-8.

[dan/california]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

You missed my point.  It is not any one system, it is the enhancement of a particular capability.  NLAW didn't stop the Russians.  Nor did Javelin, Matador, PzF3, etc.  It was the totality of them all.  So when people get focused on one of them, saying that it could change the tide of the war, it's missing the mark.

Steve

 

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

The introduction of any new system and its predicted impact on the battlefield remains one of the dark arts of force development, and frankly it is more often than not, wrong.  History shows that a weapon system can literally change a war (e.g. machine guns), however, it also shows we rarely accurately predict this.  There are a lot of reasons for this however the primary factors are:

- What are the capability metrics of the weapon system itself?  Are they incremental or are they significant improvement over what is already there? Or are they completely new?  This is the end-point of analysis for most people which is well short of what is required.  For example, HIMARS/MLRS definitely have longer range and likely higher precision (munitions dependent) so on paper the capability definitely raises an eyebrow but there is a lot more to the story.

- Capacity and density of the new capability.  So people should not take my musings on mass as "mass is dead", in warfare mass will always have a role, but I am talking mass effects - what appears to be changing in this war, on the defence at least, is how those effects are generated and projected.   Most new capability is going to have to arrive with enough mass effect to have an impact on the overall exchange.  This does not necessarily mean millions of systems, particularly if the system has wide effects built in, but you still need enough to make an impact.  Take the ME 262, game-changing technology, however, Germany could not produce enough of them to get the effects the weapon system was capable of to make a difference.  In this war the NLAWs/Javelins and other smart-ATGMs are an excellent example of enough capacity and density to make mass effects possible.  I agree that these systems likely contributed to the stalling and collapse of the norther Russian front, however, how that happened was also dependent on the next key factor -  

-  Integration of, or Around.  The ability to integrate a new capability into a war is likely one of the most decisive factors in its impact. Normally we integrate new capability into an extant operational system and it makes that system more effective or efficient, or provided more decisive effects and broader options.  We also normally get this wrong.  You can see it with the introduction of the machine gun, they were treated the same as field guns and brigaded together because we rarely build a operational system around new capability...at first.  As we saw in WW1 the machine gun (and massed fired artillery) soon became the core of a new operational system built around them.   It does happen (rarely) that militaries take risk and get out in front of this such as the German employment of combined arms warfare before WW2 and US AirLand Battle, all before the technology and capabilities they were designed around came to full realization.  In this war, I think the smart-ATGMs were not only integrated into the Ukrainian defence, they became a core/foundational piece.  So what?  Well for any new capability a very important question is "will it be integrated into, or around?" 

- Sustainability and enablers.  The full realization of any new capability often hinges on the ability to sustain and enable it.  Very few capabilities come entirely self-contained and need other capabilities to allow them to develop fully mature impacts.  Back to machine guns, useless without the industry to keep manufacturing them and their ammunition.  Also useless without rail systems to get them and the troops needed to the front quickly, and also useless without an ability to feed those troops (enter the mighty tin can).  

- Modularity and cost.  Most very successful war-changing capabilities have been cheap and very modular - however here there are noted exceptions and I will come back to these.  This not only reinforces density and capacity, it build in a high level of capability agility to allow those impacts to adapt to counter-capabilities over time.  It is of little use to simply have a wonder-weapon if in 6 months it has been made obsolete.  Modularity allows for rapid add-on to ensure whatever you are pushing into the war remains competitive.   

Now all this hold historical water and explains why "average" weapon systems like the Sherman won wars.  The Sherman tank was not the highest on capability metrics when compared to the German top tier tanks but it easily beat them on almost every other axis.

And now for The Exceptions, and there always are.  Strategic game-changing weapons are extremely rare but they do happen.  Nuclear weapons for example are able to create such massive effects that their very existence has forced a re-write of how wars happen.

We were expecting cyber in this war, and even though it is on the battlefield I have yet to see evidence that it is in the league of other war-changers yet.  Information has definitely been war-changing in this war - how it is collected, process and utilized, I suspect history will show that C4ISR was one of the decisive capabilities in this war and how it was employed will likely change wars from here on out.  Unmanned is also likely in this league - does anyone think we are going into any future wars without thinking about unmanned systems calculus?  And finally smart-man portable systems of all types have re-written how we think about denial and superiority - we will be studying that for a generation.  I also expect that once the details come out we are in for more surprises but we will just have to wait and see.

 

It is that I am not making making my point very well. The point I am trying to make is that the the NATO ATGMs, most of which were sent right around the start of the war, increased the the total anti tank capability of the Ukrainian forces by a factor of five, a factor of ten? I would love to see a real analysis of what they had on Jan 1 2022, vs what they had on March 1 2022. That increase in anti tank capacity, and its brilliant incorporation into an operational plan by the Ukrainians turned a Russian war war plan that would probably have resulted in a messy invasion of Georgia style win, into an absolute bleeping fiasco. 

2 hours ago, sross112 said:

This, to me, is the big thing that a lot of people are overlooking in the MSM assessment of the different weapon system deliveries. 100 M777's sounds like a lot but the front is 800 km long. The guns will be concentrated for effect and will give new capability in a localized area but they aren't going to be a miracle weapon that can effect the entire front simultaneously. Same with the MRLS systems that come in. They will be useful and add capability but won't be a huge game changer unless way bigger numbers are pushed in.

Let's think about the overall numbers. The UA started with 200,000ish troops in 17 brigades. They now state they have 700,000ish troops. Each brigade has an artillery group (based on pre-war TO&Es) consisting of 36 tubes and 18 MRLS. Pre war they needed 600ish tubes and 300ish MRLS. So just to give their regular pre war brigades the upgraded capabilities they need a lot more guns and rocket trucks than what is being sent now. All the mishmash of self propelled guns might be able to update a single brigade at this point. If the west announced 300 M777s, 300 Pzh2000s and 300 HIMARS that would be a "game changer" as the RA would be out matched along the entire line. And even that still depends on the ammunition types provided for the systems. The capabilities of each have a wide range that totally depends on what types and quantities of ammo are provided. 

This also bleeds over into the question of why we haven't seen several new UA formations appearing on the battlefield. They have pushed a few TD brigades to the front with varying degrees of success but reports say that they didn't have the heavy equipment they need to be front line brigades. Why? Because the UA doesn't have it. Reports since the beginning of the war, even for regular units, were of crowd funding a lot of basic equipment. UAV's, body armor, optics, medical supplies, etc. If they need crowd funding for regular units they definitely don't have the gear for the newly mobilized ones. I keep thinking of the US army doing exercises with mock tanks and support weapons prior to entry into WW2. 

Of course it all boils down to time or complete commitment to support. The best example is probably the US. They have committed to giving a large amount of support in the form of the equipment we have seen so far and the $40 billion package. The US military could conceivably send everything the UA needs to be a modern force, but that totally strips them. I'm talking from boots to body armor to personal weapons to trucks to support weapons to IFVs and tanks to air power. They could send everything needed but they would have to strip a very large percentage of their own forces in order to do so, or the UA has to wait until the new gear can be built and sent. It is a tough choice and what is the magic number that can be given while still maintaining their own capabilities? I personally say strip all 10 National Guard Divisions of everything they have and send it. Back fill them with new production. If China or North Korea pops off in the interim the active forces will just have to make due, but I'm not in charge so that probably isn't going to happen.

The current equipment transfers, except from probably Poland, seem to be a trickle when it seems to me that if we want to change the game we need to open the hydrant. 

MLRS systems are probably the easiest area to open the hydrant. First and foremost The U.S. has this big shiny air force to help with deep strikes if China or Iran decided this was the moment to do something spectacularly stupid, really don't see a third possibility. I have great deal of concern about the viability of manned aircraft even five years from now, but at this moment we have an air force that nobody else can touch.

Secondly the HIMARS is just a really easy system to train people on. Not that there is no training involved, but there is nothing like the training and logistical tail to equip the Ukrainians with Abrams. The Ukrainians already know what to do with rocket artillery, it isn't THAT complicated to figure out what to do with BETTER rocket artillery. The Russians seem to be on knife's edge of failure in this whole war. Why in the bleep wouldn't we run some small risks with our short term force structure to push them right off the cliff. There is a big upgrade planned for U.S. MLRS starting in ~2027 anyway. We can live with a small capability gap between now and then. Doubly so if what is now left of the Russian army is a smoking ruin in the Donbas. Every munition we send to Ukraine is killing the army it was built to kill. Biden is way too deep into this to get scared of winning now.

Edited May 30, 2022 by dan/california
double typed the first bit

[dan/california]

I

 

[akd]

This is becoming a genre of videos:

 

[Kinophile]

Reading "The War That Made the Roman Empire", Barry Strauss.  A bit "popular" in tone for my taste, just a bit, but fine otherwise. And relevant

Edited May 30, 2022 by Kinophile

[Kinophile]

[Vacillator]

6 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Any news on the other poor buggers taken prisoner in (or perhaps some still in) Mariupol?  Last I saw was talk of trials.

[Blazing 88's]

2 hours ago, Bearstronaut said:

Almost everybody in the US Army buys their own boots after basic training anyways. Issue boots are not very comfortable at all. I once had a commander who wore issue boots and I thought he was a weirdo for doing so.

Prada's like Ramzan!?

https://www.gq.com/story/ramzan-kadyrov-leader-chechnya-boots

[Vanir Ausf B]

55 minutes ago, dan/california said:

It is that I am not making making my point very well. The point I am trying to make is that the the NATO ATGMs, most of which were sent right around the start of the war, increased the the total anti tank capability of the Ukrainian forces by a factor of five, a factor of ten? I would love to see a real analysis of what they had on Jan 1 2022, vs what they had on March 1 2022. That increase in anti tank capacity, and its brilliant incorporation into an operational plan by the Ukrainians turned a Russian war war plan that would probably have resulted in a messy invasion of Georgia style win, into an absolute bleeping fiasco.

“Anti-tank missiles slowed the Russians down, but what killed them was our artillery.” -- Gen. Valerii Zaluzhnyi, commander of the Ukrainian armed forces

I would be cautious about ascribing outcomes to any particular weapons system or type. Reasons for the Russian failure are manifold.

[Vic4]

@Battlefront.com@The_Capt@Haiduk@kraze et al..

Appreciate any perspective on the following regarding Crimea.

1. Should reacquiring Crimea be a strategic/operational goal at all for Ukraine?

2. If yes, what would you anticipate Russia’s response to be, given the current condition of the RA & political climate?

3. Would a majority of the Crimean population actively support or reject such an endeavor by Ukraine?

[Vanir Ausf B]

Many if not most of the Russian units in the Kherson area are reservists. The front line units are concentrated in Donbas.

13 hours ago, FancyCat said:

If this is true, then those reports that the T-62s were merely for reserve units to replace more modern units for the front are false somewhat.

 

 

[kraze]

35 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

I still fail to understand how english letters N and I look like wolfsangel, especially when Z looks literally like it. But every russian lover in the West was like "look if you forget it's "N.ational I.dea" and consider it a single symbol and also turn it 90 degrees - it looks somewhat like that Z symbol!" - so OK. But who gets to be the "nazi batallion" now?

[Taranis]

32 minutes ago, Vacillator said:

Any news on the other poor buggers taken prisoner in (or perhaps some still in) Mariupol?  Last I saw was talk of trials.

 

Quote

Les soldats ukrainiens du régiment Azov qui ont combattu à Marioupol risquent la peine capitale
Les combattants ukrainiens du régiment Azov qui se sont rendus après avoir combattu à Marioupol, en Ukraine, seront jugés et risquent la peine de mort, a affirmé lundi un responsable du territoire séparatiste prorusse de Donetsk. « Tous les prisonniers de guerre se trouvent sur le territoire de la DNR », a déclaré à la télévision russe Iouri Sirovatko, ministre de la justice de cette république autoproclamée située dans l’est du pays.

« Concrètement, nous avons 2 300 prisonniers de guerre de [l’aciérie] Azovstal », a-t-il précisé, avant d’ajouter que le régiment « Azov est considéré comme une organisation terroriste » et que tous « feront l’objet d’enquêtes criminelles » en vue d’un procès. « De tels crimes sont passibles chez nous de la peine capitale : la peine de mort », a conclu le ministre.

Les derniers défenseurs ukrainiens de Marioupol, retranchés dans l’immense aciérie Azovstal, se sont rendus aux forces russes entre le 16 et le 20 mai, après trois mois d’intenses combats. Les autorités russes présentent les combattants d’Azov, un régiment fondé par des nationalistes ukrainiens, comme des « néonazis » et entendent les traiter comme des criminels de guerre et non comme des prisonniers de guerre. Samedi, le président français, Emmanuel Macron, et le chancelier allemand, Olaf Scholz, ont demandé au président russe, Vladimir Poutine, de les libérer.

 

"Ukrainian soldiers from the Azov regiment who fought in Marioupol risk capital punishment
The Ukrainian fighters of the Azov regiment who went after having fought in Marioupol, Ukraine, will be tried and risk the death penalty, said a head of the separatist territory of Donetsk on Monday. "All prisoners of war are on DNR territory," said Russian television Iouri Sirovatko, Minister of Justice of this self -proclaimed Republic located in the east of the country.

"Concretely, we have 2,300 prisoners of war of [the steelworks] Azovstal," he said, before adding that the "Azov regiment is considered a terrorist organization" and that all "will be the subject criminal surveys ”for a trial. "Such crimes are liable to us in capital punishment: the death penalty," concluded the minister.

The last Ukrainian defenders of Marioupol, entrenched in the immense Azovstal steelworks, went to the Russian forces between May 16 and 20, after three months of intense fighting. The Russian authorities present the Azov fighters, a regiment founded by Ukrainian nationalists, like "neonazis" and intend to treat them as war criminals and not as prisoners of war. On Saturday, the French president, Emmanuel Macron, and the German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, asked the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to release them."

Source : Le Monde

Edited May 30, 2022 by Taranis