How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[MikeyD]

1 hour ago, SeinfeldRules said:

I am always skeptical of people claiming certain equipment or contributions will be war changing

My thought when Switchblade was originally billed as a game-changer. In a war where the opposing sides are firing GRADs and IKSANDERs at each other a flying 40mm rifle grenade is little more than a nuisance weapon.

[Taranis]

"A Ukrainian soldier maneuvers a recovered Russian BMP-2 armored vehicle on the front line in the Kharkiv region on May 29, 2022. BERNAT ARMANGUE / AP"

[LongLeftFlank]

4 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

T-72Bs and T-80BVs pulled from storage to join the earlier mentioned T-62s.

 

Ha, with T72Bs now joining the 62s and BMP1s, if the US throws in some NG M60s on top of the Leopard 1s and M113s, maybe we'll need to hound @Bil Hardenberger and @The_Capt for a new CMCW module instead of Steve and Charles!

Edited May 30, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Huba]

4 hours ago, akd said:

Some interesting (if perhaps overoptimistic) analysis of the potential of US MLRS provision to Ukraine (thread contains a link to an earlier important thread):

 

Nice thread indeed! I don't feel competent enough to evaluate the assessment of MLRS impact on the battlefield, too much faith in any wunderwaffe is an obvious mistake of course. However, there are some particular facts are worth mentioning as those give a clearer picture of the situation (for me at least) :

- more than 100 M142 in US service are not in active status, no need to strip active units 

- same is true for M270A1s, and those are capable to fire all the contemporary munitions developed for MLRS systems

- reload time being 5 minutes (!) seems like quite a performance

Edited May 30, 2022 by Huba

[Huba]

I didn't serve, but this is an example of low morale, right? 

 

Also, +8 L52 155mm SPGs from Slovakia. I wonder to what degree training on Danas is applicable to these new guns:

 

Edited May 30, 2022 by Huba

[The_MonkeyKing]

Ukraine is going to get the most colorful of artillery arms in terms of equipment...

I guess common type and standardization isn't that big of a worry. Maybe in the sort timespan of this war 1-2 years it doesn't matter. No overhauls or major maintenance relevant. 

[Huba]

15 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Ukraine is going to get the most colorful of artillery arms in terms of equipment...

I guess common type and standardization isn't that big of a worry. Maybe in the sort timespan of this war 1-2 years it doesn't matter. No overhauls or major maintenance relevant. 

I assume for anything major they will just ship them back to Slovakia/ Poland. Czechia and Slovakia are officially servicing UA equipment already, as part of their support effort.

Other thing that is not mentioned, but I think can have a really significant impact on maintenance and even operating some of the western supplied equipment, is how easy and prevalent teleconferencing has become in last few years. I imagine that for critical, big ticket stuff that has to be fixed, expert support has to be just a Zoom call away.

Edit: one more thing that just came to mind mind regarding major overhauls - I wonder how long those M777s will last, given that barrel life is supposed to be around 2000 rounds. I assume exchanging the barrel is quite a major task.

Edited May 30, 2022 by Huba

[LongLeftFlank]

4 hours ago, Taranis said:

"A Ukrainian soldier maneuvers a recovered Russian BMP-2 armored vehicle on the front line in the Kharkiv region on May 29, 2022. BERNAT ARMANGUE / AP"

Patrick Stewart has volunteered for the UA foreign legion?! 

P.S. Bog willing, those Slovak guns last longer than the S400 system they kindly sent previously, and which I understand (from Russian sources, but it's credible) was promptly blown to bits by cruise missiles at Dnipro Airport.

In other celebrity news, Legolas is fighting for the UA as well. Hide the mûmakil, yrch!

 

Edited May 30, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Taranis]

Kherson area :
"Ukrainian paratroopers engaged Russian 104th assault airborne regiment"

https://t.me/ukrpravda_news/18408

[JonS]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

 major overhauls - I wonder how long those M777s will last, given that barrel life is supposed to be around 2000 rounds. I assume exchanging the barrel is quite a major task.

Not as major as you might think. Assuming the goons are well trained, and the head technical NCO knows his business, it's a one-day job for the battery-level light aid detachment.

That said, 2,000 efc's seems really low I would have expected 10 or 20,000.

[LongLeftFlank]

This pro-Russian blogger is geolocating film clips of the Russian advance into eastern Severodonetsk, including the power plant which lately was the site of a hard fight.

His editorial viewpoint is wevs, but his product is very CM-reminiscent. It gives a good flavour of the 'map' and battlespace. Note however that the RA have already occupied these areas, so this isn't combat footage.

Sievierodonetsk has been on the front lines for months now, so I imagine there is some kind of defensive crust in the town.

OSINTAggregator does love his Giant Red (and Blue) Arrows of Doom lol....

 

Edited May 30, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[LongLeftFlank]

1.  Go shopping, get shelled? Was this a military target? Looks more like a construction site. But then, why park so far away? Who the hell knows. War is hell.

2.  But meanwhile it looks like Ukraine is running the table now (with its new US guns) in the sector west of Izyum, joining Kharkiv and Kherson fronts as a place where Ivan is acted upon, no longer acting.

Even allowing for video editing prop, these are clearly punishing artillery strikes, taking out a LOT of equipment.(there's more in the thread)

Russians just won't disperse in laager, will they?

 

3.  Meanwhile, it looks very much to me like the RA is building up for an intensive bombardment of Sloviansk, which is a key road/rail junction for sustaining the UA Donbas salient. Kiev Independent had 2 reports, one of a buildup of 120 new 'pieces of equipment' and another re withdrawal of mobile forces from the Lyman area.

There was also a report of PMP bridging equipment, but I find it doubtful that they will have the forces to seriously attempt a river crossing in the Lyman sector, even once they finally clear the north bank.

 

Edited May 30, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[The_Capt]

7 hours ago, SeinfeldRules said:

I am always skeptical of people claiming certain equipment or contributions will be war changing, I've heard that since February 24th and yet to see any of it pan out. There's also a lot of best-case-scenario type situations being bandied about with MLRS, and it may be strictly factual but often doesn't take into account reality. I think HIMARS or the M270 will be a good asset for Ukraine and give them a useful capability, but I doubt it will be war changing and there is still a lot that is contingent on what they actually will receive, and how much. 

The introduction of any new system and its predicted impact on the battlefield remains one of the dark arts of force development, and frankly it is more often than not, wrong.  History shows that a weapon system can literally change a war (e.g. machine guns), however, it also shows we rarely accurately predict this.  There are a lot of reasons for this however the primary factors are:

- What are the capability metrics of the weapon system itself?  Are they incremental or are they significant improvement over what is already there? Or are they completely new?  This is the end-point of analysis for most people which is well short of what is required.  For example, HIMARS/MLRS definitely have longer range and likely higher precision (munitions dependent) so on paper the capability definitely raises an eyebrow but there is a lot more to the story.

- Capacity and density of the new capability.  So people should not take my musings on mass as "mass is dead", in warfare mass will always have a role, but I am talking mass effects - what appears to be changing in this war, on the defence at least, is how those effects are generated and projected.   Most new capability is going to have to arrive with enough mass effect to have an impact on the overall exchange.  This does not necessarily mean millions of systems, particularly if the system has wide effects built in, but you still need enough to make an impact.  Take the ME 262, game-changing technology, however, Germany could not produce enough of them to get the effects the weapon system was capable of to make a difference.  In this war the NLAWs/Javelins and other smart-ATGMs are an excellent example of enough capacity and density to make mass effects possible.  I agree that these systems likely contributed to the stalling and collapse of the norther Russian front, however, how that happened was also dependent on the next key factor -  

-  Integration of, or Around.  The ability to integrate a new capability into a war is likely one of the most decisive factors in its impact. Normally we integrate new capability into an extant operational system and it makes that system more effective or efficient, or provided more decisive effects and broader options.  We also normally get this wrong.  You can see it with the introduction of the machine gun, they were treated the same as field guns and brigaded together because we rarely build a operational system around new capability...at first.  As we saw in WW1 the machine gun (and massed fired artillery) soon became the core of a new operational system built around them.   It does happen (rarely) that militaries take risk and get out in front of this such as the German employment of combined arms warfare before WW2 and US AirLand Battle, all before the technology and capabilities they were designed around came to full realization.  In this war, I think the smart-ATGMs were not only integrated into the Ukrainian defence, they became a core/foundational piece.  So what?  Well for any new capability a very important question is "will it be integrated into, or around?" 

- Sustainability and enablers.  The full realization of any new capability often hinges on the ability to sustain and enable it.  Very few capabilities come entirely self-contained and need other capabilities to allow them to develop fully mature impacts.  Back to machine guns, useless without the industry to keep manufacturing them and their ammunition.  Also useless without rail systems to get them and the troops needed to the front quickly, and also useless without an ability to feed those troops (enter the mighty tin can).  

- Modularity and cost.  Most very successful war-changing capabilities have been cheap and very modular - however here there are noted exceptions and I will come back to these.  This not only reinforces density and capacity, it build in a high level of capability agility to allow those impacts to adapt to counter-capabilities over time.  It is of little use to simply have a wonder-weapon if in 6 months it has been made obsolete.  Modularity allows for rapid add-on to ensure whatever you are pushing into the war remains competitive.   

Now all this hold historical water and explains why "average" weapon systems like the Sherman won wars.  The Sherman tank was not the highest on capability metrics when compared to the German top tier tanks but it easily beat them on almost every other axis.

And now for The Exceptions, and there always are.  Strategic game-changing weapons are extremely rare but they do happen.  Nuclear weapons for example are able to create such massive effects that their very existence has forced a re-write of how wars happen.

We were expecting cyber in this war, and even though it is on the battlefield I have yet to see evidence that it is in the league of other war-changers yet.  Information has definitely been war-changing in this war - how it is collected, process and utilized, I suspect history will show that C4ISR was one of the decisive capabilities in this war and how it was employed will likely change wars from here on out.  Unmanned is also likely in this league - does anyone think we are going into any future wars without thinking about unmanned systems calculus?  And finally smart-man portable systems of all types have re-written how we think about denial and superiority - we will be studying that for a generation.  I also expect that once the details come out we are in for more surprises but we will just have to wait and see.

 

[AlsatianFelix]

1 hour ago, Taranis said:

Kherson area :
"Ukrainian paratroopers engaged Russian 104th assault airborne regiment"

https://t.me/ukrpravda_news/18408

Ukraine's Pravda claimed on Saturday that the commander of the assault battalion of the 104th AAR was killed. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/28/7349152/

Same source says attack shown in photo was executed by UAF 80th Separate Air Assault Brigade. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/30/7349413/

Of those units, UAWarData map only locates 104th's parent division (76th Guards Air Assault) but all the way over behind Popasna

[Harmon Rabb]

Ukrainian Mig-29 using its afterburner.

[Battlefront.com]

8 hours ago, dan/california said:

I think there is a far amount of evidence from Ukraine that this isn't true. NATO ATGMs are why the initial bums rush got stopped. The Ukrainians had to do a lot of other stuff right, and be suicidally brave. It didn't hurt that the Russians are idiots. But is was ATGMs that just made the Russians STOP. The entire Russian plan was to NOT stop. Once they stopped Ukrainian artillery could get serious about killing them, their supply lines could be attacked and so on, and the war evolved from there. FWIW I think NLAWS were probably more important in the battle for Kyiv than Javelins. Both missiles seem too handily kill anything the Russians have, but with mostly short sight lines north of Kyiv the NLAW's much shorter time to fire trumped all the Javelin's other advantages.

The MLRS will meaningfully increase the Russians attrition rate, it will apply at least some pressure further behind the Russian lines than anything else the Russians have had to deal with on a regular basis. If we assume the fight is relatively balanced currently, that is a lot.

You missed my point.  It is not any one system, it is the enhancement of a particular capability.  NLAW didn't stop the Russians.  Nor did Javelin, Matador, PzF3, etc.  It was the totality of them all.  So when people get focused on one of them, saying that it could change the tide of the war, it's missing the mark.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

8 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

I hope you're right, Steve.  For the sake of Ukraine, first and foremost.

But also for the sake of the Russian and Siberian and Caucasian kids whose lives are being thrown away so wantonly by an evil elite that views them as cattle.

History, of course, suggests things could drag on, against all sense and reason, for much longer than we think....

Yeah, and that's the problem with history.  There are ample examples to support a wide range of possible hypothesis, none of which are an exact fit.  I make no pretenses of knowing the future, however in analyzing the facts we have in front of us it appears we should be finding historical examples that are less positive for the Russian side.

As has been said by me and others, there is no real ability to know what the heck is going to happen until it has happened.  Timing is extremely hard to judge, so the best we can do is look at the situation and anticipate what might happen instead of when.  Still, if you correctly guess the what you can get a better handle on the when.  Heard some wise words from the likes of Hodges and Petraeus a while ago that were more elegant than how I just put it

There are plenty of things Russia COULD do to lengthen this war.  The thing is, as time goes on conditions change that generally reduce the options and increase the difficulty to execute any individual one of them.  This is standard for any complex situation, warfare definitely included.

The point here is that the war is going horrible for Russia in every way that matters, yet they aren't doing much to address the roots of those problems.  Window dressing, wishful thinking, acts of desperation, etc. is what we've seen so far because addressing the roots requires a massive change in the "special military operation" that Putin is obviously very reluctant to do.  There is only so long this can go on without a collapse of some sort.  It is either a collapse like we saw in Kyiv, Mykolaiv, and Kharkiv, a systemic front collapse, the collapse of the war effort at some other level, or Putin fundamentally changing the nature of the conflict.

Something has to give.  And soon.

Steve

[Los]

Agree 100% w Steve...too much focus on this or that system. It's the integration of capability, tactics, logistics and resolve of the  army that makes the difference. Had the U.S. traded equipment with the  Iraqi Army in Desert Storm, the outcome would have been essentially the same, total defeat for the Iraqi army.

 

Los

Edited May 30, 2022 by Los

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

The introduction of any new system and its predicted impact on the battlefield remains one of the dark arts of force development, and frankly it is more often than not, wrong.  History shows that a weapon system can literally change a war (e.g. machine guns), however, it also shows we rarely accurately predict this.  There are a lot of reasons for this however the primary factors are:

- What are the capability metrics of the weapon system itself?  Are they incremental or are they significant improvement over what is already there? Or are they completely new?  This is the end-point of analysis for most people which is well short of what is required.  For example, HIMARS/MLRS definitely have longer range and likely higher precision (munitions dependent) so on paper the capability definitely raises an eyebrow but there is a lot more to the story.

- Capacity and density of the new capability.  So people should not take my musings on mass as "mass is dead", in warfare mass will always have a role, but I am talking mass effects - what appears to be changing in this war, on the defence at least, is how those effects are generated and projected.   Most new capability is going to have to arrive with enough mass effect to have an impact on the overall exchange.  This does not necessarily mean millions of systems, particularly if the system has wide effects built in, but you still need enough to make an impact.  Take the ME 262, game-changing technology, however, Germany could not produce enough of them to get the effects the weapon system was capable of to make a difference.  In this war the NLAWs/Javelins and other smart-ATGMs are an excellent example of enough capacity and density to make mass effects possible.  I agree that these systems likely contributed to the stalling and collapse of the norther Russian front, however, how that happened was also dependent on the next key factor -  

-  Integration of, or Around.  The ability to integrate a new capability into a war is likely one of the most decisive factors in its impact. Normally we integrate new capability into an extant operational system and it makes that system more effective or efficient, or provided more decisive effects and broader options.  We also normally get this wrong.  You can see it with the introduction of the machine gun, they were treated the same as field guns and brigaded together because we rarely build a operational system around new capability...at first.  As we saw in WW1 the machine gun (and massed fired artillery) soon became the core of a new operational system built around them.   It does happen (rarely) that militaries take risk and get out in front of this such as the German employment of combined arms warfare before WW2 and US AirLand Battle, all before the technology and capabilities they were designed around came to full realization.  In this war, I think the smart-ATGMs were not only integrated into the Ukrainian defence, they became a core/foundational piece.  So what?  Well for any new capability a very important question is "will it be integrated into, or around?" 

- Sustainability and enablers.  The full realization of any new capability often hinges on the ability to sustain and enable it.  Very few capabilities come entirely self-contained and need other capabilities to allow them to develop fully mature impacts.  Back to machine guns, useless without the industry to keep manufacturing them and their ammunition.  Also useless without rail systems to get them and the troops needed to the front quickly, and also useless without an ability to feed those troops (enter the mighty tin can).  

- Modularity and cost.  Most very successful war-changing capabilities have been cheap and very modular - however here there are noted exceptions and I will come back to these.  This not only reinforces density and capacity, it build in a high level of capability agility to allow those impacts to adapt to counter-capabilities over time.  It is of little use to simply have a wonder-weapon if in 6 months it has been made obsolete.  Modularity allows for rapid add-on to ensure whatever you are pushing into the war remains competitive.   

Now all this hold historical water and explains why "average" weapon systems like the Sherman won wars.  The Sherman tank was not the highest on capability metrics when compared to the German top tier tanks but it easily beat them on almost every other axis.

And now for The Exceptions, and there always are.  Strategic game-changing weapons are extremely rare but they do happen.  Nuclear weapons for example are able to create such massive effects that their very existence has forced a re-write of how wars happen.

We were expecting cyber in this war, and even though it is on the battlefield I have yet to see evidence that it is in the league of other war-changers yet.  Information has definitely been war-changing in this war - how it is collected, process and utilized, I suspect history will show that C4ISR was one of the decisive capabilities in this war and how it was employed will likely change wars from here on out.  Unmanned is also likely in this league - does anyone think we are going into any future wars without thinking about unmanned systems calculus?  And finally smart-man portable systems of all types have re-written how we think about denial and superiority - we will be studying that for a generation.  I also expect that once the details come out we are in for more surprises but we will just have to wait and see.

 

Many thanks for this, again, as always a very interesting read though some of it (what the heck did he mean by Mass again?) makes my brain hurt. I sometimes miss the Eyes / Teeth / Hands thing.

...I thought you (as well as those close to the Mighty Wurlitzer, like @billbindc) might appreciate this snip from a worthy longer thread on the Twitter Wars.

The keys go up an' down, the music goes round and round (wo-oh-woah) an' it comes out.... here!

 

 

P.S.  And speaking of It Comes Out Here, this sequence is darkly comical, in a Wile E Coyote kind of way. I've had days when I feel like this.

 

Edited May 30, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Kinophile]

5 hours ago, Huba said:

I didn't serve, but this is an example of low morale, right? 

 

Also, +8 L52 155mm SPGs from Slovakia. I wonder to what degree training on Danas is applicable to these new guns:

 

Col. Gen  "Scumchuck"

Oh my lord I LOL'd hard.

[Huba]

Another statement by Biden that really requires clarification. Does he mean ATACMS? Or MLRS in general?

 

[sross112]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

 

- Capacity and density of the new capability.  So people should not take my musings on mass as "mass is dead", in warfare mass will always have a role, but I am talking mass effects - what appears to be changing in this war, on the defence at least, is how those effects are generated and projected.   Most new capability is going to have to arrive with enough mass effect to have an impact on the overall exchange.  This does not necessarily mean millions of systems, particularly if the system has wide effects built in, but you still need enough to make an impact.  Take the ME 262, game-changing technology, however, Germany could not produce enough of them to get the effects the weapon system was capable of to make a difference.  In this war the NLAWs/Javelins and other smart-ATGMs are an excellent example of enough capacity and density to make mass effects possible.  I agree that these systems likely contributed to the stalling and collapse of the norther Russian front, however, how that happened was also dependent on the next key factor -  

 

This, to me, is the big thing that a lot of people are overlooking in the MSM assessment of the different weapon system deliveries. 100 M777's sounds like a lot but the front is 800 km long. The guns will be concentrated for effect and will give new capability in a localized area but they aren't going to be a miracle weapon that can effect the entire front simultaneously. Same with the MRLS systems that come in. They will be useful and add capability but won't be a huge game changer unless way bigger numbers are pushed in.

Let's think about the overall numbers. The UA started with 200,000ish troops in 17 brigades. They now state they have 700,000ish troops. Each brigade has an artillery group (based on pre-war TO&Es) consisting of 36 tubes and 18 MRLS. Pre war they needed 600ish tubes and 300ish MRLS. So just to give their regular pre war brigades the upgraded capabilities they need a lot more guns and rocket trucks than what is being sent now. All the mishmash of self propelled guns might be able to update a single brigade at this point. If the west announced 300 M777s, 300 Pzh2000s and 300 HIMARS that would be a "game changer" as the RA would be out matched along the entire line. And even that still depends on the ammunition types provided for the systems. The capabilities of each have a wide range that totally depends on what types and quantities of ammo are provided. 

This also bleeds over into the question of why we haven't seen several new UA formations appearing on the battlefield. They have pushed a few TD brigades to the front with varying degrees of success but reports say that they didn't have the heavy equipment they need to be front line brigades. Why? Because the UA doesn't have it. Reports since the beginning of the war, even for regular units, were of crowd funding a lot of basic equipment. UAV's, body armor, optics, medical supplies, etc. If they need crowd funding for regular units they definitely don't have the gear for the newly mobilized ones. I keep thinking of the US army doing exercises with mock tanks and support weapons prior to entry into WW2. 

Of course it all boils down to time or complete commitment to support. The best example is probably the US. They have committed to giving a large amount of support in the form of the equipment we have seen so far and the $40 billion package. The US military could conceivably send everything the UA needs to be a modern force, but that totally strips them. I'm talking from boots to body armor to personal weapons to trucks to support weapons to IFVs and tanks to air power. They could send everything needed but they would have to strip a very large percentage of their own forces in order to do so, or the UA has to wait until the new gear can be built and sent. It is a tough choice and what is the magic number that can be given while still maintaining their own capabilities? I personally say strip all 10 National Guard Divisions of everything they have and send it. Back fill them with new production. If China or North Korea pops off in the interim the active forces will just have to make due, but I'm not in charge so that probably isn't going to happen.

The current equipment transfers, except from probably Poland, seem to be a trickle when it seems to me that if we want to change the game we need to open the hydrant. 

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

BSF Captain 3rd Rank Svyatoslav Nizhegorodov:

 

[Kinophile]

7 minutes ago, sross112 said:

The US military could conceivably send everything the UA needs to be a modern force, but that totally strips them. I'm talking from boots to body armor to personal weapons to trucks to support weapons to IFVs and tanks to air power. They could send everything needed but they would have to strip a very large percentage of their own forces in order to do so, or the UA has to wait until the new gear can be built and sent.

I'm not fully convinced here; if you're talking heavy systems then yes, the US will need to ensure no gaps open up in US Force equipment levels first, as a national defense mandate. Naturally This kind of requirement is part of why its a process to get certain heavy weapons over to Ukraine, and in the relatively low numbers we're seeing, and why the DoD will never strip any US unit of its gear for anyone. Not even Canada. And EVERYONE loves Canada!

But lighter, personal protection gear - body armor, boots, medical gak - the US has oodles and oodles of that stuff that could be easily (and I believe is fully in process) sent without affecting active or reserve forces. 

[Kinophile]

https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cDovL3dhcm9udGhlcm9ja3MubGlic3luLmNvbS9yc3M/episode/Y2RhNWQzMmMtNjFiYy00YzYyLTkxMzQtOTQxZGI3M2RjY2Q3?sa=X&ved=0CAQQ8qgGahcKEwiopIaoyYf4AhUAAAAAHQAAAAAQLA

Good WOTR podcast about pre-and-start of the war views by experts, reviewed by some of the experts themselves.

Kofman has a funny bit when he's asked early on what he got wrong and he snippily replies "well I don't know who didnt!" Please, someone get him and @Battlefront.com and @The_Capt on a zoom chat...and a lot of popcorn please.

But he has some good takes, as well as Dara Massicot of RAND. Like Steve above, she notes that Russia has shown almost no capacity to adjust to the tactical realities and even though they are somewhat changing, its too slow and too small.

And all this since even the very start when the West was publishing Russian war plans and the RuA still said, "Feckit lets go ahead anyway- our blue stripeys will protect us!" - and hoped for the best. Then shes promptly man-splained by Ryan but kk, its his podcast.

Chris Dougherty notes Granada as US mirror-in-microcosm (to the Russian performance in this war) of the disconnect between what reforms promise versus the reality of war's sandpaper on those promises' nether regions.

But god I hate that opening music. Screw you Wagner. Ugh.

Edited May 30, 2022 by Kinophile