How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[akd]

Interesting captured document (not sure if authentic):
 

 

[Haiduk]

4 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Whats your take on Sieverodonetsk? UA will hold and grind out the RUS to a stop? By retaining a hold on the city it forces the popasna arm to keep forces facing the city, which by inference reduces what can face west, and separates the assault effort from the breakthrough, further limiting whats available to turn the breakthrough North into a push West.

Is this the UA intent, do you think? Threaten both flanks of the breakthrough (even if just a threat on the city side) to spread apart the available forces within the arm itself? 

Looks like crisis of first days of Popasna breakthough passed, UKR troops got reinforcements and more 155 mm barrels, so in last two days we have seen Russian advance stalled. Initially they tried to attack from Popasna in several directions simultainously. In more critical night (two days ago, as I recall) Russians could reach the Bakhmut - Lysychansk road and set two chekpoints there with 50 men (likely VDV company). But at the morning UKR troops after artillery strike counter-attacked and pushed Russians away from the road, clearing the road again, though, Russians could shell it anyway.   

Yesterday UKR troops pushed Russians further from the road. Also, reportedly they recaptured Komyshuvakha village north from Popasna, which partially was captured by Russians in previous days. 

On this directions Russians already have a lack of manpower, throwing in the battle elements of 6th cossack motor-rifle regiment of LPR (regular unit) and probably LPR conscripts. During one attack cossacks lost almost all company. 

More northward LPR forces advanced from Toshkivka toward Ustynivka on 1,5 km. But Toshkivka still an arena of heavy clashes - today UKR froces again restored own positions in the part of this village, lost in previous day.

In Siverodonetsk Russians rejected from mass attacks, which cost them many personnel and involved special units, in particular Kadyrov's troops. Two days ago they could seize "Myr" hotel and bus station area on the NE outskirt of the city, all attempts of UKR troops to push them off were unsuccessfull, but enemy's attempts to avdance further inside the city also failed. 

Looks like Russians "plan D" to make a pocket between Siverodonetsk and Bakhmut is also failing so, Russians can claim "plan E" victory - to make three little pockets  - Avdiivka, Zolote and Siverodonetsk 

"Plan E" Left to right  - Siverodonetsk, Komyshuvakha - Zolote, Avdiivka

Edited May 29, 2022 by Haiduk

[dan/california]

 

11 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Looks like crisis of first days of Popasna breakthough passed, UKR troops got reinforcements and more 155 mm barrels, so in last two days we have seen Russian advance stalled. Initially they tried to attack from Popasna in several directions simultainously. In more critical night (two days ago, as I recall) Russians could reach the Bakhmut - Lysychansk road and set two chekpoints there with 50 men (likely VDV company). But at the morning UKR troops after artillery strike counter-attacked and pushed Russians away from the road, clearing the road again, though, Russians could shell it anyway.   

Yesterday UKR troops pushed Russians further from the road. Also, reportedly they recaptured Komyshuvakha village north from Popasna, which partially was captured by Russians in previous days. 

On this directions Russians already have a lack of manpower, throwing in the battle elements of 6th cossack motor-rifle regiment of LPR (regular unit) and probably LPR conscripts. During one attack cossacks lost almost all company. 

More northward LPR forces advanced from Toshkivka toward Ustynivka on 1,5 km and conducted. But Toshkivka still an arena of heavy clashes - today UKR froces again restored own positions in the part of this village, lost in previous day.

In Siverodonetsk Russians rejected from mass attacks, which cost them many personnel and involved special units, in particular Kadyrov's troops. Two days ago they could seize "Myr" hotel and bus station area on the NE outskirt of the city, all attempts of UKR troops to push them off were unsuccessfull, but enemy's attempts to avdance further inside the city also failed. 

Looks like Russians "plan D" to make a pocket between Siverodonetsk and Bakhmut is also failing so, Russians can claim "plan E" victory - to make three little pockets  - Avdiivka, Zolote and Siverodonetsk 

"Plan E" Left to right  - Siverodonetsk, Komyshuvakha - Zolote, Avdiivka

Thanks for keeping us in the loop Haiduk, we really appreciate it!

[Kinophile]

Lol Plan E.

Only 28* more letters to go!

Russian alphabet

[Haiduk]

Some words about Lyman. UKR troops reportedly still to hold SE part of the town and the area close to NW outskirts of Lyman around Blue lakes. On this axis Russians have 3-4 BTGs based of 80th tank regiment of 90th tank division, 15th motor-rifle brigade and 30th motor-rifle brigade + battery of 2S7 Pion guns and platoon of TOS-1A

From Kreminna in area of Bilohorivka (yes, again) moved "shortened BTG", probably of 35th motor-rifle brigade - 8 tanks, 12 BMPs, 4 2S3 SP-howitzers. Also 6 PMP sections and two tugboats already there in the forests - Russians again thinking about river crossing

Edited May 29, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

Meanwhile in Sumy oblast the "small border war" is continuing. Russians periodiclally shelled border villages and towns with mortars, sometime with artillery and MLRS, rare they conducted airstrikes through the border. Russian recon-diversion groups alsmost each day try to sneak on our territory. Most hot areas are Seredyno-Buda, Bachivsk, Bilopillia. 

As wrote a man, who likely served in Border Guard Service in that area 25-26th of May Russian recon group about 20 men conducted attempt to breakthrough on our territory, but was engaged and as told that man almost all elimiunated (and most of KIAs were on the count of snipers, when Russians became retreat).

Today in Russian social media appeared information about 7 KIA and 9 WIA Russian servicemen because of UKR strike on the school in Vorobzha village, Kursk oblast (14 km to the border), where Russian troops were depolyed. 

Also in Russian media appered photos of 6 Russian border guards/VDV, "killed by UKR diversants" near the border village Zyornovo, Briansk oblast - against UKR border town Seredyna-Buda. According to twitter information of the same UKR border guard servicemen, this was a crews of Russian mortars, which shelled our town recently and hit with return fire. 

[Taranis]

1 hour ago, SeinfeldRules said:

Thank you, this is quite interesting and sounds ver similar to our systems. So can the howitzers in Ukraine receive Digital Fire commands with their upgrade or is the retrofit just to allow installation of Ukrainian radios? Also, does the howitzer have optical backups, where the crew can lay the gun using conventional means? Every unit I’ve been in has had at least one howitzer that had a degraded digital system for one reason or another and had to be operated conventionally, even while deployed. I’m always curious if these more advanced howitzers have that capability because it seems most don’t from the pictures and videos I’ve seen. 

Unfortunately, I have no idea, not having seen the interior of the vehicle and not knowing the Ukrainian radio systems. I do think a Digital Fire system was set up but how I have no idea. One of the previous articles implied that modifications had been made by Nexter (the manufacturer) and that contracts had been put in place. It would be a really big handicap if the latter wasn't implemented, which makes me 90% think they've found a way (which one I don't know).

The vehicle does not have a traditional aiming system, relying on the SIGMA-30N. It only has an LTD (Lunette de Tir Direct = direct fire sight) to be fitted only if necessary. Its usefulness would really be for the neutralization of fortifications because a CAESAR in the front line would really not be a good thing... It could also be for making an ambush on suddenly appearing tanks (but OMG, the silouhette is so high !).  I think that there was no degraded system put in place for the sake of lowering the cost already height of the vehicle and that it is intended in case of damage or anomaly to return to the base to be repaired (it is not a very armored vehicle, if one already considers that it is armored). Only the cabin is armored for protecting the crew.

From a more general point of view, the French doctrine of the Régiments d'Artillerie (US Artillery Battalion equivalent) is to combine 120mm RTF-1 and 155mm CAESAR mortars. The first is rustic, not digitized, towed by a VAB and is used for the short range (approx 0-13km) while the CAESAR covers the rest (approx 6-40km). The doctrine really emphasizes its long distance side which should not be engaged in the front line because it is the rustic 120mm RTF-1 which is there for that. Lower mortars (81mm) are distributed in infantry units. The 120mm was in infantry units before but is now exclusively in artillery units (since 1990-2000)

To sum up, the CAESAR relies solely on its technology. The software and sensors had flaws when the vehicle was introduced to the units, but I could see the improvement in reliability with my own eyes. It works well and I think the units can have confidence in it, as the first positive feedback also indicates. However, the vehicle remains fragile and requires a rear base available in case of repair. In theory, being quick to set up, to fire and to fold, it should not have to undergo counter-battery and therefore damage. The doctrine seems to me very coherent but as we all know, War = SNAFU

 

[Taranis]

A Ukrainian soldier sets up an anti-materiel rifle near Marinka, Donetsk region, May 28, 2022. ANNA KUDRIAVTSEVA / REUTERS

[Haiduk]

19 minutes ago, Taranis said:

A Ukrainian soldier sets up an anti-materiel rifle

Looks like this is not antimaterial rifle, but DSHKM-TK, popular crowdfund upgrade of DSHKM during positional war since 2016. Each fire support company in battalion has 6 such HMGs or mix of TK and usual DSHKM. This is some average between HMG and AM rifle, which shoot with short bursts. Mostly used against fortified positions, MG nests, light armor etc. Unlike ususal DSHKM, which just maintaned "density of fire", upgrades of DSHKM-TK allows it to fire with more accuracy and precision, so skilled gunner can use it like a sniper rifle. DSHKM-TK also can be equipped with thermal sight. Special trainings since 2016 were established for DSHKM-TK gunners, so the gunner could hit a "man" target from 800 m at least with one bullet from ten, usung usual mechanic sight.

Edited May 29, 2022 by Haiduk

[akd]

Personnel roster for the DNR's 1st Battalion, 111th Rifle Regiment (I think), from which we can derive the organization in part.  7-man rifle sections.  Be sure to check the birth dates on some of these mobiks.

 

Edited May 29, 2022 by akd

[Haiduk]

@sburke @Kinophile

Mayor Nikolay Kolomoyets, 61st Naval infantry brigade, 14th Army Corps of Norhern Fleet coastal units

 

[Haiduk]

9 minutes ago, akd said:

7-man rifle sections.

Now this is standart for both RUS and UKR squads

[sburke]

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Lol Plan E.

Only 28* more letters to go!

Russian alphabet

Plam E. Take and Hold Belgorod....  success!!!  Putin can hold a parade!

[FancyCat]

 

 

[Huba]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Here's the most interesting thing about this news... we didn't see it ahead of time.  Not only did the Poles allocate this equipment to Ukraine, but they have already trained 100 crew members.  This is proof of something that's been kinda evident, which is that the suppliers are revealing enough to ensure everybody knows Ukraine is well taken care of, but like late night TV commercials... "but wait, there's more!" is revealed at a later date.

BTW, several sources are disputing that M109 Paladins are on the menu at all, not to mention already on their way to Poland.  Could be that some over eager blogger mistook older M109s for the more advanced A6 version.  Or it could be that someone got a hold of info that was supposed to stay hidden for a while yet.

Steve

What I really hope is that in the same spirit, future UA Air Force is being trained as we speak, and will make a debut in say 3 - 5 months from now. And then Russians will kindly go away or die.

Edited May 29, 2022 by Huba

[Battlefront.com]

I've been on the road for a few days now and I've been unable to do my own digging for information.  I think the only way I've been able to take some time off is because I know you guys have everything covered quite nicely

Over the last week I think it's become quite clear that the Russians no longer have any offensive capabilities above small unit actions.  Popasna was their big chance for something significant and, like I predicted, it collapsed due to a lack of manpower.  In fact it was pretty clear the exploitation phase of the breakthrough broke down a few days ago.  The only thing that needed to happen was for Ukraine to put enough force into play to start the process of pushing back.  This seems to be happening now. 

Mind you, even if the line stays exactly as it is with no Ukrainian gains, it means exactly the same thing... Russia is a spent force pretty much everywhere.  Why am I taking what is going on around Popasna and applying it to the rest of the front?  Because Russia has been trying for almost 2 months to achieve a breakthrough in Luhansk and then, when it finally succeeded, wasn't able to do anything meaningful with it.  The only possible reason for this is that Russia simply doesn't have enough force to exploit a breakthrough. 
Russia had every incentive to strip its front line of mobile reserves and units in excess of what it needed to defend the line in order to gain something from the breakthrough at Popasna.  Clearly there are no units to spare, therefore it is reasonable to conclude that Russia has finally hit a critical point in this operation where Russia has to be very concerned about systemic collapse simply because it has insufficient forces to man the front it already has.

And it gets worse...

[G.I. Joe]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

What I really hope is that in the same spirit, future UA Air Force is being trained as we speak, and will make a debut in say 3 - 5 months from now.

Agreed... hopefully the Ukrainian Air Force has managed to find a friendly country willing to take in some of their more advanced pilot candidates who were close to operational status and start finishing their combat pilot training on NATO equipment. It might take a long time yet, especially because it's unlikely they can spare anyone already fully trained, but the sooner they start preparing the better.

F-16s seem like the obvious choice for a first non-Soviet type, but I also wonder if any A-10s can be made available...

Edited May 29, 2022 by G.I. Joe

[Battlefront.com]

Sure, there is still intensive fighting going on for Severodonetsk.  But the forces there are fully committed and aren't likely going to be meaningfully reinforced to replace casualties.  Another example is Lyman where Ukraine mostly withdrew and yet the Russians have yet to clear the eastern bank of Ukrainian rearguards.  And now there's Kherson area where Russians have been busy digging in (including concrete bunkers) and yet don't seem able to keep Ukraine from regaining ground.  Russian forces in Kharkiv have apparently done little more than stopped the Ukrainian advance, not reversed it (minor gains don't amount to much).  All other sectors of the front are devoid of significant ground activity other than artillery and skirmishes.

This is all extremely bad for Russia, but there's so much more bad news at the strategic level.  Russia is clearly running out of weaponry to invest into this war as evidenced by the inability to properly equip newly raised DLPR units.  The Russian airforces are unable to secure the skies and have to avoid direct contact with Ukrainian frontline units out of fear of various AA systems (mostly manpads).  Russia's navy is out of the war in all meaningful ways.  Recruitment continues to be a huge problem, so much that they are now risking higher profile recruitment drives.  The ultra hardcore Russian supporters of the war seem to be OK with openly criticizing how the war is being fought.  They are mimicking Ukraine's crowdfunding, which is a sign of them giving up on official efforts to equip/feed soldiers.

Then there's the whole problem with existing contract soldiers getting out of their contracts.  Either because of the 90 day time period for the "special military operation" or because their contracts expire.  While Putin can, and probably will, extend the operation (that's easily done), he can't extend expiring contracts with a waive of his hand without serious pushback.

Underlying all of this is Russia's economic capacity to continue waging a large scale war AND taking care of things at the homefront.  Cracks are already well established and they will only grow.  Some economists think that Russia will run out of economic gimmicks by the middle of the summer.  After that some real pain is going to hit everyday Russians and that pain will not go away easily. 

Politically, things aren't going well either.  While Putin has managed to keep dissent and assassination in check, there's evidence that it's taking more effort to do it now than when the war started.  As other things worsen, this will worsen too.

Which means Russia's ability to continue waging this war is rapidly coming to an end without a full mobilization of its military and economy to keep things going.  This should have happened months ago, yet Putin has consistently stayed away from doing so.  Which is going to make the next couple of weeks quite critical and exceptionally interesting to watch.

Steve

[Centurian52]

I'm sure someone has already posted this video (I am finding it hard to keep up with this thread). But I have to wonder if there was a squad inside that BTR when it was hit? I didn't see any Russian infantry around the BTR in the footage. They may have been in the trees nearby. But it isn't unlikely that they were all mounted up. Killing a BTR is a win any day. But I don't need to tell my fellow CM players just how satisfying it is to take out an APC that is crammed full of infantry.

 

[Fenris]

Another heavy weapons announcement, says possible transfers, anyone in Europe know any details?

 

Edited May 29, 2022 by Fenris

[Huba]

I

3 minutes ago, G.I. Joe said:

Agreed... hopefully the Ukrainian Air Force has managed to find a friendly country willing to take in some of their more advanced pilot candidates who were close to operational status and start finishing their combat pilot training on NATO equipment. It might take a long time yet, especially because it's unlikely they can spare anyone already fully trained, but the sooner they start preparing the better.

F-16s seem like the obvious choice for a first non-Soviet type, but I also wonder if any A-10s can be made available...

We'll learn about it only when/if the planes will already be in Ukraine. F-16/ A-10 combo seems the most likely, there was also some gossip about UK Tranche 1 Eurofighters. This is the one thing that Eastern Europe cannot help that much with, altough we paved the way delivering "MiG-29 parts" and Su25s. 

Meanwhile, Canada shops for artillery ammo:

 

[Huba]

14 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Which means Russia's ability to continue waging this war is rapidly coming to an end without a full mobilization of its military and economy to keep things going.  This should have happened months ago, yet Putin has consistently stayed away from doing so.

Yet another parallel to the mustache-sporting painter - Putin might yet do it when, let's say Ukrainians will kick RU out of Kherson or hit Russia's proper too hard, but like in case of his predecesor, it will be way too late then. 

Edited May 29, 2022 by Huba

[Machor]

4 hours ago, akd said:

Interesting captured document (not sure if authentic):
 

 

Thank you for this. [Can we have more likes please?] I think the document passes the sniff test - poorly worded and has typos  - but also because it has 'hidden' propaganda directed at the soldiers themselves as part of the instructions. I thought it worthwhile to translate some of the talking points, and I will bold the 'hidden' propaganda:

1. Instead of: "shot, liquidated, killed"

Say: "The problem was solved."

Explanation: Regarding domestic dogs, marauders, members of TD

Notes: Has a very negative effect on the local population.

2. Instead of: "Death to Ukrops"; "It's already Russia here, forget Ukraine."

Say: "The people will independently decide how to live and whom to elect."

Explanation: Regarding the question of who will rule, Ukraine or Russia.

Notes: Allows to shift the vector of responsibility from Russia to the local population.

3. If asked: "What are you doing here?"; "What do you want?"

Say: "We came for a humanitarian mission; we have brought food, since your government has abandoned you. Where's the government? Where's police?"

Explanation: No need to explain, that they [Ukraine] are bombarding people in Donbas, and that we came to solve this problem. The local population will not understand that.

Notes: Responding to a question with a question shifts the vector of answering to the opponent.

4. If asked: "Why are you armed?"; "We're scared."

Say: "Don't be afraid; we're temporarily replacing the police, who ran away. There are marauders and criminals on the loose, who were armed and set free by Zelensky (In Kiev alone they distributed 25000 assault rifles to all who wanted one.)

Explanation: We don't use the word 'war.' We don't answer questions about a war. We answer the question to which we have an answer: That the [Ukrainian] government and police ran away.

Notes: The chief goal is to encourage people to think that the Ukrainian government is weak, and that they were abandoned without food, pensions, and salaries.

6. If asked: "Are you Ukrainians or Russians?"

Say: "We're both Ukrainians and Russians, but the chief thing is we're all Orthodox Christians."

Explanation: Give examples of Gay Parades, the division of the Orthodox Church, the sale of land to foreigners, the biolabs.

Notes: In order to avoid confrontation, don't say "Yes, we're Russians!" 9 years of propaganda have equated the image of Russians to occupants. The image of Orthodoxy remains clean.

7. We do not blame 'Khokhols' or 'Ukraine' for everything.

Instead: We blame the puppets Poroshenko, Zelensky, and their master, the USA.

Explanation: Initially, until the formation of the state apparatus and legislative base, we will have to cope with the terms 'Ukraine', 'Ukrainian'.

Notes: You should categorically avoid conflict due to national identity.

[Machor]

The Russian advance on the Bakhmut axis is, erm, getting 'weighed down':

This is why Mongol horsemen went on campaign with two horses.

[FancyCat]

I was rereading When Titans Clashed by David Glantz, and Glantz talks about how lend lease to the Soviet Union allowed for the Soviet mechanized breakthroughs on the Eastern Front to occur and exploit, thanks to material like American trucks that prolonged the Soviet logistical tail, had it not been sent, Soviet offensives would be exhausted quicker, and Axis forces could reconstitute a new defensive line easier. 

In that sense, the fact that Popasna didn't turn into a mechanized breakthrough means Russia does not have the tail to enable the mechanized breakthroughs that was Soviet doctrine and had even occurred in some form in the first stage of the war. Whatever breakthrough Russian artillery creates, Russian forces no longer have the ability to create decisive quick collapses, so in a sense, this is becoming quite WWI like. 

If Russia cannot conduct decisive operations, without mobilization, Russia will absolutely eventually lose a WWI type of conflict with infinite NATO equipment inbound that will open up the same sort of local breakthroughs Russia had in Popasna. 

Whether Ukraine has the ability to or the willingness to seek out mechanized deep breakthroughs, I have no clue. While the offensive in Kharkiv region was successful, I don't think it was necessarily a example of a breakthrough. Also, Ukraine seems in a way, quite keen to preserve their manpower, instead of risky maneuvers, Ukraine seems fine with slower advances, whether this is intended or a result of their situation, i dunno.