How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[BornGinger]

2 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

So, are you named after ... the male p*rn star?

It seems some people use their free time to memorise the names of male so called "adult film actors".

 

1 hour ago, Bulletpoint said:

The war in Ukraine has been the only thing on the BBC news page for more than a month now, but this morning, I noticed it's been pushed below the fold and replaced by coverage of the French elections.

Oh good. So that means we're soon back to the see the usual headlines we've all missed so much. I'm talking about celebrities and their pitty problems and the royal family.

Edited April 11, 2022 by BornGinger

[LongLeftFlank]

31 minutes ago, The Steppenwulf said:

The problem I guess with this idea is the all too apparent lack of mobility with most UA units; no ready to go armor units (1st Tank Bde remains in Kyiv undergoing refit);  and pulling off an offensive operation (even a limited one like this) without air cover goes against the military handbook and would be decidedly risky for this reason. 

Maybe the Russians don't even think it's possible for these reasons? 

Very well put!

But the entire strategic point is to *force* a premature Russian response, by striking to the very borders of his homeland (maybe beyond, but just raiding at this point)!  At a time and in terrain which is Good Fer Yer Arse, and bad for his....

As for the lack of UA armour, isn't 125mm vs 125mm really playing Ivan's game not your own? The RuAF still retains air superiority and active drones (although using more of them up saps their strength for the next move in the south), so RT footage of burning UA tank columns contributes little to the greater good here.

Better to let your hardened, bloody minded rocket infantry lead the way, and let the limited mech forces help with the mop ups of cut off and shattered Russian pockets.

Just my layman's opinions, you understand. I have no better or worse gauge of the outcomes than any other wargaming geek. But hopefully the UA command has been thinking through these kinds of tradeoffs.

Edited April 11, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Combatintman]

1 hour ago, TheVulture said:

BBC news, like most UK news, suffers from an obsession with human interest stories. Journalists are pretty much trained to care about nothing else it seems. They don't know how to cover a war except ion the big situation changes (Russia invades, Ukraine wins battle for Kiev and Russia withdraws), and stories about normal people being affected by the war. Once they've run out of angles to cover on that, they don't know what to do any more. because they don't know how to report on the actual military situation where there are developments worth reporting.

Any dramatic or noteworthy developments will get covered still, but anything else is going to be fighting for air time with coverage of the upcoming local government elections in May.

Indeed ... illustrated perfectly here ...

Ok - I get its a cat and not a human but @TheVulture is bang on.  I recall remarking very early on in this thread during the first 24 hours of this conflict that all I was seeing on MSM was journos on the rooftops of hotels in Ukraine miles away from the shooty-bangy end of the conflict bumping their gums about nothing that added any value regarding the shooty-bangy part of the conflict.  My analogy is it would be like coverage of a football match where 90% of the footage and commentary is about who is in the crowd, the dressing room, in the carpark outside the stadium etc and the final 10% is Liverpool won 2-0 and here is footage of the goals.

They need to give their heads a wobble.

[Bulletpoint]

Speeding ticket? You're in the army now.

 

Russian forces are implementing increasingly draconian measures to conscript previously ineligible personnel. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 10 that Russian forces are now conscripting previously ineligible categories of people, including those with childhood disabilities and workers in protected industries.[3] The GUR reported that DNR/LNR authorities are enabling traffic inspectors to issue on-the-spot conscription notices and are establishing checkpoints on key highways.

 

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10

[LongLeftFlank]

3 minutes ago, BornGinger said:

It seems some people use their free time to memorise the names of male so called "adult film actors".

Great, so now I not only draw out a newbie troll, but his self-appointed rapid response force drives straight into the blast too. Soooo predictable.

.... And I believe this is now the second time you've gotten stuck to my particular flypaper.

I've posted about a dozen times in the last 5 hours, mainly, ahem *straight* on topic. Yet THIS was the only item you could summon the umm mental *energy* to respond to????

[/I'll cut the countertrolling off now, but believe me the next one will be worth the holiday]

 

 

[Elmar Bijlsma]

A squad of infantry being a bit careless in spacing and unit ID. Not a mistake they'll make a second time.

Though it is in doubt who is who. Might be Russians getting jumped by a Ukrainian tank. Hard to tell from the footage.

[Ultradave]

10 hours ago, chuckdyke said:

Beating them up and then claiming victory is ludicrous.

Ludicrous it may be but at this point that's about what's left of the "victory" that they could actually claim to. I didn't claim it was valid or sane.

Dave

[Ultradave]

7 hours ago, akd said:

A legit pedophile (also idiot and Russian tool).

All true, however everything he said about Saddam ending his WMD program after Clinton's 1999 bombing campaign turned out to be correct. His reputation has been justifiably trashed because of his later scummy actions.

Dave

[chuckdyke]

This is what a victory looks like. Taking a military objective merely helps. Once you see Putin sign something like this. He is a cancer don't be fooled by a remission. 

[Ultradave]

Deleted. Not worth it.

Dave

Edited April 11, 2022 by Ultradave

[Zeleban]

41 minutes ago, Elmar Bijlsma said:

Отряд пехоты немного небрежно относится к расстоянию и идентификатору отряда. Не ошибка, которую они сделают во второй раз.

Хотя сомнительно, кто есть кто. Возможно, украинский танк набросился на русских. Трудно сказать по кадрам.

I think it was a captured Russian tank captured by the Ukrainians. This explains why the infantrymen did not react to the appearance of this tank.

The Russians do not use captured equipment

[Ultradave]

Summary article in this morning's The Times, about halfway down mentions an attack on Dnipro using Kalibr missiles fired from sea. 

While they outrange a Harpoon, or whatever ASM Ukraine is being newly provided, this kind of attack may become a little more dicey for Russia if the Ukrainians start slinging ASMs back at the ships launching Kalibrs. One can hope anyway.

Dave

PS - not sure how The Times paywall works so I've pasted the relevant paragraph below (I subscribe).

 

"The Defence Ministry in Moscow said “high-precision sea-launched Kalibr missiles” had been used in the attack yesterday against four S-300 launchers concealed in a hangar on the outskirts of the Ukrainian city of Dnipro."

Ukraine, BTW, says they missed and that their S-300s were not destroyed. Or maybe they weren't even there. They don't say ( no surprise )

 

[chuckdyke]

Pity it is unofficial, but we see some Olympic records broken here for the 100 meter dash.

 

[Thomm]

26 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

I think it was a captured Russian tank captured by the Ukrainians. This explains why the infantrymen did not react to the appearance of this tank.

That would explain the guy filming the scene better than if it was the other way round.

Let me add another layman question:

How likely is it for a soldier to run out of ammo during a firefight like those that we see here on video:

• Always
• Depends on experience
• Not if they can share ammo among each other
• Never

Best regards
Thomm

 

 

[The_Capt]

8 hours ago, billbindc said:

 

Jomini has some thoughts tonight: 

 

So a couple things about this whole thing as it appears right now:

- The UA likely knows exactly where the Russian build up is occurring thanks to it own ISR and western feeds.  So they can see the Russian plan and build up clearly.  So why stay in that “pocket of doom”?  The UA defence has been excellent in positioning and anticipating Russian movements, so if they are leaving forces in that pocket I doubt it is an accident.  The UA assessment must point to success by remaining in that pocket or they would simply pull out.

- Mariupol.  This one has been bugging me for weeks.  What possible value does this city have in the overall Russian plan?  Steve has proposed it as a symbolic “de-nazi” win but that is so weak.  I mean how can one claim to have denazified an entire country by taking a single ruined city?  Soviet doctrine was to avoid bogging down in cities at all costs but here the Russians appear to have done the exact opposite.  How much combat power has been soaked up trying to take this place?  How much has been lost?  As a operational or strategic objective Mariupol just does not make sense beyond “do something…anything, the boss is watching”.

 

[Taranis]

4 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So a couple things about this whole thing as it appears right now:

- The UA likely knows exactly where the Russian build up is occurring thanks to it own ISR and western feeds.  So they can see the Russian plan and build up clearly.  So why stay in that “pocket of doom”?  The UA defence has been excellent in positioning and anticipating Russian movements, so if they are leaving forces in that pocket I doubt it is an accident.  The UA assessment must point to success by remaining in that pocket or they would simply pull out.

- Mariupol.  This one has been bugging me for weeks.  What possible value does this city have in the overall Russian plan?  Steve has proposed it as a symbolic “de-nazi” win but that is so weak.  I mean how can one claim to have denazified an entire country by taking a single ruined city?  Soviet doctrine was to avoid bogging down in cities at all costs but here the Russians appear to have done the exact opposite.  How much combat power has been soaked up trying to take this place?  How much has been lost?  As a operational or strategic objective Mariupol just does not make sense beyond “do something…anything, the boss is watching”.

 

I agree with you. But I really think Mariupol is an important political target. They've failed in everything they've done since the invasion began, and Mariupol is one of the only goals where the world (and the Russians in particular) have their sights set and where a Russian victory is achievable. I think a comparison with Stalingrad is really valid (the necessity of its taking for the symbol it represents). The Russian army is so discredited that it cannot lose there too and that will allow Putler to say "hey you saw, we take cities, we win. If we want something, we gets it". Without talking of the "de-nazification" you had say. Even the Chechen credibility (with Tiktok everywhere) is in play

[kraze]

21 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

- Mariupol.  This one has been bugging me for weeks.  What possible value does this city have in the overall Russian plan?  Steve has proposed it as a symbolic “de-nazi” win but that is so weak.  I mean how can one claim to have denazified an entire country by taking a single ruined city?  Soviet doctrine was to avoid bogging down in cities at all costs but here the Russians appear to have done the exact opposite.  How much combat power has been soaked up trying to take this place?  How much has been lost?  As a operational or strategic objective Mariupol just does not make sense beyond “do something…anything, the boss is watching”.

 

You come at it from a standpoint of fighting war and achieving military successes like a military commander would.

But these are russians. And they aren't in it to achieve military successes.

There is a screenshot of comments of one of their social network groups a few pages back. "**** your children, we will destroy you like hitler destroyed jews". That's what a perfectly average russian truly wants.

Their task, since they can't grab whole country, is to kill as many Ukrainians as they can and destroy as much infrastructure as they can. To their people it will be enough if they come home with 6 figures of civilians murdered. If they can grab some more land while doing so - then that's a welcome bonus that will look good on maps to an average russian.

Mariupol is a densely populated city. And it dares to resist. Bucha or whole Kyiv oblast will pale in comparison to horrors that happen there.

Edited April 11, 2022 by kraze

[Probus]

1 hour ago, Elmar Bijlsma said:

A squad of infantry being a bit careless in spacing and unit ID. Not a mistake they'll make a second time.

Though it is in doubt who is who. Might be Russians getting jumped by a Ukrainian tank. Hard to tell from the footage.

That was painful to watch.  You can just never let your guard down whether Russian or Ukrainian.  It may be the last thing you do.

[DesertFox]

 

 

[Elmar Bijlsma]

21 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So a couple things about this whole thing as it appears right now:

- The UA likely knows exactly where the Russian build up is occurring thanks to it own ISR and western feeds.  So they can see the Russian plan and build up clearly.  So why stay in that “pocket of doom”?  The UA defence has been excellent in positioning and anticipating Russian movements, so if they are leaving forces in that pocket I doubt it is an accident.  The UA assessment must point to success by remaining in that pocket or they would simply pull out.

On a political level I think much of it is an unwillingness to give one more inch of Ukrainian territory than is absolutely necessary. After Bucha, who would?

On a tactical/operational level, it's not a pocket of doom yet. Better to tempt the Russians into a lunge to make a pocket happen than do the hard work for them and thereby allowing the Russians to move in their own time.

 

21 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

- Mariupol.  This one has been bugging me for weeks.  What possible value does this city have in the overall Russian plan?  Steve has proposed it as a symbolic “de-nazi” win but that is so weak.  I mean how can one claim to have denazified an entire country by taking a single ruined city?  Soviet doctrine was to avoid bogging down in cities at all costs but here the Russians appear to have done the exact opposite.  How much combat power has been soaked up trying to take this place?  How much has been lost?  As a operational or strategic objective Mariupol just does not make sense beyond “do something…anything, the boss is watching”.

 

As the home of the Azov battalion, an attack on Mariupol was the fig-leaf of credibility the Russians needed to justify the attack in the first place. If you are going to go after the conquest of entirety of East Ukraine, it is the one city you cannot skip because of it.  And now the Russians tripped over their own Richard, taking Mariupol is the only chance they have of claiming some sort of victory. This is very much the politicians calling the objectives.

 

[TheVulture]

Interesting article from Geopolitical Futures about this being the "First Economic World War". And an accurate (in my mind) little quote near the start about why Russia invaded Ukraine:

"the Kremlin perceives the eastward expansion of Western influence, including into Russia, to be a modern invasion by stealth that threatens the Russian regime.

It is not Western organizations like NATO and the European Union that challenge the Kremlin, but the socio-economic model that enabled the West to win the Cold War and that enticed Eastern Europeans to want to join the West."

As has been said before in this thread, a successful Ukraine is a problem for Russia not militarily, but because Russians can easily compare their lives with (in many cases) relatives in Ukraine, and wonder why Ukraine has it better when they all started from the same place not so very long ago.

Quote   Russia and the First Economic World War The Kremlin has prepared for decades to confront the West and its socio-economic model. By: Antonia Colibasanu   As momentous as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is, the most strategically important event in recent weeks was the global economic war between Russia and the U.S. and its allies. Russia, however, has been preparing to confront the West and challenge the Western socio-economic model for a long time. The Putin Era to the Pandemic Russia’s strategic interests in Ukraine are well-known. The geography and history of Russia compel its leaders to create and preserve a buffer between Moscow and the major powers in Western Europe, and to ensure access to the Black Sea. Ukraine is crucial to both goals. But beyond Ukraine, the Kremlin perceives the eastward expansion of Western influence, including into Russia, to be a modern invasion by stealth that threatens the Russian regime. It is not Western organizations like NATO and the European Union that challenge the Kremlin, but the socio-economic model that enabled the West to win the Cold War and that enticed Eastern Europeans to want to join the West. When he became president of Russia in 2000, in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the economic crisis of the 1990s, Vladimir Putin inherited a broken country. Many Russians contemplated joining the European Union, hoping that alignment with the West would bring a better life. The priority for the Russian establishment was to stabilize and rebuild the country. Putin just wanted to survive politically. Following the example of past successful Russian leaders, he centralized power. Knowing he needed stability and growth to slow the rate of emigration and address Russia’s poor demographics, he sought to make Europe economically dependent on Moscow. And looking back at history and the current power balance, he identified Germany as the lynchpin of his strategy of dependence. Russian ties to Germany were key to establishing ties to the European Union more broadly, but this was only the beginning of Russia’s strategy in Europe. Russia opened up its economy to Western investment, established links throughout the Continent and tried to understand the inner workings of EU bureaucracy. It established close business ties with Italy, France and later Hungary, and built a political network that would help expand its influence in Europe. For Moscow, learning about European vulnerabilities was just as important as building up its economy and growing Russia into a stable economic power. The Kremlin also campaigned to join the World Trade Organization to establish deeper relationships with the world’s biggest economic players. In the process, it benefited from foreign investments in Russia and learned how the global economy works, building partnerships with not just Western economies but also other economic powers. The only problem was that China, its major ally against the West, was not seeing the accelerated growth it hoped for and was still very much dependent on the U.S. market, giving Beijing limited ability to counter U.S. interests in the world and forcing Russia to keep its focus on Europe. Average Russians saw improvements in their standard of living under Putin. In major Russian cities, life was similar to that in the West. However, when it became a major player in the energy market, Russia also increased its exposure to global economic cycles. The European economic crisis of the 2010s sent shivers through Moscow. Russia’s economy remained fragile overall, and the gap between urban and rural areas remained dangerously high, potentially threatening Putin’s control. At the same time, the West offered an attractive model to rival Russia’s. It wasn’t so much the growing Western influence in Russia’s buffer zone that bothered the Kremlin, but the fact that ordinary Russians might look at Eastern Europe and see a better model for political organization and economic growth. Then the pandemic hit. The Russian president apparently feared that the economic insecurity wrought by COVID-19 could threaten his country’s economic security and stability. As the worst socio-economic effects of the pandemic faded, action against the West became urgent. From the Kremlin’s point of view, this was a unique moment. The U.S. has been trying to reduce its presence in Europe and instead focus on the Indo-Pacific and domestic problems. In other words, from the Kremlin, the trans-Atlantic alliance and the European Union appear weak. Most important, Russia’s leaders believe they have gained sufficient knowledge of the way the West works and can fight it effectively. Preparing for War Russia has been preparing to confront the West since at least the early 2000s. Besides stockpiling foreign reserves, Moscow constructed trade blocs and deepened relations with projects like the Eurasian Economic Union. In Europe, it enticed Germany to become dependent on Russian natural gas, which as is clear today made it extremely difficult for Europe to cut off Russian energy imports. Shifting from gas would require Europe to build new infrastructure – a costly, time-consuming process. The close German-Russian partnership also benefited the Kremlin’s Europe strategy in other ways. To give a practical example, the EU had plans to make the Danube fully navigable through the establishment of additional canals, increasing Central Europe’s connection with the Black Sea. This would have given Europe more leverage against Russia at the moment, when the war in Ukraine has forced the rerouting of commercial flows from the Black Sea to much more expensive land routes. Instead, positive relations with Moscow made the project seem unnecessary, and it faded away. It is no coincidence that after 2012, the first full year that Nord Stream 1 was operational, Europe became much more reluctant to adopt policies that could be seen as anti-Russian. There was simply no interest in Germany to carry them out. It is also no coincidence that relations between the U.S. and Germany have cooled down over that time. The U.S. needed Germany to lead Europe, or at least maintain neutrality, to prevent Russia from expanding its influence in Europe as the U.S. drew back. The fact that Russia joined the World Trade Organization in 2012 gave it even more leverage in the world economy. It is also worth noting that the Kremlin used personal relationships to shore up its influence. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder was tapped to lead Nord Stream 1. Nord Stream AG also hired former Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen as a consultant to speed up the permit process in Finland. Former Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi served on the board of Delimobil, a Russian car-sharing service. Former Finnish Prime Minister Esko Aho was on the board of Russia’s largest bank, Sberbank. Former Austrian Chancellor Christian Kern resigned from the board of Russia’s state-owned railway company in the early days of the war in Ukraine, while another ex-chancellor, Wolfgang Schussel, remained on the board of Russia’s Lukoil. This is just a short list of top politicians, all of whom had at least some influence over their country’s foreign policy discussions. They have certainly been useful to Russian economic growth and the advance of Russia’s economic strategy in Europe. Working closely with Europeans for the past two decades has enabled Russia to learn what is important for the stability of their countries. It has also helped the Kremlin better understand their political agendas and support causes that work to its advantage. For example, Russia enthusiastically supported many green policies, like Germany’s decision to give up nuclear power – which translated into greater reliance on Russian gas. And Russia has openly supported populist parties throughout Europe and effectively used information warfare, all in an attempt to destabilize and ultimately divide Europe. Globally, Russia has maintained close relations with traditional enemies and competitors of the West. Joining the WTO gave it a stronger position on the global stage, which is used to advance the influence and interests of emerging global players, including the BRICS countries, which also include Brazil, India, China and South Africa. Though the results were modest, Russia promoted the group as an alternative to the West and continued to focus on building ties to China and India, establishing links that it hoped would withstand in a potential confrontation with the West, which we’re seeing play out today. To counter the current sanctions, it has looked to China for help. The Eurasian Economic Union gives it proxies for continuing to do business with the world. At the same time, Russia’s presence in the Middle East and parts of Africa helps it keep the price of oil high – high enough that it can keep paying its bills. Influence in the Middle East and the Sahel, two highly unstable but resource-rich areas, also gives Russia more leverage over the world economy. In building its network, Russia has tried to focus on economics and enhancing weaknesses in the global network. It expanded its influence abroad, making sure the dependencies it was encouraging were strong enough to give it leverage but lose enough to allow its withdrawal when necessary. Russian strategy certainly has its weaknesses, but Russia has options in countering the West during the current global economic war. Supporting EU fragmentation through its economic ties in Europe and using the knowledge of European politics that it’s gained over the years are likely the most important elements of its strategy. The moment European citizens feel the repercussion of Western sanctions is when the bloc will become more fragile, which will allow Russia to exploit the EU’s weaknesses. The world is witnessing its first economic world war of the modern era. The rules are undefined, and the global economy is complex, meaning collateral damage is unavoidable and frequently unpredictable. Slowly, we are becoming aware of the repercussions the sanctions on Russia are having on the global economy. Less clear are the instruments that Russia can employ against the West. How this will change the world is a mystery. All we can do is look back at what Russia has prepared for – and guess what could come next. This is only the beginning.

Edited April 11, 2022 by TheVulture

[Elmar Bijlsma]

11 minutes ago, DesertFox said:

Azov Regiment strike Russian tanks and IFVs in Mariupol city.

How? HOW?!

I am aghast a, judging by the vehicles present, not insubstantial force can park in that courtyard and not defend it. What the fudge are they doing there?

[TheVulture]

1 minute ago, Elmar Bijlsma said:

How? HOW?!

I am aghast a, judging by the vehicles present, not insubstantial force can park in that courtyard and not defend it. What the fudge are they doing there?

Yeah, it really does look like they just parked a platoon or two's worth of vehicles there and just wandered off for lunch and an afternoon down the pub.

[MSBoxer]

Just now, Elmar Bijlsma said:

How? HOW?!

I am aghast a, judging by the vehicles present, not insubstantial force can park in that courtyard and not defend it. What the fudge are they doing there?

I also wondered why there was no reaction.  Then when we see the lone figure run across the courtyard at the end I thought, is it possible that they parked their vehicles and bivouacked in the buildings leaving them un-manned and un-protected?

 

[chuckdyke]

They drew straws whose turn it was for the security then the loser fell asleep. 

Edited April 11, 2022 by chuckdyke