How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Huba said:

I'm too lazy to dig it up, but it was said by a former official (former US Ambassador to UA IIRC). So it's a little ambiguous, I imagine on purpose.

I'm also too lazy, but this is correct

The US was pretty explicit that Ukraine could directly respond to a source of attack on its soil, no matter what patch of Russian terrain it came from (Belarus was not mentioned).  The statement itself was rather vague, so not sure if more explicit conditions were given to Ukraine.

The purpose of the restriction was to provide political cover for the West if some Ukrainian artillery unit went rogue and plopped some fire on something clearly civilian in an expression of revenge.  "We told them not to do that and they did it anyway, therefore we have to reevaluate future aid".  That sort of thing.

More likely, though, is that the US didn't want Ukraine to start proactively whacking places in Crimea, in particular Sevastopol harbor and the Kerch bridge.  Hitting such targets have the potential for undesirable retaliation by Russia.  If Ukraine uses its own resources to do it, that's one thing, but it is entirely different if a Western system was the only reason it could be hit at all.

This is very sensible for everybody.  An example... Russia isn't complaining about the West giving Ukraine the ability to hit ammo dumps.  Russia, for all its nastiness and lies, is still inherently rational and is still (mostly) playing by accepted rules of war.  Ammo dumps are, in their mind, a legitimate target for Ukraine.  Cutting Crimea off from Russia... not so much.

Steve

[Grigb]

Missed small but important part from Murz rant

Quote

The "betrayal of the generals" is no longer "another rumor from the multitude", it is a fait accompli of public opinion. The most dangerous public opinion, the views of the part of society that is fighting this war with weapons in its hands. The opinion of those very people who were told by the "advisers" [RU officers] sent from Russia during the Minsk agreements that "Yes, I have a fellow [UKR] student friend there, I believe him as myself, he wrote to me that you yourself are always the first to start [Shelling forbidden by Minsk agreement]!"

Looks like RU nationalists are severely dissatisfied with RU generals. They are threatening to rebel and fight civil war. 

[Haiduk]

33 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Shell Famine

I don't like Arestovich, but he told in last interview, we passed sharp shell famine in the end of May - beginnng of June, when our artillery shortened own fire missions to minimum. Arestovich said "10 days didn't shot at all", but this is just to dramatize. Though this is the case, when he doesn't tell fairy-tales. I read our soldiers or those, who have familiars in army and many of them asked "were the f..g hell artillery gone?" Especially bad situation was from Siverodonetsk to Popasna and near Avdiivka. The latter saved only that, Russian command threw on Popasna - Bakhmut - Lysychansk direction most of regular DPR troops and those who remained stopped own advance on Avdiivka.   

In June first 155 mm howitzers and ammunition have been coming to Ukraine and probably 152 mm shells for Soviet barrels from ex-Warsaw pact countries, so the work of artillery was gradually renewed

Edited July 5, 2022 by Haiduk

[Battlefront.com]

38 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Artillery of 28th mech.brigade destroyed position of Russian Uragan MLRS in 3 km north from Tomyna Balka village, Kherson oblast - 2 launchers and 2 loaders destroyed.

 

Fun compare/contrast.  Compare the above rather typical Ukrainian video with the previous Russian one.  The above Ukrainian one clearly shows what was targeted, that it was hit, and whatever remained of it after.  All the same strike.  And the Russian one, as I outlined last page, was just a jumble of almost random stuff that shows nearly nothing.

 

[Huba]

14 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is very sensible for everybody.  An example... Russia isn't complaining about the West giving Ukraine the ability to hit ammo dumps.  Russia, for all its nastiness and lies, is still inherently rational and is still (mostly) playing by accepted rules of war.  Ammo dumps are, in their mind, a legitimate target for Ukraine.  Cutting Crimea off from Russia... not so much.

 I imagine that this will also be subjected to pushing the borders of what's acceptable and what not, a.k.a boiling the frog slowly. At some point UA will use the GMLRS to strike a legitimate military target on Russia proper. Then another, and then it will become the norm. And after that, if the war progresses to the point of UA counterattacking into Donbas or Crimea, we might see longer range weapons in UA hands - either ATACMS, or first ER-GMLRS as AFAIK those are just about to enter serial production.

I must say that up to this point, the US approach of avoiding rapid escalation, while gradually supplying more and more powerful stuff to UA, tipping the scales one grain at time, seems to be working very well. Hat off to people who devised the strategy.

 

Edited July 5, 2022 by Huba

[Grigb]

Just now, Haiduk said:

I don't lile Arestovich, but he told in last interview, we passed sharp shell famine in the end of May - beginnng of June, when our artillery shortened own fire missions to minimum. Arestovich said "10 days didn't shot", but this is just to dramatize. Though this is the case, when didn't tell fairy-tails. I read our soldiers or those, who have familiars in army and many of them asked "were the f..g hell artillery gone?" Especially bad situation was from Siverodonetsk to Popasna and near Avdiivka. The latter saved only that, Russian command threw on Popasna - Bakhmut - Lysychansk direction most of regular DPR troops and those who remained stopped own advance on Avdiivka.   

Various shell shortages during a war are the norm. LDNR had their own shortage at the end of April beginning of May. What is important is that RU started to talk about their Shell Famine which means not only they have second shell shortage (and very bad) but that trust in competence of RU high command is broken. Shell Famine is a synonym of war losing military incompetence in RU milhistory circles (from where majority of volunteers are). 

[Haiduk]

1 minute ago, Grigb said:

Various shell shortages during a war are the norm. LDNR had their own shortage at the end of April beginning of May. What is important is that RU started to talk about their Shell Famine which means not only they have second shell shortage (and very bad) but that trust in competence of RU high command is broken. Shell Famine is a synonym of war losing military incompetence in RU milhistory circles (from where majority of volunteers are). 

Explosion of several arsenals in 2015-2018 significantly reduced the number of many 152 mm ammunition, especially for Giatsynt, partially for Msta, and heavy MLRS like Uragan and Smerch. 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

Since Feb 8th UKR troops have started defensicve operation covered as maneuvers. Units occupied own defensive areas according to the plan. And artillery, of course too. It's naturally that some BTGs and  artillery battalions of arty brigades were in reserve. The sounds of cannonade in Hostomel I heard already 24th Feb at the evening and since 26th Feb Pions battery alredy fired from position not far from of my house.  

Thanks!

OK, so it seems the initial Ukrainian artillery usage was more varied than I remember.  Which does make sense because Ukraine had Russia's battle plan ahead of time.  Even if they didn't, they could have pretty much guessed at how the initial phase would go (i.e. initial and deep territorial gains for Russia).

With recent feedback taken into account, I amend my summary:

Russian Artillery

At the beginning of the war Russia totally dominated Ukraine with its artillery, however it wasn't used all that often.  Most likely a result of Russia's general lack of preparedness for fighting a real war.

When it became clear that Ukraine was going to fight, Russia switched to destroying civilian infrastructure in an attempt to terrorize Ukraine into surrender.  Artillery was used primarily for this purpose.

Starting with the Easter offensive in the Donbas, Russia once again switched its strategy and reverted to traditional Soviet massed fire to eliminate or otherwise tie down defenders.  In critical sectors it was massed and employed to wipe out Ukrainian defenders prior to ground assaults.  In non-critical sectors of front it seems the tactic was to mostly keep the Ukrainian defenders from being able to mount counter attacks.  We are still in this phase.

 

Ukrainian Artillery

In the very beginning of the invasion Ukrainian artillery seems to have been positioned to the rear of the international borders where it was anticipated Russia would make rapid territorial gains.  This was likely in part aided by Western intelligence providing Russia's detailed battle plan.  The positioning prevented its artillery from being overrun without significantly affecting the outcome at the border.  In any case, obviously Ukraine did not lose significant amounts of artillery in the first phase of the war, therefore it seems safe to assume that for whatever reason they weren't in the vulnerable areas.

Once Russia's forces had stalled out, Ukraine was able to deploy its artillery and effectively direct fire into both concentrated "tip of spear" ground forces as well as LOCs.  The slaughter of Russian forces around Kyiv and Kharkiv were repeated over and over again, indicating very deliberate strategy on Ukraine's part.

After the target rich environment of the early part of the war subsided, Ukraine had to choose how to employ its limited and inadequate number of artillery pieces to cover the entire front.  For the most part it decided to spread the artillery thin and have them operate as "snipers", reserving heavy concentrations for select sectors of front.  This worked very well in part due to long standing experience with decentralized targeting and fire control.

Ukraine's primary problem was not loss of artillery due to combat, but loss due to wearing out barrels and exhausting ammo (including shipments from former Warsaw Pact countries).  This required Ukraine to further restrict it's use of massed fire and rely upon sniping to attrit Russian forces.  This is the same time we saw concentrated effort by Ukraine to acquire NATO standard systems.

Now the strategy has changed yet again.  Ukraine has significant NATO artillery and ammo on hand, but it's still a fraction of what it needs to maintain it's prewar tube count.  These systems are being employed in more operational and even strategic uses, such as the recent strikes on Russian ammo dumps.  Remaining long range rocket stocks are also being used for this purpose.  Some Soviet legacy systems appear to still be in use, though with barrel wear and ammo shortages it seems they must be used sparingly compared to earlier phases of the war.

 

Additional feedback welcomed!

Steve

[Haiduk]

Sloviansk now

[Grigb]

5 hours ago, Huba said:

So if that's the plan indeed, and it's already in motion, what awaits Putin? Will he be gradually removed form power, or Polonium tea? And more importantly, will he be thrown under the bus of another Brest-Litovsk humiliation, or will the new guy actually try to salvage the situation and win militarily ?

I do not see how they could keep him alive - for both peace/sanctions talks healthy Putin is a big no. Regarding military win I also do not see how they can pull it and as far as we know RU high command thinks the same.

So, applying logic there should be Putin tea party > Peace offer. But Putin is not an easy target for tea party. And RU and logic are often not compatible. 

At the end Putin will die and there will be peace offer but before that we might have a real roller coaster.

[Grigb]

2 hours ago, dan/california said:

I fully agree that Patrushev is one factions candidate for the leadership post Putin, but there are at least three factions. I don't thing we can assume the current regime, by which I mean the FSB faction that Putin represents, can smoothly retain power after Putin's death with the whole regime under this level of stress. There are a LOT of other sharks that would like be first at the buffet whatever its current size. Indeed it is even more important to be at the front of the line as size of the buffet gets smaller. The obvious way for them to achieve that is if the entire FSB faction is suddenly on the menu. And the combination of the decision to launch the war being so tightly held, and the FSB's failure to actually produce a coup in Kyiv, certainly give at least a theoretical opening. There is a GREAT deal of blame to be assigned somewhere.

Agree. Just wanted to note that it looks like FSB put plan in motion.

[BlackMoria]

The most madding aspect of this war to me is the delusion the Russian nationalists/imperialists/knuckle draggers have that they still can "win" this war, despite all evidence across a wide spectrum on a wide range of metrics that it simply isn't going to happen.  Russian isn't a great power anymore - it has not met that definition pre-Feb 24 and even less so now.  That is got to be some fantastic 100 proof hooch that is being served up in tanker trucks that is being swilled in the power structures of Russia to continue to believe that all their stated objectives will be met by their beaten to crap army.  Completely ignore that the expected 3 day op and a parade in Kiev is now 4+ months in.  And everything is 'going to plan' we keep hearing from Kremlin talking heads.  It is like they are snorting lines of coke off of a stripper's ass and then getting in front of a camera and proclaiming everything is going as planned and victory is just around the corner....yeah, right <eye roll>.

Except that dream is a nightmare now.  Except they don't see it or accept it.  And the dying on all sides just goes on and on.

[Huba]

Just now, Grigb said:

I do not see how they could keep him alive - for both peace/sanctions talks healthy Putin is a big no. Regarding military win I also do not see how they can pull it and as far as we know RU high command thinks the same.

So, applying logic there should be Putin tea party > Peace offer. But Putin is not an easy target for tea party. And RU and logic are often not compatible. 

At the end Putin will die and there will be peace offer but before that we might have a real roller coaster.

 If you think of all of that from the perspective you painted, Putin's craziness about long tables, security picking up his feces etc. kinda makes sense.

For UA it is quite uplifting I think. Whoever gets to be the next Russian dictator, will probably get to power as a savior of the country, which was almost run into the ground by the previous incompetent/ malicious team. Even accepting humiliating peace 1917 style might be viewed as good realpolitik perhaps? It's better than destruction of Russia and russian cause, for which Putin and his west-appeasing sellouts are to blame of course...

As crazy as that sounds, it's the best "road to peace" proposed up to this point.

[sburke]

4 minutes ago, BlackMoria said:

It is like they are snorting lines of coke off of a stripper's ass and then getting in front of a camera and proclaiming everything is going as planned and victory is just around the corner....yeah, right <eye roll>.

That line gave me a chuckle and at the same time seems the most apt description of what seems to be going on in Russian high command.

[dan/california]

31 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Thanks!

OK, so it seems the initial Ukrainian artillery usage was more varied than I remember.  Which does make sense because Ukraine had Russia's battle plan ahead of time.  Even if they didn't, they could have pretty much guessed at how the initial phase would go (i.e. initial and deep territorial gains for Russia).

With recent feedback taken into account, I amend my summary:

Russian Artillery

At the beginning of the war Russia totally dominated Ukraine with its artillery, however it wasn't used all that often.  Most likely a result of Russia's general lack of preparedness for fighting a real war.

When it became clear that Ukraine was going to fight, Russia switched to destroying civilian infrastructure in an attempt to terrorize Ukraine into surrender.  Artillery was used primarily for this purpose.

Starting with the Easter offensive in the Donbas, Russia once again switched its strategy and reverted to traditional Soviet massed fire to eliminate or otherwise tie down defenders.  In critical sectors it was massed and employed to wipe out Ukrainian defenders prior to ground assaults.  In non-critical sectors of front it seems the tactic was to mostly keep the Ukrainian defenders from being able to mount counter attacks.  We are still in this phase.

 

Ukrainian Artillery

In the very beginning of the invasion Ukrainian artillery seems to have been positioned to the rear of the international borders where it was anticipated Russia would make rapid territorial gains.  This was likely in part aided by Western intelligence providing Russia's detailed battle plan.  The positioning prevented its artillery from being overrun without significantly affecting the outcome at the border.  In any case, obviously Ukraine did not lose significant amounts of artillery in the first phase of the war, therefore it seems safe to assume that for whatever reason they weren't in the vulnerable areas.

Once Russia's forces had stalled out, Ukraine was able to deploy its artillery and effectively direct fire into both concentrated "tip of spear" ground forces as well as LOCs.  The slaughter of Russian forces around Kyiv and Kharkiv were repeated over and over again, indicating very deliberate strategy on Ukraine's part.

After the target rich environment of the early part of the war subsided, Ukraine had to choose how to employ its limited and inadequate number of artillery pieces to cover the entire front.  For the most part it decided to spread the artillery thin and have them operate as "snipers", reserving heavy concentrations for select sectors of front.  This worked very well in part due to long standing experience with decentralized targeting and fire control.

Ukraine's primary problem was not loss of artillery due to combat, but loss due to wearing out barrels and exhausting ammo (including shipments from former Warsaw Pact countries).  This required Ukraine to further restrict it's use of massed fire and rely upon sniping to attrit Russian forces.  This is the same time we saw concentrated effort by Ukraine to acquire NATO standard systems.

Now the strategy has changed yet again.  Ukraine has significant NATO artillery and ammo on hand, but it's still a fraction of what it needs to maintain it's prewar tube count.  These systems are being employed in more operational and even strategic uses, such as the recent strikes on Russian ammo dumps.  Remaining long range rocket stocks are also being used for this purpose.  Some Soviet legacy systems appear to still be in use, though with barrel wear and ammo shortages it seems they must be used sparingly compared to earlier phases of the war.

 

Additional feedback welcomed!

Steve

Combat mission Fire Direction Center needs to be a thing...

[Huba]

6 minutes ago, sburke said:

That line gave me a chuckle and at the same time seems the most apt description of what seems to be going on in Russian high command.

On a megayacht, it has to be taking place on a RU General Staff megayacht.

As long as we're not serious, I ran across this thing that made me laugh really hard. I work and spend way too much time on the Internet lately, so maybe that's why find it hilarious. If after taking a look, community will ask me to delete my account, that's fine, I understand.

 

[Grigb]

26 minutes ago, BlackMoria said:

It is like they are snorting lines of coke off of a stripper's ass and then getting in front of a camera and proclaiming everything is going as planned and victory is just around the corner....yeah, right <eye roll>.

Well, here is this:

Quote

The mystery of the "Argentine" board: what [RU] officials are carried by the plane from the "cocaine case"

According to the Argentine police, 12 suitcases of contraband found in the Russian embassy in Argentina were transported by the IL-96 of the special flight detachment "Russia". In the last three months, this plane has appeared on the same dates and in the same cities where Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Vladimir Putin's delegation arrived.

Among the materials about the operation to seize almost 400 kilograms of cocaine from the Russian embassy in Buenos Aires were photos and videos of the loading of suitcases on board the IL-96 with the number 96023.

It was this plane, according to the police, that was supposed to transport a large shipment of cocaine from Argentina to Moscow. Instead of a batch of cocaine, suitcases with flour and location sensors were loaded on board.

So, your quote might be the most accurate description of the Kremlin decision making process.

[panzermartin]

41 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Sloviansk now

This is very intense, seems they are in a hurry to advance or not?...I dont think its logical for RU to pause and wait for UKR to strengthen their artillery even more.

[Battlefront.com]

52 minutes ago, Grigb said:

I do not see how they could keep him alive - for both peace/sanctions talks healthy Putin is a big no. Regarding military win I also do not see how they can pull it and as far as we know RU high command thinks the same.

So, applying logic there should be Putin tea party > Peace offer. But Putin is not an easy target for tea party. And RU and logic are often not compatible. 

At the end Putin will die and there will be peace offer but before that we might have a real roller coaster.

I agree.  There is no practical way for ending the war and sanctions as long as Putin and some others are still alive.  Even if he is replaced without being killed, then what?  The Hague will issue an arrest warrant for Putin, Shoigu, and other Russian leadership.  If Russia doesn't hand them over to the Hague, I doubt very much that sanctions will be significantly lifted.  And what is the last thing in the world that Russia could stomach?  Having *ANY* of its leadership put on trial because that opens up way too many cans of worms.  Putin's replacement government would be unable to handle the fallout, nor would the government that replaced that one!

Which puts the world into an extremely difficult position.  The only way we can move ahead in this world without a perpetually antagonistic Russia is to have it defeated AND take responsibility for its actions.  The defeat is inevitable, but getting Russia to accept responsibility for its many crimes is something I find difficult to imagine.  A massive Western leaning revolution would be required for that and I don't see one of those on the horizon any time soon.

Yes, I can see Putin dying either during the coup or after.  But how many other current top Russian officials would also have to be killed to avoid a Hague scenario?  Shoigu and Gerasimov for sure, but I expect the top FSB leadership would need to be disposed of as well.  Which I don't see happening.

Really interesting days lay ahead for us, that is for sure!

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

14 minutes ago, Grigb said:

So, your quote might be the most accurate description of the Kremlin decision making process.

That is just eerie!

Steve

[akd]

BDA (Butt Damage Assessment):

 

[Battlefront.com]

8 hours ago, scarletto said:

Been out there twice now, as a civilian aid worker, different this last time, aid convoy was shelled, no one hurt, but the signs that the Russians are shelling villages etc for fun very obvious, more widespread firing. Watched a massive firefight  (from safety of a cellar) lots of night time artillery. Things more tense. Last time  I am going, as my missus says at 64 I am to old, hey in my head I'm still a 21 year old soldier. Sadly i see peace has more chance of platting fog than stopping this war at the moment.
 

Thanks for posting again and thanks for ignoring your wife long enough to help out Ukraine

Would be interesting to hear more about your experiences.

Steve

[sburke]

Russian millionaire linked to Putin energy giant Gazprom found shot dead in pool (msn.com)

He is the sixth wealthy businessman with links to the Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom to have been found dead in unnatural circumstances since the start of the year.

Yuri Voronov, 61, was head of a logistics company that held lucrative contracts with Gazprom in the Arctic.

His body was discovered floating in the swimming pool of his mansion in an elite village close to St Petersburg on Monday.

He had suffered a gunshot wound to the head.

A pistol is said to have been found nearby, with ‘several spent cartridges’ allegedly located at the bottom of the pool.

The Russian Investigative Committee is investigating his death which is believed to be linked to ‘a quarrel with partners’.

His wife has reportedly told investigators that Voronov had believed he was being swindled by contractors and partners who had ‘behaved dishonourably’ for several weeks.

The businessman is understood to have feared he had ‘lost a lot of money’.

[Harmon Rabb]

Thanks for the tanks!

[Vanir Ausf B]

4 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Thanks for the tanks!

IIRC the literal translation is "Tanks a lot!"