How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Huba]

All right, so what is Putin's grand strategy now? IMO this guy get's it right, broadly. I don't believe RU is counting at actually beating Ukraine into submission, it is about saving as much from the conquered territory and somehow freezing the conflict:

 

[billbindc]

4 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I disagree. +2,000,000.

BTW, Elvis recently saw Devo live.  The bastard didn't even invite me.

Back to our regular schedule discussion...

Steve

I hereby confer collective blame on all Elvii (sp?). 

[Seedorf81]

 With no Putin-putsch in sight (as far as I am aware), this mobilization-escalation, and the prospect of a long war/stalemate, the EU and US attitudes seem even more important. Vital, maybe.

IMHO president Biden has handled this situation pretty well so far.

But next month he turns 80 and if he suddenly falls ill, or dies, Kamala Harris takes over. The information I have read about her so far makes me a little nervous about her presidential capabilities.

Does she have what it takes?

[BFCElvis]

6 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I disagree. +2,000,000.

BTW, Elvis recently saw Devo live.  The bastard didn't even invite me.

Back to our regular schedule discussion...

Steve

I know it's way off topic but...

 

Yes, I did see them in May. The song cited by LLF has always been one of my favorites but I thought that there was no way they'd ever do it again live. I was wrong.

 

Back to your regularly scheduled war analysis. 

[The_Capt]

All war is negotiation and sacrifice - all war is negotiation with sacrifice.

So Putin dropped the 'mobilization' boogey man, kinda.  And of course threatened nuclear war without saying it...oh my.

Well I think Phase 2-3 of this war were positioning for endgame - Russia's point "Imma gonna take the Donbas, cause that was what I wanted all along...well that plus Kherson and everything I did not lose in Phase I".  And Ukraine's counter-point "No you are not."  This could have gone on for some time longer but clearly things are coming to a head in Moscow.

So I think this is endgame.  What does a soft-mobilization/slightly-louder-threat-of-nuclear-war-based-on-bizarro -annexation-internal-legalities-that-no-one-else-is-going-to-recognize-for-a-century, really tell us?

- Well first it tells us that Russia is desperate. Putin and the gang are opening themselves up to significant political exposure here.  You average Russian may, or may not, have actually supported this war but they all had the luxury of staying out of it - changing that is a major shift.  We are already hearing rumblings in opposition, who knows how far that will go; however, we do know that Putin would not have pulled on this lever if Russia was winning.  This is a pretty clear sign of losses and the impact it is having on his war machine.

- Next, this is not an escalation, it is desperation.  This is an attempt to preserve military capability in the field and re-assert a status quo, not raise enough forces to re-take Kyiv.  In short, whatever the UA is doing, it is working very well.

- Russia is clearly on the defensive, and likely will stay there until this is over.  Throwing 300,000 conscripts in any variation is not going to create offensive military capability - unable to create positive decision, so at best negative and null (i.e. denial).  This signals a shift into a strategy of exhaustion, annihilation for the Russians has left the building.  This puts Russia a couple rungs above an insurgency as far as military strategy goes.  They are going to try and dig in an hold on to what they have until the other side gets tired.

-  We could be heading towards a nuclear decision point.  The battlefield use of nuclear weapons has always been a grey area in warfare.  It is an escalation but the West and USSR went around and around on whether one could have a limited nuclear war.  I suspect that Putin might be thinking about testing the norms around this by declaring all the territory they have taken as "mother Russia" - we freakin knew that Russian doctrine and law were useless to refer to because autocrats just move the goalposts.  So I suspect the redline is the Crimea, and maybe somewhere in the LNR/DPR.  If the UA push that far, we might actually see Putin try to go that way - I say "try" because he 1) might already be removed from power by then, or 2) someone will put a bullet in his dome before they drag Russia into a doomsday scenario.  If one does go off well it won't be the end of days, tactical nuclear weapons can effect a couple grid squares and were designed for heavy armor concentrations at Fulda - this war is far to spread out.  We will likely lose our minds in the West and the response will be key to what happens next. I suspect conventional escalation or other options to send a strong signal to Russia that they will be the first country in history to lose a strategic nuclear war.  Regardless, if Russia employs a nuclear weapon, we are off the map, beyond the Cuban Missile crisis; however, I also still think this actually happening is a long shot.  For those in Europe and NA, I would not start getting too excited until strange looking Patriot systems start being deployed around major urban areas and/or in the Canadian north.

  So the biggest question on the table is - "what does endgame look like?"  This is in the weird political space as militarily Ukraine has demonstrated that given time they can likely retake everything back to the pre-2014 border - the question is do they want to?  Do they need to?  Putting emotions to one side - I suspect the West will be putting a lot of incentives for Ukraine to push to 2014 borders and then stop.  Why?  Well some possible reasons:

- DNR and LNR are burned out wrecks with large sections of the population that clearly do not want to be Ukrainian, so let em go.  Ukraine gains nothing but a couple Northern Ireland scenarios if they re-occupy, that and a massive reconstruction bill.  Walk away and wish them luck with their sugar daddy.

- Crimea.  Here we could see "neutral and open" tossed around a lot more.  Without Sevastopol Russia is pretty much cut out of the Black Sea, and if they are out of the Black Sea they are out of the Med.  If Russia is going to go nuclear, it will be over Crimea...and to this guy over in NA, it is not worth it.

- Ok, so that is the unthinkable "bad", what is the carrot?  Fast tracked entry in NATO - this entire bullsh#t goes away if Ukraine has Article 5 to lean on, because that is simply too big to fail for the West.  Hell Ukraine is already armed better than most NATO nations, with NATO STANAG equipment.  Their training is US/UK standard and I have no doubt we have already built most of their ISR infrastructure.  Ukraine in NATO next week is a clear win for the west. 

Next, entry into the EU.  Bureaucratic nightmare that it is, this would cement Ukraine into Europe economically and set them up for post-war success.

Last, a reconstruction plan to rival Marshal.  The West commits hundreds of billions to turn Ukraine into a shining example of what our money can do as a counter-point to China's game these last 15 years or so.

As to Russia?  Well it made its bed. Sanctions stay in place until 1) reparation deal is cut and in motion, 2) war crimes of all sorts are investigated and prosecuted and 3) Putin regime is gone enough that we can pretend whoever replaces it is clean...or clean enough. If Russia refuses any of the above, well enjoy being a Chinese satellite with a Cold War Soviet standard of living and we will see you again in 30 years - we will risk manage Russia, we are good at that in the West.

So What War?  Well UA will likely focus on taking bights out of Donbas just to ensure 300,000 Russian conscripts don't feel left out.  They will re-take Kherson and push south over the Dnipro up to the Crimean border.  And Melitopol, cut that stupid land bridge and box the Russians and their cronies back to where they were before this nonsense started.

Anyway, crazy days and keep your head up because it might get crazier.

 

[The_Capt]

2 minutes ago, BFCElvis said:

I know it's way off topic but...

 

Yes, I did see them in May. The song cited by LLF has always been one of my favorites but I thought that there was no way they'd ever do it again live. I was wrong.

 

Back to your regularly scheduled war analysis. 

And I just threw up in my mouth a bit.

[MSBoxer]

18 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I disagree. +2,000,000.

BTW, Elvis recently saw Devo live.  The bastard didn't even invite me.

Back to our regular schedule discussion...

Steve

Eh, I was more of an Oingo Boingo kind of guy.

so +10, just for nostalgia 

[MSBoxer]

dbl post

Edited September 21, 2022 by MSBoxer

[The_MonkeyKing]

Kofman and Lee going live in half an hour.

[DesertFox]

Maybe that helps to keep you from conscription?

 

 

[FancyCat]

2 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So the biggest question on the table is - "what does endgame look like?"  This is in the weird political space as militarily Ukraine has demonstrated that given time they can likely retake everything back to the pre-2014 border - the question is do they want to?  Do they need to?  Putting emotions to one side - I suspect the West will be putting a lot of incentives for Ukraine to push to 2014 borders and then stop.  Why?  Well some possible reasons:

- DNR and LNR are burned out wrecks with large sections of the population that clearly do not want to be Ukrainian, so let em go.  Ukraine gains nothing but a couple Northern Ireland scenarios if they re-occupy, that and a massive reconstruction bill.  Walk away and wish them luck with their sugar daddy.

- Crimea.  Here we could see "neutral and open" tossed around a lot more.  Without Sevastopol Russia is pretty much cut out of the Black Sea, and if they are out of the Black Sea they are out of the Med.  If Russia is going to go nuclear, it will be over Crimea...and to this guy over in NA, it is not worth it.

- Ok, so that is the unthinkable "bad", what is the carrot?  Fast tracked entry in NATO - this entire bullsh#t goes away if Ukraine has Article 5 to lean on, because that is simply too big to fail for the West.  Hell Ukraine is already armed better than most NATO nations, with NATO STANAG equipment.  Their training is US/UK standard and I have no doubt we have already built most of their ISR infrastructure.  Ukraine in NATO next week is a clear win for the west. 

Next, entry into the EU.  Bureaucratic nightmare that it is, this would cement Ukraine into Europe economically and set them up for post-war success.

Last, a reconstruction plan to rival Marshal.  The West commits hundreds of billions to turn Ukraine into a shining example of what our money can do as a counter-point to China's game these last 15 years or so.

As to Russia?  Well it made its bed. Sanctions stay in place until 1) reparation deal is cut and in motion, 2) war crimes of all sorts are investigated and prosecuted and 3) Putin regime is gone enough that we can pretend whoever replaces it is clean...or clean enough. If Russia refuses any of the above, well enjoy being a Chinese satellite with a Cold War Soviet standard of living and we will see you again in 30 years - we will risk manage Russia, we are good at that in the West.

So What War?  Well UA will likely focus on taking bights out of Donbas just to ensure 300,000 Russian conscripts don't feel left out.  They will re-take Kherson and push south over the Dnipro up to the Crimean border.  And Melitopol, cut that stupid land bridge and box the Russians and their cronies back to where they were before this nonsense started.

Anyway, crazy days and keep your head up because it might get crazier.

 

Ukrainians approve of Zelensky, Ukrainians also have a knack for being very loud when **** does not go their way (They will turn on him instantly if he looks like he will give up any part of Ukraine in a peace deal). There isn't a scenario in the near future where Ukraine has the military power to retake all her lands past 2014 and just gives it away. Yeah the Donbas is ruined, but so was Germany past 1945 and she was up and running within 20 years. 

So the economic argument for ceding away the Donbas, or Crimea is not effective, those lands can be restored (and the people who fled those regions can return).

I highly doubt we will see active resistance movements in the Donbas, it looks like the Russians have basically pulled every man within fighting age and have exhausted the manpower in the pre-invasion region of the Donbas, anyone not dead, a POW or fled to Russia, is gonna be not a lot. 

Polling pre-2014 showed majorities for staying with Ukraine in most of the Donbas. Ukraine has always held the position that the separatist states are the creation of Russia, there will not be any sort of legitimation of their status, there will most likely be no special status for the Donbas like Crimea had pre-2014 in Ukraine. 

It is important to note that only Russian intervention into the Donbas saved it from being crushed by Ukraine in 2014-15. Aside from seizing the regional capitals, most of the two oblasts were held by Ukraine. Those puppet states were barely viable then, a Ukraine with the ability to push Russia back has the ability to retake all the Donbas and controlling the population fine. (even without the bloodletting Russia has caused using them as cannon fodder) 

Crimea, i think it would be doubtful even for it to get autonomy status, at least without more safeguards in the Constitution. Crimea will be retaken by Ukraine, militarized as appropriately as Ukraine feels like it, with no regard for Russia. Crimea held by Russia has shown itself to be a sword at Ukraine's neck, able to at will cut off Ukrainian sea access and threaten Southern Ukraine. The Kerch bridge will be destroyed, and ships will flow to and from Odessa without the worry of Russian blockades ever again with Crimea in rightful hands. 

The economic argument for retaking the Crimea, including offshore oil and gas speaks for itself in addition to keeping the sealanes open. 

After the bull**** of the full scale invasion, offers of "neutral and open" are DOA. Ukraine wants to join the EU and NATO, but is under no illusions over her own defense, offering to internationally monitor Crimea or the Donbas without Ukraine being on site, will be met with the cynicism unleashed by a Russia that literally began the war with the UN Security Council making useless *** statements calling for dialogue. 

As for carrots, no point for carrots, Crimea and the Donbas pre-2022, are probably more easier to take now than any point pre-Russian intervention. I already laid out the arguments for why it will be retaken. 

[The_MonkeyKing]

some rumor news busting:

According to Finnish border officials there has been no change in the amount or the profile of the border crossing.

https://www.is.fi/kotimaa/art-2000009085672.html

[Kinophile]

300k,pffft SUUUURRRE. 

More like 100k, "re trained" for a month and thrown into the line,  over the course of 3, months.  Sound dumb? Welcome to the RUS Way of SMO.

Plus,  it doesn't change the fact that it's RUS-AFs definitive loss of dominance in the air that will decide things, not waves of Ivans running into 155 barrages.

They can get their 100, 200,300, 400k mobiliks, fine, whatever. UAF will inevitably get F16s and A10s, a relentlessly larger, more robust, layered and effective SAM infrastructure, yet more drones and the organizational ability to really go to work on the RUS-AF. 

Tbh I think c-130s are just as important. 

Leo's etc are stopgap measures for the war.  Yay tanks and all that.  But now that were looking at a UA defined increase in operational tempo and range, then its Air power that is UKR's real strategic need

If UA shoves past LDPR down to Azov coast, that would spasticate  RUS logistics and cauldron the entire expeditionary army. Do it in winter for maximum effect.

But also UAs logistics will get extended to a degree. Still, I have far more faith in UA staff capability than RUS. 

Edited September 21, 2022 by Kinophile

[kevinkin]

36 minutes ago, Huba said:

All right, so what is Putin's grand strategy now? IMO this guy get's it right, broadly. I don't believe RU is counting at actually beating Ukraine into submission, it is about saving as much from the conquered territory and somehow freezing the conflict:

 

There's the darn concept again "freeze the conflict". I just wonder how Putin's explicit nuke threats, pressure from China / India and the rag tag call up will affect Allied calculus regarding the speed of Ukrainian operations? Wait and see is unacceptable. Going too fast might produce unintended consequences which makes the West nervous. Perhaps play Pacman and gobble up territory in manageable bites all the way to the 2014 frontier. But don't lose momentum at this stage. 

[Artkin]

10 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Tbh I think c-130s are just as important.

Especially when they don't a neat satellite array like we do to keep track of our opponents. C-130's are essential for deploying your formations quickly into battle. One of Russia's greatest weaknesses is just this - they only have a fraction of the old Soviet sea and air lift capabilities

[Zeleban]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

All right, so what is Putin's grand strategy now? IMO this guy get's it right, broadly. I don't believe RU is counting at actually beating Ukraine into submission, it is about saving as much from the conquered territory and somehow freezing the conflict:

 

I also think that the whole idea of mobilization is more intended to intimidate the West than for real military benefit

[Letter from Prague]

My understanding was that LDPR and Crimea contain millions of Ukrainians who lived there for decades and don't want to be part of Russia or fake republics. Telling them "sorry guys, you're not worth it, maybe the Russians will let you go" is not a very good.

Also strategically, if Russia keeps even a square kilometer of Ukraine after this is over, they still won. If Russian war criminals never end in court, they still won. They gained territory, they hurt Ukraine, killing several hundreds of thousands of people while losing 50k and invented new levels of barbarity and they got away with it - at cost of losing some tanks and some sanctions, which nobody will even think about in five years.

It might not look like it now, but in history books it will look like a win. This war started in 2014 on 2014 Ukraine borders and if it ends behind them, it is still win for Russia. And giving Russia a win just means we will see a repeat of this soon.

[FancyCat]

 

31 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So the biggest question on the table is - "what does endgame look like?"  This is in the weird political space as militarily Ukraine has demonstrated that given time they can likely retake everything back to the pre-2014 border - the question is do they want to?  Do they need to?  Putting emotions to one side - I suspect the West will be putting a lot of incentives for Ukraine to push to 2014 borders and then stop.

Just to elaborate some more, a Ukraine restored to the full 1991 borders, is much more economically stronger than 2014. One, the industrial nexuses in the Donbas are completely unlocked, and again, whatever the damage done to it, we have plenty of examples of devastated regions being restored, and of course, the Marshall Plan is the clear argument for it being possible. 

Two, the Black Sea offshore Natural Gas and Oil production is locked off now and for the foreseeable future if Crimea is retained by Russia. Ukraine takes it, and Europe can happily invest and utilize it, the Donbas energy production as well. Furthermore, the loss of Sevastopol as a seaport, and military base will hamstring any future Russian projection of power. 

Plus, let's be clear, a Ukraine in NATO with Crimea, is much more useful to NATO and the West than Ukraine with Crimea still in Russian hands. 

There is tons of incentive for Ukraine to go all the way, but I think the West is actually more than fine with Ukraine going all the way, for all the reasons i laid out, it would be the most substantial victory for Western influence since....i suppose the expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe? Probably greater than that tbh. 

The worry has always been a stalemate, where Europe cannot normalize relations with Russia and Ukraine still a basketcase. Ukraine achieving the full restoration of her 1991 borders would be devastating for opponents of the West and a absolutely clear signal that the West remains on top.

Also, as seen in recent U.S moves towards Armenia, if NATO (minus Turkey) had Crimea, and Ukraine in NATO....well, it would be a lot more easier for U.S projection of power into the Caucasus no? Oh sure, the U.S could use Romania or such but I think Ukraine would be absolutely fine with that arrangement in Crimea i think. 

[Huba]

8 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

 

Just to elaborate some more, a Ukraine restored to the full 1991 borders, is much more economically stronger than 2014. One, the industrial nexuses in the Donbas are completely unlocked, and again, whatever the damage done to it, we have plenty of examples of devastated regions being restored, and of course, the Marshall Plan is the clear argument for it being possible. 

Two, the Black Sea offshore Natural Gas and Oil production is locked off now and for the foreseeable future if Crimea is retained by Russia. Ukraine takes it, and Europe can happily invest and utilize it, the Donbas energy production as well. Furthermore, the loss of Sevastopol as a seaport, and military base will hamstring any future Russian projection of power. 

Plus, let's be clear, a Ukraine in NATO with Crimea, is much more useful to NATO and the West than Ukraine with Crimea still in Russian hands. 

There is tons of incentive for Ukraine to go all the way, but I think the West is actually more than fine with Ukraine going all the way, for all the reasons i laid out, it would be the most substantial victory for Western influence since....i suppose the expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe? Probably greater than that tbh. 

The worry has always been a stalemate, where Europe cannot normalize relations with Russia and Ukraine still a basketcase. Ukraine achieving the full restoration of her 1991 borders would be devastating for opponents of the West and a absolutely clear signal that the West remains on top.

Also, as seen in recent U.S moves towards Armenia, if NATO (minus Turkey) had Crimea, and Ukraine in NATO....well, it would be a lot more easier for U.S projection of power into the Caucasus no? Oh sure, the U.S could use Romania or such but I think Ukraine would be absolutely fine with that arrangement in Crimea i think. 

Can't agree more, with this as well as the two previous posts.

I'm pretty sure that after few more substantial defeats RU will collapse on the political level, and the new people might very well find themselves in 1917 situation, where any peace will be better than continuing the war and it will be easier to accept whatever peace is offered and just blame it on (deceased) Putin. It wouldn't be a permanent solution of course, the revanchism will raise it's ugly head very soon, but that's bound to happen anyway, and the only solution is NATO membership for Ukraine.
Whatever happens, I don't see how we could get a 'proper' peace, one where RU admits to what it did, agrees on warcrime  trials, pays reparations etc. Whatever Ukraine manages to take back by force will be all it gets, it's better to have a broader aim in this situation.

Edited September 21, 2022 by Huba

[Bulletpoint]

14 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

I also think that the whole idea of mobilization is more intended to intimidate the West than for real military benefit

I don't think the West is intimidated by this mobilisation at all. The only thing Russia can now do to intimidate anyone is rattling the nuclear saber.

[danfrodo]

Hoo boy, what a wild ride little Vladdy Putin is taking us on.  And what a busy forum, hard to keep up since I am traveling (I am in very westernmost Poland, meaning Winona, MN.  Went to funeral yesterday where everyone attending was req'd to wear polish flag lapel pin ).

Very very interesting insights on Putler's 'mobilize & terrorize' speech, promising big army buildup and to nuke everyone, yet again.  

Some consensus opinion forming around the 300lk not really changing things on the ground, for multitude of reasons (won't really be 300k, no training, no equipment, etc).  Plus seems to be causing some flight as moms are driving their sons to the border or shoving them onto airplanes.  

One thing I hadn't thought of until Zeleban mentioned it above is how much of this is just a propaganda ploy.  It's meant to frighten the west, along w earlier mentioned objective of providing shout out to the RU nats who only want more/bigger war.

And now we see what can happen before the mud season.  Of course, given right circumstances there could still be plenty of opportunities even w the mud.  Kherson pressure won't magically end due to mud, I think.  

Another thing this speech provided was a way to shift the narrative.  Right now everyone is seeing massive RU defeats and this speech is a nice distraction from that.

 

[FancyCat]

Turkey has always been a country playing both sides (or even 3 sides), nothing wrong with that, but I think there's a lot to be said for a future visualization of U.S military transport planes flying out of Crimea to Georgia and Armenia than say from Romania across the span of the Black Sea. 

Some food for thought for the Armenia-Azerbaijan situation. I'm not saying Azerbaijan needs to not have internationally recognized borders fully restored, but it would be quite nice if parity between the Armenia and Azerbaijan could be restored in such a manner that violations of the recognized international borders of each country would be more trouble than they are presently for both sides. Crimea would be very important for that I think. 

[sross112]

5 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

 

Just to elaborate some more, a Ukraine restored to the full 1991 borders, is much more economically stronger than 2014. One, the industrial nexuses in the Donbas are completely unlocked, and again, whatever the damage done to it, we have plenty of examples of devastated regions being restored, and of course, the Marshall Plan is the clear argument for it being possible. 

Two, the Black Sea offshore Natural Gas and Oil production is locked off now and for the foreseeable future if Crimea is retained by Russia. Ukraine takes it, and Europe can happily invest and utilize it, the Donbas energy production as well. Furthermore, the loss of Sevastopol as a seaport, and military base will hamstring any future Russian projection of power. 

Plus, let's be clear, a Ukraine in NATO with Crimea, is much more useful to NATO and the West than Ukraine with Crimea still in Russian hands. 

There is tons of incentive for Ukraine to go all the way, but I think the West is actually more than fine with Ukraine going all the way, for all the reasons i laid out, it would be the most substantial victory for Western influence since....i suppose the expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe? Probably greater than that tbh. 

The worry has always been a stalemate, where Europe cannot normalize relations with Russia and Ukraine still a basketcase. Ukraine achieving the full restoration of her 1991 borders would be devastating for opponents of the West and a absolutely clear signal that the West remains on top.

Also, as seen in recent U.S moves towards Armenia, if NATO (minus Turkey) had Crimea, and Ukraine in NATO....well, it would be a lot more easier for U.S projection of power into the Caucasus no? Oh sure, the U.S could use Romania or such but I think Ukraine would be absolutely fine with that arrangement in Crimea i think. 

It probably all depends on how far to the future the western influencers are looking. They will probably be split somewhat along the lines that we have seen so far. Some want to try to "normalize" relations as soon as possible and will push for 2014 borders. Those that are looking at the long game will probably prefer the 1991 borders.

With the US starting to work on Armenia and a couple of the stans on Russia's southern border you can see them looking at the long game. Russia will be a pariah and will be put in a box surrounded by a coalition of willing neighbors to keep them in the box. Those that want "normal" relations will argue that this is bad and will make Russia angry and aggressive, but they fail to see that Russia's choices to already be angry and aggressive have earned them nothing but the box. 

Play stupid games, win stupid prizes.

Personally I think the best thing Europe can do for their future security is to fast track Ukraine into the EU and NATO. Economically it will pay dividends in the future and give access to a lot of cheap energy to replace what they have lost. Security wise it solidifies the eastern border against any kind of future aggression from Russia by people that won't give an inch and won't be bullied. 

The next similar conflict will probably be in Belarus. The longer the sanctions stay in place the less economic and military aid will come from Moscow. This could cause the masses to look more to the west than to the east. If they start making moves to join the west we could see an "intervention" that results in another war like we have today. That could result in a real war between Russia and some western nations. I could see Poland and Ukraine deciding to go to the aid of Belarus and openly fighting Russian invaders there.  

[The_Capt]

57 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

 

Just to elaborate some more, a Ukraine restored to the full 1991 borders, is much more economically stronger than 2014. One, the industrial nexuses in the Donbas are completely unlocked, and again, whatever the damage done to it, we have plenty of examples of devastated regions being restored, and of course, the Marshall Plan is the clear argument for it being possible. 

 

Cost vs gains - cost here is also time and narrative.

I question the western resolve to support a war that drags on for another 3 yrs so that Ukraine can take back stuff it has not held since 2014.  Without western support, particularly ISR, this conflict has a good chance of freezing back to where it was on 22 Feb 22.

Ukrainian economically stronger with Donbas - c'mon, we have covered this.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Ukrainian_subdivisions_by_GRP.  The Donbas constitutes $6.8 billion GRP (2020) our of a national $113.8 billion.  At this point is is cheaper for the west to pay Ukraine to not try and take it back, than whatever they expect to develop in a hostile territory that shares a border with the enemy - that actively supports across that border.

57 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Two, the Black Sea offshore Natural Gas and Oil production is locked off now and for the foreseeable future if Crimea is retained by Russia. Ukraine takes it, and Europe can happily invest and utilize it, the Donbas energy production as well. Furthermore, the loss of Sevastopol as a seaport, and military base will hamstring any future Russian projection of power. 

Plus, let's be clear, a Ukraine in NATO with Crimea, is much more useful to NATO and the West than Ukraine with Crimea still in Russian hands.

Sure, except the for the facts that 1) Crimea is a freakin nightmare to try and take back militarily, 2) see Donbas on local hostility potential and 3) it is the one spot that might trigger a true nuclear escalation...sorry not worth it either.  Declare Sevastopol an open city, whatever, and move on.

57 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

There is tons of incentive for Ukraine to go all the way, but I think the West is actually more than fine with Ukraine going all the way, for all the reasons i laid out, it would be the most substantial victory for Western influence since....i suppose the expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe? Probably greater than that tbh. 

The worry has always been a stalemate, where Europe cannot normalize relations with Russia and Ukraine still a basketcase. Ukraine achieving the full restoration of her 1991 borders would be devastating for opponents of the West and a absolutely clear signal that the West remains on top

The only way it happens easy - and ffs we should not be falling into that trap anymore than Putin did at the start of this thing - is a total Russian collapse.  Not military but national.  If that happens, sure go for it, there is no more Russia to push back.  Short of that, I am pretty sure we already proved our point.

Opponents of the West have already got the message.  [aside: I do not for second want to under value the frankly breathtaking efforts of the UA and Ukrainians but we are talking projected narrative here] We took an underdog nation that by all military metrics we understand should have fallen months ago, and turned it into a terrifying war beast that is crushing a P5 nation on the battlefield. Do you seriously think we really care where lines on the map line up right now?  Do you think China is going to go "well sure, but you did not take Crimea back"...?! 

There is tons of disincentives for Ukraine not to go all the way, given current conditions (see Russian collapse).  There will be a point when the sacrifice equation for the west splits from Ukraine on this trajectory because we 1) already proved our point, 2) want stability, more war for symbolic land gains really is not a sold concept for us, and 3) Russia sucks and we can continue to punish it; however, this war is not existential for the west at this point - it was back in Feb.  So dragging this well out, at this point is likely to start to take the shine off. 

I have said for some time - Russia back in line, regime of gangsters we can deal with, strong rebuilt Ukraine with a westward facing.  None of these are hinging on Donbas or Crimea. 

Last point of narrative - right now Ukraine is on top.  The underdog little guy who really knocked the bully on his ***.  Re-take Kharkiv and Kherson, Melitopol and Mariupol - have a parade: "today is our independence day!"  Oh wait, Ukraine wants another year or two of slugging to retake land it hasn't held since the Obama administration?  Oh and we are going to spend billions more on that instead of re-building Ukrainian schools and businesses?  Oh, look another election cycle. 

I am not an expert on Ukrainian, or Russian political mechanisms, personalities or perspectives as they relate to military affairs.  I am an expert on US/5EYES and NATO, but I do not need to be to know how this will go in the west, without a major strategic shift to reframe these regions as existential to us.  The "oh, no not another Afghanistan/Iraq voices will get louder" and once seats change this could risk the entire reconstruction momentum.  As I wrote, China is shackled to a zombie right now - you can fill in the blanks if the West wakes up one morning and thinks it is shackled to a rabid dog.  

Edited September 21, 2022 by The_Capt

[Huba]

2 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Turkey has always been a country playing both sides (or even 3 sides), nothing wrong with that, but I think there's a lot to be said for a future visualization of U.S military transport planes flying out of Crimea to Georgia and Armenia than say from Romania across the span of the Black Sea. 

Some food for thought for the Armenia-Azerbaijan situation. I'm not saying Azerbaijan needs to not have internationally recognized borders fully restored, but it would be quite nice if parity between the Armenia and Azerbaijan could be restored in such a manner that violations of the recognized international borders of each country would be more trouble than they are presently for both sides. Crimea would be very important for that I think. 

And 

 

7 minutes ago, sross112 said:

It probably all depends on how far to the future the western influencers are looking. They will probably be split somewhat along the lines that we have seen so far. Some want to try to "normalize" relations as soon as possible and will push for 2014 borders. Those that are looking at the long game will probably prefer the 1991 borders.

With the US starting to work on Armenia and a couple of the stans on Russia's southern border you can see them looking at the long game. Russia will be a pariah and will be put in a box surrounded by a coalition of willing neighbors to keep them in the box. Those that want "normal" relations will argue that this is bad and will make Russia angry and aggressive, but they fail to see that Russia's choices to already be angry and aggressive have earned them nothing but the box. 

Play stupid games, win stupid prizes.

Personally I think the best thing Europe can do for their future security is to fast track Ukraine into the EU and NATO. Economically it will pay dividends in the future and give access to a lot of cheap energy to replace what they have lost. Security wise it solidifies the eastern border against any kind of future aggression from Russia by people that won't give an inch and won't be bullied. 

The next similar conflict will probably be in Belarus. The longer the sanctions stay in place the less economic and military aid will come from Moscow. This could cause the masses to look more to the west than to the east. If they start making moves to join the west we could see an "intervention" that results in another war like we have today. That could result in a real war between Russia and some western nations. I could see Poland and Ukraine deciding to go to the aid of Belarus and openly fighting Russian invaders there.  

In general, my impression is that Russia's neighbours have smelled the blood and if things keep going the way they are, we'll see RU collapse and massive change of security arrangements across it's whole (former) sphere of influence. Turkey, China, US/ NATO will gain a lot of influence, perhaps Iran too in the southern 'stans too. 
As for Belarus, if 1917 situation develops, I'm really hoping that it will 'pivot to the east'. It's really hard to predict how exactly that would happen, but some points I think are important:

- there's significant internal opposition to Luka, that was visible during the last rigged elections. He almost lost it to the protesters and is now completely dependent on RU for keeping his power. With collapsing RU, I can see the ground being  ready for a colour revolution
- there are significant Belarussian units fighting russians in Ukraine right now, a few battalions at least. I really see them playing a role in the future
- unless RU is in total chaos, I don't see a direct intervention in Belarus even from UA side, much less so from any NATO member. But if RU collapses, then all bets are off, it's just really hard to predict with any certainty.