How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Aragorn2002]

7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Very good natural feature.  There is also a line of built up areas from Sloviansk to Kostyantynivka behind that feature that could be fortified.  I strongly suspect this entire area id to draw in as much of the Russian forces as possible to open up opportunities elsewhere...but we will have to see if that long anticipated UA operational offensive actually occurs or are they also counting on good old mother-attrition.

My gut feeling tells me it's still too early. If the Russians are really suffering as much as we think/hope it's better to wait for the right window of opportunity.

[Huba]

9 minutes ago, Aragorn2002 said:

My gut feeling tells me it's still too early. If the Russians are really suffering as much as we think/hope it's better to wait for the right window of opportunity.

I think that what will be really telling regarding the state of RU armies is when (if ever) will they resume the push on the new Bakhmut - Siversk defensive line. Girkin suggested that UA will now want to take as many units as possible out of line in Dobnas to let them rest and refit - makes senses with shortened lines. Some of newly created units will probably be send there as replacements. It's better they have the baptism of fire while defending then tasking them to attack straight away.

In the meantime UA will be improving it's artillery substantially in next two moths, and hopefully will acquire powerful AD capabilities. And will integrate hundreds of new APCs, maybe some tanks too. Then will be time for the counteroffensive - maybe at the end of August. In the meantime I'd be watching the Kherson region closely, it looks like something decisive might happen there at any moment.

[Haiduk]

UKR Su-24M under cover of Su-27 fly toward frontline

[Greup]

On 7/2/2022 at 5:14 PM, Huba said:

Ask and you shall receive "Stawka większa niż życie" ( "Stakes higher than life"), starring Stanisław Mikulski as Hans Kloss. 

 

Oh the nostalgia.  Captain Kloss!

[FancyCat]

Thread, long so click it, apparently Russia did attempt to try and stage counter battery on Snake Island, but as we know, failed before the order to evacuate. Apparently Russia released a PR vid of the evacuation, what a small island. 

 

 

 

[Haiduk]

SOF reported resistance forces in Zaporizhzhia oblast in second time blew up railroad bridge in Liubymivka village between Melitopol and Tokmak. Day ago reportedly resistance damaged railways between Yakymivka and Melitopol and Russian armored train was derailed.

About two hours ago Chornobaivka airfield was struck again

Edited July 3, 2022 by Haiduk

[FancyCat]

 

[Haiduk]

@sburke @Kinophile

Lt.colonel Sergey Moskvichyov, 155th separate naval infantry brigade (Vladivostok), Pacific Fleet. Killed 27th of March, likely during the battle for Kyiv.

 

[Bulletpoint]

58 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Thread, long so click it, apparently Russia did attempt to try and stage counter battery on Snake Island, but as we know, failed before the order to evacuate. Apparently Russia released a PR vid of the evacuation, what a small island. 

 

 

 

It looks strange that the rotor is in the exact (?) same angle in each of those three pics. Quite a coincidence.

But why would they photoshop in a helicopter rotor?

[Butschi]

18 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

It looks strange that the rotor is in the exact (?) same angle in each of those three pics. Quite a coincidence.

But why would they photoshop in a helicopter rotor?

I don't think it is exactly the same angle... may be wrong though... If, for instance, the images are taken from a video and the rotor frequency happens to be the same as or close to the fps of the video (or a multiple or something) that could happen.

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

I think that what will be really telling regarding the state of RU armies is when (if ever) will they resume the push on the new Bakhmut - Siversk defensive line. Girkin suggested that UA will now want to take as many units as possible out of line in Dobnas to let them rest and refit - makes senses with shortened lines. Some of newly created units will probably be send there as replacements. It's better they have the baptism of fire while defending then tasking them to attack straight away.

In the meantime UA will be improving it's artillery substantially in next two moths, and hopefully will acquire powerful AD capabilities. And will integrate hundreds of new APCs, maybe some tanks too. Then will be time for the counteroffensive - maybe at the end of August. In the meantime I'd be watching the Kherson region closely, it looks like something decisive might happen there at any moment.

Which raises the question of: why did the RA waste the month of Jun at Severodonetsk?  They were in Popasna at the end of May and instead of putting all this weight on that axis to do exactly what they are doing now, they smashed their face against Severodonetsk - which has zero operational value.

[Beleg85]

Brutal video of death of Ukrainian soldier who tried to cover his wounded collegue. Brave guy - in US, for such action he would probably earn Medal of Honour. In this war there are probably dozens if not hundreds of similar nameless feats.

 

Also, tension remain sky high in Belarusian direction- medics are forbidden to left the country, Belarussian soldiers are keep in the field constantly training already for some time, there is also visibvle movement from ammunition depots. Lukashanka's statement hardened as well in last several days (he said he "made decision long ago'); judging by his rants, both countries are already at serious war. Perhaps Putin pressures him to do something, but it still seems he is doing everything he can not do to anything...

Ukrainian officials (Podolyak lately) constantly send messages to Belarus to **** off, they seem to believe Ru+BL soldiers in the North may at least harass their troops along the border to keep their forces occupied there.

This may still be a game "I know you are bluffing so I will bluff too".

Edited July 3, 2022 by Beleg85

[akd]

39 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

@sburke @Kinophile

Lt.colonel Sergey Moskvichyov, 155th separate naval infantry brigade (Vladivostok), Pacific Fleet. Killed 27th of March, likely during the battle for Kyiv.

 

I had noted him previously as “Lt. Col. Sergei Moskvichev,” but erroneously listed him as probably with the 137th Guards Airborne Regiment based on his burial in Ryazan.

 

[Artkin]

1 hour ago, Bulletpoint said:

It looks strange that the rotor is in the exact (?) same angle in each of those three pics. Quite a coincidence.

But why would they photoshop in a helicopter rotor?

I imagine it's a visual effect from the camera's shutter speed. If you watch helicopter rotors on video they appear to move very slowly. This is due to the limitation of the cameras hardware.

[Machor]

Quote

 

The data, provided by Semantic Visions, a defense analytics company, includes major Russian state media outlets in addition to thousands of smaller Russian websites and blogs. It gives a view of Russia’s attempts to justify its attack on Ukraine and maintain domestic support for the ongoing war by falsely portraying Ukraine as being overrun by far-right extremists.

News stories have falsely claimed that Ukrainian Nazis are using noncombatants as human shields, killing Ukrainian civilians and planning a genocide of Russians.

...

The common Russian understanding of Nazism hinges on the notion of Nazi Germany as the antithesis of the Soviet Union rather than on the persecution of Jews specifically said Jeffrey Veidlinger, a professor of history and Judaic studies at the University of Michigan. “That’s why they can call a state that has a Jewish president a Nazi state and it doesn’t seem all that discordant to them,” he said.

Despite the lack of evidence that Ukraine is dominated by Nazis, the idea has taken off among many Russians. The false claims about Ukraine may have started on state media but smaller news sites have gone on to amplify the messages.

Social media data provided by Zignal Labs shows a spike in references to Nazism in Russian language tweets that matches the uptick in Russian news media. “You see it on Russian chat groups and in comments Russians are making in newspaper articles,” said Dr. Veidlinger. “I think many Russians actually believe this is a war against Nazism.”

He noted that the success of this propaganda campaign has deep roots in Russian history. “The war against Nazism is really the defining moment of the 20th century for Russia,” Dr. Veidlinger said. “What they’re doing now is in a way a continuation of this great moment of national unity from World War II. Putin is trying to rile up the population in favor of the war.”

...

A key feature of Russian propaganda is its repetitiveness, Ms. Richter said. “You just see a constant regurgitation and repackaging of the same stuff over and over again.” In this case, that means repeating unfounded allegations about Nazism. Since the invasion, 10 to 20 percent of articles about Ukraine have mentioned Nazism, according to the Semantic Visions data.

Experts say linking Ukraine with Nazism can prevent cognitive dissonance among Russians when news about the war in places like Bucha seeps through. “It helps them justify these atrocities,” Dr. Doroshenko said. “It helps to create this dichotomy of black and white — Nazis are bad, we are good, so we have the moral right.”

The tactic appears to work. Russians’ access to news sources not tied to the Kremlin has been curtailed since the government silenced most independent media outlets after the invasion. During the war, Russian citizens have echoed claims about Nazism in interviews, and in a poll published in May by the Levada Center, an independent Russian pollster, 74 percent expressed support for the war.

 

 

[akd]

Snizhne deep in DPR is exploding:

Happy Fourth of July!

Edited July 3, 2022 by akd

[FancyCat]

9 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Which raises the question of: why did the RA waste the month of Jun at Severodonetsk?  They were in Popasna at the end of May and instead of putting all this weight on that axis to do exactly what they are doing now, they smashed their face against Severodonetsk - which has zero operational value.

I have several ideas. 

1. The Russian General Staff is stupid.

2. Didn't Russia redeploy units from Izyum when that bogged down to the SD front? Maybe the effort of sending them all the way to Popasna was too much distance for these exterior movements. 

3. Ukraine may not have been putting a PR spin when stating they lured the Russians inside SD. The question is how did they override Russian strategic mindset into a scenario instead of a classic envelopment, Russia tried to push into SD for a good while and then failed. 

https://www.scribblemaps.com/maps/view/2022051301800/nBT8ffpeGH

Def Mon has a map you can bring up his frontlines from present to June 02. Quick glance at wiki shows that the offensive into the city began May 27, Popasna, it was taken May 7th. The city offensive began without enclosing the pocket, or pushing into Lysychans'k from south or north, so clearly something caused the General Staff to order pushes into SD instead of reinforcing Popasna push. 

By June 2nd to 10th, they started pushing the flanks again. with Def Mon showing the collapse at Zolote on June 20th. Most likely, Ukraine probably indicated that morale and units in SD were collapsing, and somehow led Russia to think a quick rush into the city would let them take it, cross into Lysychansk and complete the "liberation of Luhansk Oblast".

But that does not explain why not simply push units into Popasna and encircle the SD defenders and if their morale was low, cause the breakdown of the Ukrainian units that way? I recall Russian propaganda stating several things, one, morale of UKR units in SD was low, Two, UKR civilian government was overriding military command with instructions to reinforce the SD salient. But that still does not explain why not cut off the cities, instead of the frontal pushes? 

4. Perhaps the intent was that Russia had a opportunity due to low UKR morale in the city, that a offensive would give benefits attacking head on, to one, draw in UKR forces to reinforce the pocket since Zelensky the drug fiend, was intent on preserving his power that would diminish had the cities fallen, (instead of drawing forces into the flanks had Russia attacked again from Popasna, Russia would engage and force Ukraine to battle in the city while preparing the envelopment)(maybe they heard all that talk about Ukraine fighting really well in cities and decided to do a Stalingrad, lure Ukraine into the cities) two, potentially cause a collapse in both cities and easy push into the rest of the pocket, three, maybe the Russian General Staff overestimated themselves and underestimated Ukraine? 

One thing to note, part of the reason why it took a month, is Russian ability to redeploy, move units, gather for a push, may be trash at this point. We say why did it take a month for Russia to move on to Popasna, there is a possibility Russia quickly realized they were engaged in stupid battles in SD, but the movement to get units to Popasna takes way longer than we expect. 

Russia may have had their own plans for making Ukraine suffer in the pocket, but quickly ran into the reality their units are being ground into paste, had Russia had better formations, maybe the plan to lure Ukraine into the pocket and then hit and encircle might have gone well, except they dont have the mass and speed they once did, and in reality, Russia was doing their best to encircle, but can no longer perform these actions. 

I think its a mix of both, Ukraine may have acted like the pocket was easy pickings, Russia may have decided to go for a push for the city to draw in Ukraine to a battle on favorable ground, and then conduct a encirclement, but reality hit them that they no longer have the operational capability for that so instead of parading POWs thru SD, Ukraine withdraws in good order.  

 

[Huba]

39 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Which raises the question of: why did the RA waste the month of Jun at Severodonetsk?  They were in Popasna at the end of May and instead of putting all this weight on that axis to do exactly what they are doing now, they smashed their face against Severodonetsk - which has zero operational value.

We can't tell cause there's not enough data. Maybe when Gerasimov publishes his memoirs in a few years...

Joking aside, a few things that come to mind:

1. It was a stage in a broader operation of pushing Ukrainians from the left bank of Seversky Donets. Battle of Rubizhne preceded it directly, and was quite similar - a brutal slog, with artillery systematically leveling the city. After that, Russians were already nicely set up to continue in Severodonetsk, with the logistic support etc in place. At this point it was up to UA to accept the fight or retreat, Russians were ready.

2. The political aspect of it I guess. There are rumors around that AU decision to counterattack and accept the fight were imposed on UA GS by politicians. They executed it quite well you could argue ( but perhaps Zolote and the whole Donets Line wouldn't fall if UA didn't exhaust itself in Severodonetsk...). RU decision to push in frontal attack might've been political too. UA counterattack was a bit humiliating, and at this point whoever was in charge on high level (Putin himself probably) ordered Ukrainians smashed. 

3. Russians (at least the ones making decisions, not necessarily well informed ones..) might've seen the situation as advantageous to them - they already had all artillery in place, and were grinding Ukrainians Verdun style. You could even argue that it was successful, as exhausted Ukrainians didn't manage to hold Zolote later, and it prevented the even worse battle of Lysychansk. Not that this is what really happened, but it can be thus perceived by some people on the RU side.

 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Which raises the question of: why did the RA waste the month of Jun at Severodonetsk?  They were in Popasna at the end of May and instead of putting all this weight on that axis to do exactly what they are doing now, they smashed their face against Severodonetsk - which has zero operational value.

I think FancyCat has some good ideas, but I think it's more simple... Russia needed a quick PR success and they thought Severodonetsk would give it to them.  Let's look at the timeline:

1.  Russia defeated in northern Ukraine

2.  Russia announces "hey, no worries.  We really never intended to take Kyiv.  Instead, it's all about the Donbas"

3.  Russia formally announces it is mounting a big offensive to take back the Donbas.  It rushes the smashed up units from the north into Izyum.

4.  The big offensive doesn't go so well.  Even where Russia makes advances, it does so slowly and with a lot of casualties.  Russia expects Izyum to cut off Slavyansk, it doesn't.  It expects Lyman to fall quickly, it doesn't.  It expects to get into Severodonetsk quickly, it doesn't.  It expects to push through the southern areas of the bulge quickly, it doesn't.  What it instead gets, contrary to its expectations, ia a lot of casualties and very little to show for it.

5.  While all this is going on Russia decides to cross the Siverskyi-Donets to speed up SOMETHING in the Donbas.  It goes spectacularly wrong.  So wrong that even it's hardest core supporters are starting to doubt Russia can win the war.

6.  Soon after there's a breakthrough at Popasna, but it quickly bogs down short of its objective of clipping the main supply route to the eastern part of the bulge.

This is about 1 month of humiliating failures on top of two months of massive humiliation.  Russia needed SOMETHING to show that it was making progress in retaking the Donbas and Severodonetsk was all that was practical for them as both Izyum and Popasna weren't panning out.

My guess is Russia thought that Ukraine would see Izyum and Popasna as imminent threats and would largely withdraw from Severodonetsk.  Instead, Ukraine correctly recognized that Izyum and Popasna were not imminent threats and instead opted to REINFORCE Severodonetsk.

At this point Rusisa had a choice of ceasing to attack and instead regroup for something smarter.  But that would mean openly admitting that Ukraine had, once again, humiliated Russia.  I think Russia was not in the mood to be humiliated again.  Too bad... it happened anyway

In short... Russia needed a high profile win and Severodonetsk was all it had to work with.  So that is what it went for.

Steve

[The_Capt]

16 minutes ago, Huba said:

We can't tell cause there's not enough data. Maybe when Gerasimov publishes his memoirs in a few years...

Joking aside, a few things that come to mind:

1. It was a stage in a broader operation of pushing Ukrainians from the left bank of Seversky Donets. Battle of Rubizhne preceded it directly, and was quite similar - a brutal slog, with artillery systematically leveling the city. After that, Russians were already nicely set up to continue in Severodonetsk, with the logistic support etc in place. At this point it was up to UA to accept the fight or retreat, Russians were ready.

2. The political aspect of it I guess. There are rumors around that AU decision to counterattack and accept the fight were imposed on UA GS by politicians. They executed it quite well you could argue ( but perhaps Zolote and the whole Donets Line wouldn't fall if UA didn't exhaust itself in Severodonetsk...). RU decision to push in frontal attack might've been political too. UA counterattack was a bit humiliating, and at this point whoever was in charge on high level (Putin himself probably) ordered Ukrainians smashed. 

3. Russians (at least the ones making decisions, not necessarily well informed ones..) might've seen the situation as advantageous to them - they already had all artillery in place, and were grinding Ukrainians Verdun style. You could even argue that it was successful, as exhausted Ukrainians didn't manage to hold Zolote later, and it prevented the even worse battle of Lysychansk. Not that this is what really happened, but it can be thus perceived by some people on the RU side.

 

Political interference makes sense, as political value rarely aligned with operational.  I also like the “already here and stuck” idea.

Either way RA wasted a month they really cannot afford, not to mention the resources they cannot get back to get a ruined city on the other side of a river…one they could have encircled pretty much like they have to now.  Unless they pulled UA into Severodonetsk to weaken the line on that southern front near Popansa?

Regardless, they have a tall order in front of them now.  Unless the UA is in much worse shape than we thought, summer will be over before they can really threaten Sloviansk.   

[Calamine Waffles]

3 hours ago, FancyCat said:

Thread, long so click it, apparently Russia did attempt to try and stage counter battery on Snake Island, but as we know, failed before the order to evacuate. Apparently Russia released a PR vid of the evacuation, what a small island. 

 

Tornado-G's max range is about 40 km. The author is confusing it with Tornado-S, which is based on Smerch. Tornado-G is based on Grad.

[Huba]

25 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Political interference makes sense, as political value rarely aligned with operational.  I also like the “already here and stuck” idea.

Either way RA wasted a month they really cannot afford, not to mention the resources they cannot get back to get a ruined city on the other side of a river…one they could have encircled pretty much like they have to now.  Unless they pulled UA into Severodonetsk to weaken the line on that southern front near Popansa?

Regardless, they have a tall order in front of them now.  Unless the UA is in much worse shape than we thought, summer will be over before they can really threaten Sloviansk.   

I wonder how much of an impact will new UA ability to interdict RU LOCs have on the next stage of fight in Donbas. Russians will adapt, but if they will withdraw their main storage areas (and railheads!) outside the endangered zone, the toll on the logistical system will be horrendous, comparable perhaps to the situation from first weeks of the campaign. And everything suggests that UA ability to interdict will substantially grow in next month or two. Of course believing in Wunderwaffes is a folly, but I think the new long range precision fires will be the key to the next stage of what's going on.

Now I'm not a betting man, but if I was to make a wager, I'd say RU will never be able to directly threaten Slovyansk or Kramatorsk from the east. Conditions for winning a materiel battle the way they did in Severodonetsk will not be there during battle at next UA line of defence.

11 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

Tornado-G's max range is about 40 km. The author is confusing it with Tornado-S, which is based on Smerch. Tornado-G is based on Grad.

And Tornado-U on Uragan. Kudos for pointing that out, everybody seems to be mistaking the three Tornados, even very serious analysts or military journalists.

Edited July 3, 2022 by Huba

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Political interference makes sense, as political value rarely aligned with operational.  I also like the “already here and stuck” idea.

Either way RA wasted a month they really cannot afford, not to mention the resources they cannot get back to get a ruined city on the other side of a river…one they could have encircled pretty much like they have to now.  Unless they pulled UA into Severodonetsk to weaken the line on that southern front near Popansa?

Regardless, they have a tall order in front of them now.  Unless the UA is in much worse shape than we thought, summer will be over before they can really threaten Sloviansk.   

Speaking of the end of summer, who do we think the fall mud season helps/hurts more?

[FancyCat]

Kherson has been showing heavy fire. Wonder if it's another localized push or a actual offensive. If I were Zelensky (you know, I dunno what Zelensky decides, does he do a lot of input or control over the military?), I would want Kherson before the fall mud. Give Russia and the separatists something to ponder as they wait for the next offensive.

 

Edited July 4, 2022 by FancyCat

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, Huba said:

I wonder how much of an impact will new UA ability to interdict RU LOCs have on the next stage of fight in Donbas. Russians will adapt, but if they will withdraw their main storage areas (and railheads!) outside the endangered zone, the toll on the logistical system will be horrendous, comparable perhaps to the situation from first weeks of the campaign. And everything suggests that UA ability to interdict will substantially grow in next month or two. Of course believing in Wunderwaffes is a folly, but I think the new long range precision fires will be the key to the next stage of what's going on.

Now I'm not a betting man, but if I was to make a wager, I'd say RU will never be able to directly threaten Slovyansk or Kramatorsk from the east. Conditions for winning a materiel battle the way they did in Severodonetsk will not be there during battle at next UA line of defence.

And Tornado-U on Uragan. Kudos for pointing that out, everybody seems to be mistaking the three Tornados, even very serious analysts or military journalists.

Interesting thing about game changers is that they tend to be the last piece of a puzzle as opposed to wonder-weapons on their own.  HIMARs  may fit this not solely because of the qualities of the system but because they are the last piece - delivery.  I suspect the UA can already find and fix high value targets in depth , supported by western ISR and their own.  They are only missing an ability to hit them - air power picture we discussed earlier.  Two systems can take the boom the last 1000m, very long range indirect fires (e.g. HIMARs) and self-loitering munitions.  HIMARs are only as good as that C4ISR system that generates targeting, but we know the UA system is pretty damned good.

Edited July 4, 2022 by The_Capt