How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Yes, but it cost the stayback UA forces very heavily as well. I believe that's the stalwart 79th AB.  4 out of 60 left, basically destroyed.

I didn't see "4 out of 60 left" anywhere.  Unfortunately, there's no way to know what that exchange is all about.  4 men left out of his Squad of 9 men?  4 ORIGINAL men left out of some larger count?  If the guy is referring to a Platoon, the same thing applies though obviously a worse scale.  Etc.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

I have no idea though why so many journos (or their local contacts) seem convinced the Russians are about to cross the river opposite Lyman and advance on Sloviansk. They can rain shells on it, sure.

Even ISW keeps mentioning Russia's intentions to attack from that direction, though they have clearly separated intent from ability enough in their reports that I don't think they have it wrong.   But to casual readers who aren't following the war with trained eye, I can easily see the Scary Red Arrows extending from Lyman to Slovyansk.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

The river bank is mined, so there can be no fishing for supper - something everyone here used to enjoy. 

I say again, I predict mines are going to loom VERY large in the next phase of this war.  Mines could become as dominant in shaping and limiting the tactical options for both sides as ATGW were in Feb - Mar.

Mines are certainly figuring into this war in a way that I had not anticipated.  Russia has always prioritized this sort of thing in their doctrine, so not really surprised they have the capability to deploy vast numbers of mines quickly.  What's surprised me is that they've been able to do so much mining amidst their various problems.  Including logistics.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

8 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I didn't see "4 out of 60 left" anywhere.  Unfortunately, there's no way to know what that exchange is all about.  4 men left out of his Squad of 9 men?  4 ORIGINAL men left out of some larger count?  If the guy is referring to a Platoon, the same thing applies though obviously a worse scale.  Etc.

Other guy's first language isn't English. I am pretty sure he means his company (already understrength), but I could be wrong. And that isn't beyond believable given the forest fighting. Not all killed, presumably.

Edited June 3, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[G.I. Joe]

3 hours ago, Kinophile said:

@Machor interesting articles, and echoed by others, ref the Western narrative of purely Russian incompetence. Yet the Ivan is still there and fighting. 

Ref "how could the elite Wehrmacht lose to the Russians if they were so elite", well, um, two(plus)-front war with equiv+ peers? Im fairly sure a Germant with no western/southern combat commitments or distractions could at the very least have fought the RA to a stalemate. This isn't a WW2 thread so I want to be clear my point is that this, to me, was such a significant and well known reason (among others) for the Nazi defeat that to not acknowledge or include it undercuts some primary points in his reasoning. Im curious why it wasn't even mentioned.

But overall a good discussion, thank you for it.

Definitely agree the two front war was a big factor. I'm currently reading Phillips Payson O'Brien's book How The War Was Won, which looks at World War II (especially the Anglo-American air and naval campaigns) from the perspective of equipment losses before, during and after production and deployment, as well as strategic mobility. It makes a very interesting counterpoint to the argument that "the Red Army really won the war." He also has some interesting points about the importance of Lend-Lease (e.g. Soviet aluminum production was heavily dependent on access to U.S. bauxite).

Bringing that back to the current conflict, a parallel can be made with the impact of sanctions on the Russian side vs. foreign aid to Ukraine.

---

Minor correction to my earlier reply to @Gpig: Strike Fighters 2 does have some Canadian content (other than being able to put Canadian marking on planes we never flew, which is possible) without third party mods: a merged install with SF2 Europe (CMCW style World War III scenario) and the expansion pack for SF2 Israel, which adds the F-51D, allows you to fly a Canadian Mustang in a late 40's to mid 50's scenario.

*Ahem* back on topic...

Edited June 3, 2022 by G.I. Joe

[LongLeftFlank]

36 minutes ago, Sequoia said:

Uh, empathizing with people and being told to not think like a criminal strike me as two different things, but you do you.

That's a touch uncivil, mate; it was pretty clear what he meant. I believe our comrade's first language isn't English either.

[akd]

Radio Svoboda crosses the last bridge into Sverodonetsk and links up with a Foreign Legion unit preparing for a mission:

 

[Sequoia]

7 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

That's a touch uncivil, mate; it was pretty clear what he meant. I believe our comrade's first language isn't English either.

If that's the case, I apologize.  I assumed by his location in Ontario it was.

[danfrodo]

Once again, excellent series of posts, thanks all.

My big question for today is what is Ukraine doing in Sverodonetsk?  Some smart folks are scratching their heads because this salient has no strategic value.  Others say maybe it's a morale thing -- that one I highly doubt given that UKR routinely retreats when it wants to. 

I'm thinking UKR is fighting there to tie down & deplete RU forces.  If they can do this at 'acceptable' cost it's a win.  But why tie down RU forces there?  Is it because UKR has something planned nearby?  Maybe around Izyum?  Maybe Popasne?  Maybe trying to cut off & trap those salients?  I don't know but there's got to be a good reason for the generally quite reasonable UKR command to be spending lives to hold this otherwise low value area.

What y'all think?

[LongLeftFlank]

17 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Once again, excellent series of posts, thanks all.

My big question for today is what is Ukraine doing in Sverodonetsk?  Some smart folks are scratching their heads because this salient has no strategic value.  Others say maybe it's a morale thing -- that one I highly doubt given that UKR routinely retreats when it wants to. 

I'm thinking UKR is fighting there to tie down & deplete RU forces.  If they can do this at 'acceptable' cost it's a win.  But why tie down RU forces there?  Is it because UKR has something planned nearby?  Maybe around Izyum?  Maybe Popasne?  Maybe trying to cut off & trap those salients?  I don't know but there's got to be a good reason for the generally quite reasonable UKR command to be spending lives to hold this otherwise low value area.

What y'all think?

Ref. that video AKD just posted. Look at the industrial zone they're forcing Ivan to attack through.

IMHO, it really gets back to what our host (Steve) said back on, like, page 9 of this thread: that all Ukraine has to do to win is to keep killing Russians (without bleeding itself out first).

Grim, but correct.

And as we've discussed, it isn't clear the UA is doing any better yet with combined arms tank attacks than the Russians did, so letting them burn themselves out attacking is the next best thing.

Edited June 3, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[sburke]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

[aside: I did have graphics but the "eeewww PowerPoint crowd" might get ruffled again]. 

Watch your mouth!  Funny enough I just saw this yesterday

NBC Investigation: McKinsey & Company worked with U.S. and Russian defense players (yahoo.com)

@LongLeftFlankthat one is for you.  

Regarding the rest, particularly the tail end regarding Ukraine army.  I'm on the fence about whether the ending of this war will be an utter collapse of the Russian defense or simply a change in power where some new Russian leadership recognizes they need to halt the war to survive.  I'll leave the "what does this mean for warfare" discussion to folks like yourself who actually understand how the process of running a war fighting force works.  However, I would advise against applying too much of this conflict to "this is how wars will be fought now" for a few reasons.

1.  Technology development is moving faster every day.  In a few years there will be capabilities we can only guess at now.  (for example . Suppose Elon Musk develops a cheap easily producible jet pack that allows a soldier to move 100 km in an hour along with a slaved unit carrying supplies - allowing troops movements to occur with a rapidity unlike anything we have today, at low level and with little visible indication and no need for roads.)

2.  For the aggressor in this case, they are not facing a war impact.  Sanctions yes but the war has not been carried on in a significant way to Russian society.  If anything, it is frighteningly similar to the American experience where we always wage wars on someone else's turf and don't feel the effects at home other than the losses our soldiers face.  Ukraine is fighting this war in one sense with one hand tied behind their back.  i.e. fighting completely defensively including promising not to use new weapons to strike targets in Russia.  Cyber warfare has in addition been minimal. There are whole spectrums of capabilities that have not been applied to this conflict.

3. Russia has made the inexcusable mistake of not understanding they would have to subjugate the Ukrainian people.  War in the modern era is no longer simply a fight against armies. (yeah I could go back further for examples like the Peninsula war, but modern mass communications is more the point) You have to have a plan to win the peace, or you might as well keep your troops home.  This is a lesson the US still  hasn't fully learned despite the brutal cost to our troops in at least 3 conflicts in my lifetime that should have gotten through the thick skulls of our political leadership.

Edited June 3, 2022 by sburke

[Harmon Rabb]

Doubt this footage is making it to Russian TV.

Edited June 3, 2022 by Harmon Rabb

[A Canadian Cat]

1 hour ago, c3k said:

Bolded. The rust appears almost instantly after a high-temp vehicle fire. Rust is, after all, just oxidized metal. The fires will burn off all the paint and other protections, leaving the bare metal exposed and also more reactive (due to high temp) to the atmosphere...that is 20% oxygen.

Plus the paint burns off pretty quickly.

[Battlefront.com]

A great read from The_Capt for us "deep thinking" types

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

A good start point.  I also have been mulling over a lot of these issues; however, I come to different conclusions.  My primary induction is that we are looking at this too narrowly; quality vs quantity is a one dimensional set of competitive metrics and we are clearly moving past it in this war.  To start these are somewhat vague as what do we mean by "quality"?  Is that training and equipment?  The amount of money invested prior to war?  Quantity, is that mass on the battlefield or broader strategic capacity?  Is it both?  These definitions muddle more than they really explain.

I have always been bothered by these vague definitions.  Classic example... Sherman, Panther, and T-34/85... try pigeonholing those into "quality".  If "quality" is defined by theoretical technical features, I'd rank them as Panther, Sherman, and T34.  If "quality" is defined by what is most capable of showing up to a battle in full working order, then it goes Sherman, T-34 (a close second), and then Panther.  If "quality" is defined by how easily functionality is maintained in the field, I'd go T-34, Sherman, and Panther. 

Depending on how you define the term matters.  But notice that in my quick analysis above, the Panther comes dead last in all but one situation.

It gets even more tricky when one talks about something being well balanced between "quality" and "quantity".  It's probably the Sherman on top with the T-34 close behind and the Panther once again dead last.

Now, if we add "sexy" to the mix, the Panther finally gets ranked first again

This whole concept of "quality", as defined by NATO, should be getting a huge rethink because of this war.  We here hurtle a lot of unflattering comments at the Soviet era weaponry that's on the battlefield going BOOM rather easily, but how well would a US HBCT do against a bunch of dug in, highly motivated, home turf defending infantry armed with Javelin and NLAW type weapons and ample drones?  We don't know, but CM Black Sea players probably suspect, as do I, that there'd be a lot of knocked out Abrams and Bradleys that would be just as combat effective as the scattered T-72s and BMPs.

And not to open a can of worms... but when it comes to personnel, "quality" has a lot to do with Morale and Motivation (two separate, but usually related concepts).  The Russian force is largely poor morale and poor motivation, while Ukraine tends to have high morale and always high motivation.  Take the best trained and equipped soldier and lower those two variables, then put him against a barely trained highly motivated fighter with high morale and a slingshot and see how things turn out.  There's a chance, against all odds, that the fighter will win a tactical engagement.  Not enough soldiers and plenty of fighters means a lot of chances for the higher "quality" force to lose, which in turn means a greater chance that the poor quality force ultimately wins.

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Smartness could just as easily be described as intelligence in the broader sense but the term is already in use.  By this I define smartness as: the ability of a force to competitively create usable knowledge in the prosecution of war.

Good way of thinking about the concept of "smartness".  One of the very few things that's been made clear by this war is that Russia has been lacking in the "smarts" department at all levels.  What we've seen, more than anything, is that Russia's military from top to bottom is not designed to either encourage or leverage "smartness". 

The prewar planning will be a case study for decades in this regard, that's for sure, but once the war started it seems that Russia was either unable to "competitively create knowledge" or was unable and/or unwilling to use it.  Related knock on effects trickle down all the way to the lowest levels and then back up again.

Ukraine, on the other hand, seems to have set itself up for success.  Better tactical leadership and greater degrees of flexibility certainly have paid off big time.  The leveraging of "knowledge" to crush offensive actions through disruption of LOCs was likely decisive in the north.  The coordination of widely distributed artillery assets is one of the things I think NATO is going to look at the hardest and longest.  Etc.

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So in the opening phase of this war we have seen a very smart Ukrainian force meet what I call a "dim" mass-based Russian one, and it appears the meeting was decisive in the opening phase of this war.

...

 So now we can have high quality - smart - distributed/lower capacity mass meeting low quality - dim - concentrated/higher capacity mass, and we all saw what happened. 

...

Western militaries will wring their hands over this one for at least a decade because we tend to put out high quality - smart - concentrated/low capacity mass 

Yup, yup, and yup.

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

and no matter what the military visionaries, revisionist or conservatives may say, we have no idea what happens when these types of forces all meet - Steve, has nearly shouted himself raw pointing out how wrong the pre-war modeling was, and still can be.  Particularly when we have seen what low quality - smart - distributed/high capacity (nearing endless) mass can do to our forces over time, in insurgencies over the last 20 years .

Not exactly "shouted himself raw", but my carpel tunnel has certainly not been helped by all the typing

Before this war started, LONG before in fact, I could see where the variables would play havoc with conventional thinking the most.  While I did not underestimate how badly this war would go for Russia, I did underestimate how long it would take to affect meaningful results favorable to Ukraine.  I thought Ukraine would lose the initial conventional fight in fairly short order, but I revised that within the first few days of the war.  Mostly due to Russia doing exactly what Ukraine expected, only executed with vastly less skill than even I thought likely.  That is really saying something!

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

This brings me to my last point, which no one really seems to be talking much about either: speed of victory/loss matters. 

Absolutely.  Which is why I just had a good laugh when some Russian ding-dong just said that the whole Crimean land bridge thing was settled "forever".  Anybody that uses the term "forever" generally is a knob, but to use it in the context of an ongoing war that is being lost by their own metrics, is hilariously bad form.

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Back to my main point, western militaries are built for either a quick victory or long loss.  We do not know what to do with a quick loss or long victory.  Further, the public that send us are not wired for the latter either.  Problem is that these could be the wars offered to us and this is a major strategic blind spot.  I think this was one of the authors main points, that is particularly insightful as it relates directly to what sorts of forces we have been building.

Yes, and I don't see much in the West to encourage me thinking there's a plan on how to fix this "blind spot", despite it being so obviously needed.  If one looks at all the armed conflicts the US military has been involved in since WW2, there's more than just Afghanistan and Vietnam that required a "long victory" strategy.  Somalia, Libya, Syria, and others come to mind quite easily.

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

And finally, as if all that was not enough, I am still on the fence as to what is happening between defence and offence.  Is this conditions based or are we looking at something more fundamental?

Personally, I think it's very clear that properly spelled offensive and defense (heh) is now blurred to the point of being indistinguishable.  There might still be a phase of general offensive activity to get things started, but after that I think it's more squishy terminology wise than it has been. 

For one, I think drawing a distinction between "attack" and "counter attack" is largely meaningless.  Traditionally an attack was taking an offensive force into new territory or otherwise proactive action (like an airstrike campaign, for example) to achieve something that hadn't already been achieved.  A counter attack traditionally is about reacting to the activity of the enemy and regaining something that is lost or precluding the enemy's ability to take something new.

In this war both sides appear to be relegated to fighting small to mid sized engagements only.  There are no big sweeping moves going on because, it seems, neither is capable of doing them.  So what is the difference between a Russian BTG pushing towards Ukrainian defended Village X and a Ukrainian force pushing towards Russian defended Village Y?  Especially because both consider the territory being fought over as theirs to start with.  In fact, both mindsets speak of "liberating" the territory they take.  In some ways this war has many characteristics of a civil war despite the fact that it is decidedly a typical war of aggression.

Anyhoo... interesting stuff to contemplate

Steve

[The_Capt]

3 minutes ago, sburke said:

However, I would advise against applying too much of this conflict to "this is how wars will be fought now" for a few reasons.

1.  Technology development is moving faster every day.  In a few years there will be capabilities we can only guess at now.

Actually the trends we have been seeing in this war have been building for some time.  We have a pretty good idea what things will look like in 5-10 because we are buying it right now - that is how long procurement takes.  Everything in this war we have seen elsewhere - how it has been combined and upscaled is new and so are the results.

5 minutes ago, sburke said:

For the aggressor in this case, they are not facing a war impact.

I don't agree with this one.  Beyond sanctions, Russia can not take the losses it has, which are now the highest in any conflict since WW2, and not feel it.  Russian may not be attacked directly (except all those spontaneous fires awhile back) but I don't think for a second that this has been a clean war for Russia.

7 minutes ago, sburke said:

Ukraine is fighting this war in one sense with one hand tied behind their back.  i.e. fighting completely defensively including promising not to use new weapons to strike targets in Russia.

Everyone keeps raising this one.  I think it is a red herring.  Once the shock of strikes on the Russian homeland wear off (and they have already happened) exactly what is Ukraine going to be able to do with this?  They are never going to get enough weapons to conduct a sustained strategic campaign inside Russia, even if political will was there - hell Russia couldn't pull that off against Ukraine.  Hitting SLOCs, sure, but Russian industry or broader targets are well outside the scope of what Ukraine could do effectively with conventional weapons.  Here is where cyber should be happening (and might be); however, that is a dimension of this battlefield we do not have visibility on.  Ukraine's best chance to break Russia is in the field in Ukraine.  Here it needs to demonstrate operational offensive success, which has been limited and non-decisive (at least positively) up to this point.  Not saying the can't or won't but we have not seen it yet.  They need to crack that one before they get into a missile lobbing contest.

 

[womble]

10 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

both consider the territory being fought over as theirs to start with.  In fact, both mindsets speak of "liberating" the territory they take

I think there's a difference between what the "REMFs" say on either side and what the gropos doing the pounding think. I would be surprised if the RUS grunts had quite the attachment to the land they're disputing that the UKR crunchies do. Just because the propaganda says it's so, doesn't mean the guys at the pointy end completely buy it.

[kraze]

21 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

 Especially because both consider the territory being fought over as theirs to start with.  In fact, both mindsets speak of "liberating" the territory they take.

Yeah and Democratic People's Republic of Korea is called so because it's democratic and has people running things.

Just like German Democratic Republic was democratic and a totally independent republic.

And let me tell you about the Japanese civil war of 1931. Or civil war in Finland in 1940.

Warsaw too is often mentioned as being in need of liberation as an inherent part of Russia by its indigenous buryat and kalmyk population.

Edited June 3, 2022 by kraze

[sburke]

5 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Actually the trends we have been seeing in this war have been building for some time.  We have a pretty good idea what things will look like in 5-10 because we are buying it right now - that is how long procurement takes.  Everything in this war we have seen elsewhere - how it has been combined and upscaled is new and so are the results.

I don't agree with this one.  Beyond sanctions, Russia can not take the losses it has, which are now the highest in any conflict since WW2, and not feel it.  Russian may not be attacked directly (except all those spontaneous fires awhile back) but I don't think for a second that this has been a clean war for Russia.

Everyone keeps raising this one.  I think it is a red herring.  Once the shock of strikes on the Russian homeland wear off (and they have already happened) exactly what is Ukraine going to be able to do with this?  They are never going to get enough weapons to conduct a sustained strategic campaign inside Russia, even if political will was there - hell Russia couldn't pull that off against Ukraine.  Hitting SLOCs, sure, but Russian industry or broader targets are well outside the scope of what Ukraine could do effectively with conventional weapons.  Here is where cyber should be happening (and might be); however, that is a dimension of this battlefield we do not have visibility on.  Ukraine's best chance to break Russia is in the field in Ukraine.  Here it needs to demonstrate operational offensive success, which has been limited and non-decisive (at least positively) up to this point.  Not saying the can't or won't but we have not seen it yet.  They need to crack that one before they get into a missile lobbing contest.

 

Heh will try to respond by paragraph

1. The procurement cycle isn't in my mind going to keep up with the pace of change.  As much respect as I have for DARPA, and it is a lot, I think your reply doesn't reflect the nature of what is happening right now.  Machine learning and AI is accelerating the rate of change. a 5 to 10 year development cycle won't keep pace.  That last sentence there is where the divergence will happen.  Having something isn't the same as running into someone who figures out a different way to use it.

2. I wasn't suggesting Russia wasn't feeling it, but rather the extent. Putin has slowed to a degree the knowledge of how bad loses have been and the state media similar to early Vietnam reporting in the US keeps up the myth that all is going according to plan.  Your average Russian particularly in Moscow and St Peterburg which aren't getting the same casualty rates as say Dagestan is mostly upset because McDonalds closed.  By war impact I mean the level of destruction Ukraine is facing.  

3.  The last point wasn't specifically intended about this conflict but rather a general observation about the cost of war.  I'm not proposing Ukraine make any effort to take the war to Russia, it is counterproductive and a waste of resources assuming they even had the military logistics to do so.  The point was more that most of the examples we have in the past 50 years of war are almost always very one sided.  We've had nothing like ww2 where both sides suffered heavily in loss of life both civilian and military as well as massive infrastructure destruction.  It isn't a full spectrum war that takes into account the full capabilities of either NATO or Russia.  The US did send out some info about potential for malicious code in many places including power plants etc.  This is a dimension of war that hasn't been fully explored or exploited here though there are indications US cyber command cooperated with the Ukrainians to shore up Ukrainian cyber defenses.  Having been in the telecom industry most of my life this is an area that has been discussed often regarding backdoor access in Chinese based technology particularly in relationship to companies like Huawei.

[Vet 0369]

On 5/31/2022 at 1:48 AM, sburke said:

Regarding the UK report on Russia casualties, this is our current list. 

Russia has suffered 'devastating losses' of junior officers, harming its ability to fight, claims UK intel (msn.com)

I found a list from March 20 that included lower-level officers and added

 

MG Andrey Kolesnikov, Russia’s 29th Combined Arms Army commander
Andrei Sukhovetsky, Deputy Commander of the 41st Combined Arms Army
Major General Vitaly Gerasimov, First Deputy Commander Of The 41st Army
Major-general Oleg Mitiayev, commander of 150th motor-rifle division
General-Lieutenant Andrey Mordvichev commander 8th CAA 
Major-General Tushaev (Chechen)
LTG Yakov Rezantsev, Russia’s 49th CAA commander, in Chornobaivka near Kherson.
MG Vladimir Frolov, deputy commander of 8th Guard CAA, Southern military district
Major General Simonov Deputy chief of Electronic Warfare Troops of Armed Forces of Russian Federation

 

Guards Colonel Konstantin Zizevsky commander of the 247th Guards Air Assault Regiment 
Colonel Viktor Ivanovich Isaikin (killed Mar 2)
Colonel Konstantin Ogiy, Head of Kemerovo SOBR unit, Rosgvardiya (killed Feb 28)
Colonel Sergey Karasev, Commander, 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade (Ulyanovsk) (Killed Mar 11)
Colonel Andrei Zakharov, Battalion-tactical group Commander, 6th Tank Regiment (Chebarkul) , 90th Tank division (killed Mar 10) (given Order of Courage in 2016)
Colonel Sergey Sukharev, commander of 331st Guards Airborne Regiment (of the 98th VDV Division)
Colonel? Denis Shishov, the commander of the 11th Air Assault Brigade
Colonel Yuryi Agarkov, the commander of 33rd motor-rifle regiment (Kamyshyn, Volgograd oblast) of 20th Guard motor-rifle division
Colonel Alexander Vladimirovich Zakharov, 6th tank regiment commander
Colonel Igor Nikolaev Commander of 252nd Motor Rifle Regiment, the 3rd Motor Rifle Division.
Colonel Alexei Sharov, commander of the 810th Marine Brigade
Colonel Sergey Savvateeyev, Deputy commander of Rosgvardia SOBR
Col. Denis Kurilo commander of the 200th infantry brigade (detachment #08275, Pechenga city)
Colonel Alexander Bespalov, commander of 59th Tank Regiment, 144th Motor Rifle Division Lublin twice Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov and Kutuzov Regiment
Colonel Ivan Grishin, the commander of Russia's 49th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (1st Tank Army)
Colonel Mikhail Nagamov, commander of 6th engineer-sapper regiment of 1st Guard tank army of Western military district.
Colonel Sergei Porokhnya commander of the 12th separate guards engineering brigade
Col. Denis Kozlov 12th Guards Engineering Brigade’s (Central Military District) commander This is the second loss of a commander for the Brigade
Colonel Nikolay Ovcharenko  commander of the 45th Engineer-Sapper Regiment a part of the 1st Guards Tank Army
Col. Eduard Pelishenko Acting commander of DNR 1st Army Corps  seriously wounded
Colonel Vladimir Ivanov, unit unknown
Col. Evgeny Gerasimenko,Rosgvardiya spetsnaz. He served in 12th sep.special force detachment "Ural" (Nizhniy Tagil). But he got lost early of 8th of April.
Col. Alexei Smirnov, Chief of Communications for 98th Guards Airborne Division
Col. Vladimir Ivanov was a press officer for the MoD.

Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Agarkov, Commander, 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment. (killed Mar
Lieutenant Colonel Okruzhnov Alexander Nikolaevich, Head of Artillery, 104th VDV Regiment, 76th Airborne Division (killed Mar 7)
Lieutenant Colonel Renat Ravilovich Gaisin
Lieutenant Colonel Denis Glebov, Deputy Commander of the 11th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade (killed Mar 5, given Order of Courage)
Lieutenant Colonel Vitaly Slabtsov The Deputy Commander of the VDV's 83rd Air Assault Brigade
Lieutenant Colonel Dmitry Sofronov, Commander of the 61st Separate Marine Brigade of the Russian Armed Forces, (killed Mar 5)
Lt Colonel Mikhail Orchikov was deputy commander of a motor-rifle brigade 19th motor-rifle division
Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Savvateev, Deputy Commander, SOBR unit (Vladimir), Rosgvardiya
Lt.colonel Ilya Piatkin, 38 years  SOBR
Lt.colonel Roman Ryabov, 50 years  SOBR
Lt.colonel (likely) Mikhail Rodionov, 46 years   SOBR
lt.colonel, Ruslan Gashiyatullin, but only motor-rifle battalion commander. Odd.
According to Russian media, he lived in Dagestan, so probably he is from 136th Guard motor-rifle brigade of 58th CAA.
lt.colonel Igor Zharov a VDV officer and RVVDKU graduate, was killed in Ukraine. He was the chief of staff for a regiment
lt.colonel Alexandr Okruzhnov, artillery chief of 104th Guard air-assault regiment of 76th Guard air-assault divosion
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Kornik, head of the HQ for 40th Engineer-Sapper Regiment (but I can’t find a reference to this unit, so I wonder if it was actually 45th Engineer-Sapper Regiment
Lt.colonel Dmitriy Dormidontov, MLRS battalion commander 20 of March Ukrainian mortar shell directly hit Russian blindage. Three officers were killed
    - battalion commander (probably motor-rifle, so mayor or lt.colonel too)
    - forward air-controller (usually lt. or captain)
Lieutenant Colonel Georgy Petrunin, the military commandant of Samara
Lt.colonel Dinar Khametov, MLRS battalion commander of 200th motor-rifle brigade of 14th Army Corps of Joint Strategical Command "Northern Fleet".
Lt.colonel Dibir Dibirov, 291st motor-rifle regiment of 42nd MRD, 58th CAA
Lt.colonel Viacheslav Savinov, deputy chief of the staff, chief of artillery recon of 49th CAA 
Lt.colonel Miras Bashakov, commander of 133th separate guard tank battalion of 138th separate guard motor-rifle brigade
Lt.colonel Denis Mezuyev, commander of 1st Guard motor-rifle regiment of 2nd Guard "Tamanskaya" MRD.
Lt. Col. Aleksey Kryukov, possibly FSB Special Purpose Center Alfa group FSB 
Lt.colonel Eduard Dmitriev, senior officer of combat training department of 2nd guard CAA, Central military district, killed 24th of April.
Lt.Colonel Grigoriy Tarasenko.
Interesting person. He already participated in the war on Donbas during 2016-2019 probably as a shadow comamnder and even was wounded in 2019. Then participated in Syria operation. 
Lt.colonel Alexandr Blinov, senior officer of combat training of 150th motor-rifle division, Novoherkassk, Rostov oblast, 8th CAA
Lt. Col. Albert Karimov, GRU Spetsnaz
Captain 2nd Rank (Lt. Col. equivalent) Alexander Bobrov, commander 170th Minesweeper Division, 184th Water Area Protection Brigade (Novorossiysk).
"Lt.colonel" (LPR-promoted) Roman Medvedev, artillery chief of 4th motor-rifle brigade of LPR.
Lt.colonel Dmitriy Golosenko, 1st GTR of 2nd GMRD - MIA
Lt. Col. Denis Sukhanov, artillery officer for unknown unit
Lt. Col. Valentin Kuzmin, HQ staff of 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division
Lt. Col. Sergey Nikitin, 74th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade
Lt. Col. Alexander Dosyagaev, commander 2nd Airborne Battalion, 104th Guards Airborne Regiment, 76th Guards Air-Assault Division

Lieutenant Colonel Fezul Bichikaev from Vladikavkaz was the deputy commander of a regiment in Yekaterinburg, possibly the 288th MRR

Major Ruslan Leonov, Spetsnaz company commander (killed Mar 10)
Major Alexei Ilnitsky, deputy battalion commander, VDV 11th Air Assault Brigade (Ulan-Ude) (killed, given Order of Courage)  
Guards Major Andrei Petrovich Burlakov, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Secret Service, Chief of Intelligence of Regiment, Rosgvardia (killed Mar 10)
Major Bezborodov Dmitry Valeryevich, Rosgvardiya battalion commander (killed)
Major Vorsyuchenko Alexey Vasilyevich, VDV Unit #81430 HQ, 76th Airborne SAM Regiment (killed)
Major Dmity Bezborodov Bezzhizninski, Operational Battalion Commander, Rosgvardia (killed)
Major Sergey Vladimirovich Kashansky, GRU/GU 24th SpetsNaz Brigade? (killed)
Major Dmitry Bukatin, 336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltiysk, Kaliningrad) (killed)
Major Patskalev Oleg Mikhailovich, Deputy Commander, 2nd Battalion, 331st VDV Guards Airborne Regiment (Kostroma), 98th Guards Airborne Division (killed)
Major Alexander Viktorovich Shchetkin, Deputy Commander for Military-Political Work, 1st Guards Motor Rifle Regiment (Sevastopol), 2nd Guards Tamanians Motor Rifle Division (killed)
Major Ratmir Kudayev (Police) (killed, given Order of Courage)
Major Sergei Krylov, Deputy Commander, 331st VDV Guards Airborne Regiment (Kostroma), 98th Airborne Division (killed Mar 17)
Major Alexey Osokin, the commander of the VDV's 31st Air Assault Brigade's 1st battalion
Major Oleg Patskalev, deputy battalion commander, 331st Guards Airborne Regiment, 98th Guards Airborne Division.
Mayor Denis Yagidarov, commander of airborne battlion of 31st separate air-assault brigade
Major Ruslan Vladimirovich Petrukhin, deputy battalion commander in the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 35th Army, Eastern Military District (killed Mar 11)
Major Dmitry Toptun motorized rifle battalion commander 488th Motor Rifle Regiment, 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division
Major Viktor Maksimchuk possible deputy commander of a motorized rifle regiment or battalion commander
Major Alexandr Lyubanov. VDV.
Marine Major Alexey Sukhanov 177th Naval Infantry Regiment
Major Azamat Alinov, company commander in 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade 
Major Livoskiy Deputy Commander of 35th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade’s rocket artillery battalion
Major Sergei Panov was reportedly the tank battalion commander in the 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade (other sources say 90th GTD)
Major Alexander Sergeevich Fedorov, Chief of Communications and Deputy Chief of Staff of Unit #47130, 103rd Rocket Brigade (Ulan-Ude, Divizionnaya station) (killed Mar 15)met with our SOF...
Major Ruslan Petrukhin, a graduate of the Kazan Higher Military Command School and a deputy battalion commander in the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade, was killed in Ukraine.
Maj. Pavel Suslov, Tyumen is his city. 40th engineer-sapper regiment, Ishym town of Tiumen oblast
Mayor Dmitriy Tiunin, commander (?) of engineer-sapper battalion of 136th guard motor-rifle brigade, 58th guard CAA
Captain Timur Suleymanov acting commander for 228th motor-rifle regiment?
Major Dmitriy Stakheev
Mayor Yegor Sannikov. No other info. Probably artillery officer.
Mayor Alexey Martiushev
Mayor Denis Golovko, deputy commander of 2nd motor-rifle battalion of 71st guard motor-rifle regiment, 42nd guard motor-rifle division, 58th guard CAA
Mayor Sergey Kashanskiy, 19th separate special force detachment "Yermak" (Novosibirsk) of Rosgvardia, Syberian military district of Rosgvardia
Mayor Sergey Reznichenko, chief of the staff of some supply battalion.
Mayor Pavel Gareyev, unit and data of death unknown. Judging by the signs on lapels he served in air defense unit and his rank is AD battalion command/staff duty.
Mayor (?) Pavel Yevgkevskyi. Commander of 4th battalion of 105th rifle regiment of DPR's 1st Army Corps
Major Artyom Lazarenko was the operations officer for the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade
Major Alexey Dineka, 247th Air Assault Regiment, 7th Air Assault Division
Mayor Alexey Varnavskiy. Data of death and unit unknown. He has signs of signal troops on lapels. His rank corresponds to HQ of divisional level signal unit.
Major Yury Belitchenko, Flight Commander in 55th Separate Helicopter Regiment, SMD
Mayor Nikolay Kolesnikov, unit unknown, signs on the shoulder strips similar to ground forces (except tank trops)
Mayor Vasiliy Tynnyi, deputy of company comamnder of Spetsnaz. unit unknown
Mayor Grigoriy Artemyev, officer of military commandant unit.
Mayor Andrey Kunakov, chief of the staff, 153rd separate SOF detachment of 346th separate SOF brigade, Special Operations Command.
Mayor Azamat Alimov, company commander of 3rd Special forces brigade
Mayor of reserve Valeryi Statilko.
Reserve Maj. Valery Farshatov, volunteer for LNR
Mayor Sergey Kotelnikov, killed 7th of May, unit unknown
Maj. Dmitry Vostrikov, deputy commander of 810th Naval Infantry Brigade’s air-assault battalion
Major Galiev Artyom Radikovich, KIA
Mayor Sergey Borisenko, 106th guard airborne division
Maj. Ivan Zaika, possibly from 41st CAA headquarters or some subordinate unit
Mayor Ramis Zagretdinov, motor-rifle battalion commader of 35th guard motor-rifle brigade, 41st CAA
Mayor Leonid Sharshukov, unit unknown, likely engineer. Died in hospital on 9th of May
Mayor Viacheslav Karenko, due to anchor signs he served in Black Sea Fleet, but in some coastal unit. He had Ukrainian citizenship, served in Ukrainian naval forces and betrayed in 2014.
Retired (?) mayor (?) Ivan Kravchenko. Battalion commander. He has a chevron of GRU, but also has a sign of Donbas Volunteer Union, so currently he was not officer of Russian regular troops. Either DPR battalion commander (regular or conscripts), or Russian volunteers battalion commander. 
mayor Alexandr Shchetkin, 1st GTR of 2nd GMRD
mayor Dmitriy Lytnyev, 423rd GMRR of 4th GTD
mayor Ilgiz Usmanov, 423rd GMRR of 4th GTD
mayor Maxim Khlebko, 7th separate recon battalion of 47th GTD
Major Dmitry Lytnev, 4th Guards Tank Division
Major Gregory Artemiev, head of military commandant’s office in Volsk, Saratov Oblast.
Maj. Roman Sarychev, military commandant
Maj. Anton Morozov, air-assault company commander, 542nd Separate Air-Assault Battalion
Mayor Anatoliy Miagkov, last meantion of his service - 12th separate special force detachment "Ural" of Rosgvardia, Ural district of Rosgvardia
Maj. Sergei Borisenko, 106th Airborne Division
Maj. Valentin Ivanov, unit unknown
Major Yuri Melekhin, commander 1st Spetsnaz Detachment of the 16th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade
Maj. Ivan Budkin, chief of staff of 2nd Airborne Battalion, 234th Airborne Regiment, 76th Air-Assault Division
Maj. Alexander Denisov deputy of battalion commander of 137th guard airborne regiment of 106th guard airborne division
Reserve Maj. Denis Sorokin
Mayor Nikolay Kolomoyets, 61st Naval infantry brigade, 14th Army Corps of Norhern Fleet coastal units
Major Roman Khlynovsky, engineering officer (probably) in the 64th Guards Separate Motor Rifle Brigade

Captain Andrey Paliy
Capt. Fakhretin Gasanov, commander 1st MRB, 394th MRR, 127th MRD
Captain Maklagin Vyacheslav Vyacheslavovich (killed Feb 25, given Order of Courage)
Captain Aleksey Aleksandrovich Chuchmanov, GRU/GU 3rd SpetsNaz Brigade (Tolyatti) (killed Mar 3, 2022)
Captain Yevgeny Ivanov, platoon commander, Russian 247th Guards Assault Caucasian Cossack Regiment (killed)
Captain Sergei Aleksandrovich Visyach (killed)
Captain Alexey Glushchak, GRU/GU 22nd Spetsnaz Brigade (killed, given Order of Courage)
Captain Ilya Kuptsov, VDV 76th Air Assault Division, Intelligence Department (Pskov) (killed)
Captain Alexander Vladimirovich Shokun, Chief of Communications, VDV 11th Guards Air Assault Brigade (Ulan-Ude) (killed)
Captain Nikitin Alexey Nikolaevich, 1141st Guards Artillery Regiment, 7th VDV Guards Mountain Air Assault Division (Novorossiysk) (killed)
Captain Eduard Gilmiyarov Rinatovich, Commander, 5th Airborne Assault Company, 31st VDV Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade (Ulyanovsk) (killed)
Police Captain Opatsky Alexei Mikhailovich, Commander, Zyryanin OMON Special Purpose Mobile Platoon, Rosgvardia Directorate, Komi Republic (killed)
Captain Dmitry Nikolayevich Chumanov, Commander, MLRS Battery (Ulan-Ude) (killed Mar 4)

Senior Lieutenant Alexei Aleshko, Military Intelligence Officer (killed Mar 10)
Senior Lieutenant Andrei Shamko, VDV, GRU/GU 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Pskov) (killed)
Senior Lieutenant Nurmagomed Gadzhimagomedov, company commander, 247th Guards Air Assault Regiment (killed, given Hero of Russia)
Senior Lieutenant Nikolai Shumitsky, Tank Company Commander, 81st Tank Battalion, 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (killed, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Sergey Dorokhov, Rosgvardia SOBR team member (Vologda) (killed)
Senior Lieutenant Aleksey Aleshko, Platoon Commander, VDV, RVVDKU graduate. (killed Feb 25, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Nikita Ivanovich Perfilov, VKS Russian Aerospace Forces (killed Mar 6)
Senior Lieutenant Lazarenko Alexander Alexandrovich (killed, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Nikolai Symov, 331st VDV Airborne Regiment (Kostroma), 98th Airborne Division (killed)
Senior Lieutenant Sukhovskoy Semyon Mikhailovich, Company Commander, 234th Air Assault Regiment, VDV 76th Guards Air Assault Division (killed Mar 5)
Senior Lieutenant Sergei Zuykov Alekseevich, Rosgvardia (killed, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Sergey Alekseevich Zuykov (killed, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Vokhmyanin Alexander Viktorovich, Chief of Staff, Artillery Battalion (killed)
Senior Lieutenant Maxim Vadimovich Susloparov, Unit #90600, 15th Separate Motorized Rifle Peacekeeping Brigade of Alexandria (Roshchinsky), 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army (killed)
Senior Lieutenant Maxim Kholkin, Air Defense, 4th Military Base (South Ossetia) (killed March 7, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Anton Volkov, Translator, GRU/GU, (killed Feb 27)
Senior Lieutenant Sergei Chudnik, Commander, Tank Platoon (killed March 16, given Hero of DPR)
Senior Lieutenant Dmitry Vyacheslavovich Vdovin, Company Commander (killed, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Ilya Sergeevich Chernyshev, Commander, Armored Battery, 331st Guards Airborne Regiment (Kostroma), 98th VDV Guards Airborne Division (killed, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Nikita Samoilov, Deputy Commander, VDV Reconnaissance Company (killed)
Senior Lieutenant Alexei Ivanov, 5th Separate Guards Tank Brigade (Ulan-Ude) (killed)

Lieutenant Alexander Osipov, VDV (killed)
Lieutenant Georgy Alexandrovich Dudorov, Deputy Commander, Military-Political Affairs, Recon company, 137th Airborne Regiment, 106th VDV Airborne Division (Tula) (killed March 6)
Lieutenant Alexander Lebedev (killed)
Lieutenant Vitaly Olegovich Golub , Platoon Commander, 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Guards Combined Arms Army (Volgograd) (killed, given Order of Courage)
Lieutenant Dmitry Chernyshev, VDV 247th Air Assault Regiment (killed, given Order of Courage)
Lieutenant Daniil Dmitreievich Kurin, Reconnaissance Platoon Commander, 34th Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade (killed, March 3)
Lieutenant Georgy Dudorov, Deputy Commander, Reconnaissance Company, 137th VDV Airborne Regiment, 106th Guards Airborne Division (Tula), son of Alexander Durorov, the Deputy Governor of Nenets Autonomous Okrug (killed Mar 6)
Lieutenant Ovchinnikov Lev Aleksandrovich, VDV 331st Airborne Regiment (Kostroma) (killed)
Lieutenant Vsevolod Vasilyevich Yaroslavtsev, Commander, Mortar Platoon, Motorized Rifle Battalion, 126th Gorlovskaya Separate Coastal Defense Brigade (Perevalnoe), 22nd Army Corps. (killed Mar 3)
Lieutenant Stanislav Olegovich Kutelev, VDV, RVVDKU graduate (killed)
Lieutenant Brian Andrei Yurkov, Ground Forces Air Defense Officer (North Ossetia) (killed)

Naval-
Captain of 3rd rank (=mayor) Alexandr Chirva, commander of large landing ship "Tsezar Kunnikov" of 197th landing ship brigade, Black Sea Fleet. Died from wounds 16-17th of April. He was wounded during Uлrainan strike on Russians landing ships in Berdiansk on 24th of March
Captain of 1st rank (=colonel) Andrei Paliy Deputy of Black Sea Fleet commander
Captain of 3rd rank (mayor equivalent) Roman Pasynkov, chief of troops service department of Black Sea HQ 810th Naval Infantry Brigade

Aviation -
Mayor Yevgeniy Osipov, 18th Guard assault aviation regiment "Normandia-Neman" (Su-25SM)
Mayor Artyom Ogoltsov, 332nd Guard helicopter regiment (airfields Pushkin, Pribilovo, Leningrad oblast) of 6th AF and AD Army, Western militrary district. This regiment is armed with Mi-28N, Mi-35 and Mi-8AMTSh. Google search shows, during maneuvers Zapad-2021 he was a pilot of Mi-28N.
Colonel Ruslan Rudnev was a Su-25 attack aircraft pilot based in the Far East. He was killed in Ukraine and buried on March 1
Lieutenant Colonel Alexey Narzullaevich Khasanov, Deputy Commander, 31st Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (pilot, Su-30SM, killed Mar 5)
Lt.colonel Fyodor Solovyov, commander of 872nd SP-howitzer regiment of 127th motor-rifle division, 5th CAA Eastern Military District
Major General (*ret.) Banamat Botashev Russian Air Force 
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Pozynych, Deputy Commander for Military-Political Work, 14th Guards Fighter Regiment (Kursk) (Pilot, Su-30SM, killed)
Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Chervov, Deputy Commander, Aviation Regiment (Voronezh) (Pilot, Su-25, killed Mar 7)
Captain Ivan Sergeevich Afanasyev (Pilot, Ka-52?, killed)
Captain Radzhabov Rabazan Gasainievich (Pilot, killed)
Captain Emelyanchik Sergei Stanislavovich (Pilot, Mi-28n?, killed Mar 4)
Captain Eugene Kislakov, 14th Guards Fighter Regiment (Kursk) (Pilot, Su-30SM, killed)

Separatist Forces -
separatist commander Mikhail Kyshchyk, better known as "Misha Chechen,"
Colonel (DPR-promoted? Or posthumously?) Statsenko Alexey, deputy commander of armament of 1st motor-rifle brigade of DPR. 
"Mayor" (LPR-promoted) Alexzndr Shepel, battalion commander of 2nd motor-rifle brigade LPR. Citizen of Ukraine. Considered as "best battalion comamnder of LPR". Killed 6th of March
"Captain" or even "mayor" (DPR-promoted) Agranovich Sergey, company commander of recon-assault battalion "Sparta" of DPR.
"Colonel" (DPR promoted) Vladimir Kovalenko, chief of "non-departamental security of Internal affairs ministry of DPR" (prisoners guarding service). Citizen of Ukraine. Former officer of Ukrainian 20th separate convoy service battalion of Internal troops (later National Guard), dislocated in Donetsk. After his unit was seized in 2014 by DPR he defected to separs side.
Reserve Lt. Col. Alexander Kalnitsky, presumably with a Cossack volunteer unit from Krasnodar Krai
LNR Police Lt. Col. Denis Babich
Vladimir Zhoga, warlord, Sparta Battalion (Lt Col equivalent?) (killed Mar 5)
Separatist Taras "Clooney" Gordienko, Commander, B-2 Anti-tank group (killed Mar 14)

WIA
Major General Serhiy Nirkov was seriously wounded; Chief of Staff - Deputy Commander of the 35th Combined Arns Army
Major General Andriy Serytsky Chief of Staff - Deputy Commander of the 36th Combined Arms Army was seriously wounded;
First Rank Captain Anton Kuprin, 44, lead Russian warship was fatally hit by Ukrainian Neptune missiles
Col. Yan Sukhanov, acting commander 810th Guards Separate Naval Infantry Brigade - heavily wounded (commander Col. Aleksey Sharov was killed in Mariupol on Mar. 22nd)clancy
Lt. Col. Aleksey Teremkov, commander 542nd Separate Air-Assault Battalion - heavily wounded
Maj. Leonid Smirnoff, acting commander 382nd Separate Naval Infantry Battalion - heavily wounded

Captured
Lieutenant Colonel Krishtop Maxim Sergeevich Deputy Commander of the 47th Aviation Regiment 

   I have two listings which may both be Krishtop.
   Lieutenant Colonel Krishtop Maxim Sergeevich, (Pilot , Su-30, captured)
   Lieutenant Colonel, 247th Guards Air Assault Regiment 47th Bomber Aviation Regiment, 105th    Guards Mixed Aviation Division (Pilot, Su-34, captured)

Lt. Colonel Astrakhov Dmitry Mikhailovich:from SOBR
Lt.colonel Alexandr Koshel Claimed he is the chief of PsyOps counteraction group of 58th CAA His documents says he is mayor, serving in m/u 21250 - 212th Training center of tank troops (Siberian Military district). He can be promoted to lt.colonel and appointed lately on the duty of PsyOps in 58th CAA and hadn't time to change own military ID.  
lt.colonel Sergei Kosik, 14th Fighter aviation regiment 
Lieutenant Colonel Anikin head of artillery of the 59th regiment
Captain Denisov the head of communications of the 59th regiment
Major Sergey Yermalov, 159th Fighter Aviation Regiment, Besovets airfield, Karelia, 105th Mixed Aviation Division, 6th AF and AD Army, Western Military District
lt.colonel Yevgeniy Starodubov, 1st GTR of 2nd GMRD
mayor Ilshat Gazimov, 27th GMRB
mayor Yuriy Grechko, 96th separate recon brigade
Major Schetkin Leonid Petrovich, Commander and chief of staff, 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 41st Combined Arms Army (captured Feb 26)
Major Rashki Shishkanov Dmitry Alexandrovich, Battalion Deputy Commander, 126th Gorlovskaya Separate Coastal Defense Brigade (Perevalnoe), Unit #12676, 22nd Army Corps, Black Sea Fleet (captured)

Sacked
General Roman Gavrilov of Rosgvardia
General Vladislav Ershov, commander of 6th Army
Lieutenant General Sergei Kissel, commander 1st Guards Tank Army
Anatoly Bolyukh Deputy to FSB head Col Gen Sergei Beseda  
150 FSB agents purged
Lt. Gen. Arkadiy Marzoev as a commander of the 22nd Army Corps

Arrested
Admiral Igor Osipov commander of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Armed Forces arrested
Col Gen Sergei Beseda, head of the foreign intelligence branch of the FSB, the Fifth Service   Beseda has been sent to Lefortovo prison in Moscow

Fragging incidents - okay maybe just a rumor but a fun one!
37th Guards Separate Motor Rifle Brigade commander Col. Yuri Medvedev hospitalized in Belarus after being intentionally run over by one of his own soldiers

Suicide
commander of the 13th Tank Regiment of the 4th Tank Division 

Others
Col Vladimir Kryvolapov replacement commander of the 810th Marine Brigade only a Sgt?

Oligarchs

These two and there was another one in Surrey, England, age 58, who supposedly hanged himself 2 weeks ago in his $18 million custom mansion. Mikhail Watford was worth tens of billions and told his neighbor last year that he was on Putin's list.

Spanish news website El Punt Avui reported the bodies of Sergey Protosenya, 55, his wife and his daughter were found at around 4 p.m. on Tuesday, April 19 at their home in the seaside resort of Lloret de Mar in Spain's Catalonia region.

Former Kremlin official and Gazprombank vice-president Vladislav Avayev, 51, was found dead in his luxury Moscow apartment by his 26-year-old daughter on Monday, police said. The bodies of his wife Yelena, 47, and younger daughter Maria, 13, were also discovered. All had suffered gunshot wounds.

Alexander Subbotin has reportedly died after an anti-hangover treatment that involved toad poison

As are many others, I’m struggling to keep up with the “firehose” volume of information here, so I apologize if someone else has already asked this question. I wonder how many of these deaths resulted from “friendly-fire” incidents?

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

Quote

Five top generals — Maj. Gens. Vasily Kukushkin, Alexander Laas, Andrey Lipilin, Alexander Udovenko and Yuri Instrankin — in addition to Police Colonel Emil Musin were fired by the Russian president on Monday

https://thehill.com/policy/international/3509681-putin-fires-five-more-generals-report/

[sburke]

5 minutes ago, akd said:

@sburke @Kinophile

https://thehill.com/policy/international/3509681-putin-fires-five-more-generals-report/

yep I had that and they've been added to the "sacked" list.  They are all MVD which raises some questions as to what this reflects. 

[OldSarge]

7 minutes ago, sburke said:

yep I had that and they've been added to the "sacked" list.  They are all MVD which raises some questions as to what this reflects. 

This is what I have on them.

• Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Vladimir Region Major General Vasily Kukushkin
• Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Altai Territory, Major General Alexander Laas
• Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Yaroslavl Region, Major General Andrey Lipilin
• Chief of the Operational Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation Major General Alexander Udovenko
• Deputy Head of the Department for Logistics and Medical Support of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Major General Yuri Instrankin

Edited June 3, 2022 by OldSarge

[Armorgunner]

7 hours ago, Cederic said:

Confused. Isn't that a semi-automatic weapon?

In sweden, the name of the m82, is AG90. Direct translation of that is "Automatic Rifle 90"

[The_Capt]

42 minutes ago, sburke said:

Heh will try to respond by paragraph

1. The procurement cycle isn't in my mind going to keep up with the pace of change.  As much respect as I have for DARPA, and it is a lot, I think your reply doesn't reflect the nature of what is happening right now.  Machine learning and AI is accelerating the rate of change. a 5 to 10 year development cycle won't keep pace.  That last sentence there is where the divergence will happen.  Having something isn't the same as running into someone who figures out a different way to use it.

2. I wasn't suggesting Russia wasn't feeling it, but rather the extent. Putin has slowed to a degree the knowledge of how bad loses have been and the state media similar to early Vietnam reporting in the US keeps up the myth that all is going according to plan.  Your average Russian particularly in Moscow and St Peterburg which aren't getting the same casualty rates as say Dagestan is mostly upset because McDonalds closed.  By war impact I mean the level of destruction Ukraine is facing.  

3.  The last point wasn't specifically intended about this conflict but rather a general observation about the cost of war.  I'm not proposing Ukraine make any effort to take the war to Russia, it is counterproductive and a waste of resources assuming they even had the military logistics to do so.  The point was more that most of the examples we have in the past 50 years of war are almost always very one sided.  We've had nothing like ww2 where both sides suffered heavily in loss of life both civilian and military as well as massive infrastructure destruction.  It isn't a full spectrum war that takes into account the full capabilities of either NATO or Russia.  The US did send out some info about potential for malicious code in many places including power plants etc.  This is a dimension of war that hasn't been fully explored or exploited here though there are indications US cyber command cooperated with the Ukrainians to shore up Ukrainian cyber defenses.  Having been in the telecom industry most of my life this is an area that has been discussed often regarding backdoor access in Chinese based technology particularly in relationship to companies like Huawei.

1.  Fair points: technology will advance, the question is will we see a disruptive shock?  Answer is likely yes, but we are seeing the tips of it right now in Ukraine.  RMAs don't just happen, they build up over time.  We act all surprised when they land but in reality (and hindsight) the damn thing was right there all along.  Further RMAs are not single year phenomenon, we have likely been living inside one since the late 90s.  The impacts we are seeing are finally landing as what was revolutionary goes "mainstream".  AI and ML, here I am in the conservative camp.  If a roomful of pointdexters gave us mature next gen AI/ML it would likely take us 5-10 years just to figure out what to do with it, hell it would take us that long to get a grip on our data alone.  However, if you take the philosophy of "the future is unknowable, because technology" it leads not only to cynicism but also lazy passive thinking: "Since we can't know the future, then no point in even trying.  So we keep doing what we are doing and figure it out on the day."  That is a weak easy-exit I have seen used far too many times, especially when impacts are obvious and it puts us in a strategic planning reactive posture when that technology does hit us in the face.

2.  I think the full impact of this war will take longer to feel in Russia but when it hits the shock could be nation breaking...it was a contributor to this last time.  I also think this is a lot more than bodycounts and blown buildings in Russia.  One thing that has struck me about the narratives coming out of Russia is this illusion that they are still in control.  Warning NATO nations of consequences, warning Finland/Sweden of consequences and acting like they are still a great power.  The reality is that beyond the nuclear dead-end, they have no influence left to offer.  Economically and resource wise, we are pretty much there in living without whatever Russia has to threaten with, militarily they are a hot burning mess - I would love to see how long those T62 survive in Finland.  Some of the most horrific realizations a person or group of persons can have is when they suddenly realize that they are not who they thought they were and Russia is heading towards an identity crisis for the history books - again. 

3.  I agree that the small wars have been one sided, not so sure about the larger ones.  Korea was not one-sided, nor was Vietnam or Afghanistan for the Russians, at least not when we are talking about Will.  The Cold War was definitely not one sided.  To my mind this war is a bit like the Crimean War, Boer War or the Franco-Prussian War, or even the US Civil War - it is a trailer for what a large fully symmetrical conflict would look like - assuming we could find the right context to have one, that did not escalate.  This is a high-intensity peer conflict at the tactical/operational level - with plenty of strategic LL's.  This is not full spectrum strategic or total war...I am not sure we could even have one of those and not destroy ourselves to be honest.  This one is frankly as close as I would want to get if we have to go this route.

The only reason I am even close to making firm calls - and as I noted there is some distance to go here - is that what we have seen in this war has been aligned to a set of consistent trends stretching back at least to Iraq '03 and maybe Gulf '91.

[sburke]

4 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

The only reason I am even close to making firm calls - and as I noted there is some distance to go here - is that what we have seen in this war has been aligned to a set of consistent trends stretching back at least to Iraq '03 and maybe Gulf '91.

I'm gonna go shuffle off and work on my fireplace mantle some more.  

Your perspective as always is engaging and thought provoking.  As Mr Gumby said on Monty Python. 

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, womble said:

I think there's a difference between what the "REMFs" say on either side and what the gropos doing the pounding think. I would be surprised if the RUS grunts had quite the attachment to the land they're disputing that the UKR crunchies do. Just because the propaganda says it's so, doesn't mean the guys at the pointy end completely buy it.

Don't be so sure   There's quite a few soldiers fighting in Ukraine who are thoroughly brainwashed into believing exactly what we're hearing out of senior leadership.  You can hear that in the intercepted phone calls in particular.  For sure the DLPR guys seem to think they are "liberating" their territory from "Ukrainian Nazis".  There's all kinds of people fighting and for different reasons (many for money only), so obviously there's quite a range of mindsets.

As I said, there's quite a lot of factors in this war that are more akin to a civil war than what it really is.  It doesn't matter one bit if Ukraine and most of the world view it as a traditional war of aggression (which it is), the Russian perspective needs to be paid attention to even if it is completely wrong.  Understanding how your opponent thinks should not be distorted by how you think.  Failing to keep the two separate is a really good way to screw up a war.

Kraze's point about Communist countries calling themselves "democratic" is a good example of that.  Most of the people in those countries believed the label because they were brainwashed into it.  Some in the West were as well.  Hell, we can still find people in the West that believe the Soviet Union was a worker's paradise.  Mental defects aren't limited to a specific nationality.

Steve

[dan/california]

6 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Don't be so sure   There's quite a few soldiers fighting in Ukraine who are thoroughly brainwashed into believing exactly what we're hearing out of senior leadership.  You can hear that in the intercepted phone calls in particular.  For sure the DLPR guys seem to think they are "liberating" their territory from "Ukrainian Nazis".  There's all kinds of people fighting and for different reasons (many for money only), so obviously there's quite a range of mindsets.

There are also a lot of phone calls about the DPLR guys having their delusions beaten out of them with a hammer. The "please lord Tsar we have been mistreated videos" from whole units being another example. Ukraine needs to figure out the right way to make those poor bleeped fools a better offer. It really shouldn't be hard, considering the Russians seem to be offering death now, or death in just a little while. A few well timed surrenders would wreck the Russian position pretty thoroughly.