How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[danfrodo]

So, getting back on track:  time to lay down your bets, if you have an idea of what's coming, on where/how Ukraine will begin it's counterattack phase.   What will be the first big goals? 

I look at the map and am confused as where to even begin.

[LongLeftFlank]

1 minute ago, danfrodo said:

So, getting back on track:  time to lay down your bets, if you have an idea of what's coming, on where/how Ukraine will begin it's counterattack phase.   What will be the first big goals? 

I look at the map and am confused as where to even begin.

Well with 700 pages it's hard to keep track, but I've opined several times already that the key front is east of Zaporizhne, the hardest for the Russians to reinforce (unless you're foolish enough to give them time to do it).

Others might say that Kharkiv is the key.

[danfrodo]

2 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Well with 700 pages it's hard to keep track, but I've opined several times already that the key front is east of Zaporizhne, the hardest for the Russians to reinforce (unless you're foolish enough to give them time to do it).

Others might say that Kharkiv is the key.

so  you mean from point east from Zaporizhiia, UKR to push south toward Melitopol?  Am I seeing that correctly?

 

[FancyCat]

Ensuring the Kherson Peoples Republic never comes to fruition is probably the most important goal. It will spook Crimea, be a decisive blow to Putin’s wargoals, empower further Ukrainian occupied resistance, and impart to all potential collaborators to not rise.

[Kinophile]

Interesting article on Turkey as a geopolitical model and CoG for Ukraine.

https://newlinesmag.com/argument/ukraines-security-model-should-be-turkey/

[billbindc]

55 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Yes, I think we're both on the same page that the Russians are

1. trying to 'secure' a new frontier along the Seviersky Donets and southern Dnipr and then

2. make enough crazy nuke noises that Western liberals poop their pants and pressure UKR to accept a cease fire and 'referendum'.

Here's Ed Lutttwak (no liberal!), calling for 'plebiscites':

https://unherd.com/2022/04/how-the-ukraine-war-must-end/

....

And the tide of that backing will ebb astoundingly fast once the Russians call for 'cease fire and negotiations'.  Nobody trusts them, fine, but believe me, the West will always go for the 'negotiated' way out and let the Ukrainians live with the consequences.  Ask the Koreans.

One man's opinion, and I guess time will tell.

A couple points: 

1. Russia has to take it first and isn't showing the ability to get to Sloviansk much less the Donets/Dnipr.

2. I would strongly suggest following what folks at Brookings/German Marshall Fund/SAIS/etc are saying. They reflect official opinion in Brussels/DC pretty well and the explicit word is that only Ukraine decide when to quit. Russia has taken such an extreme and incompetent course that there's simply no alternative but to castrate their military power now or plan on having to do it again three years from now.

3. Ah, Luttvak. Let's just say a guy who wrote a book called "The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire" and another called "The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire" wherein his theses are completely unsupported by any archaeological, textual or historical evidence is not the guy you should be putting much trust in. He's a clever dilettante and not much more.

Edited May 3, 2022 by billbindc

[LongLeftFlank]

20 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

so  you mean from point east from Zaporizhiia, UKR to push south toward Melitopol?  Am I seeing that correctly?

 

Yes, exactly.

[danfrodo]

5 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Yes, exactly.

That is quite a long line for RU to defend, I bet they've got a lot of areas that will ripe for exploitation once the ground dries.  Some heavy artillery strikes on some low quality units followed by mechanized infantry & armor, perhaps? 

[LongLeftFlank]

22 minutes ago, billbindc said:

A couple points: 

1. Russia has to take it first and isn't showing the ability to get to Sloviansk much less the Donets/Dnipr.

2. I would strongly suggest following what folks at Brookings/German Marshall Fund/SAIS/etc are saying. They reflect official opinion in Brussels/DC pretty well and the explicit word is that only Ukraine decide when to quit. Russia has taken such an extreme and incompetent course that there's simply no alternative but to castrate their military power now or plan on having to do it again three years from now.

3. Ah, Luttvak. Let's just say a guy who wrote a book called "The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire" and another called "The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire" wherein his theses are completely unsupported by any archaeological, textual or historical evidence is not the guy you should be putting much trust in. He's a clever dilettante and not much more.

I'll sidestep your second two points, as it's yet more Fortress America court politics and not useful here IMHO. It's also what makes most other English language boards on this topic unreadable, frankly. Drain The Swamp!

...On your first point, if you consult a map, they're pretty much at those rivers already.

Which is why, on Steve's earlier meme of 'diminishing expectations', my theory is that the Russians may be looking to round out those natural barriers, declare "the job's a good 'un" on 9 May and send someone to Geneva, or New Delhi or wherever to Negotiate with the aforementioned big brains [pick yer poison].....

[PS I'm going to shut up for a bit.  I don't like bogarting the thread]

Edited May 3, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[MSBoxer]

7 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

That is quite a long line for RU to defend, I bet they've got a lot of areas that will ripe for exploitation once the ground dries.  Some heavy artillery strikes on some low quality units followed by mechanized infantry & armor, perhaps? 

What role could supposed partisans play in this route.  According to ISW there is some activity between the two.

 

[Kinophile]

ref UKR partisans...why Melitopol area? Why not Kherson? Ineffective RUS local command v effective UKR partisan leaders? How long can it last, if collaborators are really starting to buy into the RUS regime? 

Would a partisan effort south of Kherson be more effective at eroding RUS strength in Kherson, than aMelitopol based one? I understand that partisanship occurs organically, and heavily depends on personal networks in the area, but could the effort be directed to a certain degree?

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, akd said:

Part 1 of a look into who is fighting for Russian in Z operation:

 

That was quite good, thanks.

Somewhere in the last week I read/heard someone talking about the command problems Russia is experiencing with the different units from far flung parts of Russia.  The local nature of the units and their tendency to stay in place most of the time means there's cultural and linguistics issues for more senior Russian commanders to deal with.  How much of a problem is this really?  Well, maybe not much most of the time.  But we saw with the South Ossetian troops... it can be huge.  And what is Russia to do about a mutiny like that?  They need the South Ossetian units to keep the peace back home, so tossing them all in jail for disobeying orders is not really feasible.

Steve

[dan/california]

49 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

so  you mean from point east from Zaporizhiia, UKR to push south toward Melitopol?  Am I seeing that correctly?

 

https://www.google.com/maps/place/Melitopol',+Zaporizhia+Oblast,+Ukraine,+72300/@46.9283725,35.2438086,1271m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x40c2b1e224ede523:0xa1e1e16ff3a2914a!8m2!3d46.8550216!4d35.3586996

Zaporizhiiia to Melitipol is just about the hardest place for the Ukr too operate with their current AA set up. It is pancake flat and very little cover. Pushing the Russians back out of artillery range of Kharkiv, and then leaning on the supply lines to Izyum might just be a lot more doable

[BeondTheGrave]

1 hour ago, akd said:

 “Big-brained”…

 

I wish I had a grumpy face react I could give this post. 

Also in terms of grumpy face things:

 

Also in terms of operational direction, Kherson is the most politically important. Without that city Russia cannot credibly hive off a new oblast, though certainly they could try. DR/LR are already, for now, lost to Kyiv. HOWEVER the greater military threat is in the east along the line from the DR/LR to Kharkov. Winning hear means beating the Russian field army, and will IMO produce a more durable victory. Assuming Ukraine must hold on all fronts to push one, driving the biggest grouping of Russian forces back over the border (or at least threatening supplies) seems the most useful. 

Edited May 3, 2022 by BeondTheGrave

[danfrodo]

2 minutes ago, BeondTheGrave said:

I wish I had a grumpy face react I could give this post. 

Also in terms of grumpy face things:

He does realize that Stalin would've killed him, right?  His chances or survival in that regime would've been below zero.  Yet he does pine for the good ol' USSR. 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Also, a lot of the world (Asia, MEA) sees Ukraine as a US proxy, a stick the Empire is using to beat Russia. They would firmly back a cease fire, having no interest in a prostrate Russia.

These nations aren't the ones backing Ukraine now, so why would they be relevant later on?  The UN?  They aren't able to stop Russia from mass murder and destruction of someone else's homeland, so why would the UN be able to stop someone from defending their own homeland?

Now, if India and China were actively assisting Ukraine now, but might not later, then you'd have a point to consider.  As it is the only countries Ukraine needs to back them are the Western ones.  Not even all of them... US and Poland would probably do just fine on their own.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

This is why I continue to believe that time is NOT on Ukraine's side strategically, the way others here believe, and that a strong, early counteroffensive toward the Azov to retake the land bridge and place half the Russian invaders en prise is imperative, in spite of the military risks.

Time isn't on Ukraine's side only in the sense that each day that goes by is more death and destruction to its people, infrastructure, and economy.  Russia has similar problems in that the longer this war goes on the more death and destruction to its people, infrastructure, and economy it experiences.  Sure, the death and destruction isn't on the same level as Ukraine, but it's there and it is cumulative.

From a military sense, time is absolutely on Ukraine's side.  Russia has only its own resources to draw from and they are proving difficult to muster even at this stage.  Ukraine hasn't even gotten started yet.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Izyum area is not a dagger pointed at the heart of Ukraine, but that long Kherson-Zaporizhe-Donetsk front *definitely* is. You simply cannot leave that in place, but you can't retake it without firm Western backing, intel, etc.

Izyum is where the bulk of Russia's forces are currently located.  Crush them and they won't have anything to redeploy to Kherson-Zaporizhe-Donetsk.  In fact, why do you think Russia hasn't been able to just push up from there towards Kyiv already?  Because they don't have the forces to do it.  If they did then the fairly thin Ukrainian defenders would already be driven over.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

19 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

From a military sense, time is absolutely on Ukraine's side.  Russia has only its own resources to draw from and they are proving difficult to muster even at this stage.  Ukraine hasn't even gotten started yet.

Izyum is where the bulk of Russia's forces are currently located.  Crush them and they won't have anything to redeploy to Kherson-Zaporizhe-Donetsk.  In fact, why do you think Russia hasn't been able to just push up from there towards Kyiv already?  Because they don't have the forces to do it.  If they did then the fairly thin Ukrainian defenders would already be driven over.

Steve

Oh, I would love to see the Izyum armies crushed (Napoleon's dictum), but the UA isn't going to do that on defence alone. 

I don't buy the 'tipping point' collapse theory for the Russian Army, unless it is pushed, which to me is the destruction of division sized formations, not mere attrition.

I say again, waging a war of attrition with Russia is a mistake for Ukraine, not because they will lose, but because the clock of massive Western support will run down in months of stalemate, and it will be very hard for Ukraine to resist the pressure to 'deal.'

But let's take the other side of that: what are your thoughts on what the Ukrainian Liberation Offensive looks like?

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

I'll sidestep your second two points, as it's yet more Fortress America court politics and not useful here IMHO. It's also what makes most other English language boards on this topic unreadable, frankly. Drain The Swamp!

...On your first point, if you consult a map, they're pretty much at those rivers already.

Which is why, on Steve's earlier meme of 'diminishing expectations', my theory is that the Russians may be looking to round out those natural barriers, declare "the job's a good 'un" on 9 May and send someone to Geneva, or New Delhi or wherever to Negotiate with the aforementioned big brains [pick yer poison].....

[PS I'm going to shut up for a bit.  I don't like bogarting the thread]

I'm not sure I'd call a sea change in say, German/Finnish/Swedish/Polish/etc strategic postures and the American role in that process "Fortress America" court politics. Quite the opposite. But putting that aside, it seems pretty important what actual policy makers and those who advise them are saying not a Luttwak, who is a poseur pretending to be a player. The US is committed to this fight and Putin isn't going to be able to name an interlocutor and walk away. That's simply not how significant conflicts without clear solutions end in the real world.

Edited to add: And that last point is extremely crucial to what we talk about here. There is no obvious out for Putin or Ukraine. Both are too committed to stop and both have options to exercise to continue the fight and profound motivations to do so. That means Ukrainian counter offensives, Russian mobilization and probably at least another year of conflict with more opportunities for potential escalation. 

 

Edited May 3, 2022 by billbindc

[Machor]

After posting official statements that Poland would be getting its TB2s in Fall [Why that late?] and Canada had sold Ukraine "30-40" Wescam sights [For what? Replacing Turkish sights in their existing inventory?], I finally have a 'smoking gun' proving that Ukraine is receiving new batches of TB2s: This part from a downed TB2 captured by Russians was manufactured in March 2022 (the date is at the bottom, next to the Baykar logo):

[sross112]

2 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Yes, I think we're both on the same page that the Russians are

1. trying to 'secure' a new frontier along the Seviersky Donets and southern Dnipr and then

2. make enough crazy nuke noises that Western liberals poop their pants and pressure UKR to accept a cease fire and 'referendum'.

Here's Ed Lutttwak (no liberal!), calling for 'plebiscites':

https://unherd.com/2022/04/how-the-ukraine-war-must-end/

 

...And fine, all that certainly doesn't suit our Ukrainian friends here at all, but while sending you lots of lethal stuff is one thing, I must tell you there is very little stomach in the West for joining you in the 'our survival is on the line' category. Very few of my acquaintances pay the war much mind even though they know who the 'good guys' are.

So the pressure to accept a cease fire and 'end this' (i.e. get it out of the news and get back to doomscrolling about the slow rot of our various welfare states) will be substantial.

Also, a lot of the world (Asia, MEA) sees Ukraine as a US proxy, a stick the Empire is using to beat Russia. They would firmly back a cease fire, having no interest in a prostrate Russia.

This is why I continue to believe that time is NOT on Ukraine's side strategically, the way others here believe, and that a strong, early counteroffensive toward the Azov to retake the land bridge and place half the Russian invaders en prise is imperative, in spite of the military risks.

Izyum area is not a dagger pointed at the heart of Ukraine, but that long Kherson-Zaporizhe-Donetsk front *definitely* is. You simply cannot leave that in place, but you can't retake it without firm Western backing, intel, etc.

And the tide of that backing will ebb astoundingly fast once the Russians call for 'cease fire and negotiations'.  Nobody trusts them, fine, but believe me, the West will always go for the 'negotiated' way out and let the Ukrainians live with the consequences.  Ask the Koreans.

One man's opinion, and I guess time will tell.

Agree with a lot that you say here especially about the land bridge being the most important target. Which axis to take I think depends on the amount and composition of UA forces available for an offensive. If they can pull off an attack on the west side to either Melitopol or Mariupol not only do they sever the land bridge and relieve a besieged city or liberate one actively resisting, they also force the RA to respond. If nothing else the RA has to divert troops from the Kherson and Zaporizhe area to contain the western flank of the UA drive. Then move on Kherson. Could create some good successive pockets of RA or cause a full scale route for the Crimea. Blocking the land bridge to the east creates the conditions for the retreat/route.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Well with 700 pages it's hard to keep track, but I've opined several times already that the key front is east of Zaporizhne, the hardest for the Russians to reinforce (unless you're foolish enough to give them time to do it).

Others might say that Kharkiv is the key.

Kharkiv/Izyum area is an option if there isn't the forces available for a big southern push. The terrain up north is much rougher and can be conducive to a static offensive like Steve advocates. Steady light infantry push and small bites along the front. The UA has done some of this, especially in front of Kharkiv against the DNR conscripts. I believe any kind of dynamic offensives with eyes on pocketing large numbers of RA in this area is not very probable. Rougher and more built up terrain, lots more RA to defend, closer to Russia for supplies and support and it isn't a big part of the political goal for Russia. 

Makes much more sense to go south imho.

[Machor]

For the folks who want Zalas in CMBS to be vulnerable to Stingers: A Ukrainian Valkyrie drone took a shot of Russian MANPADS unsuccessfully trying to intercept it (source: https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/ufxvnd/russian_manpads_shot_missed_its_target_pictured/ )

The Valkyrie [What's the Canadian connection?]:

Edited May 3, 2022 by Machor
Unintended emoji

[Machor]

Russian Signals using Buryat as 'poor man's Navajo' - are the SIGINT pros on the Forum @Bearstronaut able to divulge how a modern military would counter this?

 

[sburke]

21 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Oh, I would love to see the Izyum armies crushed (Napoleon's dictum), but the UA isn't going to do that on defence alone. 

I don't buy the 'tipping point' collapse theory for the Russian Army, unless it is pushed, which to me is the destruction of division sized formations, not mere attrition.

I say again, waging a war of attrition with Russia is a mistake for Ukraine, not because they will lose, but because the clock of massive Western support will run down in months of stalemate, and it will be very hard for Ukraine to resist the pressure to 'deal.'

But let's take the other side of that: what are your thoughts on what the Ukrainian Liberation Offensive looks like?

There are two items running on that clock - military and economic

On the military side Ukraine is moving to a NATO based army.  That will take at least months, but the road is already charted, and the west will do it for political and financial reasons.  Being pretty cynical I think the US defense industry will lobby like hell for it.

On the economic side the EU is making major moves to be weaned off Russian energy.  Also a long term commitment that has consequences for Russia and I don't see the EU backing off that.

So in my view the long term road, not just months, but years is already charted and Russia is on the losing end of both.

As to a stalemate, I guess I differ with you in that I also don't think we will see a stalemate.  As Western military hardware is increasingly integrated into the UA, IMHO you'll start seeing some (more) major hurt on the RFA.  Sitting still and digging in isn't going to work any better than their previous strategies.

Last item  - Part of what I think will keep the west fixated is that Russia will continue to be its own worst enemy.  The atrocities aren't a fluke, they are part and parcel of the Russian view of this war and they will continue.

[Machor]

Russian TV fantasizing about turning Britain into the next Atlantis - they also took the Irish out while they were at it:

Erm, the LOTR analogies related to this war have really gone overboard - Ian McKellen has showed up in Lviv: 

 

[dan/california]

17 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Oh, I would love to see the Izyum armies crushed (Napoleon's dictum), but the UA isn't going to do that on defence alone. 

I don't buy the 'tipping point' collapse theory for the Russian Army, unless it is pushed, which to me is the destruction of division sized formations, not mere attrition.

I say again, waging a war of attrition with Russia is a mistake for Ukraine, not because they will lose, but because the clock of massive Western support will run down in months of stalemate, and it will be very hard for Ukraine to resist the pressure to 'deal.'

But let's take the other side of that: what are your thoughts on what the Ukrainian Liberation Offensive looks like?

I think they wait until their shiny new gun line is ready to use. They get it all set up south of Kharkiv, where they are energetically prepping the ground. When all the ducks are in a row they systematically smash their way all the way to Kup'yans'k, and then make the Russians dig them out or quit and go home. Those DPR conscripts holding the Russian flank, and calling them conscripts overstates their military utility, won't like 155 airburst much at all.