How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[akd]

Rather important if true:

 

[Suleyman]

Isn’t a RU mechanized company like 81 infantry together with the crew + 9 IFVs? If true that’s just sad

Edited May 20, 2022 by Suleyman

[LongLeftFlank]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

The presence of BMP-1s was used by Russian social media guys to claim all of this destruction was, in fact, Ukrainian vehicles.  But Schlottman, IIRC, documented a Russian unit having a lot of them AND it turned out that was, in fact, one of the units involved.  So it all jibes.

Steve

The Syrian SAA preferred the 73mm HE chucker to the autocannon for shooting up buildings, for obvious reasons.

[sburke]

‘Our Commander Is Leaving With Us’: Putin’s Troops Openly Plot to Ditch ‘Stupid’ War (yahoo.com)hone prank (msn.com)

[FancyCat]

 

 

 

 

[LongLeftFlank]

4 hours ago, SeinfeldRules said:

I also think it’s raises the question of how desperate manning levels must be on the Ukrainian side of things as well, at least in this part of the front.

Surely they have a good picture of Russian force levels by now, that they would be able to launch successful attacks of their own (on this part of the front, I know there are local counterattacks elsewhere). The battles described seem to be small groups of units punching at each other in the dark over villages, hoping to achieve local success, rather then any set piece operation. 

Very important, and bears repeating.

In much the same way, the Battle of Britain was much closer fought than was reported at the time, even though the Luftwaffe never had any real prospect of 'winning' (in terms of clearing the skies for an invasion).

I'm not very interested in propaganda, Minister. If we're right, they'll give up. If we're wrong, they'll be in London in a week.

...I too have the uneasy feeling that Ukrainian losses are quite heavy. The command level may also not yet be up to waging more complex offensive operations.

What we are still seeing today in the way of UA attacks is mainly battalion (CM) scale infantry operations Tito or Giap would have known how to fight. The primary evolution since March has been in the artillery arm.  Happy to be proven wrong on this, if anyone is aware of counterexamples...

****

2.  Here's Strelkov's latest.

Both us and Ukrainians are entrenching. And... THIS IS VERY BAD! Why?

We will again need to wage fierce bloody fights for each village, every grove and every high-rise... pay with Russian blood for every few hundred meters conquered....

The "attrition battle" (as I have repeatedly noted - as a military decision, I rate it no higher than "idiotic") in the Donbas continues and the "strategic impasse" (for the RF Armed Forces, but not for the UAF, who are gaining time) is getting deeper....

Especially it's meaningless to hope for victory through attrition taking into account that almost all of Europe and North America are acting as a rear for UAF. Thus, it will be necessary to try and defeat the enemy in field battles. And, excuse me, with whom, and with what?! If so far not even the partial mobilisation has been carried out?

3.  Varyag Valkyrie.

 

Edited May 20, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[dan/california]

6 hours ago, SeinfeldRules said:

Thank you for posting this. It paints a very dire picture for the force level of Russian infantry in Ukraine. It reads like some of the German WW2 memoirs where the situation was desperate and unit sizes were in name only. I also think it’s raises the question of how desperate manning levels must be on the Ukrainian side of things as well, at least in this part of the front. Surely they have a good picture of Russian force levels by now, that they would be able to launch successful attacks of their own (on this part of the front, I know there are local counterattacks elsewhere). The battles described seem to be small groups of units punching at each other in the dark over villages, hoping to achieve local success, rather then any set piece operation. 

This is pure speculation on my part, and yes i realize the the last thing I wrote was wrong but..

I think the Ukrainians a have very intentionally held their lines in the Donbas with the minimum number, and the minimum DENSITY of troops they can possibly get away with. In addition to freeing up soldiers for the 9,000 other things they need them for it just reduces casualties from Russian artillery. And you certainly can't say the Russian artillery is any good, but seems a lot more effective than the rest of their army. Thus taking some risks with manning of the front layers of defense being penetrated occasionally hurts less than a higher daily casualty number from the shelling the Russians are spraying pretty much everywhere, aimed or otherwise. This obviously would hamper the Ukr ability to do local counter attacks. They certainly seem to be making good use of their mobile forces around Kharkiv. Hopefully they will be able to do more in other areas soon.

[Der Zeitgeist]

New evidence and witness testimony about the torture and execution center operated during the Russian occupation of Bucha:

 

[dan/california]

25 minutes ago, Der Zeitgeist said:

New evidence and witness testimony about the torture and execution center operated during the Russian occupation of Bucha:

 

And that wasn't the worst thing posted today, either. But Steve wants to keep the focus on the tactics, as opposed to the atrocities, and it is his game, and board....

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

Does US actually even have any land based anti-ship missiles to give?

[Holien]

Unless the Russian submarines can be dealt with too I am not sure just dealing with the surface ships will deal with the blockade. 

I am all for sinking more Russian surface ships, but that is only one part of the problem. 

[Raptor341]

37 minutes ago, Holien said:

Unless the Russian submarines can be dealt with too I am not sure just dealing with the surface ships will deal with the blockade. 

I am all for sinking more Russian surface ships, but that is only one part of the problem. 

ASW, now we are talking. Sinking more RFN surface vessels will most impactful with regards to the blockade and overall naval pressure on Russians, however I have a few ideas on how ASW could also be done vs the Kilos in the Black Sea. Thankfully they are not nuclear powered boats and therefore come with a distinct set of limitations (but also advantages). 
 

Still, it might take an international naval fleet to fully open that seaway up. A topic of discussion in its own right. 

[womble]

38 minutes ago, Raptor341 said:

ASW, now we are talking. Sinking more RFN surface vessels will most impactful with regards to the blockade and overall naval pressure on Russians, however I have a few ideas on how ASW could also be done vs the Kilos in the Black Sea. Thankfully they are not nuclear powered boats and therefore come with a distinct set of limitations (but also advantages). 
 

Still, it might take an international naval fleet to fully open that seaway up. A topic of discussion in its own right. 

Where does the blockade sit in the scale of escalations? Given that there's been no declared war, what "right" do the Russians have to interdict shipping in Ukrainian waters? Beyond the fact that "they can", I mean. ISTR some reports of shipping (Bulgarian) suffering mishaps in the Black Sea in the early part of the war, but don't remember seeing those incidents clarified. What would be the consequences of the Russians sinking a Panama-flagged bulk carrier in- or out-bound for/from Odessa?

[LongLeftFlank]

Skoda Works in da house....

 

 

[LongLeftFlank]

19 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Just wanted to say that I treat Tweets from "OSINT Aggregator" with more salt than others.  I think he strays a bit from the facts than some of the others I follow.

Steve

Fairly major development in Donbas over the last day.

1.   I actually agree that OsintAggregator has been out over his skis before, but I guess this will be a good benchmark case. And as I said before, his maps are very useful if you take the big red arrows with several grains of salt.....

2. possible corroboration from DefMon3, he retweeted an hour ago.

 

3.  FWIW, here is an assessment by a pro-Russian Israeli analyst, worth a skim. Not endorsing its conclusions though. In keeping with my general efforts to check 'the other side of the hill, I've checked out his stuff before. While Zimerman's logic/pitch sounds rigorous, if you read back in his feed, you'll find a number of his confident calls in the past have gone horribly wrong on the ground....

 

A word on the salient south of #Popasna, that often gets overlooked. Using livemap (typically a bit outdated & w a UA bias). Firstly, this salient is very important for several reasons. The blue are represents a general heavily fortified area of the Ukrainian front. It guards the critical junctions of Bakhmut and Kostyantynivka.

The Horlivka (RU) front, has not moved very much the entire war due to these heavy entrenchments. Note the two main roads south from Bakhmut that feed this front. Also note the important railway from Poapsna (now under RU control). Finally, two important cities, Svitlodarsk & Myronivskyi are behind this front. It would be very difficult for RU to attempt to take these by frontal attack.

Cutting off one of these roads would be a strong blow to this front & both would be fatal. Background behind us, note the developments. Thick red lines indicate recent developments. Thin lines one of many potential future ones. #Troitske has been captured by RU forces rendering strong UA positions in the east untenable.

As I commented on previously, RU was unlikely to concentrate an advance on Bakhmut at first, and more likely to start surrounding it in order to avoid heavy urban combat at this time & achieve the effect of capturing the hub by dominating the individual axis. The Popasna - Bakhmut is heavily fortified....

They have taken larger towns than that thus far, but it seems to me that surrounding it in such conducive territory for the act would make more sense and avoid much death & destruction. Popasna, which is a bit smaller than Bakhmut, took a very long time to capture. Now that it was (captured), note the localized collapse it is leading to. Actually trapping the forces on this large front would require a second pincer. A breakout from W or NW Horlivka. But smaller encirclements are still possible if the UA forces refuse to retreat....

The general idea by the Russian forces will be to advance west behind the Ukrainian fortification & not head on through them (see thread images). Hopefully will get to the arguably more interesting update on the northern (Popasna) salient recent developments. 

4.  Schlottman here, on Russia still being Russia, i.e. reinforcing breakthrough, heedless of the costs elsewhere. But can the beans and bullets keep up with that doctrine given Russia's performance to date?

 

Edited May 20, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[poesel]

23 minutes ago, womble said:

What would be the consequences of the Russians sinking a Panama-flagged bulk carrier in- or out-bound for/from Odessa?

That I would like to know, too. Is it "legal" for Russia to sink commercial shipping to Ukraine?

And what if Turkey or any other NATO state would send a ship instead of Panama? (I really mean commercial - not "commercial" )

[FancyCat]

While its unfortunate it is occurring, I am under the impression, that Russia continuing to attack, and spending combat power on costly offensives is more beneficial to Ukraine in the long run than full shift to defense. As long as Ukraine does not wholly collapse, and is prepped for defensive fighting in depth, draining Russian combat power is vital for any future Ukrainian offensive no? 

Longer thread than just below. 

 

 

[LongLeftFlank]

Polish military analyst on Popasna. In spite of the translation step, I like his mapwork.

Another short thread about Popasna. Many commentators see this breach as a catastrophe for the Ukrainian army and the Severodonestk - Lysychansk 'cauldron'. Indeed, the threat is great.

The Russians desire a strategic breakthrough on this front, but there is also a risk that they will jump into the fire. On the one hand, the defeat of their crossing on Donets and the desire to expunge it, on the other hand, the longed-for surrender of Azovstal give them an injection of optimism and energy.

But let's look at similar events at Izyum. On a 37 km front, the Russians broke through in several places by crossing Donets. They entered the depth of about 25 km and were then bogged down under the fire of Ukrainian artillery.

So far out of Popasna, from a front about 7 km wide, the Russians broke 20 km to the west and 10 km to the north (they do not control the road yet).

If they do not broaden the base, e.g. the road to Troitske, then they will not be able to pour a large amount of equipment and Popasna may become a trap for the Russian army. Even a repeat of Izyum if the Ukrainians pull up enough artillery.

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

3 hours ago, Holien said:

Unless the Russian submarines can be dealt with too I am not sure just dealing with the surface ships will deal with the blockade. 

I am all for sinking more Russian surface ships, but that is only one part of the problem. 

Yes, the commercial blockage can be enforced only by planes, helicopter, mines, subs ext. Basically anything that can hit commercial vessels. 

We are going to have to see some form of western guarantee of freedom of navigation. Enforced by the west as well. This is maybe relevant a half a year from now. 

[Haiduk]

Azovstal now

[c3k]

4 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Does US actually even have any land based anti-ship missiles to give?

Great question.

The US seems to have 3 anti-ship missiles: Harpoon, NSM, and (some) LRASM.

Harpoon's land-based launchers are a bit limited in availability. (I wonder if Taiwan has a lot of them?)

The NSM (Naval Strike Missile) has ~twice the range (up to 100-150 miles), but half the warhead (~250 pounds). It is Norwegian, and, as you'd expect from a country with the coastline of Norway, a very good shore-launched anti-ship missile. I have no idea how many are in stock, if there are extras, or if Norway and/or US would be willing to give them to Ukraine.

The LRASM has about double the range of the NSM (most think about 300 miles) and has a 1,000 lb warhead. Is stealthy and has various passive and active sensors, swarm capability, etc.  It has only just reached IOC and only on a limited number of platforms. I would think that the advanced technology in it would preclude giving it to Ukraine (even if any were available), due to concerns about capture.

TL;DR: If anything, I'd think just Harpoons, and not many. And that's only if politicians get past their fears of escalation. 

[FancyCat]

A very good thing about the Neptune sinking the Moskva is that Ukraine has demonstrated the ability to sink Russian warships using their own home-grown weaponry, in the same manner towed artillery, soviet-era tanks and AA systems are considered not as escalatory cause they are merely adding to Ukrainian capability and not necessarily new capability/technology, that Russia can point and feasibly denounce with any traction. Any Russian shouting at the top of their lungs at another warship being sunk by a Harpoon, and Ukraine will need to merely point out Russian warships were already reaching the bottom of the sea, nothing "escalatory" about the Harpoons. 

Edited May 20, 2022 by FancyCat

[Haiduk]

There is some information appeared, Russian advance of last week around Popasna and Rubizhne hapapned because of units of 115th TD defense brigade (Zhytomyr) and 103rd TD brigade (L'viv) just abandoned own positions and later filmed a video, blaming UKR command that "you got us only rifles against artillery, we reject to fight without cover". This caused very angry comments of fighters of reguar units, which blamed theese soldiers in cowardness, because they were equipeed not only with "rifles", but with NLAW and MANPAD and they, regulars, are also suffreing under Russian arty fire, but dug in in hold positions since Feb and don't cry "take us back".

There are also many motivated people in TD units, but many also, especially in western part of Ukraine enlisted there to avoid mobilization and sending to war, because accordig first edition of the law, TD units could be used out of own oblast only for TD tasks. But since situation demands more people on frontline, the law was changed and TD now can be send in combined arms operations. Example of Kharkiv TD brigade showed this was right decision, but if units have motivated servicemen, well supplied and have experienced commanders. Looks like 115th and 103th have a lack of some of theese features. 

Bad situation, which already use Russian PsyOps. I feel a smell of 2014, when wives gathered meetings and demanded "to turn back our husbands home, they are TD and hadn't serve out of own oblast!"

Edited May 20, 2022 by Haiduk

[FancyCat]

2 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

There is some information appeared, Russian advance of last week around Popasna and Rubizhne hapapned because of units of 115th TD defense brigade (Zhytomyr) and 103rd TD brigade (L'viv) just abandoned own positions and later filmed a video, blaming UKR command that "you got us only rifles against artillery, we reject to fight without cover". This caused very angry comments of fighters of reguar units, which blamed theseese soldiers in cowardness, because they were equipeed not only with "rifles", but with NLAW and MANPAD and they are also suffreing under Russian arty fire, but dug in in hold positions since Feb.

Bad situation, which already use Russian PsyOps. I feel a smell of 2014, when viwes gathered meetings and demanded "to turn back our husbands home, they are TD and hadn't serve out of own oblast!"

Interesting, TDF on the heaviest parts of the front, its one thing for TDF to be placed in secondary fronts, but right in Donbas? Obviously I understand the regular army isn't big enough to staff the entire length of the front, but damn. 

Is this a newer video, or the original video floating around pro-Russian channels about UKR forces refusing to fight due to lack of equipment and support? 

[Haiduk]

16 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Interesting, TDF on the heaviest parts of the front, its one thing for TDF to be placed in secondary fronts, but right in Donbas? Obviously I understand the regular army isn't big enough to staff the entire length of the front, but damn. 

Is this a newer video, or the original video floating around pro-Russian channels about UKR forces refusing to fight due to lack of equipment and support? 

Forced measure. Regulars need in rotation. 24th brigade held Popasna three months. And in this time dozen thousands of light infantry drink a coffee in western Ukraine, playing in space troopers on already useleess checkpoints. 110th TD brigade of Zaporizhzhia oblast. for example already about month hold positins around Velyka Novosilka and Huiliaypole. Of course, they are not alone, but in Rubizhe and Popasna areas TDs wasn't one-by-one against enemy. 

115th is old video, but now appeared from Rubizhne.

Edited May 20, 2022 by Haiduk