How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Offshoot]

23 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Seems like major development. What is source?

 

An article about Bakhmut from usually well-connected reporter. Heavy casualties on both sides, but author states that Wagner creeping offensive seem to be loosing impetus:

https://kyivindependent.com/national/as-battle-of-bakhmut-nears-culmination-ukraines-artillery-gasps-for-more-ammo

It ties in with recent comments by Prigozhin:

"In Artemovsk [Bakhmut], every house has become a fortress. Our guys sometimes fight for more than a day over one house. Sometimes they fight for weeks over one house. And behind this house, there is still a new line of defence, and not one. And how many such lines of defence are there in Artemovsk? Five hundred would probably not be an exaggeration.” - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/03/ukraine-wagner-leader-counts-cost-as-russian-offensive-stalls-in-bakhmut

Probably as close to a climb down or admittance of defeat as you are going to get.

[Beleg85]

19 minutes ago, Offshoot said:

It ties in with recent comments by Prigozhin:

"In Artemovsk [Bakhmut], every house has become a fortress. Our guys sometimes fight for more than a day over one house. Sometimes they fight for weeks over one house. And behind this house, there is still a new line of defence, and not one. And how many such lines of defence are there in Artemovsk? Five hundred would probably not be an exaggeration.” - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/03/ukraine-wagner-leader-counts-cost-as-russian-offensive-stalls-in-bakhmut

Probably as close to a climb down or admittance of defeat as you are going to get.

Yes, a fact worth to notice. However this appeal could also be interpreted in the light of fight for supplies between Prigozhin' slave tropps and regulars. Given Wagnerites are now operating artillery, planes, helos and supposedly even T-90M's they have more and more reasons to compete with other branches than ever. There was an interesting interpretation of this situation in one of PL channels, perhaps I'll find it and translate it some day.

Btw. Prigozhin discovering that towns are made of ...well this thing called houses that can be fortified is quite amusing. And behind houses are even more houses. Who would predict?

Edited January 5, 2023 by Beleg85

[sburke]

34 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Btw. Prigozhin discovering that towns are made of ...well this thing called houses that can be fortified is quite amusing. And behind houses are even more houses. Who would predict?

I knew the Russians were short of washing machines and toilets, but I figured if they were stealing them at least it meant they had houses to put them in.  

[Vet 0369]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

Precisely! What is an AMX-10RC if not a light tank on wheels? 

And there-in lies the issue. I would ask that someone who says they are tanks, or someone who says they aren’t tanks, to provide a definitive definition of what constitutes a “tank.” I wager that, in reality, a definition doesn’t exist!

[FancyCat]

Part of a thread that is pretty broad overview of the benefits of the Marder, Bradley, and AMX and well known probably to all here, but basically these will make kharkiv offensives more likely in the future.

 

Edited January 5, 2023 by FancyCat

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

Seems like major development. What is source?

 

An article about Bakhmut from usually well-connected reporter. Heavy casualties on both sides, but author states that Wagner creeping offensive seem to be loosing impetus:

https://kyivindependent.com/national/as-battle-of-bakhmut-nears-culmination-ukraines-artillery-gasps-for-more-ammo

The KI and Ponomarenko in particular must be up for some sort of Journalist/Paper of the Year award. He's been really excellent (from an English speaker POV).

Who do our UKR friends on here recommend?

Edited January 5, 2023 by Kinophile

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

YThere was an interesting interpretation of this situation in one of PL channels, perhaps I'll find it and translate it some day.

Please do! You always have interesting stuff.

[Kinophile]

48 minutes ago, Vet 0369 said:

And there-in lies the issue. I would ask that someone who says they are tanks, or someone who says they aren’t tanks, to provide a definitive definition of what constitutes a “tank.” I wager that, in reality, a definition doesn’t exist!

Oryx certainly has a simple opinion:

 

 

Edited January 5, 2023 by Kinophile

[Kinophile]

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

I wonder...

Does UKR intend to keep up the corrosive, tactical raiding/long range fires pressure on Russia, but no major offensive over Jan,  Feb? There's certainly no signage.  Kremina feels more like a steady push,  but there seems to be sustained (and sustainable) Ivan resistance. 

Say UKR start ramping up in March as their US  vacationing pilots and NATO trained ground pounders return and integrate,  gain some experience and iron out logistical/technical kinks, then go for the jugular in April/May? 

That gives them 3 months of relative rest/refit of worn out units, keep torturing the Ivan's logistics into funny shapes and solidify their own AD defenses (incl. versus any Iranian SRBM crap).

It plays to the UKR preference for corrosive shaping of Russian units and plans while they themselves gain in strength, then attack. 

It's what they've done each time and it's worked,  solidly. There's no tech the Russians can get that will counter this basic approach.

There's certainly nothing systemic they can do, or rather,  succeed at that will stop this plan. Mobiks won't be in better shape after 3  months if winter exposure...

Also, by March, supposedly Russia will be at/just about at peak shell-hunger....

[LongLeftFlank]

On 1/4/2023 at 7:56 AM, Beleg85 said:

Hard to believe AFU has anything of this sort of capability. Zaluzhny himself directly stated it is not the case unless magical sack with hundreds of vehicles and artillery would open in the West. For now even capturing Kreminna, theoretically sorrounded from 3-sides, becomes problematic (just today UA could again lost foothold at Chervonopopivka).

Your assessment (thanks for the posts!) is quite close to my own. 

In the current paradigm, attacking into prepared defences is difficult and costly for either side, even with a badly impaired enemy.

With every week that goes by, the land bridge area -- the one piece of ground Putin MUST hold (beyond the Feb 2022 lines) to give his fig leaf 'victory' -- becomes more analogous to the built up Kursk salient of mid-1943;  belts of trenches (prefab bunkers?) plus mines, mines and more mines (remote controlled mines, smart mines, wheeled mines, etc.).

Continuous channeling and killing zones, to slow and then blast UA forces with old school mortars and rockets (which Russia can still produce in bulk with a little Chinese help). And their tac air arm will become more formidable supporting such a static defence. It is unsafe to assume he never learns, and eventually the Ukes may run out of ways to surprise him.

A "retro" Russian army, even poorly commanded, trained and resupplied, can make the Ukrainians pay dearly in blood and equipment for every meter of ground.

There's no "snow eating fog" solution I can see for this case.

Even though the overland routes from Donetsk are already largely denied by fire, a siege of Crimea+landbridge is still likely to take a very long time indeed when they can't deny the sea crossings to the Russians.

Prove me wrong, please.

Edited January 5, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[danfrodo]

Geeez, slow down y'all.  I had three+ pages to get caught up with.  I just finished 5 day hell drive across most of the US (taking daughter to med school in Indiana from Oregon).  Lost two full days due to snow in Wyoming, finally backtracked hundreds of miles w first hundred miles in near white out.  Whew, glad that's over.  Just a few hours earlier and we would've beat the storm.  I know UKR needs some frozen ground but I don't think they'd want snow with continuous winds of 50kph for multiple days.  

Anyway, been trying to keep up with all the posts and this week has been quite a bit of good stuff IMO.  

LLF post above mentions that RU troops could be quite effective in defense in the landbridge, and I think this could certainly be true.  But I also think that if the ground allows mobility that UKR will find the weak (mobik) sections of the front and be able to bypass the solid areas.  At least that is my hope.

Amx10 looks like a great addition for UKR.  Officials from BFC greatly oppose this weapon transfer because it will delay their upcoming CM release as they have to add yet another new vehicle.  The rest of us are happy about the amx10 I suspect.  That 105mm gun could come in pretty handy in infantry support and for blasting BMP & other RU AFVs.  

And looks like bradleys are for real?  Yay america, way to go. 

Plus, when we talk about collapse, I think we are not necessarily talking about Russia collapsing as a whole, though that's one possibility w various regions going independent.  I am thinking more of collapse of Putin's regime w a new regime coming in that actually wants out of the war and wants to get the country out of sanctions.

Thanks for all the great info, everyone.

[kevinkin]

On 1/4/2023 at 7:10 PM, NamEndedAllen said:

And a chilling warning against failure. 

One thing that the writer sort of implied with scenario one was that the west will need to allow Putin an 'out" with his people. A way to blame any retreat or failings by Russia on NATO i.e. "we" were outnumbered this time ... but "we" live on to fight some day in the future. All the while the west would do its utmost to give: "Russia, like Germany or Japan after the World War II, gets a chance to remake its future." A long shot, but perhaps the only way out of this mess. 

Edited January 6, 2023 by kevinkin

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Your assessment (thanks for the posts!) is quite close to my own. 

In the current paradigm, attacking into prepared defences is difficult and costly for either side, even with a badly impaired enemy.

With every week that goes by, the land bridge area -- the one piece of ground Putin MUST hold (beyond the Feb 2022 lines) to give his fig leaf 'victory' -- becomes more analogous to the built up Kursk salient of mid-1943;  belts of trenches (prefab bunkers?) plus mines, mines and more mines (remote controlled mines, smart mines, wheeled mines, etc.).

Continuous channeling and killing zones, to slow and then blast UA forces with old school mortars and rockets (which Russia can still produce in bulk with a little Chinese help). And their tac air arm will become more formidable supporting such a static defence. It is unsafe to assume he never learns, and eventually the Ukes may run out of ways to surprise him.

A "retro" Russian army, even poorly commanded, trained and resupplied, can make the Ukrainians pay dearly in blood and equipment for every meter of ground.

There's no "snow eating fog" solution I can see for this case.

Even though the overland routes from Donetsk are already largely denied by fire, a siege of Crimea+landbridge is still likely to take a very long time indeed when they can't deny the sea crossings to the Russians.

Prove me wrong, please.

The crucial problem with assessing these things, especially conditions for large-scale operations, is that our sources are extremely scattered, subjective and for 80% anecdotal, probably even more so than at the start of the war. So we could in one post find similar arguments for two contradictory claims, like was the case with assessment of Russian mobiliziation. A banch of absolutelly pathetic endevours, half of the world laughing from their junk, mobiks send to their frozen deaths on clips like taken from Red Army in 1920. And yet, they largely did their job to buy enough time to train additional force of possibly at least tolerable quality (+favourable weather, ofc.). I have no idea if it will be enough for next year's campaigns. Or collapse will indeed happen as folks predict here. Somehow.

Further-  some Osint-er may find satellite images of trenches and AT ditches and claiming these are mighty obstacles...but they can be as well just staging areas and training grounds for units deeper in mainland, like seems to be the case with some of Crimea defences. Logically you should be right, Russians undoubtedly fortified Azov Sea strip, and battles there will be bloody, unless they fold in other way.  But this is Russia, so their overall strategic thinking may be totally cut from reality, like illustrated with this Belarus case. Muscovites evidently do big preparations, UA is constantly signalling it, but what are their true intentions? Attacking through already massively developed, multilayered UA lines at Prypec marshlands (this is actually well grounded fact they are there- making photos is strictly forbidden but several reporters described impressive field fortifications) will bring destruction on any attacker, and even dumbest of Moskal high commanders should know it by now. And yet they still seem to be keen on this action from the North. Maybe they envisage they will try to strategically do to Ukraine what Ukrainians did to them earlier? I.e. two simultaneus operations along entire frontline, one bloody holding action in the South and one offensive from far North (not necessarly on Kyiv), hoping that this way they bound enough AFU forces to allow their Novorossya survive till the next winter. I don't know, competent people here probbably know way better.

There is finally tactical dimention of offensive The_Capt is so good at illuminating. Since both UA offensive successess thus far (excluding AT bonanza at the begginings- note it was also then when Russian heavy equipment lossess were probably greatest) were made in very specific conditions, we wll need to see if AFU can pull another one in more normal situation, i.e. with linear frontline, prepared enemy and some Russian reserves behind. I am still not sure for example if we should count initiall, very bloody attacks on Kherson lines (specifically Davydyv Bryd areas) as strategic necessity or simply tactical failure on its own, that was fortunatelly overshadoved later by Kharkiv blitz. Probably only historians with access to more complete sources will be able to tell; the same is the case with real ratio of forces gathered by two sides. I only know this operation was costly for Ukrainian brigades fighting there. 2-3 similar successes and we could potentially talk about Pyrrhic Victory. Kherson was definitelly worth it, but will some villages in Donbas/Luhansk?

Edited January 5, 2023 by Beleg85

[LongLeftFlank]

31 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

And looks like bradleys are for real?  Yay america, way to go. 

....Sadly, spent 25mm uranium (DU) round fragments littering the fertile black earth is an environmental crime in itself, but there's gonna be a massive and costly Cambodia level cleanup anyway.  Plus, well, Donbas....

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

4 hours ago, Kinophile said:

I wonder...

Does UKR intend to keep up the corrosive, tactical raiding/long range fires pressure on Russia, but no major offensive over Jan,  Feb? There's certainly no signage.  Kremina feels more like a steady push,  but there seems to be sustained (and sustainable) Ivan resistance. 

Say UKR start ramping up in March as their US  vacationing pilots and NATO trained ground pounders return and integrate,  gain some experience and iron out logistical/technical kinks, then go for the jugular in April/May? 

That gives them 3 months of relative rest/refit of worn out units, keep torturing the Ivan's logistics into funny shapes and solidify their own AD defenses (incl. versus any Iranian SRBM crap).

It plays to the UKR preference for corrosive shaping of Russian units and plans while they themselves gain in strength, then attack. 

It's what they've done each time and it's worked,  solidly. There's no tech the Russians can get that will counter this basic approach.

There's certainly nothing systemic they can do, or rather,  succeed at that will stop this plan. Mobiks won't be in better shape after 3  months if winter exposure...

Also, by March, supposedly Russia will be at/just about at peak shell-hunger....

Hah, and Kyrylo Budanov agrees. 

[dan/california]

Lukashenko faking it harder?

 

[Kinophile]

13 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Lukashenko faking it harder?

 

Yup; especially as almost all Belarussian artillery ammo is now in Russian hands...

[Battlefront.com]

The Eurasia Group (influential think tank) just put out a short report/prediction that Russia has so totally lost this war that it has no option but to go rogue like Iran (surrender, obviously, isn't an option). 

https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/top-risks-2023-1-Rogue-Russia?campaign_id=249&emc=edit_ruwb_20230104&instance_id=81832&nl=russia-ukraine-war-briefing&regi_id=77867169&segment_id=121571&te=1&user_id=06eb42ecc9056dd32ea63af0c30707b6

They predict Russia will ramp up its asymmetric warfare against the West and cause major problems just shy of getting into a shooting match with NATO.  They see more explicit nuclear threats as being part of the package, but clearly state they don't think Russia will do more than threaten.  However, saber rattling alone could accidentally produce a real effect through incompetence and/or accident.

The way this article is written shows the authors are carefully considering the situation, not shaping a message to fit a pre-war bias or some sort of political agenda.  I can't say I disagree with their conclusions that this is a fairly real, if not inevitable, direction for Russia to go.  The potential flaw in their prediction is that it requires Russia to be able to maintain the war in Ukraine without collapse and to keep things quiet on the homefront. Much of our discussions here since the war started has come back around to questioning if Russia can in fact do both.  Because if it can't, then Russia has as much chance of pulling off an Iranian style strategy as it did taking Kyiv in 3 days. 

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

There is finally tactical dimention of offensive The_Capt is so good at illuminating. Since both UA offensive successess thus far (excluding AT bonanza at the begginings- note it was also then when Russian heavy equipment lossess were probably greatest) were made in very specific conditions, we wll need to see if AFU can pull another one in more normal situation, i.e. with linear frontline, prepared enemy and some Russian reserves behind. I am still not sure for example if we should count initiall, very bloody attacks on Kherson lines (specifically Davydyv Bryd areas) as strategic necessity or simply tactical failure on its own, that was fortunatelly overshadoved later by Kharkiv blitz. Probably only historians with access to more complete sources will be able to tell; the same is the case with real ratio of forces gathered by two sides. I only know this operation was costly for Ukrainian brigades fighting there. 2-3 similar successes and we could potentially talk about Pyrrhic Victory. Kherson was definitelly worth it, but will some villages in Donbas/Luhansk?

I agree.

For all that is good about how Ukraine is fighting this war, it finds it difficult to combat a determined and well resourced Russian force.  Even though Ukraine comes out ahead, sometimes way ahead, the losses are huge and progress very slow.  By contrast, when Ukraine has faced an enemy force that is not sufficiently resourced it is capable of major advances at relatively low costs.

The two examples to contrast are Kherson and Kharkiv/Luhansk offensives.  Kherson saw a few significant territorial gains by Ukraine, but at huge cost and after quite a bit of time.  Kharkiv, on the other hand, took days and casualties were light until they finally hit a reconstituted Russian defensive line.

Even with all the "shaping" and favorable advantages it had for taking back Kherson, it was slow and bloody. As you said above, for Ukraine to take back significant territory at an acceptable cost, it is going to have to figure out where the Kharkiv opportunities are and steer clear of Kherson type engagements if at all possible.

Steve.

[Ts4EVER]

"RUMINT" from Germany regarding the Pumas: Possibly the problems were intentionally exaggerated for political reasons (similar to the G36 issues a few years back). While some of them are serious, they were lumped together with tons of minor stuff like non-working seat heating etc.

[FancyCat]

thread on how Bulgaria got off Russian gas.

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

4 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Oryx certainly has a simple opinion:

 

Oryx wants "tank" to mean MBT.  It doesn't. 

some relevant words:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tank
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armoured_fighting_vehicle
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_battle_tank

Leopard 2 is a tank, AFV and an MBT
AMX-10 is a tank, AFV but not an MBT

AMX-10 can be a light tank, cavarly tank, tank destroyer or a scout tank. 

Leopard 2 is an MBT

[Taranis]

1 hour ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Oryx wants "tank" to mean MBT.  It doesn't. 

some relevant words:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tank
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armoured_fighting_vehicle
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_battle_tank

Leopard 2 is a tank, AFV and an MBT
AMX-10 is a tank, AFV but not an MBT

AMX-10 can be a light tank, cavarly tank, tank destroyer or a scout tank. 

Leopard 2 is an MBT

Yes.

I think the more appropriate term is Cavalry Tank. Because it is the French doctrine that wants it.

It is therefore not an MBT because of its light weight, low armor and mobility. The MBT descending among other medium and heavy tanks, while AMX-10RC does not have the capacity to carry out frontal attacks at all. While a cavalry tank in French and British WWII concepts, are mobile vehicles that must achieve rapid surprise attacks and reconnaissance. What our good old cavalry did before tanks. To this, we must add the anti-tank capacity thanks to its powerful gun and there it comes more from the doctrines of in-depth defenses of the Germans.

Guys, we really need to use the term AMX-10RC ! AMX-10 is the tracked IFV on a completely different chassis.

Edited January 5, 2023 by Taranis
typo

[Huba]

CFE treaty defines AMX-10RC as "Heavy Armament Combat Vehicle", and groups it separately with similar types:

 

Quote

Heavy Armament Combat Vehicles:
 AMX-10RC PT-76
 ERC 90 Sagaye SU-76
 BMR-625-90 SU-100
 Commando V 150 ISU-152
 Scorpion
 Saladin
 JPK-90
 M-24
 AMX-13
 EBR-75 Panhard
 PT-76
All models and versions of an existing type of heavy armament combat vehicle listed above
shall be deemed to be heavy armament combat vehicles of that type. 

https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/9/14087.pdf

Nevertheless, the "light tank" term seem to be accepted and repeated by various news sources. IMO it was a conscious choice of wordsw on the side of Macron and Zelensky, who both used it in their announcements:

 

Edited January 5, 2023 by Huba

[Taranis]

22 minutes ago, Huba said:

CFE treaty defines AMX-10RC as "Heavy Armament Combat Vehicle", and groups it separately with similar types:

 

https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/9/14087.pdf

Nevertheless, the "light tank" term seem to be accepted and repeated by various news sources. IMO it was a conscious choice of wordsw on the side of Macron and Zelensky, who both used it in their announcements:

 

Yes, you're right. It is a political choice. So a political name. I think it's like journalists who generically use the term Tank for MBT because it appeals to collective understanding and it immediately gives an image of power in people's heads. This may also be a big understatement for other allies. I think talking about Cavalry Tank for most people wouldn't make sense.
For me, what defines a vehicle is above all what you do with it, its doctrine. Often we say that a vehicle is bad, but in fact we have simply used it badly. That's why I prefer the term Cavalry Tank (IMHO) because it represents more why it was developed and how it could be used. The term therefore depends on what one does with it. 
Taking the example of the 2nd World War, the PzIV was at the beginning of the conflict considered as a heavy tank of rupture and ended up at the end by becoming a kind of medium / light tank

Edited January 5, 2023 by Taranis