How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[FancyCat]

We should not forget mobilization resulted in hundreds of thousands of skilled, educated Russians fleeing the country, undoubtedly a pressure valve release that helps Russia contain societal instability, at a expense of output and etc but still a pressure release valve. ‘

[chris talpas]

9 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Who's "we" in this particular reality? How do you enforce a Naval blockade in the Black Sea?  How do you slip through the Montreux Convention?  Whose ships do the stopping and boarding? Who thinks the Black Sea Fleet will agree for one hot second to allow NATO vessels to stop them, to fire shots across Russian bows? Do you really think a Russian frigate is not going to fire back? What about the BSF submarines,  their naval ace-in-the-hole via a vis any potential adversary? How do you blockade them?

So who's ship's will do the sinking, and be sunk? The US? So, War then. Britain? War. EU? War. Turkey? ROFL. 

And bye-bye any chance of this war ending in 2023.

Yer 'avin a laff, guv' nor! 

Actually why would one do a blockade in the Black Sea when the Mediterranean would be a much more effective place to do it?  You are in NATO home waters with access to far more assets than you could ever have in the Black Sea.  At the same time Ivan suddenly has diminished options in terms of projecting power.   Also all meaningful outbound cargo would need to enter the Med since there isn’t an absolute need to transport by ship, other than for efficiencies, to friendly Black Sea ports.  All other ports lay within NATO/aligned territories. Not not that I’m suggesting we do this, but if One had to, I think the Med would offer the best chance of success in enforcing a blockade while also being less escalatory.

 

Edited January 4, 2023 by chris talpas

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

Good questions. My take is that Russian state (and broadly- political psyche) and its military is like a golem without normal neurological cords- you can punch it again and again, crash singluar parts  until you completelly tatter your fists to the blood- and it will still stay largely motionless where it was, not resembling any human figure anymore but still a block of something. Crushed, but also not entirely defeated. Problematic for anyone, because it is directed by strange internal logic. So what is pessimistic scenario?

I agree that is the way it is at the moment.  But there's 1917 to consider, as well as 1990 in a different form.  In both cases there were clear events that led up to sudden collapse.  Similar events are going on right now, though it is unclear where we are on the timeline.  Every circumstance in history is unique and I think regime collapse started before 2014 and only in 2022 has put Putin in serious danger.  I think we have already passed the tipping point, but there's no way to know until there is an overt challenge to Putin.

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

It is obvious for anyone that Russians can now only count for a draw or at the most preservation of their conquest...

I don't say it will happen ofc, or even that this is most plausible version of the future, but I think we should remember it is still a possibility. Just, you know, not to gaze too much into our own overoptimistic echo-chamber, like was partly the case with Kherson's fall predictions. Certainly in Washington they intensively try to figure out how plasuible it may be.

True, it is certainly a possibility.  However, there's been some pretty serious consequences for Russia as well.

The demographer's concern about 200k Ukrainians being removed from reproductive activities is interesting.  We don't have a sense of what Ukraine has lost in total, but it doesn't seem to be 100k yet.  Russia, on the other hand, has lost as many as 1.3m since the war began. mostly in people fleeing the country.  This added to the large numbers that have left in recent years probably is excess of 2m to 2.5m and counting.   True, some could come back to Russia when tings settle down, some no doubt already have returned, but that number is massive.  Like Ukraine, Russia's demographics prior to this war were quite bad, so whatever the demographer was thinking MIGHT happen to Ukraine could already HAVE happened to Russia.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

We've discussed the chicken and egg situation several times now as to whether military collapse will happen only after civil collapse, or civil collapse will happen only after military collapse.  It is possible that the two could happen simultaneous.  What I don't think is very likely is that neither will happen.

I think Putin's regime can keep dissent under control for at least a year or two if it isn't forced to (effectively) surrender.  This means for the war to end there has to be a military collapse.  The problem for Russia is that at this rate of decline I don't see Russia's military surviving 2023, not to mention 2024.  And if Russia's military does collapse, civil collapse is going to happen a short time later.  Depends on how dramatic the defeat is.

Either way, Putin's regime will end soon.  I was not the only one that predicted this war would be a regime ending event BEFORE the war started, and I for one don't see any reason since to change my mind.

Steve

[The_MonkeyKing]

https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/maximum-pressure-brought-down-the-soviet-union-and-other-lies-we-tell-ourselves/

This is a good article on how the western story of soviet unions collapse is mostly false. It was not ever determined and could have easily gone the other way.

They also have a podcast series ongoing about the subject (paywall): https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/28031/the-collapse-of-the-soviet-union-part-1/

I am thinking that the common meme thinking about "collapse" is mostly just that, a meme. Everything is always collapsing, China, USA, EU economy, Iran .... When we look back in history collapses are quite rare.

[NamEndedAllen]

8 hours ago, The_Capt said:

There are many roads to victory or defeat in this war, as well as negotiating an end-state, just because you cannot see them or “believe” does not mean they do not exist.

 I’ve been stressing this for a while. It’s my primary perspective. Repeated very recently in this discussion:

11 hours ago, NamEndedAllen said:

To be clear, I am looking for a range of outcomes, not one prediction that must happen. Not absolutes. I assume that the extreme on either end of most or least preferred outcomes tend to be the least likely ( kind of like life!). So I seek examples of outcomes along the spectrum of possibilities, always keeping in mind the difference between what I prefer and the squishy probabilities of what could happen. So I prefer a Ukrainian victory, but recognize that it could take various shapes. Only one is as the Capt prefers, and only another one is as I prefer. There are quite a few. Lengthy stalemate is a possibility, also a grinding back and forth prolonged war. All these are possible, besides total defeat of Ukraine and total collapse of Russia and a new government there that pays reparations and embraces peace with Ukraine. 

 

8 hours ago, The_Capt said:

We have avoided detailed predictions, and frankly when we have made them we have been a lot more accurate than the mainstream - Fall offensive anyone?  

Maybe a different topic? I was musing on the ways the entire war itself might end. I’ve already said I realize and respect the scenario you have elaborated on. I believe it is along the lines of a negotiation without bloody battles in Crimea and the Donbas. Instead for them to be administered by an (unspecified) international body for perhaps ten years, followed by them voting on their status. Also, deals with Russia to pay reparations, install a more rational if still evil dictator, and respect the borders. For this they receive restored trading with the West. It’s pretty detailed! Do I have it fairly correct? I’m sketching it from memory of your earlier posts. It’s a good scenario. You’ve been selling it pretty consistently.  I do think it’s a bit of a stretch though. And I’m skeptical that Ukrainians would embrace it warmly. No idea how the Russians would read it. There are a lot of moving parts to achieve. But I’m not dismissing it! It is one of many scenarios, regardless of our opinions.

You find your.scenario reasonable, and I suggest a nastier one may be more probable, where the force of arms drives one of the parties to believe it has no better choice than to sit down and accept terms. Or another scenario perhaps more likely, Russia largely retreats but without negotiating, in hopes of fighting another day. A messy conclusion with Russia a heavily militarized state, fuming and  resentful. Rather like a far larger North Korea.. Unclear why those don’t seem even faintly possible. Iirc, neither Vietnam’s war, nor the Syrian civil war ended by negotiation. Somebody won, and somebody lost. The Korean War still isn’t over. Sure, some major conflicts end by negotiation! But certainly not all of them. We don’t know how this one will end.

Most people here would cheer if NATO somehow agreed to bring Ukraine in while the war is raging. But It isn’t unreasonable to see this as a not high probability event. We should entertain lots of scenarios. I think it wise to rate them for probability. Separately from our personal preference. I think that has worked well here for speculating on what might happen next as events on the battlefield unfold - just as you mentioned . I think we are weaker when it comes to assessing the outcome of the war itself, and even being able to discuss it.

 

Edited January 4, 2023 by NamEndedAllen

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, NamEndedAllen said:

I think we are weaker when it comes to assessing the outcome of the war itself, and even being able to discuss it.

Ok, well let’s unpack this one then.  First all war is personal, so discussions of the war outcome while people on this thread are in the middle of it is hard to do objectively.  Second, I am not sure what you mean by “weaker”…as compared to what or who?  We have discussed a range of outcomes from nuclear Armageddon with a prelude of western intervention, to a complete breakdown of Russia, to a partial breakdown of Russia, to a unilateral Russian withdrawal, a forced Russian withdrawal,  a negotiated end state with variations on who controls what, a frozen conflict a la Korea, and finally a Russian resurgence forcing Ukraine to negotiate from a position of weakness.

We have discussed the political ramifications and potential outcomes at length of each of these, as well as geopolitical implications.  We have discussed post-war challenges as the relate to reconstruction and pulling Ukraine into a western orbit, and how they are directly linked to the battlefield.  We have discussed the potential impacts of a broken Russia at length.

So if we are indeed “weak on assessing the outcome of this war”, I am afraid I do not see it.  In fact that sentence really does not make a lot of sense as one cannot really assess something that has not happened yet.  We can project and assess those predictions - humans are very good at remembering the future.  

Your original post that started this discussion read as “we can only see victory as driving the Russians out by force from all of Ukraine”.  Well ok, that is one version of military victory.  It won’t mean anything if we leave Ukraine a shattered nation and do not pull into western economic and defence alliances.  It is also not the only possible military outcome, as I note above.  Frankly I am not sure it is the most likely, but it is on the board and I think we all hope it goes that way.

In reality the outcome of this war is pretty much decided in many ways. Russia has by all metrics definitively failed to achieve it somewhat pliable stated strategic goals.  It has failed on its most likely real strategic goals.  And in many ways has engineered the exact opposite of its strategic intent, it is trying to put out fires with gasoline.  Nothing is going to change this at this point as full reversal on the battlefield is highly improbable.  

So what we are really discussing is just how bad the Russian loss will be.  Absolute best case for Russia right now is the conflict freezes in place and they can declare some sort of victory in the Donbas and southern Ukraine.  At this point Putin may actually survive this debacle if that happens.  But we know that this is unlikely because Ukraine is not done yet nor is western support. So we are back to variations on what Russian defeat looks like, and what Ukrainian victory looks like.  There are many variations on these visions, even in the political signalling going on. I think maximalist positions are dangerous and may do more harm than good but obviously others disagree.

So if all that is “weak” then I think you are on the wrong forum to be honest.  But hey if you can find a better one, send us the link.

[kevinkin]

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11597799/Putin-facing-quick-military-catastrophe-former-Russian-defence-minister-warns.html

Igor Strelkov: 'Intelligent people have come to the conclusion that, in the current situation, Russia is in a complete Zugzwang,' he said, in reference to a chess dilemma in which a player is put at a disadvantage because of their obligation to move.

His army is at the point of no return where he loses if it attacks and if it retreats

This 'clearly demonstrates the general level of brainlessness of our top generals, to which he recently belonged,' said Strelkov. 'Probably, the general forgot - or perhaps he never knew - that NATO has a large space capability and effective modern air reconnaissance. 'There is also radio interception and radio location. 'They also have brains in their headquarters and analytical centres….

Note the reference to NATO's the all important ISR contributions. 

[Huba]

I came across something extremely interesting - a transcript from the French National Defense
and Armed Forces Commission, from November 16th. It concerns various subjects, but let me paste here the most juicy bits (Google translated):

On the RU losses:

Quote

According to our most credible estimates, at least 60,000 Russian fighters would have been killed, for three times as many wounded, which means that around 250,000 Russian fighters would be “out of service” today.

Paradoxically, the Ukrainian figures are more difficult to obtain. We estimate that the Ukrainian losses are less important than those of the Russians, but still considerable.

 

Russia would have lost 60% of its total stock of main battle tanks, and 70% of its stock of missiles suitable for ground targets. This is why it now employs anti-aircraft missiles to strike ground targets, with the resulting problems of accuracy, and turns to Iran or North Korea to supply it with equipment. It is unclear what North Korea provided. We know that Iran provided drones. Its ability to deliver medium-range ballistic missiles is extremely credible as well. Russia also lost 40% of its personnel carriers and 20% of its artillery.

On the monetary value military support from US vs UE:

Quote

The press, in particular Anglo-Saxon, was able to indicate that the effort of the European Union represented less than 20% of that of the United States. However, including the European Peace Facility and deliveries for which reimbursement has not been requested by certain Member States, the European Union has collectively devoted more than 8 billion euros to military assistance to Ukraine , or 45% of the American effort on a like-for-like basis. It devoted 0.05% of its GDP to this assistance, compared to 0.07% of their GDP for the United States. As a proportion of GDP, the two efforts are therefore comparable. We must therefore counter the inaccurate narrative according to which the “Anglosphere” would help Ukraine and the European Union would only help itself.

 

In sixteen months, 52% of the 2021-2027 budget of the European Peace Facility has been spent. If we add the expenses that I have declared as eligible for reimbursement, three-quarters of this budget has been incurred. Finally, with all the expenditure planned for 2023, this budget will have been consumed at 82%, while there will remain four years to cover. The Facility is therefore already almost out of budget. It was not designed to reimburse member states for donations of armaments to support high intensity warfare.

And a bit about training UA forces and their plans:

Quote

This mission responds to a request from the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The short-term objective for the Ukrainians is to set up three new army corps by March 2023, for an estimated volume of 75,000 men, in order to be able to take the initiative in operations next spring. This very ambitious objective practically corresponds to the volume of the land operational force of the French army.

 

The European Union has undertaken to train 15,000 soldiers initially. To this end, the EUMAM Ukraine mission will provide individual and collective combat readiness training, based on Ukraine's declared needs. It will aim in particular to supervise the lower levels (from the section and the squad to the companies, battalions and brigade commands), including the preparation of the companies, battalions and brigades, training in collective maneuver, in tactics up to brigade level, as well as advice on the planning, preparation and conduct of numerous exercises and live-fire maneuvers, specialized training in the field of medical support, logistics, engineer combat, communications , nuclear and radiological protection, bacteriological and chemical, and the maintenance of military equipment. EUMAM will also participate in the further coordination of Member States' training activities.

 

This will initially ensure the collective training of 12,000 combatants, from battalions to divisions, ie the equivalent of 8 brigades and 2,800 specialists trained in the expertise mentioned. This mission will take place on the territory of the European Union, and in the infrastructures of the Member States, as long as the conflict continues. No European soldier will therefore be deployed on Ukrainian territory as part of this mission, apart from the equivalent of our defense attaché at the European Union embassy in kyiv. In order to reduce logistical constraints, the training sites should be located as close as possible to Ukraine, and in limited numbers. Poland will establish a "Combat Arms Training Center" (CAT-C), an operational level staff, equivalent to a Force Headquarters, this name having been changed for political reasons. Germany will set up a “Special Training Center” (ST-C) for the command of training actions taking place on its territory. These two centers will not be exclusive of other offers from Member States which will either reinforce their training teams or carry out training actions in their own territories, such as France, Spain and Italy. expressed their intention. This dispersal of training sites will make the task more complex, but will also reflect the framework of flexibility and modularity desired for this mission. These two centers will not be exclusive of other offers from Member States which will either reinforce their training teams or carry out training actions in their own territories, such as France, Spain and Italy. expressed their intention. This dispersal of training sites will make the task more complex, but will also reflect the framework of flexibility and modularity desired for this mission. These two centers will not be exclusive of other offers from Member States which will either reinforce their training teams or carry out training actions in their own territories, such as France, Spain and Italy. expressed their intention. This dispersal of training sites will make the task more complex, but will also reflect the framework of flexibility and modularity desired for this mission.

Full document is available here:

https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/16/comptes-rendus/cion_def/l16cion_def2223022_compte-rendu#

[The_Capt]

Just now, Huba said:

I came across something extremely interesting - a transcript from the French National Defense
and Armed Forces Commission, from November 16th. It concerns various subjects, but let me paste here the most juicy bits (Google translated):

Full document is available here:

https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/16/comptes-rendus/cion_def/l16cion_def2223022_compte-rendu#

3 new corps by this spring?!  75k fully trained and equipped troops?!  I am starting to wonder if the UA isn't planning on marching on Moscow.

[MikeyD]

I have a recollection of a Ukrainian official some months back saying they had had a 6.5-to-one advantage in combat casualty rates. Which means if Russia has 100,000 dead Ukraine has 15,300 or thereabouts. Now that I type out those numbers they don't seem very plausible. If you include civilian casualties one supposes the Ukrainian number would double.

[Battlefront.com]

Just saw this in NY Times (paywall, but you get the point from this synopsis):

Quote

Moscow has enough missiles for “two to three” more large strikes and is rushing newly produced munitions into service, a Ukrainian official said.

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/01/04/world/russia-ukraine-news

Would be great if this is true, and it very well could be.  Not only is Russia running out of its own weapons to chuck at civilians, but I doubt Iran was any better stocked for this sort of dramatic usage of its drones than anybody else.  They are likely running out of ready to go drones to send to Russia without cutting into their own supply.  Given the change of power in Israel and internal problems at home, if I were them I'd be keeping my own stocks as full as possible.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

33 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

3 new corps by this spring?!  75k fully trained and equipped troops?!  I am starting to wonder if the UA isn't planning on marching on Moscow.

With that much they probably could

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/maximum-pressure-brought-down-the-soviet-union-and-other-lies-we-tell-ourselves/

This is a good article on how the western story of soviet unions collapse is mostly false. It was not ever determined and could have easily gone the other way.

I don't have time to read this now, but I will.  That said, of course it could have played out differently.  The fact is it didn't, therefore it is likely that the weight of factors that led to the actual outcome made collapse inevitable.  In other words, the reasons for the Soviet Union ceasing to exist was not due to some limited fluke flip of a coin.  It was the culmination of massive issues, including hundreds of years of resentment towards Moscow by very powerful groups within the Soviet Union.

7 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

I am thinking that the common meme thinking about "collapse" is mostly just that, a meme. Everything is always collapsing, China, USA, EU economy, Iran .... When we look back in history collapses are quite rare.

Again, it comes down to how one defines "collapse".  Dramatic and sudden collapse, what I call "catastrophic collapse", is indeed quite rare.   However, states and organizations (including businesses) getting to a point where it can no longer can continue to exist as it did before is quite common.  Especially in the business sector.  Russia has been in a steady decline for more than 10 years.  Without this war it probably could have gone on for a lot longer.  With a successful war it could have gone on longer.  However, we have the war and those possibilities are no longer on the table.

Steve

[Huba]

5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Just saw this in NY Times (paywall, but you get the point from this synopsis):

Would be great if this is true, and it very well could be.  Not only is Russia running out of its own weapons to chuck at civilians, but I doubt Iran was any better stocked for this sort of dramatic usage of its drones than anybody else.  They are likely running out of ready to go drones to send to Russia without cutting into their own supply.  Given the change of power in Israel and internal problems at home, if I were them I'd be keeping my own stocks as full as possible.

Steve

Can't find a link right now, but UA estimate is that they are able to produce 20 Kalibrs and 30 Kh-101 per month - one barrage per month, at best. 

In other news, France is sending more and more serious AFVs:

 

[sross112]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Ok, well let’s unpack this one then.  First all war is personal, so discussions of the war outcome while people on this thread are in the middle of it is hard to do objectively.  Second, I am not sure what you mean by “weaker”…as compared to what or who?  We have discussed a range of outcomes from nuclear Armageddon with a prelude of western intervention, to a complete breakdown of Russia, to a partial breakdown of Russia, to a unilateral Russian withdrawal, a forced Russian withdrawal,  a negotiated end state with variations on who controls what, a frozen conflict a la Korea, and finally a Russian resurgence forcing Ukraine to negotiate from a position of weakness.

We have discussed the political ramifications and potential outcomes at length of each of these, as well as geopolitical implications.  We have discussed post-war challenges as the relate to reconstruction and pulling Ukraine into a western orbit, and how they are directly linked to the battlefield.  We have discussed the potential impacts of a broken Russia at length.

So if we are indeed “weak on assessing the outcome of this war”, I am afraid I do not see it.  In fact that sentence really does not make a lot of sense as one cannot really assess something that has not happened yet.  We can project and assess those predictions - humans are very good at remembering the future.  

Your original post that started this discussion read as “we can only see victory as driving the Russians out by force from all of Ukraine”.  Well ok, that is one version of military victory.  It won’t mean anything if we leave Ukraine a shattered nation and do not pull into western economic and defence alliances.  It is also not the only possible military outcome, as I note above.  Frankly I am not sure it is the most likely, but it is on the board and I think we all hope it goes that way.

In reality the outcome of this war is pretty much decided in many ways. Russia has by all metrics definitively failed to achieve it somewhat pliable stated strategic goals.  It has failed on its most likely real strategic goals.  And in many ways has engineered the exact opposite of its strategic intent, it is trying to put out fires with gasoline.  Nothing is going to change this at this point as full reversal on the battlefield is highly improbable.  

So what we are really discussing is just how bad the Russian loss will be.  Absolute best case for Russia right now is the conflict freezes in place and they can declare some sort of victory in the Donbas and southern Ukraine.  At this point Putin may actually survive this debacle if that happens.  But we know that this is unlikely because Ukraine is not done yet nor is western support. So we are back to variations on what Russian defeat looks like, and what Ukrainian victory looks like.  There are many variations on these visions, even in the political signalling going on. I think maximalist positions are dangerous and may do more harm than good but obviously others disagree.

So if all that is “weak” then I think you are on the wrong forum to be honest.  But hey if you can find a better one, send us the link.

Out of all the possibilities I'm casting my vote for the UA being able to restore it's 2014 boundaries and then the never ending conflict along the border. The reason I vote this way is that the UA so far has shown that it can displace the RA and recover territory, so I expect it to keep doing that as I don't really see the RA being able to overcome their shortfalls and be able to stop it. Unknown timeline but I expect it to continue to go slow until at some point it goes quick.

I don't expect Russia to ever "surrender" or even sue for peace. Politically, especially internally, they can't. At least the current regime can't. If the current regime is toppled then there would be a chance for peace but whether or not that can or will happen is up for debate. I also think it is a western pipe dream that war criminals will be handed over or any significant reparations will ever be made by any regime. Lip service maybe. Maybe. And that would just be to get normal trade going again. 

So in the end, unless the regime collapses or is replaced, I see a lower intensity conflict along the border for the foreseeable future. The nice thing about that is that as long as Russia keeps up the conflict they will be kept in the box they are in now. That keeps them from being a threat to anyone else except with the big red button. As long as they keep up the fight they really remove themselves as a player from the world stage which really does help the overall world security for the near future. 

The other reason I don't see Russia ever stopping the low intensity conflict after the borders are restored is because the second they do Ukraine can be part of NATO. If they just keep some metal flying west it keeps them from having NATO accept Ukraine. NATO/EU/US, none of them want a war with Russia because both Russia and them know that Russia will lose and lose quickly. That leads to the big red button. I really don't believe that Putin and friends want a nuclear war, but I believe they would choose that over losing. So the long term will be a Russia that slowly asphyxiates itself into a larger version of North Korea in order for the powers that be to keep the powers they have. 

[FancyCat]

Matches the Bradley rumors. If you recall the artillery, and everything else, NATO and co usually all collectively give the same equipment at the same time. Meaning Marders just got a big boost for being given.

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

I came across something extremely interesting - a transcript from the French National Defense
and Armed Forces Commission, from November 16th. It concerns various subjects, but let me paste here the most juicy bits (Google translated):

On the RU losses:

On the monetary value military support from US vs UE:

And a bit about training UA forces and their plans:

Full document is available here:

https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/16/comptes-rendus/cion_def/l16cion_def2223022_compte-rendu#

Wow very nice find @Huba.

Link? 

[Huba]

16 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Matches the Bradley rumors. If you recall the artillery, and everything else, NATO and co usually all collectively give the same equipment at the same time. Meaning Marders just got a big boost for being given.

I'd say that Centauro and Leo1 would be more closer equivalents here. Looks like NATO 105mm will vecome quite common in UA army in near future. 

Edit: also, it appears that UA is confident that M2s will be delivered too - this tweet quotes GUR chief commenting on that:

 

 

Edited January 4, 2023 by Huba

[The_Capt]

Just now, sross112 said:

Out of all the possibilities I'm casting my vote for the UA being able to restore it's 2014 boundaries and then the never ending conflict along the border. The reason I vote this way is that the UA so far has shown that it can displace the RA and recover territory, so I expect it to keep doing that as I don't really see the RA being able to overcome their shortfalls and be able to stop it. Unknown timeline but I expect it to continue to go slow until at some point it goes quick.

I don't expect Russia to ever "surrender" or even sue for peace. Politically, especially internally, they can't. At least the current regime can't. If the current regime is toppled then there would be a chance for peace but whether or not that can or will happen is up for debate. I also think it is a western pipe dream that war criminals will be handed over or any significant reparations will ever be made by any regime. Lip service maybe. Maybe. And that would just be to get normal trade going again. 

So in the end, unless the regime collapses or is replaced, I see a lower intensity conflict along the border for the foreseeable future. The nice thing about that is that as long as Russia keeps up the conflict they will be kept in the box they are in now. That keeps them from being a threat to anyone else except with the big red button. As long as they keep up the fight they really remove themselves as a player from the world stage which really does help the overall world security for the near future. 

The other reason I don't see Russia ever stopping the low intensity conflict after the borders are restored is because the second they do Ukraine can be part of NATO. If they just keep some metal flying west it keeps them from having NATO accept Ukraine. NATO/EU/US, none of them want a war with Russia because both Russia and them know that Russia will lose and lose quickly. That leads to the big red button. I really don't believe that Putin and friends want a nuclear war, but I believe they would choose that over losing. So the long term will be a Russia that slowly asphyxiates itself into a larger version of North Korea in order for the powers that be to keep the powers they have. 

I have to say this is also in line with my thinking, and why I lean towards a ZOS scenario in Dobas and Crimea.  To the picture you paint above, add the fact that Ukraine will own Dobas and Crimea, complete with all their problems.  Russia will not only peck away along the border, it will go back to its A-game and support active subversion and insurgency in those formerly held regions.  How active these regions may be? Or how open to conducting insurgency? are open questions; however, given their behaviour in this war, particularly the LNR and DPR active participation in the war, I have some grave concerns.

Ukraine could end up in an endless sniping war on the border as Russia pulls back, rebuilds and flexes now and again - pretty much what it was doing before.  It could also end up trying to manage two insurgencies actively supported by Russia, and none of that is a good news story as insurgencies are notoriously difficult when supported from the outside and offer a lot of opportunities to lose ones strategic narrative.  And it is going to be doing all this in the middle of reconstruction on the scale of the Marshal Plan while trying to sustain support from an increasingly less-interested and more distracted (Hey look Hawkeye got run over by his own snowplow!) western public.

The other side of the dilemma is a shattered Russia no longer able to prosecute bad on Ukraine.  Which sounds like a great idea but at that point Russia may be in free fall and unravelling, Ukraine and the West will then have a whole new set of problems, not the least of which is revenge attacks using WMDs by non-state or pseudo state groups, having a Russian Civil War spill over, or a refugee crisis for the ages, or...well pick your poison.

There is a scenario where we get a stable western orientated Ukraine and a functioning Russia whose main aim is not to make everyone else's lives miserable so they can feel better about themselves, on the road to some sort of renormalization - but man, it is one slim needle to thread as far as I can see. 

But we are notoriously weak on assessing the outcome of this war here, I can only hope smarter people than me are on it.  

[The_Capt]

Just now, Kinophile said:

Wow very nice find @Huba.

Link? 

It really is.  Great lines here:

We will make every effort to ensure the training of the requested 15,000 soldiers, and perhaps more, before the end of the winter. For their part, the Americans, the English and the Canadians proceed in the same way, using the same training frameworks, so that the battalions trained are interoperable. The Ukrainians have an estimated pool of 600,000 to 700,000 people ready to enlist to defend the Ukrainian homeland. They are the ones who must be trained, because only professional soldiers have been hired by Ukraine for the moment.

Russia for its part has called in 300,000 reservists, of which 200,000 were forcibly recruited, with many malfunctions, deaths, sick and elderly having been counted initially. It will therefore be difficult to make these reservists fully operational. Rather than as combatants, they will be used to multiply the lines of defense on the illegally occupied territories.

Thanks to the sanctions, Russia lacks raw materials and electronic components to equip itself with new equipment. This is why Russian soldiers take televisions, washing machines, etc. when they retire: the objective is not so much to decorate their homes, but to supply Russian industry with materials. However, this will not be enough to restore his power.

https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/16/comptes-rendus/cion_def/l16cion_def2223022_compte-rendu#

[Beleg85]

14 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Fair points and I would not say totally out of the realm of possibility.  I am not so sure Russia is as much a monolithic nation of stone as you describe - human societies do not work that way, even 1940s Japan had a breaking point.  I am not sure what Kherson predictions you are talking about to be honest.  We saw the fall coming and it came.  It was more orderly than I think many hoped for but Russia withdrew after taking a pounding. 

Ofc. it is true that no nation is monolythic- what I mean is that due to political passivity and cultural pesssimism of most of the population (minus convinced Nats) capacity of Russian state structures to endure various external pressures are much more than many Western analytics want us to believe. Sure there is a breaking point somewhere (always is), but I am in serious doubt if Ukrainians will be able to push RU military out of their Feb'24 borders without massive sacrifices on their part. Perhaps on themselves they can be even greater than they took during these 10 months. So question of for example "Is Crimea really worth it?" will inevitably come with time for Kyiv.

Mind you, despite massive downfalls Russians did surprised us somewhat. That what I meaned with Kherson- it took much more blood and time to dislodge them than we initially predicted here (ca. 2 months of difference if I remember) and retreat- let's face it- was very successfull operation. They weren't also so completelly cut off from logistics as we previously thought as well. The same was for Svatove axis- their supply roads were supposedly being cut with fire...but they somehow still manage to hold it. Shortage of ammo do exist and is fortunatelly growing, but it seems to be connected to increased consumption rather than broken logistics (a propos of possibility of another operation to "cut and squize" a la Kherson).

Now, let's move into economy area. Sanctions are working in a way, but they are not enough to force Russians to retreat, who are traditionally very gifted at various ways of circumventing them (Soviet/mafia heritage of "playing outside the system" on individual and group level kicked in almost naturally). Even Muscovite military industry, despite severe limitations, seem to be still relatively well at producing stuff. Perhaps not on the level of 2010's, but 80's. For example there was an in-depth talk with Rochan specializing in Belarus direction, where analyst was amazed how much equipment they managed to bring back from military storage sites there- amount that defied pre-war expectations. Of course its partly Soviet crap eaten by mothes, but still it point out they plan to gear toward long war. Plan of enlargement of nominal size AFRF is another sign of this- hopefully leading to their doom under sheer size of the task, but nonetheless concerning.

Also Russian Central Bank did very effective wok on stabilizing currency, state structures are holding tight around its Tsar and propaganda machine seems to be zombifying population at increased pace; I try to observe it semi-regularly, and unfortunatelly picture is not very bright- initiall hesitation after defeats from September seem to morph into more realistic determination with -sometimes- surprisingly frank messages "us or them, no retreat or we are simply done". Hell, perhaps even if they didn't zombify them so much, Russians at large would still want to keep war effort going. After all, this is about survival of the Russian World and their own polity as they know it, not some neocolonial adventure. Heavy stuff.

Ok, so sorry for Ropcke vibes, but just some things worth to remember. War may be very long and bloody; my bet is still it will not end before 2024, unless some Black Swan kicks in (fortunatelly, chances for it happening are growing as well).

12 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

True, it is certainly a possibility.  However, there's been some pretty serious consequences for Russia as well.

The demographer's concern about 200k Ukrainians being removed from reproductive activities is interesting.  We don't have a sense of what Ukraine has lost in total, but it doesn't seem to be 100k yet.  Russia, on the other hand, has lost as many as 1.3m since the war began. mostly in people fleeing the country.  This added to the large numbers that have left in recent years probably is excess of 2m to 2.5m and counting.   True, some could come back to Russia when tings settle down, some no doubt already have returned, but that number is massive.  Like Ukraine, Russia's demographics prior to this war were quite bad, so whatever the demographer was thinking MIGHT happen to Ukraine could already HAVE happened to Russia.

Yeah, Russia will be demographically broken country for the future this or other way (add even greater casualties of Covid), no doubt about that. They simply don't care. Nor we should. But that is while we do care for Ukraine and its future, so we should always remember the price they may take for all these brilliant offensives and holding actions at central front we imagine here.

I had several interesting talks lately about real size of UA lossess; the best was with former participant of Kherson offensive that is curing in my hospital. Guy told me that they lost 60% of the company within 3 days of assaults, and that SBU for already month or two is trying to actively supress families joining together and counting their lossess, including visiting relatives and even blackmailing them to keep them shut. It was first time I heard about such practice in Ukraine. Ofc. this is just ancedote, inherently subjective, but it raises question: how many offensives like Kherson one can AFU endure before determination start to falter? Especially that Bakhmut is also taking its heavy, daily toll. So it's not only about tanks, IFV's and planes; Ukrainian resolve is not bottomless as well- if Russians manage to turn following year into grinding fest on successive defense lines like they seemingly hope to, depsite their military decaying in the eyes, they may create a situation that could lead to some kind of war exhaustion.

We will see, and don't threat it as my projections. Just a summary of loose thoughts on the occassion of New Year. Let's all hope future will be brighter than this.

Edited January 4, 2023 by Beleg85

[Taranis]

32 minutes ago, Huba said:

Can't find a link right now, but UA estimate is that they are able to produce 20 Kalibrs and 30 Kh-101 per month - one barrage per month, at best. 

In other news, France is sending more and more serious AFVs:

 

You were faster than me 

I love the AMX-10RC. I really think he can be formidable in defensive position (mobile defense). It requires effective command, but the Ukrainians have shown us from the start that they are excellent. He also remains a formidable opponent for all Russian IFVs. And then after all, since the number of T-62s is increasing...

[Taranis]

39 minutes ago, Huba said:

Can't find a link right now, but UA estimate is that they are able to produce 20 Kalibrs and 30 Kh-101 per month - one barrage per month, at best. 

In other news, France is sending more and more serious AFVs:

 

I have this in my "archives" :

 

[billbindc]

16 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I have to say this is also in line with my thinking, and why I lean towards a ZOS scenario in Dobas and Crimea.  To the picture you paint above, add the fact that Ukraine will own Dobas and Crimea, complete with all their problems.  Russia will not only peck away along the border, it will go back to its A-game and support active subversion and insurgency in those formerly held regions.  How active these regions may be? Or how open to conducting insurgency? are open questions; however, given their behaviour in this war, particularly the LNR and DPR active participation in the war, I have some grave concerns.

Ukraine could end up in an endless sniping war on the border as Russia pulls back, rebuilds and flexes now and again - pretty much what it was doing before.  It could also end up trying to manage two insurgencies actively supported by Russia, and none of that is a good news story as insurgencies are notoriously difficult when supported from the outside and offer a lot of opportunities to lose ones strategic narrative.  And it is going to be doing all this in the middle of reconstruction on the scale of the Marshal Plan while trying to sustain support from an increasingly less-interested and more distracted (Hey look Hawkeye got run over by his own snowplow!) western public.

The other side of the dilemma is a shattered Russia no longer able to prosecute bad on Ukraine.  Which sounds like a great idea but at that point Russia may be in free fall and unravelling, Ukraine and the West will then have a whole new set of problems, not the least of which is revenge attacks using WMDs by non-state or pseudo state groups, having a Russian Civil War spill over, or a refugee crisis for the ages, or...well pick your poison.

There is a scenario where we get a stable western orientated Ukraine and a functioning Russia whose main aim is not to make everyone else's lives miserable so they can feel better about themselves, on the road to some sort of renormalization - but man, it is one slim needle to thread as far as I can see. 

But we are notoriously weak on assessing the outcome of this war here, I can only hope smarter people than me are on it.  

The frozen conflict scenario that you envision above isn't really sustainable for a sanctioned and ever devolving Russian economy. And believe me, those sanctions aren't going anywhere in any significant way until Russia has made peace with Ukraine. In fact, from what I hear, the ability of the US and allies to tighten the screws is getting better as time goes on. The die has been cast. Russia has a year or two at best.