How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Cederic]

Cutting power to Crimea? Does Crimea have any power stations?

 

[Haiduk]

16 minutes ago, Cederic said:

Does Crimea have any power stations?

Since 2015 Crimea was cut off from UKR electricity lines. It has some energy plants (you can recall a scandal with Siemens turbines), but main energy supply maintains through so-called "energy bridge" from Russia throug the powerfull cable, bought in China. 

Now Russia is preparing works to plug Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant to Crimean and Russian power grid.

Edited August 11, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

UKR arty shells former own positions in NE part of Pisky, occupied by the enemy

 

 

[poesel]

So Ukraine took something away from Russia - in Crimea - slowly cooking the frog.

What could they do next? How about Transnistria?
It's an unrecognized country full of Russian soldiers in an area bordering Ukraine. It's an annoyance for Ukraine and a fantasy goal for the Russians. Taking it would crush any idea of connecting it to Russia.

Is that militarily feasible? Does it make sense, or is it more costly for Russia to just isolate those troops?

[akd]

3 minutes ago, poesel said:

So Ukraine took something away from Russia - in Crimea - slowly cooking the frog.

What could they do next? How about Transnistria?
It's an unrecognized country full of Russian soldiers in an area bordering Ukraine. It's an annoyance for Ukraine and a fantasy goal for the Russians. Taking it would crush any idea of connecting it to Russia.

Is that militarily feasible? Does it make sense, or is it more costly for Russia to just isolate those troops?

It’s Moldova, not Ukraine.

[cesmonkey]

Somewhat off-topic, but then, a lot of things on this thread are ...

Several newspapers reported on recent wargames conducted by CSIS in Washington D.C. on what might happen in an invasion of Taiwan by China.  Below is a link to one of the articles that is not behind a pay wall:

What-if war game maps huge toll of a future US-China war over Taiwan
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2022/08/11/2003783337

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/08/china-taiwan-tensions-flare-us-faces-shrinking-window-deter-conflict/375514/

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/08/a-bloody-mess-with-terrible-loss-of-life-how-a-china-us-conflict-over-taiwan-could-play-out/

Edited August 11, 2022 by cesmonkey
Linking an additional article.

[Beleg85]

31 minutes ago, poesel said:

So Ukraine took something away from Russia - in Crimea - slowly cooking the frog.

What could they do next? How about Transnistria?
It's an unrecognized country full of Russian soldiers in an area bordering Ukraine. It's an annoyance for Ukraine and a fantasy goal for the Russians. Taking it would crush any idea of connecting it to Russia.

Is that militarily feasible? Does it make sense, or is it more costly for Russia to just isolate those troops?

Several shoddy batalions of conscripts commanded by offcers married to local women. Not worth it. Even Bielarussians pose much greater threat now.

 

Now I would expect something may happen to one of Russian submarines...they do launch cruise missiles constantly (last one was on Khakriv, fortunatelly shot down). And they are symbols of Russian power. One of the few that still stands largely undefeated in this war; from propagadna viewpoint, loss of one could be comparable to sinking of Moskva if not even more.

Edited August 11, 2022 by Beleg85

[Grigb]

So, time for a map. According to RU sources today again no changes (they are saying it openly now). So, instead of the evening map I finished Avdeyivka map.

Discussion:

• Avdyivka is the main UKR stronghold at Donetsk. RU offensive will be failure (and big political one) unless they take Avdyivka.
• Avdyivka seems to be so well prepared/fortified that RU already publicly says they are not interested in assaulting it.Only in surrounding it (that's why Pisky is so important for RU)
• All battles so far happen in positions outside of Avdyivka.  And they look more like probing attacks than real assaults (see above)
• The northern flank of UKR forward defenses (left on the map) is anchored on Krasnohorivka settlement. RU constantly put pressure on it but I do not see any serious assaults there to put it as contested (probably they did try to assault it in the past but failed hard). 
• To the east of Krasnohorivka (above on the map) a hill named Yar Sukhiy (it could be name of creek under the hill). The hill and the road are currently under RU control. It looks like UKR are pushing RU back, but it is unconfirmed.
• Further south there is small settlement Vesele which is most likely contested but not captured. And Kamyanka settlement which is most likely captured but unconfirmed.
• Next, we have Donetsk Filtration Station which is supposed to be neutral territory (it supposed to be working) but so far little to no info. Across the road is wood, RU reported it is UKR heavily fortified position.
• The southern flank of forward defenses consists of several UKR positions: industrial zone (seems contested as RU often claim they are fighting there but probably just probing there), Tsar Hunt, Wolf Bridge aka Orel and Zenit. None of them reported as taken.
• Position at Vent Shaft was taken around 31-Jul (could be UKR withdrew, and RU followed).

So, unless they take one of the above UKR positions any RU claims about advancing at Avdyivka can be safely disregarded.

Edited August 11, 2022 by Grigb

[akd]

7 hours ago, akd said:

Maj. Pavel Shtepa, unit unknown:

 

@sburke @Kinophile

Maj. Shtepa was GRU Spetnaz, but specific unit still unknown.

2 hours ago, Haiduk said:

@sburke

Russian volunteer, former UFSIN serviceman (jail guard) and later private security company employee, which came to Luhansk as far as in 2014 and raised from private to "major" of "LPR-promotion". Last known duty - commander of recon company of 6th LPR cossack motor-rifle regiment in the rank of "captain". Since he became "major", probably he was regimental cheif of recon or some else. Got lost during assault of Popasna on 1st of March

This article suggests he died still serving as commander of the LPR 6th Cossack MRR’s Recon Company:

https://chulymgazeta.ru/nash-zemljak-andrej-gusarov-pogib-osvobozhdaja-doneckuju-i-luganskuju-narodnye-respubliki/

 

[Calamine Waffles]

3 hours ago, Haiduk said:

@MikeyD

Small phonetical lesson

Unlike in Russian, where the letter "Г" transmits only the voiced velar plosive [g] sound like in English "gain",  Ukrainian language has two sounds: " ґ " for voiced velar plosive [g] and "Г" for voiced glottal fricative [ɦ] (like in the English "home", but slightly closer to [g], then in English ).

Sound [ɦ] is common, in that time, when [g] is very rare and apperaed only in less than two dozens words. 

Until new rules of translitaration were introduced about 5 or more years ago, usually words with "г" letters transliterated through "g" letter on Russian language manner. And this practice was usual and for western media. So, because of this you can see "Grim-2" spelling, though according to new transliteration rules  "Hrim-2" is more correct.

But there is some confusions with pronunciation - theese new rules have struck on established speech habits. For example the word "hobbit" in Ukrainian spelled like "хоббіт", which corresponded to Russian pronunciation [khobbit], but now new spelling rules demand all foreign words on "h" letter to write through "г" letter -  "гоббіт" with pronunciation [ɦobbit]. But historically all foreign words with initial "h" letter always spelled and prononciated in Ukrianian with "kh" sound, because it more close to English "home", than to UKR variant of [ɦ], which I just can't transmit here

So, when I see the spelling like Hrim, my mind, habits and logic cry to me to read it like "khrim" 

That's interesting. I'm more familiar with Russian where words that begin with "h" in English (e.g. Hitler, Herman, howitzer, etc.) become "g" in Russian (Gitler, German, gaubitsa, etc.). They almost never use "х".

Defense Express in their 2021 article refers to the whole thing as "OTRK Sapsan" as do the people in their video, but in others they cal it "OTRK Hrim-2". There are also pictures with "GROM" on the prospective missile itself.

 

[paxromana]

7 hours ago, akd said:

@Haiduk added that he was Deputy Commander for Combat Training for the Division.

It's interesting - it seems, on the evidence available, that one of the 'tricks' Putler has been using to keep his forces at the front 'manned' (for some limited values of 'manned') is to commit some or all of the 'Third Battalions' ... the unit training Battalions which actually do the training of new conscripts and enlistees. This is, historically, a desperation move (as if it hasn't been obvious that Putler has been operating in desperation mode since the first week or so) -- it's what the Germans did in early 1945, they converted all of the Training units in each Wehrkreis (the ones that did all the primary training) into combat units ... it gave a momentary manpower boost but meant no more units could be generated.

Reports of extremely abbreviated 'training' periods even for Russian (as opposed to treasonous Ukrainian LDNR/DPR) troops of a few days to a week or two would tend to indicate there aren't many trainers left. So even if Putler decided to mobilise and introduce more widespread conscription ... who would train the new recruits to be more than the worst sort of cannon fodder?

Anbd it would be pretty obvious to said recruits that that's what they were ... which would do wonders for their morale!

Edited August 11, 2022 by paxromana

[sburke]

1 hour ago, akd said:

It’s Moldova, not Ukraine.

funny you should mention that...

Signs Romania is readying to defend Moldova against Russia (msn.com)

[chuckdyke]

any different opinion about this?

 

[FancyCat]

9 hours ago, Grigb said:

RU Cossacks mainly are LARPers or bandits. Often both. And every Cossack that is motivated to fight is already at the frontline. Which is a minority of Cossacks because as I said they are either LARPers or bandits. Here is good quote:

Moscow, July 6. The All-Russian ataman Nikolay Doluda criticized the leaders of the Cossack detachments due to insufficient participation in the special operation on demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine. His statements were made during a teleconference between the leaders of Cossack societies.

Doluda stressed that the atamans have not yet been able to withdraw a satisfactory number of Cossacks; in general, their reluctance to play the role of "defenders of the Russian land" is noticeable. According to the All-Russian ataman, the Cossacks' avoidance of participation in the SVO casts doubt on the very meaning of the revival of the Cossack movement in Russia...

In the four months since the beginning of the special operation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, the Cossacks have not shown themselves too actively at the front. According to some reports, no more than five thousand people went from the Cossack detachments to fight Nazism, who mainly perform rear functions and do not fight on the front line. At the same time, the Cossacks in Russia do not stop organizing festivals, reconstructions, exhibitions and other cultural events all the time.

Others and myself have stated this, but I must say it again, your contributions are so useful to us all. Thanks for taking the time to translate and bring insights to everyone. 

[Lethaface]

On 8/9/2022 at 1:49 AM, Battlefront.com said:

About the Kherson situation.

It is entirely possible that Ukraine might not conduct a full scale offensive in Kherson for one or more reasons, but if they don't do it there then I don't think we should expect it elsewhere.  Ukraine is concentrating a wide array of its newly acquired offensive capabilities there already.  Including, it now seems, HARM attacks on AD equipment.  If Ukraine intended to do something big elsewhere, we'd see similar activities at a minimum.

What Ukraine is doing now is systematically weakening the Russian forces on the western bank of the Dnepr.  Since time is on their side they can afford to do it correctly.  Even allowing Russia to bring in replacements is smart because this means Russia is taking stuff from other sectors and presenting it on a silver platter to be destroyed without Ukraine having to redeploy or expand its capabilities.

Think about Combat Mission.  Would you rather the enemy feed all of its tanks, one at a time, into a single well equipped ambush spot of your choosing OR would you rather maneuver those same forces around the battlefield to take out the tanks wherever the enemy might want them to be?  I know the answer so let's move on

Ukraine doesn't have to launch a huge all-or-nothing offensive to defeat Russia's forces in Kherson.  Ukraine doesn't even need to have numerical or even equipment superiority to win this.  What Ukraine needs is the ability to choose where and when it attacks Russian force that are operating with restricted (ideally highly restricted) LOCs.

Thinking about this in wargaming terms, let's say that Russia has 10,000 troops present and this force requires 1 unit of food, 1 unit of ammo, and 1 unit of fuel per day per soldier to function under current conditions.  Let's be generous and assume that the ferries and remaining bridge capacity allows 10,000 units of each type of supply per day.  Which means as long as the status quo remains the same, Russia can hold out indefinitely.

Now let's say Ukraine hits a limited sector of Russia's frontage and obligates it to triple it's supply needs (expended and lost due to combat) for that specific sector.  Let's say it involves 1000 soldiers.  This means it now has to bring in 12,000 units of supply for the same sized force every single day.  If the capacity is only 10,000, this means every day supplies will be short of what is needed.  In 5 days it is the equivalent of having 1 day without any supply at all.  If this small amount of pressure is exerted over a month (30 days) it is the equivalent of Russian forces going without ANY supply for 6 whole days. 

This is with Ukraine actively engaging 10% of the Russia force.  Does anybody seriously think Ukraine can't apply that amount of pressure?

Obviously my numbers are pulled out of my arse, so they shouldn't be taken verbatim.  The point I'm making, however, is sound.  Ukraine only has to apply enough force against Russia to over commit its ability to supply them.  I believe Ukraine could do it today if it wanted to, but maybe with higher risk than it wants to take.

Steve

I (too) can see Ukraine choosing not to attack in strength anywhere as long as Russia has sufficient assets to throw against such an attack - and turn it into a bloody grind. Why would they? Lot's of things been doing 'splodey stuff in Russia's rear lately, making Russians die for their country without Ukrainians joining them. 

Like you say, if you can take out the enemy in a piecemeal fashion why force a decisive engagement?. Especially when the enemy seems to be looking for the latter. Reminds me of 'emptiness and fullness' written by some old Chinese man which features here on a somewhat regular basis ;-).

Of course ending the war sooner has merits of its own, but given the context I'd say 'more haste less speed' applies.

[Huba]

My favorite talking head Wolski and his buddy Kamizela published a 50 minute video discussing the attack on Peski. A short summary of their points:

- 4 ammo stores were the only object of attack, all other damage is secondary

- cratering suggests weapons with big warheads that buried themselves in the ground before exploding

- 2 of the craters are a bit off from centers of the stores, suggesting these are caused by the warheads themselves and not stored ammunition going off

- ballistic missiles are unlikely as there were no sings of air defence at all. There is a S400 unit just north of Peski that hould pick the missiles up. 

- their bet is that it were cruise missiles flying a route over the sea and then perhaps attacking over ground from the south, avoiding air defense thanks to superior ISR

- Neptunes are an obvious option of course, with the caveat that their original GPS/ INS module might be not up to the task

- alternatively, something air launched that was integrated with UA jets same way as HARM.

- SLAM-ER would be the first candidate from US weapons

- only possible non-US weapon would be Storm Shadow. UK reportedly has some at the end of shelf life... 

[Beleg85]

32 minutes ago, Huba said:

My favorite talking head Wolski and his buddy Kamizela published a 50 minute video discussing the attack on Peski. A short summary of their points:

This was interesting talk indeed. They heavily opted for SLAM-ER or Storm Shadow; curiously, they skipped on Hrim-2 very fast, believing it was not in production. Oldest UK-made Storm Shadows reportedly are close to reach their shelf life, so could be good (if costly) option here. I hope it was Ben Wallace initiative to perhaps give Ukrainains something extra, he was very cocky last weeks...

Perhaps this Murz post was translated here before, worth to note:

https://wartranslated.com/lpr-blogger-and-volunteer-murz-on-why-the-russian-advance-in-the-donbass-is-so-slow/

[JonS]

7 hours ago, Markus86 said:

Did you read the exceptions? 

There are good historical (and affects-the-future) reasons for the Estonian exclusions. During The Soviet a lot of Russians were moved to the Baltic States for military, science, political, economic, etc reasons. Funnily enough, during The Soviet the Baltics were actually a pretty great place to be posted. Better food, slightly free-er, better value for money, nice people, good beaches, etc. So a lot of them stayed, or went back later. A LOT of them. So many that they /still/ make up a quarter of Latvia's population.

Then the singing revolution came, at a time when the Kremlin was a bit busy with other things. Things like a concurrent coup in Moscow and multiple other SSRs collectively going "screw this, we are OUT". So the revolution was a success, and hey presto; three new countries. Congratulations! 

All that was left was the minor problem of what to do with all the Russians. Lithuania went hard-core, and just expelled them all - helped by the lack of a common land border (ignoring Kalingrad), which meant there wasn't really much Russia could do about it.

Estonian looked across their border and noticed that Leningrad was RIGHT THERE, so took a more live and let live approach.

Latvia was literally and figuratively in the middle. The Russians were 'encouraged' to go home ... but for many of them by now Latvia WAS home, they had no other.

This has left rather large expat Russian communities in both places, which are in an awkward position. Russia doesn't really want the back, but neither do their host countries, and many many of them are functionally stateless because due to official policy and personal choice they don't have Latvian citizenship (including descendants born since 1991) and Russia won't give them citizenship. It's tricky, yo.

The exclusions should be seen in that light - despite legal technicalities, a lot of these 'Russians' are for all practical purposes Estonian or Latvian. Restricting their movement would create a whole lot of really unnecessary anger amongst these expat communities, for absolutely no benefit to the Latvian state.

Keep the Russian citizens out? Sure!

Restrict the movement of your own people? ... ahhh, no. Dumb idea.

Edited August 12, 2022 by JonS

[Calamine Waffles]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

- ballistic missiles are unlikely as there were no sings of air defence at all. There is a S400 unit just north of Peski that hould pick the missiles up. 

- their bet is that it were cruise missiles flying a route over the sea and then perhaps attacking over ground from the south, avoiding air defense thanks to superior ISR

- Neptunes are an obvious option of course, with the caveat that their original GPS/ INS module might be not up to the task

- alternatively, something air launched that was integrated with UA jets same way as HARM.

- SLAM-ER would be the first candidate from US weapons

- only possible non-US weapon would be Storm Shadow. UK reportedly has some at the end of shelf life... 

Do they think Russian radars are only pointing in one direction?

[sburke]

13 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

Do they think Russian radars are only pointing in one direction?

heheh  Moskva anyone?  Sorry just a fun memory.

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

This was interesting talk indeed. They heavily opted for SLAM-ER or Storm Shadow; curiously, they skipped on Hrim-2 very fast, believing it was not in production. Oldest UK-made Storm Shadows reportedly are close to reach their shelf life, so could be good (if costly) option here. I hope it was Ben Wallace initiative to perhaps give Ukrainains something extra, he was very cocky last weeks...

Perhaps this Murz post was translated here before, worth to note:

https://wartranslated.com/lpr-blogger-and-volunteer-murz-on-why-the-russian-advance-in-the-donbass-is-so-slow/

 

1 hour ago, Huba said:

My favorite talking head Wolski and his buddy Kamizela published a 50 minute video discussing the attack on Peski. A short summary of their points:

- 4 ammo stores were the only object of attack, all other damage is secondary

- cratering suggests weapons with big warheads that buried themselves in the ground before exploding

- 2 of the craters are a bit off from centers of the stores, suggesting these are caused by the warheads themselves and not stored ammunition going off

- ballistic missiles are unlikely as there were no sings of air defence at all. There is a S400 unit just north of Peski that hould pick the missiles up. 

- their bet is that it were cruise missiles flying a route over the sea and then perhaps attacking over ground from the south, avoiding air defense thanks to superior ISR

- Neptunes are an obvious option of course, with the caveat that their original GPS/ INS module might be not up to the task

- alternatively, something air launched that was integrated with UA jets same way as HARM.

- SLAM-ER would be the first candidate from US weapons

- only possible non-US weapon would be Storm Shadow. UK reportedly has some at the end of shelf life... 

Plugged in Polish Ukrainian reporters/commentators aren't going to start bragging about the carefully not shiny new Polish/Ukrainian joint missile development and manufacturing program until they are told too.

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, chuckdyke said:

any different opinion about this?

 

Not bad analysis based on SOME of the evidence we have.  However, he's made a couple of assumptions that I don't think are supported by the evidence he didn't mention at all... the videos of the explosions.  Here's the problems I see:

• No explanation of the (minimum) 4x MASSIVE explosions that were seen, especially the two synchronized ones.  Planting some C-4 just isn't likely to do that.
• Since he doesn't address the MASSIVE explosions, he doesn't consider this when puzzling over what caused the damage of the planes in the berms.  Specifically the explosions throwing flaming metal debris (evidence of this around #1 and below #3A) or fireball going along the ground close enough to cook off the planes (plausible for ones near #2 and #1).  Further, he points to the smaller craters and doesn't explain how they got there, because if he did then he'd see the flaw in his thinking that the aircraft in the berms could have been hit by similar flung munitions/debris.
• He is wrong about the "scorch marks" seen on the tarmac proper.  I thought they were scorch marks based on one image, but I've seen other pre-attack images that show the scorch marks were already there.  Must have something to do with the planes firing up their engines after the roll forward a few meters.  Or something like that.
• He dismisses the idea of missile strikes almost totally because he doesn't see how they could have destroyed the planes without hitting each individually.  And he is correct, there is zero evidence that there were specific attacks from the air for each of those destroyed planes.  Problem is he didn't properly assess the explosions as caught on video.
• In any case, he theorizes that they placed explosives on each plane to explain how the aircraft got destroyed, yet only one fully exploded on the tarmac and probably a half dozen were removed intact (though likely damaged).  Unlikely they would get that many explosives placed incorrectly when they did so well on the others.  So either the partisans/SOF didn't bother with them or they were too far outside of the strike zone to be fully destroyed by the strikes.
• Early on he points to #1 and says something like "this looks like a crater" then dismisses it as some sort of berm, despite pre-strike imagery not showing a berm there.

In conclusion, he bases his theory this was a ground attack by partisans and/or SOF based on things which he doesn't think have other explanations, yet there are.  He also has not taken the most important visual information of the attacks and put that into his analysis at all.  Evidence that casts significant doubt on a ground attack.

As for his analysis of how a ground attack might have happened, it's fine.  And believe me, I'd love for this to have been a ground attack!  I just don't think it's the most likely explanation.

On a positive note... his over reliance on using just two images to do his analysis made me go back and look through my collection of images again.  In doing so I decided to remove S2 (secondary 2, building south of tarmac) from the mix.  I think the image I used for that played tricks on me.  Other post-attack images seem to show the building intact.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, Huba said:

My favorite talking head Wolski and his buddy Kamizela published a 50 minute video discussing the attack on Peski. A short summary of their points:

Obviously I couldn't make anything of the discussion in the video.  Polish has way too much going on for my meager language skills   But I can comment on what you wrote about their discussion:

3 hours ago, Huba said:

- 4 ammo stores were the only object of attack, all other damage is secondary

Correct, though I think the aircraft were an intended target (even if "bonus"). 

I think this point is critical to the whole "missile vs. SOF" debate.  SOF would have gone after the aircraft first and been satisfied with minor fireworks from the ammo/fuel storage facilities.  Missile attacks, on the other hand, would do the opposite due to not being able to fire two dozen missiles to take out the aircraft.

3 hours ago, Huba said:

- cratering suggests weapons with big warheads that buried themselves in the ground before exploding

Yup.  And the visuals of the explosions rule out things like airburst, thermobaric, or any form of cluster munition.

3 hours ago, Huba said:

- 2 of the craters are a bit off from centers of the stores, suggesting these are caused by the warheads themselves and not stored ammunition going off

Yup.  And it is consistent with the CEP of such missiles.  They'd aim dead center on their targets, but are unlikely to hit exactly that.  I estimate they were off center by maybe 15m or so.  Which is incredibly accurate, but within realistic boundaries.  A quick shows ATACAMS is 10m-50m depending on the specific model.

3 hours ago, Huba said:

- ballistic missiles are unlikely as there were no sings of air defence at all. There is a S400 unit just north of Peski that hould pick the missiles up. 

This presumes the radar was on, functioning, properly crewed, and any number of other variables that Russians are known to be slack on.  It's also possible that SOF took out or otherwise interfered with these stations.  We'd likely not have that sort of information unless Ukraine provided it to us, which of course they have no reason to do at this time.

3 hours ago, Huba said:

- their bet is that it were cruise missiles flying a route over the sea and then perhaps attacking over ground from the south, avoiding air defense thanks to superior ISR

What cruise missl

3 hours ago, Huba said:

- Neptunes are an obvious option of course, with the caveat that their original GPS/ INS module might be not up to the task

Ruled out as unlikely due to range unless fired from a ship that managed to get into better range.  Also ruled out as their warheads are unlikely to make that sort of impact crater.

3 hours ago, Huba said:

- alternatively, something air launched that was integrated with UA jets same way as HARM.

This I have no problem with.  GPS guided munitions + preprogrammed coordinates = all kinds of launch options.

3 hours ago, Huba said:

- SLAM-ER would be the first candidate from US weapons

Warhead also seems to be a bit light for the task.  Also, Ukraine explicitly stated it was their weaponry and the US explicitly stated it was not supplied by the US.  If it was a US weapon I would expect both parties to not mention origins at all instead of bald face lying.  So I think that alone rules it out unless there's other evidence to suggest it.

3 hours ago, Huba said:

- only possible non-US weapon would be Storm Shadow. UK reportedly has some at the end of shelf life... 

Similar problems to their SLAM-ER theory.

In conclusion, I think they have the basic narrative correct, but they have selected unlikely candidates for what caused the explosions.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Again, someone wanting to advance a theory of a ground attack or rather small munitions needs to explain these

These two videos were taken from slightly different angles from north of the airbase.

 

I geolocated the 2nd video to a house somewhere in this neighborhood (I think my image isn't up-to-date with construction):

 45° 7'22.80"N 33°37'2.12"E

BTW, I think the second video is incorrectly edited.  Evidence in first video, and others, suggests the twin explosions happened last.  However, it's very speculative so maybe the video is correctly edited and it's the twins were in the middle.

First video is from somewhere in this general area.  I'm not bothering to try and narrow it down:

 45° 6'59.00"N 33°34'38.60"E

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

12 hours ago, poesel said:

I don't think the Russian public is anywhere close to panic. Sure, those on the beach left in a hurry, but for the average moskovite this has hardly any impact on day-to-day life.

I don't think the Russian people, on the whole, are anywhere close to panic either.  What I was talking about is this is the first time any large chunk of the Russian citizenry had a reason to, and in fact did, panic.  This is the first time we've seen such a thing in 6 months of war.  Even the attacks in Belgorod didn't seem to phase people.  However, what we saw since the attack is abject panic amongst thousands of Russians.  Maybe 10s of thousands.

What is the significance of this?  Panic is a powerful thing.  It gets people's attention.  And this specific incident certainly did.  Whose attention?  Well, for one other Russians.  Does this matter?  Perhaps not right now, but I can almost guarantee you that any Russian citizen who heard of this attack and saw evidence of the panicking citizens paid attention to it in a way they might not have paid attention to the war before this event.  That sort of thing might not show evidence of mattering now, but it can matter later.

Steve