How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Artkin]

The Kerch Peninsula is absolutely NOT where you want to be in the defense. I wouldn't even want to begin digging trenches. Cringe. 

[LongLeftFlank]

4 minutes ago, acrashb said:

Your ability to rapidly find relevant, but highly-obscure video 'memes' is - both awesome and disturbing.

 

 

[chrisl]

2 minutes ago, RandomCommenter said:

I think we are agreed that a drive to Moscow risks nuclear war.

Where we disagree is whether or not Ukraine retaking Crimea risks nuclear war.

And I agree that we are dealing with insane people and that the cost of assuming something that just ain't so is very high. Nobody wants mushroom clouds.

We have discussed Russia's threshold for nuclear weapons before. Perun put out a good video on this months ago.

He mentions here four reasons the Russians say they will use nuclear weapons:

Now will the loss of Crimea put "the very existence of the state" in jeopardy. Clearly no. Although it may well put the existence of the current regime in jeopardy.

To me, this is Ukraine's best chance it will ever have to get Crimea back. Once the Russian army is defeated and Ukraine will have lots of Western kit and mobilized troops the balance of power will be very favorable to Ukraine.

And if we say that no, they cannot get Crimea back because of some sham poll done eight years ago, well, that is an argument for the Republic of Kherson being an indivisible part of Russia (I know we have not got the count yet from the "referenda" taking place today but I think we can guess what the outcome will be).

I think acrashb has a good post directly above talking about Quebec. Now if somebody wants to say, OK, we agree that we will have a referendum on whether Crimea secedes from Ukraine or rejoins Russia in say 25 years time, I would be OK with that. But to do a referendum now? After the Russians moved people in and Ukrainians left and the Tartars get chewed up on the front lines as a modern form of ethnic cleansing? No. 

Why is it important to regain Crimea? Because then Ukraine will control the Black Sea. A Russian fleet in Sevastopol is an ongoing threat to Odesa not to mention Mariupol / Berdyansk / Melitopol / Kherson. And the end state here is Ukraine in NATO. And NATO does not admit members with border disputes. So this needs to be resolved.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Post-war, I'm not sure that Sevastopol will ever actually be helpful to Russia.  If Ukraine has access to modern ISR and anti-ship missiles, the only threat is missiles from subs.  There will be no invasion threat.  Throw in some ASW and the sub threat likely goes away, too.  It will probably go away anyway - postwar Russia isn't going to have the resources to maintain a Black Sea fleet, and it will only be a matter of time before you just have to keep an eye on the tugs to know where the subs are.  Given the way the Russian military has self-destructed, Russia is going to need to come to terms with the fact that the only thing providing the facade of it being a world power is the nuclear weapons, and it no longer has the economy, or likely the technical capability, to maintain those indefinitely.  Russia can try to maintain a BSF, but it really won't be able to project power and if it tries to project piracy or destruction after some kind of peace agreement is reached, it likely won't take much for other Black Sea powers to erase the remnants of the fleet.  

[G.I. Joe]

1 hour ago, acrashb said:

Crimea, like any other piece of land, belongs to "those who reside there", not based on any written constitutions (which in theory codify both natural principles and operations / administration to enact those principles) but on the overall natural principle of self-determination.

This has been discussed; some more perspective and addressing of topics below.

In Canada, Quebec (a large province) has had two referenda on separation.  The last one - 1995 - was on the brink of success, and as a result there is now a federal law on the conditions for separation, called the "Clarity Act".  

What about the portions of a province that don't want to secede?  For example, in Quebec there are many regions / enclaves who wish to remain in Canada - mostly Anglo, but not all.  What about the various indigenous groups, most governed by the Indian Act, that prefer to be part of Canada vs. part of Quebec?  

What about the people who have been run out of the province?  Various pieces of legislation have pushed mostly-Anglos out of Quebec for about fifty years (I don't have a reference for that, but I recall kids in high school who exited with their families as a result of concern about their social and economic future).  Should they get a say in the next referendum, if there is one?

Why do lines on a map matter?  Because they set boundaries for social, economic and legal systems and opportunities, and strategic risks and opportunities.  They matter a lot.  If an American crosses the border to Canada with a restricted (in Canada) firearm (and no paperwork), serious consequences.  If a Canadian lands in Singapore with a joint - very serious consequences.

Applying this to Crimea / Donbas:

• most importantly and differently from the Quebec example, they were taken forcibly and recently by a foreign state, so they should be returned "to" the original government to prevent the moral hazard where, in future, other states nibble provinces from each other.  If something is successful, it will be repeated. Having said that, the costs and risks of returning them to Ukraine will be and are being weighed against the moral hazard issue by Ukraine and its supporters.  The Ukraine government's maximalist position of all of the Donbas and Crimea is either a firm position or setting a stance for eventual negotiation - no way to tell.
• once returned: do the people in those regions want to be part of Ukraine?  If after a few years of stabilization, rebuilding, return of kidnapped and displaced persons, purging of RU agents and land occupiers (people who moved on to stolen land vs. purchased a nice house voluntarily on the market), there is overwhelming support for separation, what then?  The two basic alternatives are the use of force, which always results in insurgency and civil war, or a negotiated handshake and well-wishes with post-separation cultural, political and economic ties maintained.  On the first, perhaps civil war / insurgency is worth it in return for keeping the Russian Armed Forces physically further away from the rest of Ukraine - or not.  On the second (and the first ,for that matter), for the minority who wish to remain "in" Ukraine - sucks to be you, see the Quebec example above.  

So there is no simple answer, and no risk-free way forward.  I'm on the "return them and them sort it out in a few years" camp because on balance, I think that that minimizes total (present, near-future and mid-term future) risk and maximizes 'fairness', which means different things to different people but unites the people (not governments) of the West. "Fair" and "realpolitik" are not always the same thing - when in conflict, choose realpolitik and try to turn it into fair later, but fair should weigh in.

One issue that hangs over all of this is the Western idea that every problem can have a good solution with sufficient good will and energy applied to same.  History, the present, and common sense tells us that not all problems have a solution that rises above neutral.  The current problem has, I think, at best a neutral outcome and likely only choices between bad, really bad, disastrously bad, and catastrophically bad.  Or, between ungood and double-plus ungood.

Going back to uncertainty, the Russian state could suffer a near-term peripheral collapse which would change the calculus entirely - my prediction on this is early 2026.  But it could be earlier, later, or not at all.

Someone - possibly the_capt - said that one good alternative is to leave the post 2014 borders, wait for Russian  to collapse and / or to abuse and neglect Donbas / Crimea and then try to re-unite them with Ukraine.  Not a bad idea - but strike while the iron is hot, and if not hot enough now, then make it hot by striking.  If we wait, apathy and inertia set in and the status quo gets entrenched - and Russia will never respect the will of the regions, so if in future they wish to re-unite it will be bloody regardless.

I get more "likes" from memes than from determined typing, so here is a meme  :

 

 

 

Very good overview... however, when it comes to the conclusion I tend to agree more with Steve and TheCapt that the cost-benefit analysis leans more towards the long game...

[Aragorn2002]

6 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

What about Prussians?

Only a letter difference. 

I love Prussians. Always have. Always will. If it wasn't for Blucher you and I would be speaking French.

[benpark]

20 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

"we will sell no wine before its time"

The Russian army thought it was Orson Welles in the 1930's, but this guy showed up to the Big Show instead.

"Dzzzt do'n'ything?"

 

[Chibot Mk IX]

3 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

 

Option 2: After a breakthrough in the Barvinok - Bohorodychne area, the main group should break through in a straight line towards Dar'ivka.

 

There are two difficulties here:

1. the AFU prefers to advance on roads, and there are fields here. But as long as it's dry, this shouldn't be an obstacle. There are about 24 km to cover, it can be done in a day. There is bocage (mixed woodland and pasture) in the area, which will help with concealment.

2. The second problem is possible Russian Army strongholds in settlements and villages that would have to be bypassed. This means that forces must be allocated to attack them.

The route avoids large population centres. The Russians usually defend them, neglecting the smaller ones.....

 

 

Glad to see more discussion on tactics, operational planning etc. But this option 2 sounds too risky. 

Only 24km, sounds like a short distance. But I believe he underestimated the difficulty of cross country movement, ferry through two streams and one river (although they are likely dried right now). The terrain provide mediocre concealment from aerial surveillance, little protection from artillery's bombardment. A well placed minefield from MLRS could make the whole column stuck in the open like sitting ducks, while the flank is exposed to RA's counter attack. And here is the last issue. How to deal with RA's counter attack?  RA's counter attack force's assembly area will be placed in the urban, away from UA's surveillance, so they could enjoy some surprise here. 

This kind of maneuver can be a final blow to an already deeply weekend , almost reach breakpoint enemy. But it is too risky when enemy is still strong.

 

[danfrodo]

Good short summary of situation east/SE of Oskil river, plus a bit on T72 vs M1 Abrams.  Actually had a couple bits about the T72 I didn't know.  I really know WW2 tanks well, but still am learning on modern -- if a tank design from 1972 is modern.

LIBERAL SITE, ENTER AT OWN RISK

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/9/22/2124598/-Ukraine-update-Ukraine-reportedly-breaks-Russian-lines-east-of-Oskil-River

 

[womble]

4 minutes ago, RandomCommenter said:

Now will the loss of Crimea put "the very existence of the state" in jeopardy. Clearly no. Although it may well put the existence of the current regime in jeopardy.

No, but it could well be considered to put a crimp in their nuclear forces' response actions: the BSF has ships that can fire missiles that could be nuclear-tipped, no?

Now, for me that line has already been crossed and ignored with the attacks on that airbase in Crimea, since it is a potential base for nuclear assets, but that wouldn't stop Putin if he wanted to legalise his way to the Big Red Button, I think (which is sorta fair enough; there's a difference between an airbase and a boomer pen).

7 minutes ago, RandomCommenter said:

Why is it important to regain Crimea? Because then Ukraine will control the Black Sea. A Russian fleet in Sevastopol is an ongoing threat ...

Not once HIMARS is in range or Hrim gets into serial production, it's not. At least not a credible one, any more than the threat of a northern hook out of Belarus is, today.

9 minutes ago, RandomCommenter said:

...the end state here is Ukraine in NATO. And NATO does not admit members with border disputes. So this needs to be resolved.

Hmmm. I think this bears re-evaluating. Ukraine-not-in-NATO has beaten back the invading super-army. If they maintain good relations with NATO, including non-NATO mutual defense pacts with the likes of Poland and Romania and the Baltics, their supply of HIMARS rockets will remain flowing, they'll have options to purchase heavy gear from Rheinmetal or General Dynamics (I mean Abrams, not Ajax - I'm not a monster  ), at their choice, and they'll know they have to maintain their guard against the feral bear to their east, which will not have any of those options, nor even the options they started this war with for another 30 years. I think they might be confident they can do this as many times as they need to, and that their friends will continue to back them with supplies and sanctions against the aggressor state. I think that the reactions of the "West" so far has largely demonstrated that this "international regime" does, actually, still work.

I don't even see a need for UKR to sign a peace treaty with RUS. RoK seems to be doing just fine in the "sane family" while having an unresolved border dispute with their northern relatives. Freeze the conflict at the start '22 borders for now, and next time Russia has a paroxysm of self-destruction, or when the Donbas finally discard their Soviet-tinted spectacles and realise their future is so much brighter as part of a "Black Sea Tiger" nation, welcome their wayward kin back into the fold.

And while I've been typing, there have been 11 new replies, so sorry if I'm repeating anything

 

[danfrodo]

2 minutes ago, Chibot Mk IX said:

Glad to see more discussion on tactics, operational planning etc. But this option 2 sounds too risky. 

Only 24km, sounds like a short distance. But I believe he underestimated the difficulty of cross country movement, ferry through two streams and one river (although they are likely dried right now). The terrain provide mediocre concealment from aerial surveillance, little protection from artillery's bombardment. A well placed minefield from MLRS could make the whole column stuck in the open like sitting ducks, while the flank is exposed to RA's counter attack. And here is the last issue. How to deal with RA's counter attack?  RA's counter attack force's assembly area will be placed in the urban, away from UA's surveillance, so they could enjoy some surprise here. 

This kind of maneuver can be a final blow to an already deeply weekend , almost reach breakpoint enemy. But it is too risky when enemy is still strong.

 

I am coming around to your way of thinking on Kherson.  There's a lot of RU packed in there and they've had time to set up defenses.  This could take a while, unfortunately.  This kessel is such a  wildcard in what happens for Putin.  If it did collapse w huge RU prisoner loss, could Putin survive that?  

[Battlefront.com]

27 minutes ago, RandomCommenter said:

Now will the loss of Crimea put "the very existence of the state" in jeopardy. Clearly no. Although it may well put the existence of the current regime in jeopardy.

Ack!  That's you using your logic, not Russian nationalist logic.  This is a very dangerous mistake to make!

Remember, this is the exact reason why Combat Mission (you guys remember that game, right?) has asymmetric Victory Conditions.  Just because you see things a particular way doesn't mean the other side sees things the same way.

The RU Nats are not sane.  They are fanatics and they have attached way more importance to Crimea than objectively they should.  Do not underestimate how they might respond if they see it slipping away.  That could be a mistake that stings for a couple thousand years.

27 minutes ago, RandomCommenter said:

To me, this is Ukraine's best chance it will ever have to get Crimea back. Once the Russian army is defeated and Ukraine will have lots of Western kit and mobilized troops the balance of power will be very favorable to Ukraine.

This is also incorrect.  Ukraine's military strength is going to improve for the foreseeable future.  Not just in terms of equipment, but their ability to use it proficiently.  Hell, they are improvising with this stuff right now... what do you think they're going to be like in a few years? 

On the other hand, Russia's military is in steady decline and this mobilization is likely going to crush it completely.  If Russia goes into internal political turmoil, it will be even worse than worse.

In the future there is a realistic scenario where Crimea asks to become a part of Ukraine again at zero military cost to Ukraine.

27 minutes ago, RandomCommenter said:

And if we say that no, they cannot get Crimea back because of some sham poll done eight years ago, well, that is an argument for the Republic of Kherson being an indivisible part of Russia (I know we have not got the count yet from the "referenda" taking place today but I think we can guess what the outcome will be).

Nobody here, least of all me, is saying that Crimea should remain a part of Russia because of a sham referendum.  That's not even in the mix for consideration.

However, we do know that in 2014 a significant portion of Crimea actively supported becoming a part of Russia.  The estimate is about 60%.  My guess is that every year that has gone by that number has either stagnated or gone down.  Now I'm sure it's lower than it was in 2014.  But whatever that number is, the amount of people in Crimea that fully support being a part of Russia is significant.  Might be best to wait for that number to decline some more before moving in.

27 minutes ago, RandomCommenter said:

I think acrashb has a good post directly above talking about Quebec. Now if somebody wants to say, OK, we agree that we will have a referendum on whether Crimea secedes from Ukraine or rejoins Russia in say 25 years time, I would be OK with that. But to do a referendum now? After the Russians moved people in and Ukrainians left and the Tartars get chewed up on the front lines as a modern form of ethnic cleansing? No. 

This is a separate reason to advocate taking back Crimea and/or the Donbas now vs. later.  And that is to spare the civilians there, even the pro-Russian ones, from suffering the wrath of a wounded genocidal regime.

27 minutes ago, RandomCommenter said:

Why is it important to regain Crimea? Because then Ukraine will control the Black Sea. A Russian fleet in Sevastopol is an ongoing threat to Odesa not to mention Mariupol / Berdyansk / Melitopol / Kherson. And the end state here is Ukraine in NATO. And NATO does not admit members with border disputes. So this needs to be resolved.

No, Russia's Black Sea Fleet days are over.  If they move westward they get sunk by Neptunes and Harpoons.  If they stay where they are they can be Hrim-2'd or ATACAM (if it is provided).  Unmanned vessels are also in the mix, as we have recently seen.

The Russians are sitting ducks already.  It's not going to get better for them with the passage of time.  Russia already can't afford its navy, even before this war, so you should expect that to be even worse later.  At some point even the Kremlin will not see much point in investing in the Black Sea Fleet even if it theoretically could.

Steve

[womble]

19 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

What about Prussians?

Only a letter difference. 

"Logically", they'd be "Porcs", wouldn't they? Think the French would've had an easier time in '70 if that had truly been the case.

 

[Lethaface]

1 hour ago, billbindc said:

 

Perusing the multiple reports out of Russia since the announcement of mobilization and the clearest conclusion one can come to is that these people are going to get absolutely slaughtered on the modern battlefield.

Yep

[Lethaface]

56 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

[throws back head and laughs insanely, like Bugs Bunny]

Lol how do you even find that stuff. Although Ren & Stimpy are great remind me of my teenage years when they were on tv here  

[LongLeftFlank]

3 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

Yep

These lads look big and fit, for a change. They look more like Ukrainians than Russians.

....Promise them Canadian LR status if they cross over without fuss, bringing their weapons. After paying their dues in the liberation, they can bring Sakhalin and Kamchatka into Canada with them (sorry Japan, snooze you lose mate).

...Perhaps I can get Poilievre to add that to the Tory platform, as an overseas voter.

[womble]

3 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

These lads look big and fit, for a change.

Someone upthread mentioned that the "old-looking" ones must be the ones with the leadership and maybe combat experience. I think that's a mistaken assessment, in most cases; they're just the ones who did their square-bashing and grass-painting-green the longest-ago.

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, Chibot Mk IX said:

Glad to see more discussion on tactics, operational planning etc. But this option 2 sounds too risky. 

Only 24km, sounds like a short distance. But I believe he underestimated the difficulty of cross country movement, ferry through two streams and one river (although they are likely dried right now). The terrain provide mediocre concealment from aerial surveillance, little protection from artillery's bombardment. A well placed minefield from MLRS could make the whole column stuck in the open like sitting ducks, while the flank is exposed to RA's counter attack. And here is the last issue. How to deal with RA's counter attack?  RA's counter attack force's assembly area will be placed in the urban, away from UA's surveillance, so they could enjoy some surprise here. 

This kind of maneuver can be a final blow to an already deeply weekend , almost reach breakpoint enemy. But it is too risky when enemy is still strong.

 

 

1 hour ago, danfrodo said:

I am coming around to your way of thinking on Kherson.  There's a lot of RU packed in there and they've had time to set up defenses.  This could take a while, unfortunately.  This kessel is such a  wildcard in what happens for Putin.  If it did collapse w huge RU prisoner loss, could Putin survive that?  

It's better to burn out / than it is to rust / the King is gone, but he's not forgotten.

But gents, this is where Air Power comes back into play, both conventional assets and drone swarms.  Everyone thought it would be the Chinese first to use this kind of thing. Wrong!

If the Iranians can export 'Saheed' buzz bombs that make a noticeable dent in UA defences, do you really believe the Western defence establishment can't source better weapons and crank them out by the thousand in 6 months (e.g. Turkey)?

(OK, maybe 6 months is pushing it)

...And then you have the conventional aircraft to follow up.

Every single RU AA position is under the Argus Eye, zeroed, in the crosshairs.  Their heavy guns, similarly.

You heard it here first:  air power has been MIA in this war, but just because the Russians couldn't pull it off, it doesn't mean it's gone for good.

Edited September 23, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Lethaface]

41 minutes ago, Aragorn2002 said:

I love Prussians. Always have. Always will. If it wasn't for Blucher you and I would be speaking French.

So you at least love 1/8 of my blood  No worries LLF, he's got enough love left. As long as that CMRT pack isn't delayed 

 

[Twisk]

Yesterday and the day before there has been a lot of talk about how far will Ukraine attack. I want to state out that I don't think that Ukraine will reach its 1991 borders militarily. However, I also think that its likely that Ukraine will enter the DPR/LPR.

My core reasoning for this is that the DPR/LPR have "fuzzy borders" and represent a significant amount of frontage.

So what do I mean by "fuzzy borders"? Unlike Crimea, LPR/DPR are areas with wide contiguous borders with Ukraine. So crossing them somewhere and grabbing a farm would be easy and hard for Russia to declare off limits. Would Russia go nuclear over the loss of Ivan's wheat farm? No. Well then what about going nuclear over a one horse town? likely not. And you can see how it becomes hard for Russia to red line these areas.

But more importantly I think the reason is frontage. I did a quick mockup

Assuming Russia loses everything west of the Dnipr and North of Luhansk you end up with the black lines representing static fronts if Ukraine doesn't enter LPR/DPR (and assuming they cannot bounce the Dnipr). By ruling out the "Republics" Ukraine is cutting Russian frontage from over 375 kilometers to less than half that, and essentially doing a huge favor for the Russian's given their increasingly limited military capability. 

I believe Ukraine has the military means to push through this shorter front, but why would you give your enemy a choke point of your own creation? Now obviously this doesn't necessarily mean that Ukraine pushes all the way through the LPR to the Russian border but I think it gives weight to the idea that the LPR/DPR territory isn't going to be avoided. By pushing into this terrain they more than double the amount of distance Russia needs to seriously consider defending.


edit: I also have been meaning to mention Crimea's situation gives the opportunity for the Russian's to use a nuclear strike in a non-direct way. If Ukraine begins to push across Perekop and the Russian's airburst a tactical nuke over the Sea of Azov it would very likely stop the attack without Russia suffering much in the way of consequences.

Edited September 23, 2022 by Twisk

[LongLeftFlank]

1 minute ago, Lethaface said:

So you at least love 1/8 of my blood  No worries LLF, he's got enough love left. As long as that CMRT pack isn't delayed 

 

No worries, I've just cracked the lid on a (thread relevant) topic that will win me my To The Right of Atilla the Hun wolfsangel once and for all. But that's for another day.

[Battlefront.com]

21 minutes ago, womble said:

Someone upthread mentioned that the "old-looking" ones must be the ones with the leadership and maybe combat experience. I think that's a mistaken assessment, in most cases; they're just the ones who did their square-bashing and grass-painting-green the longest-ago.

I'm wondering how much of it is chance rather than deliberate.  The standard Russian system is to fulfill quotas, so if some old duffer is easier to grab than a fit guy, then the old guy goes and they'll get the fit guy some other time.

For sure they are going to need officers.  For sure those officers are going to be older on average.

Steve

[Kraft]

Protests escalating further, RU Nats must be sweating profusely.

https://imgur.com/j90pkEH

I apologize in advance for taking the piss out of the résistance.

 

 

Edited September 23, 2022 by Kraft

[Lethaface]

More serious on the situation of 'what will Ukraine be able to do', I think it's important to remain flexible for Ukraine. Good chance they don't know what they will do yet. Of course plans/analysis etc are being made, but keep all options on the table. 
Should it be possible to take all of Crimea and Donbass without any nasty escalations from Russia and a population which is generally in support: of course (they'll) go for it. In case resistance intensifies or whatever else happens that will make it less prudent to push on into Crimea/wherever: pause to ponder the next step.
They don't have to choose right now whether to take Crimea back or not. And surely faith among us in the forum won't have much influence on either.

[The_Capt]

6 hours ago, Aragorn2002 said:

I don't know what that means, but I don't agree. 

You should put that on a T Shirt.

[Battlefront.com]

We all presumed it was going on, but still nice to see it.  US has warned if Russia uses nukes it will quickly find out it wasn't a good idea after all:

https://thehill.com/policy/international/3657842-us-has-privately-warned-russia-of-consequences-of-using-a-nuclear-weapon/

Steve