How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Anxel Torrente]

Is this war still going on? If you watch the news it seems that Donald Trump and wild fires caused by draught is what journalists are interested in.

I'm sure that in a couple of years this conflict will be just as remembered as the one in former Jugoslavia. With that I mean that people will say "War in Ukraine? What war in Ukraine?".

Edited August 14, 2022 by Anxel Torrente

[OldSarge]

It is Sunday morning (on my side of the pond) and time for another Perun release.
 

 

Timestamps:
00:00:00 -- Opening Words
00:01:34 -- What Am I Covering?
00:02:29 -- Today's Sponsor: MORNING BREW
00:03:36 -- Mobilisation - The Concept
00:05:20 -- The Soviet System
00:07:16 -- Ukraine's Reforms
00:09:12 -- The Ukrainian Mobilisation Experience
00:11:22 -- The Opening Callup
00:14:54 -- Evolving Mobilisation
00:17:55 -- Women in Service
00:20:12 -- Demography and Mobilisation
00:23:43 -- Where Are We Now?
00:24:58 -- How Much Materiel Does Ukraine Have?
00:26:25 -- Why I Don't Use Russian MOD Figures
00:28:16 -- Why I Don't Use Russian MOD Figures: The Examples
00:30:01 -- The Base-Loss-Replenish Method
00:33:38 -- Observed Equipment Method
00:34:20 -- The New
00:35:13 -- The Old
00:36:06 -- The Ugly
00:37:21 -- Statements/Observations
00:40:30 -- The Combined Picture
00:42:41 -- A Diverse Army
00:43:20 -- So What Needs To Happen?
00:46:28 -- Training & The Training Issue
00:49:43 -- Resolution Methods
00:51:52 -- Earned Veterancy
00:54:11 -- Scale and Sustainability
00:56:06 -- What Does This Mean?
00:58:18 -- Offensive Readiness
01:00:28 -- Future Potential?
01:01:48 -- Conclusions
01:02:54 -- Channel Update

A quote worth saving. Russians beware!

"I'm not convinced that there is a piece of military equipment yet designed that has half the endurance, toughness or reliability as a babushka"
-- Perun 0:20:11

Edited August 14, 2022 by OldSarge

[danfrodo]

This is some good news this morning (pacific coast time). 

1.  LongLeftFlank is back.  A weary world rejoices.  I don't always agree w him but the world is a richer place w his posts.

2.  Kherson bridge is falling down, falling down.  AD tries to intercept but we see lots of explosions at bridge and possible span falling.  That is more like it.  The Crimea attack is all good fun, but UKR still needs to take back its territory, starting w kherson.

3.  looks like more & more armored cars making it to UKR forces.  Not as good as AFVs but might provide  ability to move significant forces quickly around various sectors of the front, allow UKR to steal marches on RU.  AFVs w tracks would not be able to make large road moves w/o wearing down tracks -- and roads.

4.  I am still worried about what RU  will do as UKR partisan activity increases.  Collective punishment is what I am betting -- not that they aren't already doing some of that.

 

[LongLeftFlank]

5 minutes ago, Anxel Torrente said:

Is this war still going on? If you watch the news it seems that Donald Trump and wild fires caused by draught is what journalists are interested in.

I'm sure that in a couple of years this conflict will be just as remembered as the one in former Jugoslavia. With that I mean that people will say "War in Ukraine? What war in Ukraine?".

Hmm, other than the slow motion self-inflicted dismantling on what was once its own territory, of what was once a key Eurasian empire and global superpower holding (many of) the keys to Doomsday, sure, no doubt future historians will see no difference whatsoever....

@danfrodoaww

[Beleg85]

Bardyansk again. How unfortunate.

And state of Girkin's mustache is yet to be determined:

https://wartranslated.com/igor-girkins-detention-what-is-known/

[Battlefront.com]

From yesterday's ISW report, put out just before the latest round of strikes on the Antonivsky road bridge. 

Quote

Ukrainian forces are continuing efforts to disrupt Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that support Russian forces on the right bank of the Dnipro River. Ukrainian forces struck the bridge on the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) dam again on August 13, reportedly rendering the bridge unusable by heavy vehicles.[1] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command had previously reported on August 10 that the Kakhovka HPP dam bridge was unfit for use.[2] The Kakhovka bridge was the only road bridge Russian forces could use following Ukrainian forces’ successful efforts to put the Antonivsky road bridge out of commission. The UK Defense Ministry has claimed that Russian forces now have no bridges usable to bring heavy equipment or supplies over the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast and must rely mainly on the pontoon ferry they have established near the Antonivsky road bridge.[3]  ISW cannot confirm at this time whether Russian forces can use the Antonivsky rail bridge to resupply forces on the right bank of the Dnipro River. 

Russian forces cannot support mechanized operations at scale without a reliable GLOC.  Bringing ammunition, fuel, and heavy equipment sufficient for offensive or even large-scale defensive operations across pontoon ferries or by air is impractical if not impossible. If Ukrainian forces have disrupted all three bridges and can prevent the Russians from restoring any of them to usability for a protracted period then Russian forces on the west bank of the Dnipro will likely lose the ability to defend themselves against even limited Ukrainian counterattacks.

Indicators of degraded Russian supplies resulting from the disruption of Russian GLOCs over the Dnipro River would include: observed fuel and ammunition shortages among Russian forces in western Kherson Oblast; abandoned Russian vehicles; decreased intensity and, finally, cessation of Russian ground assaults and artillery attacks; possibly increased instances of Russian looting; increased reports from Russian soldiers about supply shortfalls; increased numbers of Russian prisoners of war taken by Ukrainian forces; and an observed absence of new heavy machinery transported to western Kherson.  Such indicators could take days or weeks to observe depending on how much Russian forces have been able to stockpile supplies on the west bank of the Dnipro and how successful Ukrainian forces are at finding and destroying those stockpiles while keeping the bridges inoperable.

Ukrainian Mykolaiv Oblast Head Vitaly Kim reported that unspecified Russian military command elements left upper Kherson Oblast and relocated to the left bank of the Dnipro River, suggesting that the Russian military leadership is concerned about being trapped on the wrong side of the river.[4] Ukrainian Advisor to the Minister of Internal Affairs Rostislav Smirnov also stated that Russia has deployed 90% of its air assault forces (presumably 90% of those deployed in Ukraine) to unspecified locations in southern Ukraine to augment Russian defenses or possibly prepare for Russian counteroffensives.[5] It is unclear whether the Russian airborne units Smirnov mentioned are concentrated exclusively in Kherson Oblast or also deployed near Zaporizhia. Elements of the Russian 7^th Airborne Division are known to be operating in Kherson Oblast as of at least August 10.[6] The concentration of Russian Airborne Forces in western Kherson Oblast could indicate Russian efforts to use forces to defend against a Ukrainian counteroffensive that they are more likely to be able to exfiltrate by air if they are unable to hold the Ukrainians back or reestablish their GLOCs.  Airborne forces are easier to move by aircraft than regular mechanized forces, of course, although the Russians could find it challenging and very risky to try to move forces by air given Ukrainian attacks on airfields in Kherson Oblast and Russian failure to secure air superiority.

To me it seems like Ukraine is about to start showing signs of a ground offensive kicking off in Kherson.  The Ukrainian strategy there is a but "unorthodox", so I'm not sure if historical precedent will offer us much to go by.  Based on how Ukraine has done things so far, I'm expecting:

• From a technical standpoint, this is an offensive vs. a counter-offensive.  This means the timing of the start of the offensive is not inherently as tied to opportunity or immediate necessity as counter offensives are.  As a result, trying to predict when preparatory actions transition to offensive is not easily done.  Especially because Ukraine is ultra cautious.  I suspect a few days to a week, but I said this after they disrupted the bridges the first time
• To me, something feels very different about this coming week vs. the previous weeks.  The attack in Crimea and the latest round of bridge bombardment seems like the sort of thing you do right before pushing forward. 
• I'm expecting to see a repeat of the successful Kharkiv offensive.  From what I saw it looked like Ukraine hit a predetermined section of front with a large force and drove it deep into Russian positions.  Once the Russians were off balance a more general push was made along a much larger sector of front with tactical emphasis probably shifting depending on developing opportunities.
• The difference between Kherson and Kharkiv is I'm expecting two major efforts vs. the single one of Kharkiv.  One about mid-point from the bridgehead and the other directly at Kherson.  Immediate objectives are to cut everybody off from Kherson's supply dumps and to slice up the defenders into three groups.
• Once the Russian defenses become significantly penetrated, a general offensive along most of the entire line will take advantage of any shifts in Russian units dealing with the penetrations, fix the remaining forces in isolated positions, and try to build up critical mass for general collapse.
• It is probable that the northern "pocket" will collapse first, followed by the middle one, then lastly Kherson itself.  However, I don't know the quality of the units and relative size of the forces.  It would not surprise me if the order was very different.  For example, Russia deployed it's best and most motivated forces to the northern area... they might hold out longer than a less motivated middle.
• Collapse is inevitable.  It's just a question of how long and how many casualties Ukraine suffers to get the job done.  Depending on how much ammo and fuel stocks remain on the western side will determine how long the battle lasts.  I'm guessing not more than 3-4 days after the full weight of the Ukrainian offensive gets underway.  Smaller pockets might hold out for much longer, but I really don't think it's likely they'll fight under extreme hardship like Mariupol's defenders.

Steve

[danfrodo]

6 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

As a result, trying to predict when preparatory actions transition to offensive is not easily done.  Especially because Ukraine is ultra cautious.

The above statement says a lot more than it says -- meaning if Ukraine can afford to be cautious, let alone ultra cautious, then Ukraine has operational and strategic initiative.  When you don't have the initiative, you can't be cautious because you have to react to your opponents actions else you lose important territory/forces/LOCs.  This says a lot about how ineffective RU forces are at this point, overall. 

And maybe the coming week we'll see UKR bite the bullet and fight to take ground? 

Can't wait to watch Perun's new video,  linked by OldSarge above.  That might give us more insight into just what UKR actually has to throw into the fight. 

[sburke]

Love this line

Quote

Ukrainian Mykolaiv Oblast Head Vitaly Kim reported that unspecified Russian military command elements left upper Kherson Oblast and relocated to the left bank of the Dnipro River, suggesting that the Russian military leadership is concerned about being trapped on the wrong side of the river.

 

makes me think of this - Russian command orders to troops staying behind.

 

[akd]

Another interesting “Terra” drone ops video. First sighting of one of those pre-fab pillboxes actually in use and direction of indirect tank fire onto a fortified position:

 

[panzermartin]

4 hours ago, Zeleban said:

What kind of Russian missiles like HIMARS intercepted Ukrainian air defense?

According to UA sources, many missiles have been intercepted, among them even hypersonic Iskanders 

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3424781-ukrainian-armed-forces-shoot-down-iskander-missile-near-kramatorsk.html

 

[Zeleban]

20 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

According to UA sources, many missiles have been intercepted, among them even hypersonic Iskanders 

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3424781-ukrainian-armed-forces-shoot-down-iskander-missile-near-kramatorsk.html

 

 

Iskander's effective scattering area is larger than that of HIMARS, it will be visible from a greater distance.

[Haiduk]

2 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

Bardyansk again. How unfortunate.

 

Locals write this is not UKR strike or diversion, just some works in the port near the place of Saratov  landing ship wreckage. Reportedly some sort of oil remains was accidentally set on fire.

[kraze]

11 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Locals write this is not UKR strike or diversion, just some works in the port near the place of Saratov  landing ship wreckage. Reportedly some sort of oil remains was accidentally set on fire.

Ah, careless smoking again

[Huba]

Situation in Przemyśl now:

Quote

McDonalds in Przemyśl: a mix of Ukrainian refugees doing their Polish lessons, American soldiers, Norwegian volunteers and a Qurterp... McRoyal with cheese.

US G.I.s just literally had a "why the heck do they call Quarterpounder 'McRoyal'? // Dude, they have metric system here, they have no idea what a pound is" conversation.

Two truck and BBQ bros from Kentucky with a van full of military gear donations for UAF. "Sir I'm pretty sure some of the **** we got in our van ain't legal even in Texas".

A convoy of Polish army trucks rides at top speed by, followed by a string of Ukrainian ambulances headed towards Rzeszów. A gargantuan C-17 zooms overhead. The price of peace you're all enjoying this weekend is paid by the people around me.

https://twitter.com/J_Jaraczewski/status/1558768055764803585?t=En78wpnb7mASuKJ7EXSBXg&s=19

 

[DesertFox]

 

 

[Haiduk]

Wagner PMC HQ was HIMARSed in Popasna. Russian military corerspondent showed on his photos the area around this building as far as on 8h Aug. Number of losses unknown

Also UKR HIMARSed yesterday the school building in the village Krynychne 6 km from Stakhanov (Kadiivka), which used for troops deployment. Locals write at least 11 dead (this is only the number, which was recovered from ruines by emergency service and some number was recovered by military)

Today HIMARS has struck some object in Makiivka city, where DPR troops were deployed, locals write about 12 KIA and 13 WIA

Edited August 14, 2022 by Haiduk

[Beleg85]

16 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Wagner PMC HQ was HIMARSed in Popasna. Russian military corerspondent showed on his photos the area around this building as far as on 8h Aug. Number of losses unknown

Unfortunatelly rumours of Prigozin presence are not confirmed. Reportedly he did actually cicrcled very close to the frontlines in last week, though. It may even suggest there may be some tensions between Wagnerites and the army.

[Kinophile]

https://twitter.com/noclador/status/1558753485952368641?t=WiRWZ7c5QniY1TjAOL8f2g&s=19

 

[Anon052]

So apperently Russia bought 1000 iranian drones. I just hope it won't have a big effect on the war.

Nice videos of trenchfighting. Its just not that easy to understand what exactly is happening and who is who. Perhaps someone here likes to do a deeper analysis on what is going on. Does someone know where this is?

 

 

Edited August 14, 2022 by Anon052

[Huba]

41 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

https://twitter.com/noclador/status/1558753485952368641?t=WiRWZ7c5QniY1TjAOL8f2g&s=19

 

I'd say they fire these missiles not in hope of actually hitting something, but to show the command that they are doing anything. 

13 minutes ago, Anon052 said:

So apperently Russia bought 1000 iranian drones. I just hope it won't have a big effect on the war

I'd be interested in delivery times for this contract. I bet RU will get maybe 30 now, and the rest gradualy till  2027 or something. No way Iran has a significant number of these stockpiled and available for sale. 

Edited August 14, 2022 by Huba

[danfrodo]

7 hours ago, OldSarge said:

It is Sunday morning (on my side of the pond) and time for another Perun release.
 

 

Timestamps:
00:00:00 -- Opening Words
00:01:34 -- What Am I Covering?
00:02:29 -- Today's Sponsor: MORNING BREW
00:03:36 -- Mobilisation - The Concept
00:05:20 -- The Soviet System
00:07:16 -- Ukraine's Reforms
00:09:12 -- The Ukrainian Mobilisation Experience
00:11:22 -- The Opening Callup
00:14:54 -- Evolving Mobilisation
00:17:55 -- Women in Service
00:20:12 -- Demography and Mobilisation
00:23:43 -- Where Are We Now?
00:24:58 -- How Much Materiel Does Ukraine Have?
00:26:25 -- Why I Don't Use Russian MOD Figures
00:28:16 -- Why I Don't Use Russian MOD Figures: The Examples
00:30:01 -- The Base-Loss-Replenish Method
00:33:38 -- Observed Equipment Method
00:34:20 -- The New
00:35:13 -- The Old
00:36:06 -- The Ugly
00:37:21 -- Statements/Observations
00:40:30 -- The Combined Picture
00:42:41 -- A Diverse Army
00:43:20 -- So What Needs To Happen?
00:46:28 -- Training & The Training Issue
00:49:43 -- Resolution Methods
00:51:52 -- Earned Veterancy
00:54:11 -- Scale and Sustainability
00:56:06 -- What Does This Mean?
00:58:18 -- Offensive Readiness
01:00:28 -- Future Potential?
01:01:48 -- Conclusions
01:02:54 -- Channel Update

A quote worth saving. Russians beware!

"I'm not convinced that there is a piece of military equipment yet designed that has half the endurance, toughness or reliability as a babushka"
-- Perun 0:20:11

well Perun does put things in perspective.  UKR short on mechanized equipment seems to be a big issue.  Aragorn has been right, we've been perhaps a bit overoptimistic though that optimism seems like it will come true, just at longer timescale than we'd like.

[The_Capt]

41 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

well Perun does put things in perspective.  UKR short on mechanized equipment seems to be a big issue.  Aragorn has been right, we've been perhaps a bit overoptimistic though that optimism seems like it will come true, just at longer timescale than we'd like.

Very big assumption, and not surprising coming from a western analyst, is that “more metal” will work.  Russia had all the metal and we saw how that worked out.

Now I am not sure if the problems with mech would go the the other way against the Russians but I have my suspicions.  The problem with metal is its support chain and here Ukrainian might be as vulnerable as Russians.  

I am not sure but I have seen this before and it is a western biased weak assumption that “if the Ukrainians could only look more like us, this would be over quickly”.   Russian ISR is not at the level that the UA has access to, but a mech unit/formation is very hard to hide and getting much easier to hit.

I am growing more and more convinced of the idea that operational manoeuvre is becoming deep strike.  I am not sure giving the UA a bunch of metal is the right way to go.

 

[danfrodo]

4 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Very big assumption, and not surprising coming from a western analyst, is that “more metal” will work.  Russia had all the metal and we saw how that worked out.

Now I am not sure if the problems with mech would go the the other way against the Russians but I have my suspicions.  The problem with metal is its support chain and here Ukrainian might be as vulnerable as Russians.  

I am not sure but I have seen this before and it is a western biased weak assumption that “if the Ukrainians could only look more like us, this would be over quickly”.   Russian ISR is not at the level that the UA has access to, but a mech unit/formation is very hard to hide and getting much easier to hit.

I am growing more and more convinced of the idea that operational manoeuvre is becoming deep strike.  I am not sure giving the UA a bunch of metal is the right way to go.

 

now I feel better   So maybe once UKR has sufficient trained, highly mobile infantry backed up by sufficient artillery and AD, that's mostly what they need given the nature of the battlespace?  Is that your point?  

[The_Capt]

8 hours ago, Anxel Torrente said:

Is this war still going on? If you watch the news it seems that Donald Trump and wild fires caused by draught is what journalists are interested in.

I'm sure that in a couple of years this conflict will be just as remembered as the one in former Jugoslavia. With that I mean that people will say "War in Ukraine? What war in Ukraine?".

There it is.  This is what Ukraine needs to be very concerned about (and likely are) and Russia is counting on.  Western “change the channel” apathy.  “That’s way over there”, “What about my gas guzzling truck?” “What else is happening on TweeterTocwhateverthef#ckpeoplewatch?”

We are an entitled/spoiled set of generations that have had a fraction of a percentage of its youth who have had to fight and die for it, in small low stakes wars on the other side of the world.

 We have forgotten that defending our way of life isn’t yelling at the other guys, and nor do we understand real threats when they appear….present company on his thread excepted of course.

If we lose the bubble on this one, we deserve what happens next.

[FancyCat]

19 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

There it is.  This is what Ukraine needs to be very concerned about (and likely are) and Russia is counting on.  Western “change the channel” apathy.  “That’s way over there”, “What about my gas guzzling truck?” “What else is happening on TweeterTocwhateverthef#ckpeoplewatch?”

We are an entitled/spoiled set of generations that have had a fraction of a percentage of its youth who have had to fight and die for it, in small low stakes wars on the other side of the world.

 We have forgotten that defending our way of life isn’t yelling at the other guys, and nor do we understand real threats when they appear….present company on his thread excepted of course.

If we lose the bubble on this one, we deserve what happens next.

Maybe....but so far U.S support to Ukraine remains constant. 

Gas prices are down, bipartisan agreement on Ukraine remains, I'm actually more worried about big price tags for further assistance to Ukraine causing dents in support, in that case, the less noise about Ukraine, the easier for money for Ukraine can pass.