How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[CHEqTRO]

17 hours ago, Huba said:

@Haiduk @kraze any news on this? I know it's Arestovych, but OTOH it's hard to believe he just plainly invented the whole thing.

 

Well, in regard to this, Zelensky had this to say:

 

He mentions it around the 5:30 minute mark. So, I guess maybe a counterattack did happen around Sverodonestk?

Edited June 3, 2022 by CHEqTRO

[akd]

6 hours ago, Fenris said:

I'd have thought range and hitting power would still be important

Suppressors affect neither.

[Ts4EVER]

9 minutes ago, akd said:

Suppressors affect neither.

My guess is that they are NOT using those with subsonic ammunition. So they are probably not really that quiet, but maybe quiet enough to protect the hearing of the soldiers somewhat and make them harder to locate / identify as gun shots by sound.

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

BSF Captain 3rd Rank Svyatoslav Nizhegorodov:

 

[Huba]

Another translated angry rant about logistical problem of Russians, this time from Izyum area. Author compares their experience to the Hurtgen Forest:

 

[sross112]

7 hours ago, Fenris said:

I've been wondering about the apparent prevalence of suppressors I've been seeing - what's the reason for this?  I'd have thought range and hitting power would still be important, especially with body armour being more common.  Or is staying concealed considered more important now?

Modern suppressors don't negatively affect bullet velocity. With a really good chronometer you will actually see a very slight increase in velocity. The "hitting power" of the bullet is a direct result of the velocity at which it is traveling, so there is no reduction in energy as there is no reduction in velocity. They generally reduce recoil and give a more stable weapon platform. The downside is the extra weight on the end of the barrel but is doesn't take long to become accustomed to it.

They do help with concealment as the reduction in noise and reduction of flash make it harder to locate the shooter, however my opinion is the more important part is the better ability to communicate. Gunfights are very loud. Gunfights in enclosed environments are stupid loud. I think most of us would agree the most important factor tying everything else together is communication and suppressors make that immensely easier, especially in an environment where not every shooter is connected with bone mics and ear pieces. 

[akd]

Quote

Another translated angry rant about logistical problem of Russians, this time from Izyum area. Author compares their experience to the Hurtgen Forest:

64th MRB has apparently been reduced to battalion rifle strengths of 12-15 men each, less than 100 men for the whole brigade and same in the 38th MRB

Edited June 3, 2022 by akd

[LongLeftFlank]

2 hours ago, CHEqTRO said:

Well, in regard to this, Zelensky had this to say:

 

He mentions it around the 5:30 minute mark. So, I guess maybe a counterattack did happen around Sverodonestk?

Re SIerverdonetsk, my expectation would be a mix of ambushes and mine warfare, a la Ortona (we were speaking of Canadian battlefields), possibly followed by counterattacks to displace the Russians from key buildings.

Maybe some kind of monster IED waiting for the Kadyrov Tiktok commandos....

But that's all conjecture on my part. I would bet any money though that mine warfare - not just AT mines - is already ramping up for both sides.

Infantry movement (Spartak). The fight for the hotel was a few days ago.

It's hard to make out btw, but the cameraman gets hit by a ricochet and binds up his wound while still giving orders to his squaddies. Yup, a bloody paratrooper all right.

...some time ago though, based on the rust. I'm seeing a lot of recycled footage on both sides btw being claimed as recent -- no leaves on the trees.

Edited June 3, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[poesel]

1 hour ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

I presume this means PzH2000 is going in fully capable and integrated to Ukraine systems?

He said that they did some integration work with specialists from the Dutch, German & Ukrainian armies as well as external companies. So I guess there is at least some integration.

[poesel]

double post

Edited June 3, 2022 by poesel

[Kinophile]

@Machor interesting articles, and echoed by others, ref the Western narrative of purely Russian incompetence. Yet the Ivan is still there and fighting. 

Ref "how could the elite Wehrmacht lose to the Russians if they were so elite", well, um, two(plus)-front war with equiv+ peers? Im fairly sure a Germant with no western/southern combat commitments or distractions could at the very least have fought the RA to a stalemate. This isn't a WW2 thread so I want to be clear my point is that this, to me, was such a significant and well known reason (among others) for the Nazi defeat that to not acknowledge or include it undercuts some primary points in his reasoning. Im curious why it wasn't even mentioned.

But overall a good discussion, thank you for it.

Edited June 3, 2022 by Kinophile

[cesmonkey]

10 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

I heard from a source I deem reliable that a 'Train the Trainer' program in the fine points of modern IATGW tank killing was held in the US Northwest (I assumed Yakima) for several hundred UA NCOs. This tracks very nicely with that.

What's interesting (ht @billbindc) is the date this training was conducted:  March 2021.

Note also though that the program was greenlit the previous fall.

...Now I understand this gets USA-political, and I can't document it, but it seems that by 2019, POTUS would only be briefed  (i.e. given an option to intervene) on certain defence and mil assistance decisions. Everything else was kept vague and merely presented for signature. And in practice, the former were solely matters where (a) US personnel might come home in body bags on camera, or (b) Israel had an interest. Pence and Mnuchin were the filters.

Beyond that, the policy establishment was left mainly to its own devices.

It probably was this group of trainers:

Quote

In March, more than 100 Guard members from the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 81st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, deployed to Ukraine to support Joint Multinational Training Group – Ukraine. 

https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2883015/washington-guard-accomplished-many-missions-in-2021/

[Huba]

8 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

@Machor interesting articles, and echoed by others, ref the Western narrative of purely Russian incompetence. Yet the Ivan is still there and fighting. 

Ref "how could the elite Wehrmacht lose to the Russians if they were so elite", well, um, two(plus)-front war with equiv+ peers? Im fairly sure a Germant with no western/southern combat commitments or distractions could at the very least have fought the RA to a stalemate. This isn't a WW2 thread so I want to be clear my point is that this, to me, was such a significant and well known reason (among others) for the Nazi defeat that to not acknowledge or include it undercuts some primary points in his reasoning. Im curious why it wasn't even mentioned.

But overall a good discussion, thank you for it.

And on top of it, it was to a large degree US industrial might they were fighting on the eastern front, not Russia alone. Now it's the other way around. 

Edited June 3, 2022 by Huba

[The_Capt]

8 hours ago, Machor said:

Intelligently contrarian article by David Johnson on WOTR - I will underline some parts for the sake of promoting discussion with TLDR folks:

"WOULD WE DO BETTER? HUBRIS AND VALIDATION IN UKRAINE"

https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/would-we-do-better-hubris-and-validation-in-ukraine/

First, a warning about Ukraine's control of the information sphere in the West:

"The Russians have, however, conducted several successful river crossings of the Siverskyi Donets River to position forces for offensive operations against Izyum. These crossings enabled the Russians to posture forces for offensive operations in the region south of the river.

These crossings, as well as other successful Russian operations, receive scant media attention. Nor do Ukrainian failures figure prominently in reporting from the war. This is likely the result of a sophisticated all-media Ukrainian information campaign, reinforced by positive stories from journalists whose access is carefully managed by the Ukrainian government. This control of information is reinforced by their military’s excellent operational security. Indeed, it was the Ukrainian government that distributed the video of the botched Siverskyi Donets River crossing."

Sizzling take on how Western militaries' prioritization of force protection [See all the folks bragging about protecting their pixeltruppen above  ] may well be counter-productive in a near-peer conflict like the war in Ukraine:

"Western militaries are also conditioned by what Jeffrey Record calls “casualty phobia.” He traces this phenomenon to the Vietnam War, but notes that its modern implications were manifested in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. His thesis is that U.S. policymakers and senior military officers believe that the “use of force in situations of optional intervention should be prepared to sacrifice even operational effectiveness for the sake of casualty avoidance” and that in the war against Serbia, “force protection was accorded priority over mission accomplishment.” To support this conclusion, Record cites then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Hugh Shelton to support this conclusion: “The paramount lesson learned from Operation Allied Force is that the well-being of our people must remain our first priority.”

Consequently, Western militaries have focused heavily on force protection. This was possible because of the discretionary nature of most operations—the types of operations most serving military members have experienced almost exclusively during their careers. There also is an ever-present concern behind most operational decisions that the perceived public aversion to casualties could unhinge policy. This is not to say that the irregular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were not brutal and deadly. They certainly were at the soldier, squad, platoon, and company levels. That said, operations rarely involved the employment of battalion or larger formations in combined arms operations.

In over 20 years of war in Afghanistan, not a single platoon position was lost in combat. Casualty levels were extraordinarily low by even Vietnam War standards and medical attention was prompt and comprehensive. Finally, combat was deadly only at the ground level; aircraft largely operated with impunity outside the range of limited adversary air defenses. Aviation losses were in low-altitude operations and almost exclusively helicopters.

The war in Ukraine has starkly demonstrated the high human costs of large-scale, high-intensity warfare. Russian casualties at the Siverskyi Donets River and in other battles show that these are wars where company, battalion, and even larger formations can be annihilated in the blink of an eye, resulting in large numbers of soldiers killed in action and wounded, as well as significant materiel losses.

Consequently, in Ukraine, we are seeing the return of the imperative for force preservation, rather than force protection. This is currently beyond the consciousness of Western militaries and current combat casualty care capacity.

Changing the mindset from “force protection” to “force preservation” borders on heresy in current Western military culture. In Ukraine, Russia is learning the necessity of force preservation the hard way — in the unforgiving crucible of combat. A reasonable question is whether or not Western governments have prepared themselves, much less their citizens, for a conflict that could result in thousands of deaths and many more casualties in just a few weeks. Would this butcher’s bill awaken the passion of the people described in Carl von Clausewitz’s On War trinity, even in countries with volunteer militaries? Could this level of casualties challenge, if not unhinge, policy?

The fact that the Russians are reconstituting units from fresh troops and remnants of units decimated in combat is the reality of protracted, high-intensity combat. Our own history from World War II shows the potential cost of peer warfare. The 1st Infantry Division, in 443 days of total combat in North Africa, Sicily, and Europe, suffered 20,659 casualties. This figure is greater than the authorized strength of 15,000 for a World War II U.S. infantry division.

Importantly, these levels of casualties in the Ukraine war also call into question the ability of Western armies to maintain adequate fighting strength in other than short wars with modest casualties. Much is being made of the Russians relying on hastily mobilized reserves to replace losses. Ironically, as has been demonstrated since the Napoleonic Wars, the levée en masse is a requirement for protracted state warfare at this level. The Russians and Ukrainians both have systems in place to conscript their citizens; the practice has been abandoned, along with its supporting infrastructure, in most Western countries. Perhaps this is a case of prudent preparation, rather than an act of desperation?"

He's with @The_Capt in arguing that there's nowhere to hide with modern ISR:

"While many aspects of the Ukraine war echo past major wars, such as World War II and, to a lesser degree, the Korean War, there are several new dimensions. One in particular, likely explains the Siverskyi Donets River crossing debacle: ubiquitous surveillance of the battlefield. The Ukrainians reported that they had discovered the Russian crossing operation via aerial reconnaissance. The potential sources of this information are much more diverse and numerous now than in even the most recent conflicts. They include a wide variety of drones, commercially available satellite imagery, intelligence from Western sources, and other means.

This new reality essentially means that there is nowhere for a relatively large formation to hide. Surprise, particularly at a limited number of potential crossing points on a river, may not be possible. Thus, these types of physical deception operations may also be pointless. Finally, given the sophistication of many sensors, smoke screens may be less useful than in the past.

This new reality renders those criticizing the Russians not only wrong but dangerous. They are clinging to a doctrine that may be completely outdated in the current operational environment. That they persist in the view that Russian incompetence is mostly due to untrained and poorly motivated soldiers, led by corrupt and incompetent leaders, gives them a comfortable answer that does not invalidate their expertise or current practices."

And he follows up with a knock-out punch:

"The U.S. Army in the 1970s and 1980s looked to the World War II Wehrmacht for lessons about how to fight the Soviets outnumbered and win. After all, the Germans had actually fought the Red Army. Former Nazi officers, such as Gen. Hermann Balck and Gen. Friedrich von Mellenthin, explained their system and its importance during conferences and meetings with U.S. officers and officials. Americanized versions of German professional military education practices, officer professionalism, and encouraging subordinate initiative through Auftragstactik, which became U.S. mission command, were adopted in the U.S. Army as best practices. But we should well remember that the same type of Red Army destroyed the vaunted Nazi Wehrmacht during World War II in a long, grinding war of attrition supposedly suffered from the similar centralized leadership and hastily trained soldier maladies as today.

Furthermore, a revisionist history, not unlike that of the Lost Cause narrative about the Confederate defeat in the U.S. Civil War, was peddled by the Germans. Robert Cittino wrote that they

described the Soviet army as a faceless and mindless horde, with the officers terrorizing their men into obedience and dictator Josef Stalin terrorizing the officers. It had no finesse. Its idea of the military art was to smash everything in its path through numbers, brute force, and sheer size.

Thus, just like the Union Army, “‘quantity had triumphed over quality.’ The better army lost, in other words, and the elite force vanished beneath the superior numbers of the herd.”

These perceptions shaped U.S. views about Russian forces during the Cold War and, despite being disproven in the 1990s, are echoed in assessments today. As retired Army colonel and diplomat Joel Rayburn said in an interview with the New Yorker, “A bad army was ordered to do something stupid.” While officers are now promoted based on patronage, this is not all that dissimilar from the requirement for political reliability in the Russian military in World War II. What should have been considered then and now is why the German forces were crushed by such an inferior adversary? Perhaps enough people, materiel, and an indomitable will to fight despite privations and setbacks are exactly what are really necessary to endure and win in peer warfare."

In his conclusion, he questions the widespread notion that the Ukrainian military is doing well because it had been 'Westernized':

"These views are dangerous in Western assessments of the Ukrainian military. Currently, the prevailing narrative is that the Ukrainian edge is that they have evolved into a modern Western military, trained for over a decade in Western methods. They are professionals. Therefore, they will prevail. Just as we would. Again, nothing to learn here.

However, the actual evidence is unclear; the assessments of the prowess of Ukraine’s military may be wishful thinking and hubris. The title of a Wall Street Journal article epitomizes this view, saying it all came down to “years of NATO training.”

One should recall that Western initiatives to reform the Ukrainian military did not even begin until after the 2014 Russian invasion. Although they have progressed, many of the senior officers were raised in the Soviet system. When I visited the National Defense University in Kyiv in 1996 on an exchange visit as the director of academic affairs at our National University, all of the senior leaders were former Soviet officers. Some were also Russian citizens who chose to stay in Ukraine because there was nothing in Russia to go home to after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Consequently, a deeply entrenched Soviet-style bureaucracy and training model permeated the Ukrainian military. Thus, their rehabilitation is fundamentally a bottom-to-top institution rebuilding and culture-changing endeavor that will take time. In particular, initiatives to create a merit-based and proficient officer and noncommissioned officer corps are decades-long efforts that are just taking root at the lower- and mid-levels of the Ukrainian military. Consequently, many of the tactics above the small unit look more Russian than American, as does most of the equipment.

An indication that there is some way to go beyond the NATO training is that there is little evidence that the Ukrainians are executing joint and combined arms offensive operations. This capability will be important if the transition from the defense and attempt offensive operations to restore territory lost to Russia. Furthermore, Ukraine also appears to be ceding ground in the Donbas to a slow, grinding Russian advance.

Consequently, the analysis of the Ukraine war needs to address another unasked question: What if this view that quality people and leaders are the most important ingredient in modern warfare is wrong? What if Stalin was correct that quantity has a quality all of its own? If that is the case, then the Ukrainians may need much greater assistance if they are to survive a Russian-style grinding war of attrition.

Additionally, as the United States plans for how it will compete and potentially fight China and Russia in the future, the approach should be characterized by humility and an intense desire to challenge existing assumptions, concepts, and capabilities, rather than to validate current approaches.

As it did for Russia, it could happen to us, and we need to fully understand what “it” is."

A good start point.  I also have been mulling over a lot of these issues; however, I come to different conclusions.  My primary induction is that we are looking at this too narrowly; quality vs quantity is a one dimensional set of competitive metrics and we are clearly moving past it in this war.  To start these are somewhat vague as what do we mean by "quality"?  Is that training and equipment?  The amount of money invested prior to war?  Quantity, is that mass on the battlefield or broader strategic capacity?  Is it both?  These definitions muddle more than they really explain.

I think there are at least three more dimensions that need to be explored (and I say "at least" deliberately): "smartness" and "distribution", and "capacity". 

Smartness could just as easily be described as intelligence in the broader sense but the term is already in use.  By this I define smartness as: the ability of a force to competitively create usable knowledge in the prosecution of war.  This is effectively competitive theory building at all levels of warfare (i.e. the warfare enterprise) - [aside: I did have graphics but the "eeewww PowerPoint crowd" might get ruffled again].  So one can have a very well trained and equipped force but is it competitively smart?  Further, can you have a smart low-quality but high quantitative force?  Theorists say yes, they call it a swarm.  Smartness could easily be called C4ISR; however, I personally think that term gets boxed up as "HQ stuff" which does a disservice to the idea of the overall cognitive ability of a force as a sentient system in itself.   

In the opening phase of this war the Russian attacked on 5 main axis where they concentrated over 190k troops well armed and just coming off moths of exercises (how effective those were are in doubt), they had the local mass advantage as Ukrainian defence was 1) still mobilizing, 2)  in a state of shock at the first punch and 3) was spread out across a very long frontage as no one knew if Belarus was going to jump in or there were more axis the Russians were going to open up. So in the opening phase of this war we have seen a very smart Ukrainian force meet what I call a "dim" mass-based Russian one, and it appears the meeting was decisive in the opening phase of this war.

Distribution and capacity speak to mass but how one employs it.  Distribution is how we spread that mass around and capacity is how much depth we invest into it.  In this war, again in the opening phase, we saw the Ukrainian defence as very highly distributed mass, yet also highly connected and very intelligent.  It met a very high density mass, yet also "dim" of the Russian forces...and we saw what happened.  The Ukrainian defence created friction and attrition along the entirely of the Russian operational system leading to the collapse of that system on at least 2 operational axis, one of them the main effort of the whole war.   So now we can have high quality - smart - distributed/lower capacity mass meeting low quality - dim - concentrated/higher capacity mass, and we all saw what happened.  Western militaries will wring their hands over this one for at least a decade because we tend to put out high quality - smart - concentrated/low capacity mass and no matter what the military visionaries, revisionist or conservatives may say, we have no idea what happens when these types of forces all meet - Steve, has nearly shouted himself raw pointing out how wrong the pre-war modeling was, and still can be.  Particularly when we have seen what low quality - smart - distributed/high capacity (nearing endless) mass can do to our forces over time, in insurgencies over the last 20 years .

This brings me to my last point, which no one really seems to be talking much about either: speed of victory/loss matters.  Hypothetically Russia could win this thing if it manages to drag out this war for a century - I am talking Taliban style of constant low level cuts and bites across the spectrum that it somehow manages to sustain.  However, by then it may no longer matter.  Putin will be dead, the political landscape will have changed to the point that what ever mattered in this war, in this moment has become a complete sideshow.  Further, Russia may "win" but the victory completely breaks the nation, to the point that the victor is not even Russia anymore.  We know this because this is what happened in Afghanistan.  In Oct of '01 it was "a critical blow to terrorism", in Aug of '20 - "*sigh* let's just get this over with".  The USA of '01 is gone and the one in '20 was built upon it but did not have anywhere near the same level of investment as fundamental conditions had changed.  

Back to my main point, western militaries are built for either a quick victory or long loss.  We do not know what to do with a quick loss or long victory.  Further, the public that send us are not wired for the latter either.  Problem is that these could be the wars offered to us and this is a major strategic blind spot.  I think this was one of the authors main points, that is particularly insightful as it relates directly to what sorts of forces we have been building.

And finally, as if all that was not enough, I am still on the fence as to what is happening between defence and offence.  Is this conditions based or are we looking at something more fundamental?  Offence in the form the Russians are offering is clearly in trouble.  It has become incredibly difficult and costly with the type of force they have employing to prosecute it.  We have all been getting "scope eye" on a 2500 sq km postage stamp of terrain - in a country of roughly 604k sq kms - down in the south; however, the rest of the country is also pretty static.  The UA has made a couple successful offensives around Kharkiv and now north of Kherson, but these have been modest.  This could be, as the author suggests, due to the Ukrainian force and how it is being employed (not western enough?).  Or has technology driven us into a different warfare paradigm?  Frankly, I do not know and I am sure people have plenty opinions but let me be the first to break it, you don't know either...no one does.  We likely won't know until something breaks and one side in this war figures it out.  Or maybe they won't and it will take the next war for a side to come up with the answer. The only thing I can say definitively is that the question is in the air right now and the real experts are all watching and waiting.

[chuckdyke]

1 hour ago, Ts4EVER said:

My guess is that they are NOT using those with subsonic ammunition

I think the purpose is to suppress perceived recoil to hold the sight on target. We did something similar with the 1911 for competitive pistol shooting. It is not the function of a silencer. 

[dan/california]

18 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Frankly, I do not know and I am sure people have plenty opinions but let me be the first to break it, you don't know either...no one does.  We likely won't know until something breaks and one side in this war figures it out.  Or maybe they won't and it will take the next war for a side to come up with the answer. The only thing I can say definitively is that the question is in the air right now and the real experts are all watching and waiting.

Hey Steve, any thoughts on when we might get a module for CMBS, CM The Sunflower War, or CM the Future of War to help us start teasing the various factors apart?

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

Another translated angry rant about logistical problem of Russians, this time from Izyum area. Author compares their experience to the Hurtgen Forest:

 

Yes, but it cost the stayback UA forces very heavily as well. I believe that's the stalwart 79th AB.  4 out of 60 left, basically destroyed.

Worthwhile piece on the Seviersky Donets river basin here, now 'running lke a main circuit cable through the heart of this war....'

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/06/01/ukraine-villagers-river-defence-russia/

I have no idea though why so many journos (or their local contacts) seem convinced the Russians are about to cross the river opposite Lyman and advance on Sloviansk. They can rain shells on it, sure.

The river bank is mined, so there can be no fishing for supper - something everyone here used to enjoy. 

I say again, I predict mines are going to loom VERY large in the next phase of this war.  Mines could become as dominant in shaping and limiting the tactical options for both sides as ATGW were in Feb - Mar.

Edited June 3, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[FancyCat]

Who knows how it went down but I could see Ukrainian forces letting Russia enter the city, think they abandoned it, when in reality they want Russia to get in close so they can be punched in the face. Since Russian doctrine is basically destroy any resistance with artillery, so instead of letting their forces get marked and barraged, let them get close, ideally that would mean letting Russian forces to think it was deserted.

Saw someone else mention letting Russia relax in the city, then since they aren't expecting exhausted defenders to counter attack and are prepping for a new attack across the bridge, don't prep defenses for defending.

While important to state that US industrial might assisted the Russian victory, a lot of that aid didn't ramp until 1943. Germany spent tons of their combat ability in 1942. Interesting....how much do we say that German combat capacity was lost in the early years that was not possible to regenerate?

What has Russia lost in Ukraine that it will never gain back? I think a ton of people commenting on the war elsewhere fail to see what Russia has lost and cannot regain within a timeframe for it to matter in the battles now. On that note, it's vital to note Ukraine has lost a lot, and yes U.S lend lease but that requires ramp up and modern warfare is way different than WWII.

How many artillery batteries is the u.s willing to give to ensure Ukrainian victory? Russia has way more artillery.

The difference between a Ukrainian broad offensive and the local counterattacks we see now may come down to what the U.S answer is.

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

Who knows how it went down but I could see Ukrainian forces letting Russia enter the city, think they abandoned it, when in reality they want Russia to get in close so they can be punched in the face. Since Russian doctrine is basically destroy any resistance with artillery, so instead of letting their forces get marked and barraged, let them get close, ideally that would mean letting Russian forces to think it was deserted.

I think you're very on point here, it's a little like the 'hanging on the enemy's belt' tactics of the Viet Cong.

I posted a link to the savage Ortona battle of 1943. While outnumbered, the German paras were lethal in their use of channeled killing zones, mined buildings and ferocious local counterattacks. Throughout WW2 the Germans on defence were masters of 'trap, maul and slink away' tactics, conserving their infantry by stalling attacks and then letting the guns and mortars go to work on the enemy.

So the Ukes are fighting like Fallschirmjager did in Italy. Small combat groups, but powerful and cunning, making cover work for them and making the enemy bleed for every house or every rock.

Worthy thread here on UKR casualties, but here's the meat of it...

Suitably fatalistic music:   https://youtu.be/UTznkBiev1Y

 

Edited June 3, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[dan/california]

Ukraine and Poland grow ever closer. 

[c3k]

2 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Re SIerverdonetsk, my expectation would be a mix of ambushes and mine warfare, a la Ortona (we were speaking of Canadian battlefields), possibly followed by counterattacks to displace the Russians from key buildings.

Maybe some kind of monster IED waiting for the Kadyrov Tiktok commandos....

But that's all conjecture on my part. I would bet any money though that mine warfare - not just AT mines - is already ramping up for both sides.

Infantry movement (Spartak). The fight for the hotel was a few days ago.

It's hard to make out btw, but the cameraman gets hit by a ricochet and binds up his wound while still giving orders to his squaddies. Yup, a bloody paratrooper all right.

...some time ago though, based on the rust. I'm seeing a lot of recycled footage on both sides btw being claimed as recent -- no leaves on the trees.

Bolded. The rust appears almost instantly after a high-temp vehicle fire. Rust is, after all, just oxidized metal. The fires will burn off all the paint and other protections, leaving the bare metal exposed and also more reactive (due to high temp) to the atmosphere...that is 20% oxygen.

 

[dan/california]

7 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

I think you're very on point here, it's a little like the 'hanging on the enemy's belt' tactics of the Viet Cong.

I posted a link to the savage Ortona battle of 1943. While outnumbered, the German paras were lethal in their use of channeled killing zones, mined buildings and ferocious local counterattacks.

Worthy thread here on casualties, but here's the meat of it...

 

 

If an enemy with a desperate shortage of effective infantry wants to get what they do have killed in ugly urban combat for a place with little to no real strategic value, by all means assist them.

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

..some time ago though, based on the rust. I'm seeing a lot of recycled footage on both sides btw being claimed as recent -- no leaves on the trees.

I don't doubt recirculating footage being used, either deliberately or accidentally, portraying it as recent.  However, the rusty look is not a good indicator of age.  High heat events (i.e. cooking off) produces a near instantaneous rust look due to metallurgical changes that are way above my paygrade to understand   You can sometimes see still smoldering vehicles (i.e. VERY recent hits) that show "rust".

Steve

[Sequoia]

9 hours ago, Machor said:

All my life I've been told to empathize with people, put myself in their shoes, etc. Then, I had to undertake training here in Canada for law enforcement work, and we were told to not put ourselves in criminals' shoes and try to second-guess their future actions, because, "Criminals make bad decisions." It was a growing-up moment.

Uh, empathizing with people and being told to not think like a criminal strike me as two different things, but you do you.

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Ref "how could the elite Wehrmacht lose to the Russians if they were so elite", well, um, two(plus)-front war with equiv+ peers? Im fairly sure a Germant with no western/southern combat commitments or distractions could at the very least have fought the RA to a stalemate. This isn't a WW2 thread so I want to be clear my point is that this, to me, was such a significant and well known reason (among others) for the Nazi defeat that to not acknowledge or include it undercuts some primary points in his reasoning. Im curious why it wasn't even mentioned.

Another interesting parallel not mentioned is Putin's refusal to put Russia on a full war footing.  Germany didn't do this across the board until 1943.  Until then it was running the war along peacetime practices, though of course with larger than usual defense spending and activation of conscripts.  Even with the horrendous losses in 1941 and 1942 Hitler held off because a) he didn't think it would be necessary (victory right around the corner) and b) thought the German population would grumble too much.  Sound familiar to the situation we're seeing now?

If Hitler had ordered full national mobilization in 1940, for example, the war would have turned out differently in some way.  Probably still a loss, but likely not in the same way (e.g. way more Allied casualties, another year of fighting, etc).  For sure if Putin went with full mobilization this war would look vastly different.

Steve