How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[LongLeftFlank]

 

 

 

 

 

[BeondTheGrave]

9 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Looks like Anonymous might have screwed around with some pressure systems at a power plant or something similar.  Personally, I've been aware of this sort of stuff since the 1990s when someone I know watched a hacker take control of room sized industrial ovens at a well known Fortune 500 company.  They could do anything they wanted with them, including turning them on full blast when people were in there for something like maintenance.

 

One thing I've been wondering. You see a lot of Anonymous hacked this. Anonymous hacked that. But boy, if I had a name that was just three letters, now would be a great time to pull all kinds of sneaky little moves like setting ovens hot, blowing pressure valves, opening and or closing pipes. And then blame Anonymous hackers for it all. What is it that a former president said? Fat kids sitting in basements? Yeah. They did it. Definitely them. 

Kidding of course who knows, and isn't that the point? 

[FancyCat]

32 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Fascinating, true.

On the opposite end, from the RUSI document Operation Z:

Amateur hour, day, week, month.. 

UKR took them at their word. 

VDV gets better training/perks no? Could explain why they get briefings, they do the more "risky" missions.

[Battlefront.com]

10 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Fascinating, true.

Ah!  I just discovered this guy is not SBU, but a video blogger that has made this his thing.  Here's an article on him:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/05/often-a-russian-mother-has-a-tv-for-a-brain-ukraine-youtuber-films-pows-calling-home

10 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

On the opposite end, from the RUSI document Operation Z:

Amateur hour, day, week, month.. 

UKR took them at their word. 

Yup, I'm sure lots of command level guys got their orders a few days in advance, with the "elite" probably knowing better what was about to happen.  However, I don't think that information was pushed down the chain of command for a couple of reasons.  One... OPSEC, which Russia knows it sucks at.  Two... there might have been some questioning what was going on because there was no obvious reason for war.  I'm not saying it would amount to mutiny, but there does seem to be evidence that higher ups were concerned that the short timers might not have their hearts fully in it.

Here is another video.  This is a paratrooper who went into Hostomel on the 24th and he said they didn't now squat until they were in the helicopter.  They had no idea what to do when the landed because NOBODY briefed them, so they did what they were trained to do which was make a "horseshoe" around the helicopter and waited for someone to tell them what to do next.  He went on to describe complete chaos and cluelessness.  He was seriously wounded by artillery and was left to die.  He only later found out the reason why was everybody else had been killed.  He was captured, obviously.  He also stated that their training wasn't good.  Better than the average Russian, but he actually felt Ukrainians were better trained than he was.

 

[Battlefront.com]

57 minutes ago, BeondTheGrave said:

One thing I've been wondering. You see a lot of Anonymous hacked this. Anonymous hacked that. But boy, if I had a name that was just three letters, now would be a great time to pull all kinds of sneaky little moves like setting ovens hot, blowing pressure valves, opening and or closing pipes. And then blame Anonymous hackers for it all. What is it that a former president said? Fat kids sitting in basements? Yeah. They did it. Definitely them. 

Kidding of course who knows, and isn't that the point? 

You have to understand that security at these places has to be HORRIBLE.  It takes a lot of resources to defend against hackers and do you really think Russian companies are sinking more money into it than Western companies who keep getting hacked?  No, of course not   It doesn't take state sponsored effort to get in and cause trouble for most places most of the time.

The industrial oven incident I just mentioned was done by a private hacker hired by a threat assessment company.  He had no knowledge of the company he was hacking before he was told to go in.  When he got in he himself figured out the oven controls, not some government or inside source.

That said, this one was a little more sophisticated because the hacker had to coordinate with someone in Moscow to get a drone up in the air.  As the hacker could probably do the damage whenever he wanted to, coordination could easily be done by text messaging.  Just had to have the guy there and there's thousands of normal Russians with drones so not that difficult to see this being non-state sponsored.  Though if it was, of course they very well might claim to be part of Anonymous.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

For what it's worth, someone dug up a video of Putin from more than 2 months ago where his hand was seen visibly shaking before he clamped onto a chair.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/resurfaced-clip-shows-putin-s-hand-shaking-before-gripping-chair-arm/ss-AAWCFPG?cvid=f62a1964a452498687eba457ffa96a47#image=7

[Battlefront.com]

While I'm at it with the interview videos, here is one from a scout with the 10th Spetsnaz.  Sounds like so many others... they weren't trusted with real information until the last minute, even then it wasn't clear or with a definitive purpose, they didn't have enough food, they were put on convoy escort duty, they got hammered, he got wounded, then captured.  All within the first two weeks of the war.

This second video is of a young Spetsnaz guy from the same brigade and his story is similarly pathetic.  In his case he had only been in the Russian Army for 3 months, which is just about what it takes to be assigned to a unit.  Which means he had just about zero time with the unit before going into Ukraine. The video is on Reddit so I posted a link only because of the stupid autoplay:

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarReports/comments/t50fyj/another_captured_russian_gru_special_forces/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3

 

[gnarly]

17 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

 

This second video is of a young Spetsnaz guy from the same brigade and his story is similarly pathetic.  In his case he had only been in the Russian Army for 3 months, which is just about what it takes to be assigned to a unit.  

 

 

And here I was thinking Spetnaz was Special Forces / SOF?? How could someone 3 months in the Russian Army be Spetznaz?  I was equating Spetznaz to the Rangers, or similar, but obviously not.

[Canada Guy]

What about authorizing some 'privateers' - your young, smart, and willing to hack from your mothers basement, - western govts can say 'no worries, if you hack anything in Russia, we will totally ignore it' we don't authorize it but good luck to you. I think Russia has condoned hacking from its shores for years without fear of repercussions as long as it was against the west so why not just give every 4th year comp sci grad a new summer project. 

[Battlefront.com]

These particular interviews, plus lots of others (some while POWs are still in the field), tells a very similar story about how things went for the first wave of grunts going into Ukraine within the first couple of days.  I think these early POWs have a very different experience than the ones that came later because, basically, they got captured before things really went to Hell.

1. they had to give up their phones and documents.  This cut them off from receiving information as well as transmitting it
2. they were told they were going on exercises or some other form of traning
3. they were sometimes told they were going to the border area ahead of time, sometimes not
4. generally they weren't made aware of what was going on until they were on the way towards the border.  Seems some commanders told their guys something, others told them nothing.
5. they weren't told what their immediate tactical mission was other than simplistic "follow the convoy" sort of thing
6. they were generally given no information about their overall mission in the big picture, though the usual vague stuff about Nazis, Ukraine attacked into Russia, and Donbas protection was circulating amongst some.
7. their vehicles broke down FREQUENTLY
8. they were left behind if their vehicle broke down
9. they only had 3 days of food and water issued to them

I've seen some expert people comment on the OPSEC aspects of this early in the war.  To them this looked like paranoia coming down from up high, probably because of the obvious US intel sources.  That seems very plausible, especially because no significant resistance was expected.  Not much harm in keeping info from guys when all they need to do is drive someplace.

It's pretty clear that the paranoid OPSEC was a huge factor in the initial invasion failing so badly.  The more senior commanders might have known what was going on, but once the shooting started they had no opportunity to communicate with their subordinates.  Especially given the mechanical breakdowns and piss-poor communications.

I remember one video posted here from the first couple of days of the war when there was a young Russian officer (probably a LT) negotiating with a Ukrainian man about staying overnight.  The officer told him they didn't want any trouble, they just wanted to sleep and move on.  He seemed honestly bewildered by the whole thing and even stated they didn't know what was going on or why they were there.  It was a fascinating exchange, especially because the Ukrainian threatened to shoot them if they came into his house and the Russian respected that.

Boy, that sort of thing didn't last too long, did it?

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

12 minutes ago, gnarly said:

And here I was thinking Spetnaz was Special Forces / SOF?? How could someone 3 months in the Russian Army be Spetznaz?  I was equating Spetznaz to the Rangers, or similar, but obviously not.

You would think so, wouldn't you?  It seems that even the Spetsnaz units were having difficulty filling their roster and so they took an available, but fresh, contract soldier.  Then they could check off the box that the position is filled and another box that it's filled with a contractor.  No need to mention he's not qualified to be Spetsnaz.

I can say for sure that as bad as I thought the Russian military was before this conflict, I am still shocked at how many ways it was completely unprepared for this war.

Steve

[Taranis]

Russian troops attempted to advance towards Tavriiske and Nova Zoria in Mykolaiv region, but failed
https://t.me/verkhovnaradaukrainy/18535

 

General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: In the Izyum direction, Russian troops captured the outskirts of the settlement of Velyka Komyshuvakha, took control of the Zavody and conducted offensive operations in the direction of Barvinkovo

https://t.me/lumsrc/1466

 

In the Lyman direction, the Russian army established control over Zarichne and stormed the areas of Yampil - General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

https://t.me/lumsrc/1468

 

In the Severodonetsk direction, Russian troops have established control over Novotoshkivske, and conducting an offensive in the direction of Nizhne and Orikhovo - the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
https://t.me/lumsrc/1469

 

"Ukraine, Donbass, Bakhmout eastern front, trenches. On the left, Sergey, 39, April 25, 2022. LAURENCE GEAI / MYOP FOR "LE MONDE""

Edited April 27, 2022 by Taranis

[kraze]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

These particular interviews, plus lots of others (some while POWs are still in the field), tells a very similar story about how things went for the first wave of grunts going into Ukraine within the first couple of days.  I think these early POWs have a very different experience than the ones that came later because, basically, they got captured before things really went to Hell.

1. they had to give up their phones and documents.  This cut them off from receiving information as well as transmitting it
2. they were told they were going on exercises or some other form of traning
3. they were sometimes told they were going to the border area ahead of time, sometimes not
4. generally they weren't made aware of what was going on until they were on the way towards the border.  Seems some commanders told their guys something, others told them nothing.
5. they weren't told what their immediate tactical mission was other than simplistic "follow the convoy" sort of thing
6. they were generally given no information about their overall mission in the big picture, though the usual vague stuff about Nazis, Ukraine attacked into Russia, and Donbas protection was circulating amongst some.
7. their vehicles broke down FREQUENTLY
8. they were left behind if their vehicle broke down
9. they only had 3 days of food and water issued to them

I've seen some expert people comment on the OPSEC aspects of this early in the war.  To them this looked like paranoia coming down from up high, probably because of the obvious US intel sources.  That seems very plausible, especially because no significant resistance was expected.  Not much harm in keeping info from guys when all they need to do is drive someplace.

It's pretty clear that the paranoid OPSEC was a huge factor in the initial invasion failing so badly.  The more senior commanders might have known what was going on, but once the shooting started they had no opportunity to communicate with their subordinates.  Especially given the mechanical breakdowns and piss-poor communications.

I remember one video posted here from the first couple of days of the war when there was a young Russian officer (probably a LT) negotiating with a Ukrainian man about staying overnight.  The officer told him they didn't want any trouble, they just wanted to sleep and move on.  He seemed honestly bewildered by the whole thing and even stated they didn't know what was going on or why they were there.  It was a fascinating exchange, especially because the Ukrainian threatened to shoot them if they came into his house and the Russian respected that.

Boy, that sort of thing didn't last too long, did it?

Steve

The "we were going on exercises" is a legend they were all told to tell when captured similarly to "we didn't know anything". In fact it got so ridiculous when in just a week the number of POWs was equal to several BTGs and they were all repeating the same thing word for word - that even russian command and FSB with its troll farms, that were spamming Ukrainian parts of social media with "poor innocent 18 y o boys sent here by evil putin" that whole week in support, had to cancel that legend. You don't hear it anymore.

So yeah, they all knew they were going to Ukraine. In fact on Feb 21st all russian soldiers signed papers, agreeing to perform military actions on foreign soil. 3 days before they got here.

But that's just a formal thing. You don't stay near a border of another country for 3 months with field hospitals and stuff and not figure out what's going to happen.

Edited April 27, 2022 by kraze

[MikeyD]

The notion that Russian forces were kept in the dark for OPSEC is funny. I'm some nobody who was sitting at his home computer on the far side of the world noticing the Russian buildup and recognizing without a doubt that Russia was preparing to invade Ukraine right after the winter Olympics was over. You'd have to be blind not to have seen it coming.

[Taranis]

10 hours ago, Huba said:

@Taranis who has first hand experience assessed (reluctantly, after pulling the guesstimation out of him) that for most purposes, experienced artillerists could retrain to CAESARs in a week or so. I don't imagine towed pieces being more difficult then that, especially super digitalized M777s.

Sorry if I'm a little late (I needed a little rest).
JonS was quick and provided a very comprehensive response.
I'll try not to go too deep into the subject myself. Honestly, I don't know too much about modern American artillery systems (at least as much as I know about French ones).

My previous messages focused mainly on the level of the gun (platoon max) and its crew but there are also other very important levels to take into account such as the command post of the battery or the higher combined arms echelons.

I think the difficulty is mainly on the change of doctrine (Eastern vs Western) and the way the material is used.

I give an example: on the French 120mm mortar (also on the 155mm TRF-1, the most comparable with the M777 I think) we use a goniometer (the sight in the artillery) with 2 plates (the top is red for the orientation of the gun with respect to the north ; the bottom is black for the direction (its aim) where the gun should fire) and uses a graduation in mils (6400 mils = 360 degrees). In Afghanistan, we were near a battery of 122mm D-30 (Kandak-34 if memory serves). I remember they used them, a single-platen goniometer and orientation in degrees, not mils. They were aiming using only one stake when we were using two. I'm sorry I didn't dig deeper into the subject, but I didn't trust the ANA soldiers too much. The 122mm D-30 have shell casings while for the 155mm TRF-1, there are none because they disintegrate while burning.
Another example is the WW2 British artillery which also used a single pan goniometer, degree orientation and two stakes for aiming (if memory serves)
The advantage of the CAESAR is that it is semi-automated. Even if you don't understand artillery (I speak for the aimer), you can use it as long as your commander and higher echelons know their job. I can only assume the same for the M777 (a US gunner will know better than me).

To sum up, a crew that already knows the artillery will become familiar much more easily with a new piece and the difficulty will be to adapt to a new organization or way of using the weapon. This is all just my opinion.

For those who are interested in artillery, here is an excellent very very complete site on British artillery of the second world war (you can learn artillery basics) :
https://nigelef.tripod.com/maindoc.htm

[Aragorn2002]

1 hour ago, gnarly said:

And here I was thinking Spetnaz was Special Forces / SOF?? How could someone 3 months in the Russian Army be Spetznaz?  I was equating Spetznaz to the Rangers, or similar, but obviously not.

Doesn't have to be true. Of course you're trying to make yourself as small as possible when you're captured. That's the first thing they teach you.

[LongLeftFlank]

12 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

OK, time to pull up to the 30,000 ft level and figure out where things are at and might be headed with the so-called "Easter Offensive" by the Russians.

I think it's pretty clear that my call last week that they scrapped a large scale offensive was spot on, if even a little late (they maybe never planned a big offensive).  Since then what we've seen is more of the same that was going on in the prior week.  Specifically, forces pressing down from Izyum in an attempt to clip roads and make life problematic for the Ukrainians arrayed further eastward along the remains of the old Donbas frontline.  It is not a deep envelopment, but rather a steady push while the Russian forces to the east are continuing to pursue a costly frontal assault strategy.

My thinking here is that Russia decided a big enveloping attack, even from just the north, was beyond their ability to support.  Ukraine has simply shown itself to be too good at laying advancing Russian forces' LOCs to waste, so the actions we're seeing now are explicitly designed to not give Ukraine that sort of opportunity.

Since I am also curious about the state of play of the slo-mo "Potemkin" offensive against Slovyansk, I went back over the last 90 pages of this thread (only 15 April!) and pulled out some of the key assessments made by our esteemed experts. All hail and praise unto them!

1. @The_Capt scans the terrain for the Izyum axis (page 532)

2. @Combatintman maps out the potential axes for a 'pincer' attack (page 548)

3.  @Haiduk confirms the attack (page 553)

4. @Kinophile shows us vividly how exposed are the northern approaches to Slovyansk (page 556)

5. @Combatintman revises the axes in light of the actual Russian advances (p557)

6. @Combatintman estimates RA force strength around Izyum at 16 BTGs not the 22 advertised

7. @The_Capt floats the interesting hypothesis that this is a 'look busy but don't bleed too much' offensive.

8. @Haiduk updates the actions around Izyum as of 23 Apr (p593)

9. @Combatintman evaluates the Engagement Area around Dovenkhe (Izyum-Slovyansk road)

 

10.  @The_Capt assesses the state of play: "using BTGs to try and find a hole in the UA defence instead of a recon screen" 

 

11. @Haiduk's latest update, noting RA gains in contested Zarichne village and a flanking operation at Yampi (which has netted them some UA prisoners)(p.610)

12.  This....

 

 

Edited April 27, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Taranis]

Shots were fired in the morning and drones observed overnight near Kolbasna village - Transnistria police
https://t.me/pridnestrovec/19293

[LongLeftFlank]

Ground level view of Russian incoming.

 

 

Edited April 27, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Combatintman]

15 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Since I am also curious about the state of play of the slo-mo "Potemkin" offensive against Slovyansk, I went back over the last 90 pages of this thread (only 15 April!) and pulled out some of the key assessments made by our esteemed experts. All hail and praise unto them!

1. @The_Capt scans the terrain for the Izyum axis (page 532)

2. @Combatintman maps out the potential axes for a 'pincer' attack (page 548)

3.  @Haiduk confirms the attack (page 553)

4. @Kinophile shows us vividly how exposed are the northern approaches to Slovyansk (page 556)

5. @Combatintman revises the axes in light of the actual Russian advances (p557)

6. @Combatintman estimates RA force strength around Izyum at 16 BTGs not the 22 advertised

7. @The_Capt floats the interesting hypothesis that this is a 'look busy but don't bleed too much' offensive.

8. @Haiduk updates the actions around Izyum as of 23 Apr (p593)

9. @Combatintman evaluates the Engagement Area around Dovenkhe (Izyum-Slovyansk road)

 

10.  @The_Capt assesses the state of play: "using BTGs to try and find a hole in the UA defence instead of a recon screen" 

 

11. @Haiduk's latest update, noting RA gains in contested Zarichne village and a flanking operation at Yampi (which has netted them some UA prisoners)(p.610)

12.  This....

 

 

Here is something I posted elsewhere on Saturday (so this is definitely no lightning war) ... which remains relevant in the light of the activity just reported in Zarichne and Yampil.  Zarichne is just north of Torske in the schematic below and Zampil is two boxes down from Torske and one to the right.

Here's what I wrote then ...

Activity in the area of Torske is quite interesting.  Should it be captured, it offers a lot of possibilities for the Russians with a series of bridges over the Siverskyi Donets River.  Even if the bridges are dropped, there are also a number of areas that could be bridged with tactical bridging with river widths in some places just shy of 40m (although the average is approaching 90m) which is bridgeable by a TMM set (40m) (Bde/Regt asset).  The banks in many areas also look from the imagery to be suitable to launch tactical bridging and subsequently ferry sites or larger pontoon bridging.  Once south of the river, the ground offers at least a couple of BTG/battalion-sized avenues of approach to hook west towards Slovyansk.  These are shown as red arrows on the schematic below with the black boxed areas as fairly coarse grained NAIs designed to find, track and confirm likely COAs.  Crossing in this area is certainly a better option than trying to grind through Lyman, then the wooded feature beyond before attempting a river crossing in the area of grid square 37U DQ 08 19.

[Combatintman]

Of course the other thing that drops out of the activity in Yampil and Zarichne is that the Ukrainian 57 Bde is in danger of being pocketed if it is still sat where UAWar is plotting it ...

[Taranis]

"Sergei fires on Russian soldiers detected on the other side of the front. In a Ukrainian army trench, in Bakmut, Donbass, Ukraine, April 25, 2022. LAURENCE GEAI / MYOP FOR "LE MONDE""


"In a Ukrainian army trench in Bakhmout, Donbass. LAURENCE GEAI /MYOP FOR “LE MONDE”"


"On the left, Vadim, 22, launches the drone, which Yevhen on the right, 21, commands. LAURENCE GEAI/MYOP FOR “LE MONDE”"

[DesertFox]

Looks like we get some movement into the affair. Finally!

Germany will send about 50 anti-aircraft guns to Ukraine as its resistance to dispatching heavy weaponry begins to crumble.

Christine Lambrecht, the German defence minister, made the announcement at US-led talks in Germany yesterday. She also announced that Ukrainian soldiers would receive artillery training on German soil.

The German defence industry is seeking permission to supply Kyiv with 88 Leopard I battle tanks, 100 Marder armoured personnel carriers and 100 Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled howitzers.

Nervous Germany agrees to send anti-aircraft guns | News | The Times

Edited April 27, 2022 by DesertFox

[Malaspina]

2 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Since I am also curious about the state of play of the slo-mo "Potemkin" offensive against Slovyansk, I went back over the last 90 pages of this thread (only 15 April!) and pulled out some of the key assessments made by our esteemed experts. All hail and praise unto them!

1. @The_Capt scans the terrain for the Izyum axis (page 532)

2. @Combatintman maps out the potential axes for a 'pincer' attack (page 548)

3.  @Haiduk confirms the attack (page 553)

4. @Kinophile shows us vividly how exposed are the northern approaches to Slovyansk (page 556)

5. @Combatintman revises the axes in light of the actual Russian advances (p557)

6. @Combatintman estimates RA force strength around Izyum at 16 BTGs not the 22 advertised

7. @The_Capt floats the interesting hypothesis that this is a 'look busy but don't bleed too much' offensive.

8. @Haiduk updates the actions around Izyum as of 23 Apr (p593)

9. @Combatintman evaluates the Engagement Area around Dovenkhe (Izyum-Slovyansk road)

 

10.  @The_Capt assesses the state of play: "using BTGs to try and find a hole in the UA defence instead of a recon screen" 

 

11. @Haiduk's latest update, noting RA gains in contested Zarichne village and a flanking operation at Yampi (which has netted them some UA prisoners)(p.610)

12.  This....

 

 

Outstanding. This post should be made into a separate forum thread and "pinned"! Thanks!!!

[LongLeftFlank]

14 minutes ago, Malaspina said:

Outstanding. This post should be made into a separate forum thread and "pinned"! Thanks!!!

[LLF preens modestly] Thanks, but no, I am merely a humble scribe. The heavy lifting was done by others. Anyway, this phase too will soon be overtaken by events.