How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Vet 0369]

13 hours ago, TheVulture said:

Yeah, it really does look like they just parked a platoon or two's worth of vehicles there and just wandered off for lunch and an afternoon down the pub.

Maybe they’re off looking for washing machines and little boys and girls.

[danfrodo]

15 minutes ago, Fenris said:

Couple of tweets on the cheery situation in the motherland

 

Hopefully he wasn't a spy at all.  I like this as Putin continues to eat his own.  I hope there's plenty of moles yet undiscovered.  And also hopefully west is being sneaky and falsely implicating innocent RU officials of spying

[Erwin]

It's long been expected that that's the bottom line now: “The war is entering the phase of competition for resources, which are almost unlimited in Russia in comparison to Ukraine,” Mr. Reznikov said. “To win in this war, we need a different kind of assistance from what we received before.”

If Ukraine cannot prevent the fall of Mariupol and the land corridor between Crimea and Russia, unfortunately there will be a very long slog which Russia expects to win by simply outlasting Ukraine and the west's attention span.  

[Fenris]

8 minutes ago, Erwin said:

If Ukraine cannot prevent the fall of Mariupol and the land corridor between Crimea and Russia, unfortunately there will be a very long slog which Russia expects to win by simply outlasting Ukraine and the west's attention span.  

How does russia maintain a war footing, on foreign soil long term if it's economy and supply chain is in the toilet?

Edited April 12, 2022 by Fenris
added supply chain

[Kinophile]

@Haiduk updating your post with the graph of Russian PGM usage:

https://twitter.com/Missile_Defense/status/1512535802131238927?t=bBW7c_Xf61YxRTT8LX7o6w&s=19

[Battlefront.com]

41 minutes ago, Erwin said:

f Ukraine cannot prevent the fall of Mariupol and the land corridor between Crimea and Russia, unfortunately there will be a very long slog which Russia expects to win by simply outlasting Ukraine and the west's attention span.  

Please, before you start in on this again... can you PLEASE address the many, many, many points that have been made against this notion every time you post the same thing?  It's like you say the "Sky is Black" without evidence and the rest us point out that the "Sky is Blue" by pointing to evidence.  Then you come back a couple of pages later and say the "Sky is Black" again.  Please either debate the challenges to your point or stop making it.  It's really getting annoying.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

I completely believe that Russia might test the waters with some chemical weapons against Azov in Mariupol.  That is completely consistent with Russian behavior, though I don't know why they would have waited so long to do it.  They must have lost thousands KIA/WIA in the past weeks.

However... the report is still unconfirmed.

There is an alternative which we must consider possible, even if unlikely.  Azov could be lying in hopes that this will get NATO's aircraft out and blowing stuff up.  It's really Azov's last hope of survival.

Again, due to the respective track records for truth, Azov wins hands down over Russia.  But serious accusations need serious evidence.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, Haiduk said:

ragic friendly fire, alas. Reportedly our crew in captured T-72B3 spotted Russain BMP with V-marking aside the road and mistook our troops for Russians, trying to recober this IFV. Judging on the video with bodies, at least one killed soldier was in light color camo, similar to Russian VDV uniform 

This makes more sense than a bunch of Ukrainians letting their guard down while a single Russian tank trundles onto their position.  Both elements didn't make much sense to me, though in war pretty much anything can happen.

There's probably been more than a few of these incidents that we're unaware of.  Friendly fire is a part of war, even when it's elite troops doing the fighting (Pat Tillman being the big example of this in the US).

The tanker's gunner and/or commander should not have fired like that.  They should have stopped and assessed the situation before firing.  If you think you're approaching a friendly area you shouldn't be slamming a round into it without being VERY sure.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

11 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Fair point, I edited out any attribution on his part.  Too bad he does not post here anymore, we rarely agreed but the guy knew his stuff and had an amazing historical depth of knowledge.  We would be better for him coming back, although don't quote me on that.

Oh man, those were some epic intellectual shoving matches.  I remember them quite well.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

11 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Again, "The Russians Suck" to explain what has happened.

The awkward reality is that the BTG concept is not that far from the western Battle Group concept, but I am sure the "Russians were doing it wrong".   This is an easy exit from the more awkward, "what did the Ukrainians Do Right, that made the Russians Wrong?  Because we might be wrong-ish too".  

Hmm, I'm a little surprised that this was your only take (or maybe it was just on O'Brien's tweet). Or did I miss a different point?

Because the Dupuy summary seemed to this layman to be pretty on the nose and tracking to prior anecdata....

(1) BTGs are simply battalion-sized, task organized combined arms teams. All major armies have done this since WWII....

(3) Russian Army BTGs and doctrine are built around firepower and mobility, at the expense of manpower...

(6) The Russian BTGs appear unable to execute competent combined arms tactics....

(7) This shows up big in the lack of effective infantry support. BTG infantry cannot prevent Ukrainian mechanized and light infantry anti-tank hunter/killer teams from attriting their AFV, IFV, and SP artillery. This is the primary job of infantry in tank units.

(8) It is not clear if this is due to ineffective infantry forces or insufficient numbers of them in the BTGs; probably both are true....

(10) The leanness of the BTG manning (~ 1,000 troops) means that they cannot sustain much attrition without suffering a marked decline in combat power and effectiveness.

(11) It will take a thorough analysis to determine if the performance of the BTGs is due to inherent flaws in Russian Army personnel and training or flaws in their doctrinal approach. Again, both are probably culpable.

(12) In any case, these problems are not likely to be remedied in the short term. Fixing them will take a major reform effort.

TL:DR, by design the BTGs don't have enough organic infantry (whether demographic reasons or 'cuz Russians suck' -- poor motivation, bad sergeants, nil situation awareness, hiding behind their armour) to do the jobs they need to do, or perhaps any other for that matter.

While the Ukrainians have, by luck or by design, created antifragile tactical forces that can neither be readily attrited by ranged artillery/air nor found and fixed by the land units (BTGs) themselves. And also seem to possess on average a degree of initiative and self suffiency reminiscent of Finnish ski troops or Ranger forces, and not readily subject to disruption up their own command or LOC chain....

What am I missing? (in your own good time, cheers, thanks for the many insights to date)

Edited April 12, 2022 by LongLeftFlank
link

[chris talpas]

Video showing the recetnly liberated village of Romanivka.  Presents the physical destruction at a human scale.  Looking at the extent of destruction, it almost resembles a path of wreckage. from  a large twister.  I cannot begin to imagine the extent of damage to Ukraine's infrastructure, let alone the human suffering.

 

[Battlefront.com]

11 hours ago, The_Capt said:

That is a really good one.  This was supposed to send a message to the Russian people as well.  I suspect "they are all out to get us but stick with me and I will save mother-Russia" fits in here as well.  Out of the "real" political objectives, this last one may still be in play as if Putin lies hard enough and can make a silk purse out of this sows ear he could secure a large enough echo chamber.  But that line of Russian kids coming home in pieces (if they come home at all) is going to get harder and harder to explain away.  I am sure they are lining up "it wasn't useless/hopeless Ukrainians that killed our boys, it was NATO/US weapons but we took 12 square feet of ground, so I saved us."

Getting back to a discussion from a few pages ago about identifying Russia's unstated goals.  To sum them up again with a new one added (#6):

1. Demonstrate and re-assert Russian global power, effectively undeciding the outcome of the Cold War.
2. Pull all of Ukraine back into its sphere of control as a lesson/signal to a fracturing global order.
3. Send a message to the entirety of its near abroad that "this is what stepping out of line looks like for you"
4. Show NATO/EU/UN and especially the US as 1) divided, 2) weak and dithering, and 3) not the pony to bet on.
5. deny the Russian people any easy way to compare/contrast what post Soviet life could look like with better governance. 
6. Accomplish all this while it still can be and/or before Putin dies or retires

I've seen some Putin and economic experts talking about #6 from time to time.  It's a good point that is no doubt playing SOME part in this.

Putin and his top goons know they won't live forever, so if they have it in their craw to see this thing through they need to act pretty soon or it won't likely happen in their lifetimes.  So if there is a goal to see the reestablishment of Russia's former glory, then they would probably not want to wait too much later.

Aside from this, let's presume that Putin is not an idiot and is quite aware that Russia is getting weaker every year in real terms as well as relative terms to the West.  Fossil fuels are under pressure to be phased out.  No matter what you think about alternative forms of energy, every single decline in fossil fuel results in less money flowing into Russia.  This wouldn't be such a problem if they had more ways to generate significant revenue, but they don't.  That's just "best case".  Think of a worst case scenario like practical fusion or improved fission power suddenly taking off.  What do you think Russia's economy would look like?  Exactly.

Then there's Russia's horrible demographic outlook amongst the western (white/christian) population.  The outflow of educated Russians and lack of importing talent is a big problem for Russia.  The growing Muslim populations in traditionally unstable parts of its Federation count as a big worry too.

Tie it all together and a goal for this war could be to make sure Russia has its shot at taking everything it wants before it no longer can.  This was a big reason for Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, so it should be considered as a likely reason why this war and why now.

Steve

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

Have we already got Lt. Col. Arkadiy Smolnikov?

 

[Battlefront.com]

24 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Hmm, I'm a little surprised that this was your only take (or maybe it was just on O'Brien's tweet). Or did I miss a different point?

Because the Dupuy summary seemed to this layman to be pretty on the nose and tracking to prior anecdata....

Funny, I hadn't thought about the Dupuy Institute in probably 15+ years until I saw people looking at high level numbers and thinking they could predict the future with them.  That was what Dupuy stared out with.  Some pretty interesting stuff, pioneering in fact, that really didn't go anywhere.  Though it was really good food for thought.  I got a lot out of it early in my wargame design days.  They also produced some really great historical analysis reports that weren't numbers based.

Anyway, just had to get that out there to prove I'm well on my way to being an old duffer

 

24 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

TL:DR, by design the BTGs don't have enough organic infantry (whether demographic reasons or 'cuz Russians suck' -- poor motivation, bad sergeants, nil situation awareness, hiding behind their armour) to do the jobs they need to do, or perhaps any other for that matter.

While the Ukrainians have, by luck or by design, created antifragile tactical forces that can neither be readily attrited by ranged artillery/air nor found and fixed by the land units (BTGs) themselves. And also seem to possess on average a degree of initiative and self suffiency reminiscent of Finnish ski troops or Ranger forces, and not readily subject to disruption up their own command or LOC chain....

What am I missing? (in your own good time, cheers, thanks for the many insights to date)

Although you didn't ask me specifically, I'm going to chime in anyway

One MAJOR difference between the Russian BTG and the way the West fights is scope of responsibility for a given sector.

Under normal circumstances a Western force would use a Brigade (Regiment in some nations) to manage a fairly large geographical area.  The Brigade (I'll just use this to represent Regiments too) has under its command the equivalent of 3 Battalions, all of which have trained together and have a unified espirt de corps.  When any portion of the Brigade runs into trouble there's a common sense of purpose to get them out of it.  If it's a bigger problem then cross attaching or coordinated commands kick in and that is something NATO forces spend a lot of time getting ready for.

Contrast this with Russia's forces where Regiments are fielding maybe 1 or perhaps 2 BTGs to start with, apparently often under strength as well.  If a BTG gets into trouble it most likely has to ask an unrelated unit for help.  A unit that itself doesn't have much backup.  Unlike NATO it's pretty clear that Russia does not have the doctrine, training, or equipment to make such ad hoc battlefield adjustments work effectively.  The results are not going to be good.  Especially if the units in question are not only unfamiliar with each other, but also hostile to each other (ethnic Russians look down on others, VDV rubs many the wrong way, nobody likes the Chechens, etc.)

Ukraine, on the other hand, has modeled its forces on the NATO system.  It's national sense of purpose overrides regional differences to a large extent.  I bet there is less tension between any two Ukrainian units than Russian ones based in St. Petersburg and those from around Moscow!  It also seems that Ukraine has kept its brigades largely intact instead of penny packeting them around the battlefield like Russia did with VDV and Marines early in the war and now various units scraped from the hinterlands.

Russia can't fix these sorts of problems within the timeframe of this war.  Ukraine, on the other hand, is likely to improve upon what it already has.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Did anybody mention yet that Russia just defaulted on its debt payments today?  Anybody that says the West isn't putting the screws to the Russian economy aren't paying enough attention to the facts:

https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/11/investing/russia-default-sp/index.html

Steve

[danfrodo]

16 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Did anybody mention yet that Russia just defaulted on its debt payments today?  Anybody that says the West isn't putting the screws to the Russian economy aren't paying enough attention to the facts:

https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/11/investing/russia-default-sp/index.html

Steve

I'll go ahead and ask the dumb question: What will be the real consequences of a Russian default?  Both economically and to their war effort?

And the article said they have  until around end of April to make things right before actual default, though no one thinks they can fix this by then.  And RU is suing the US to try to get sanctions removed on their funds in US banks -- hopefully that will drag out for a while -- and RU aint got a while.

[LongLeftFlank]

19 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Especially if the units in question are not only unfamiliar with each other, but also hostile to each other (ethnic Russians look down on others, VDV rubs many the wrong way, nobody likes the Chechens, etc.)

...I bet there is less tension between any two Ukrainian units than Russian ones based in St. Petersburg and those from around Moscow!  

Cheers, Steve, as this is your shop I generally assume you don't need to be asked to weigh in.  But I have no special claim on  @The_Capt either of course, or any of the other experts. Like me, you all have day jobs.

*Very* interesting points on the countless fissures and factions within the Russian army itself!

And, much as I hate echoing the @kraze 'Orcs' one note bugle, it's as though the gangsterism Galeev discusses has infected all of Russian society, save perhaps for a few Westernized technorati. 

Hobbesian war of all against all (with only the holy Tsar rising above it all. Until he doesn't).

Endless self pity, reflexive distrust of motives, prickly resentment of anyone who might have anything you don't, etc. 

Can't find a dark Russian nightclub Vysotsky type cover of Leonard Cohen, but it's gotta be out there.... 

 

[danfrodo]

Meanwhile.... another day passes and the great offensive does not occur.  Just more probes, although those might actually be the great offensive. 

And Putin continues to makes his own worst nightmares come true.  Russia is now recognized as weak, completely uncivilized (at gov't level), untrustworthy, dangerous, poor as heck and sinking fast.  West is more unified against Russia than it has been in ages.  And everyone wants to join NATO.  Genius!! 

[Battlefront.com]

This might be Putin trying to head off what Ukraine is about to find in the Sumy region...

 

[danfrodo]

Putin sure has an obsession w British intelligence. 

[Combatintman]

15 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Funny, I hadn't thought about the Dupuy Institute in probably 15+ years until I saw people looking at high level numbers and thinking they could predict the future with them.  That was what Dupuy stared out with.  Some pretty interesting stuff, pioneering in fact, that really didn't go anywhere.  Though it was really good food for thought.  I got a lot out of it early in my wargame design days.  They also produced some really great historical analysis reports that weren't numbers based.

Anyway, just had to get that out there to prove I'm well on my way to being an old duffer

 

Although you didn't ask me specifically, I'm going to chime in anyway

One MAJOR difference between the Russian BTG and the way the West fights is scope of responsibility for a given sector.

Under normal circumstances a Western force would use a Brigade (Regiment in some nations) to manage a fairly large geographical area.  The Brigade (I'll just use this to represent Regiments too) has under its command the equivalent of 3 Battalions, all of which have trained together and have a unified espirt de corps.  When any portion of the Brigade runs into trouble there's a common sense of purpose to get them out of it.  If it's a bigger problem then cross attaching or coordinated commands kick in and that is something NATO forces spend a lot of time getting ready for.

Contrast this with Russia's forces where Regiments are fielding maybe 1 or perhaps 2 BTGs to start with, apparently often under strength as well.  If a BTG gets into trouble it most likely has to ask an unrelated unit for help.  A unit that itself doesn't have much backup.  Unlike NATO it's pretty clear that Russia does not have the doctrine, training, or equipment to make such ad hoc battlefield adjustments work effectively.  The results are not going to be good.  Especially if the units in question are not only unfamiliar with each other, but also hostile to each other (ethnic Russians look down on others, VDV rubs many the wrong way, nobody likes the Chechens, etc.)

Ukraine, on the other hand, has modeled its forces on the NATO system.  It's national sense of purpose overrides regional differences to a large extent.  I bet there is less tension between any two Ukrainian units than Russian ones based in St. Petersburg and those from around Moscow!  It also seems that Ukraine has kept its brigades largely intact instead of penny packeting them around the battlefield like Russia did with VDV and Marines early in the war and now various units scraped from the hinterlands.

Russia can't fix these sorts of problems within the timeframe of this war.  Ukraine, on the other hand, is likely to improve upon what it already has.

Steve

The BTG discussion has been interesting - I did find it strange that people leapt on the US BCT vs Russian BTG study because it is an apples and oranges comparison.  As has emerged during the links unearthed during the discussion, the BTG in terms of its look is really no different to a standard NATO Battlegroup or Battalion Task Force.  However the less obvious things are those that matter. 

BTGs were a compromise based on the fact that Russia could not man all of its regiments/brigades so just allocated those combat, combat support and combat service support bodies they had available across the regiment/brigade to either a single or maybe two BTGs.  It is debatable whether these BTGs had any form of collective training before they crossed the border - the ones that went to Belarus should certainly have given the amount of time they sat there before this 'special military operation started.'  Anyway it is a moot point because most of what we have suggests that either the training didn't happen or was insufficient.

Then there is the C2 aspect.  Most of the Orbat diagrams that we look at show that conceptually the BTG can deliver a heavy punch - for instance they are not short on tube or rocket artillery but they have been unable to bring it all together.  Those same diagrams illustrate why in physical terms alone - not many command vehicles in the HQ being the obvious indication.

To add to Steve's point in the quoted post above about parent brigades or regiments.  The revelation of the last week (or so) that in the absence of a Supreme Commander or even a single Land Component Commander to run the whole operation, divisional commanders were just told to do their own thing until an overall commander was appointed a few days back.  This will have compounded the difficulties further down the food chain for any BTG commander who found themselves in the brown smelly stuff - who do they call for help? where are they? what help can they deliver? etc ...

Then there's logistics - which has been done to death, but worth saying again - the CSS slice for BTGs was not up to the task and Russian Army reforms of recent years weakened CSS in the Russian Army from top to bottom.

[Battlefront.com]

I'm interested to know what Russia's Regiments looked like as they moved into Ukraine and how they look today.  Most sources I've read have mentioned how understrength they were going in.  In part because conscript problem, partly because they were still largely at their peace time strength.

What I'm wondering about is when we see X Rgt on a map, are we talking about 1, 2, or 3 more-or-less full BTGs.  And secondly, how many men are in each BTG? 

It's been very difficult to get a sense of reality vs. theory.

Thanks!

Steve

 

[sburke]

1 hour ago, akd said:

@sburke @Kinophile

Have we already got Lt. Col. Arkadiy Smolnikov?

 

nope, he's new.  Any details?

[Phantom Captain]

1 hour ago, danfrodo said:

Putin sure has an obsession w British intelligence. 

Bond, James Bond.  I mean, how many times alone did 007 singlehandedly thwart the Soviet Union??  Come on! 

Edited April 12, 2022 by Phantom Captain

[LongLeftFlank]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I'm interested to know what Russia's Regiments looked like as they moved into Ukraine and how they look today.  Most sources I've read have mentioned how understrength they were going in.  In part because conscript problem, partly because they were still largely at their peace time strength.

What I'm wondering about is when we see X Rgt on a map, are we talking about 1, 2, or 3 more-or-less full BTGs.  And secondly, how many men are in each BTG? 

It's been very difficult to get a sense of reality vs. theory.

Thanks!

Steve

 

Purely FWIW, Viktor Suvorov's memoir "Aquarium" describes the late 1960s Red Army battalion structure as follows:

To an outsider, all companies in a Soviet division or regiment look exactly the same.

1. But no! In each battalion, the first company is indeed the first. Whatever good soldiers may be in the battalion, and all the best kit, the battalion commander collects in the first company. And if there is a shortage of officers, then a fresh replacement is sure to be given to the first company. Because the first company always attacks on the main axis of the battalion. It is the first to attack the enemy head to head. And on that first move depends the outcome of the battle.

2. The second company in any battalion is mediocre. The officers in the second company are without any special distinction, like me, and the soldiers too. But every second company has additional intelligence training. It's kind of like a secondary profession. First of all, it is still a combat company, but if necessary, it can conduct reconnaissance on behalf of its battalion, and perhaps serve the needs of the regiment too, replacing or supplementing the special  reconnaissance unit.

3. In the Soviet Army there are 2,400 motorized rifle battalions. And in each of them the third company, is not only third in number. Third companies get those who did not get into the first or second companies: very young, inexperienced officers, or overaged and hopeless ones. The manpower in the third companies is not always sufficient. Moreover, in the home territory of the Soviet Union, the third companies are without the overwhelming majority of their soldiers. Their  combat equipment is kept in mothballs. If war breaks out, thousands of these companies will be supplemented by reservists and then quickly raised to the level of conventional combat units.

In this system there is a profound logic: adding reservists to an existing division is a thousand times better than forming new divisions entirely from reservists.

....So for all that 'combined arms' happy talk, the essence of the BTG concept may in fact be a very old expedient of cannibalizing all the available talent and kit out of understrength parent regiments in order to stand up a "First Battalion" that is (theoretically) equipped to conduct 21st century warfare. 

But perhaps with the exception of a few Praetorian formations, there isn't enough to fit out 2 such kampfgruppen.  Once the BTG is savaged, that could be pretty much it for the entire regiment's striking power.  Everyone else is a second rater or newb who didn't make the travel team....

Just a theory here, don't know how it tracks with observed events.

P.S.  I found a Russian cover of Знают Все, although it's mediocre: the singer is more Rammstein than Leonard C, and the backup is canned twangy country not balalaikas. There's definitely a gap to fill out there.

Edited April 12, 2022 by LongLeftFlank