How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, c3k said:

Current Ukraine forces are incredibly well-suited to the defensive fight against Russia's attack. As the Russian spearheads dig in, and Putin's generals reinforce the supply lines (with Syrians and Putinjugend?), the Russian lines will harden up. 

It's great that Ukraine has a vast reservoir of motivated fighters to call up. But just sending infantry in against the Russians is NOT the answer.

In many circumstances, I think you are correct.  But in this one?  I don't think heavy weapons are needed at all.  Here's my case for that..

• the Russians are on hostile enemy terrain, with the northern and central parts offering limited fields of fire and great concealment opportunities
• Russian forces are showing all kinds of problems with logistics, morale, and basic concepts of force protection
• for the most part it seems Russians are going on the defensive and digging in.  Once dug in, by definition they aren't moving.  This means once Ukrainian recon has detected a position it can push a pin into a map and eventually get a very good picture of what the Russian defenses are and where obvious weak points are
• we've seen how cheap commercial drones have blown the traditional concepts of costly, time consuming recon work right out of the water.  This means in a VERY short period of time the Ukrainians will know pretty much everything they need to know about a particular sector of frontage

If I were in charge of establishing Ukrainian counter offensive operations I would do the following:

1. establish a detailed picture of fairly small sections of front that offer the most opportunities in terms of cover/concealment
2. select a number of such places within a fairly small geographical area.  Oh, say 10km of frontage
3. if the frontage has key roads or terrain within easy reach, focus SOME attention to them when there's a big immediate payoff (for example a single supply route for a particular area)
4. repeat this sort of analysis over a larger sector of front, like 30-60km
5. figure out where heavy weapons would be best utilized and add them to the plan
6. prioritize the attack points and have them phased in over a period of 48 hours
7. position all assets 1-2 days foot march away from their assigned attack points, with the ones to go "hot" first about 3 hours marching distance.  KEEP WELL DISPERSED and self sufficient (i.e. plenty of food)
8. heavier mobile units would be positioned 1 day before in key locations about 1 day's drive from their assigned sectors.  Again, very dispersed.

When the time came to attack the infantry would attack the preassigned weak points and flood into the rear of the enemy's fixed positions.  They'd attack from all directions except the front!  Small arms, shoulder fired rockets, and light mortars for the most part.  Heavier weapons would be used to interdict any reinforcements and/or take out heavier assets that could be made mobile in short order.  Existing frontline units, the ones holding the line already, would use their firepower to fix known Russian positions while the infiltration units did their thing.

The first wave of attacks would prove very disruptive to the Russians for sure.  They would not be able to effectively stop all of them as they'd be too small and too numerous to effectively counter.  Hold up the attackers in one place and they slip through untouched in another.  The net effect on the Russian frontline positions would likely sow panic on a large scale, which would make them easier to cut down as they either ineffectively fight from their positions or attempt to get away.

Then the second wave would hit, taking advantage of holes punched into the lines by the first wave.  They would do pretty much the same thing that the first wave did.

Third wave would be the heavier stuff, seeking to move deeper into the rear of the Russians while the light infantry fixed the the holdouts in place and mopped up the rest.

This strategy is realistic and plays to Russia's weaknesses more than it does Ukraine's strengths.  Doing this sort of thing in a few places at a time will cause a larger crisis to unfold within the Russian command.  Panic and hesitation would be the likely result.

If done in a coordinated way, I could see the entire Russian front collapsing within a few days.  10s of thousands of captured in the process.

This is a sound and realistic plan.

Steve

 

 

[keas66]

30 minutes ago, Erwin said:

And here is the problem re bio-chem weapons being researched by the US in Ukraine.  According to WSJ today:

"On his first official visit abroad, the new senator from Illinois, Barack Obama, was taken to a facility in Ukraine where the U.S. helped scientists working with dangerous biological materials. But rather than produce biological weapons, U.S. officials in that ramshackle building were trying to prevent lethal pathogens from falling into the hands of terrorists.

“I removed a tray of glass vials containing Bacillus anthracis, which is the bacterium that causes the anthrax,” recalls Andrew Weber, the Pentagon official who was in charge of the U.S.-funded program that worked with the Ukrainian government. Mr. Weber said he showed the tray “to a very concerned-looking young senator.”

The above seems to have been inexcusable and now is being used by Russian and China to beat us over the head...

---

 

Not sure what you mean by "inexcusable" ? You are aware that these Biolabs  dated back to Soviet Times and the  Working relationship between the US and Ukraine was   to make these sites safe again ? . Much like Ukraine gave up its Nuclear weapons . With regards anything China and Russia have to say about these sites - pretty much entirely propaganda - and the same when it is brought up by Extremists in the West .

 

 

Adding a w\Wikileaks document  which  shows some of the internal discussions around nuclear and Biolab  handling in Ukraine as an example of the above claim  by myself :

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE34695_a.html

sections 21 - 27

Edited March 20, 2022 by keas66
Adding a ref doc from wikileaks

[Combatintman]

For those interested in the information operations space - ExTrac is worth a look:

I haven't got the bandwidth to delve into the detail of this stuff to establish its veracity; however, I can tell you for a fact that their analysis of the Afghan media space that I read today is absolutely bang on the money so on that basis I highly recommend it for those that are interested in this aspect of the conflict.

[Haiduk]

@sburke

To your high-ranked collection

Colonel Igor Nikolayev, commander of 252nd motor-rifle regiment (Boguchar, Voronezh oblast) of 3rd motor-rifle division. By other information he was a regimental commander of 137th VDV regiment, but probably this other officer with the same name and surname or just wrong information

He was killed 15th of March in Kharkiv oblast. Direct hit of artillery shell in his BMP. 

 

Colonel Nikolay Ovcharenko, the chief of engineer troops of Western Miliatary District. The screen tells he got lost 19th of March during building a pontoon crossing through Siverskyi Donets riber near Izium, Kharkiv oblast. Together with him was killed 18 and wounded 46 servicemen of 45th engineer brigade (Nakhabino, Moscow oblast). But this is not confirmed on 100 % for now.

 

 

Lt.colonel Alexandr Pazynich, the regimental comamnder deputy for human resourses of 14th Guard Fighter Aviation Regiment (Kursk, Su-30SM). Together with him got lost captain Yevgeniy Kisliakov. The crew lost probably 16th or 17th of March. 

 

 

Edited March 20, 2022 by Haiduk

[Battlefront.com]

The_Capt,

Thanks for that write up.  This is exactly the sort of discussion I'm not seeing playing out in the mainstream media (big surprise) or even with the paid professionals who have their own outlets.  It seems that most people looking at this war are not examining the very basic elements that underpin everything.  The two most important being that Russia has shown no capacity for successfully conducting large scale military operations AND they have set themselves up to conduct a MASSIVE scale military operation. 

Russia simply does not have the manpower, equipment, or skills to put this off.

On the other hand... Ukraine has the manpower, equipment, and skills to counter it.

The math on this is pretty easy.

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Whereas in the offence you can prioritize your main efforts, in the defence you have to be able to see and coordinate fires everywhere at the same time.  Doing that along a 1300km frontage is...well, simply insane but hey here we are.  The UA, did a pretty good job of it but it was their ground, they had the HUMINT going their way, and very likely buckets of ISR feeds from the west.  The Russian architecture has not demonstrated they are set up for this. 

This is the crux of the post I just made.  Ukraine doesn't have to do huge sweeping WW2 type pincer movements.  They just have to get a bunch of small arms fire in enough rears at enough points in time to cause a systemic paralysis and eventually failure of the Russian defenses.  This can be done one spot at a time or it can be done on a wide scale.  Or one and then the other.  It really doesn't matter as the end result will be the same thing... compromise of local or operational frontage with an eventual effect of strategic collapse.

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

   To be honest, if someone tasked me with shooting for a Russian Strategic re-set, I would tell them it is going to take years because whatever they came with in this "come as you are war" was a failure and we are talking about deep military reforms and training in order to re-build a force that could actually pull off what the aspiration of this thing. 

Yes, exactly this.  Both the Russians and Ukrainians are subject to the "come as you are war".  The problem for the Russians is the scope of "as you are" is within their own resources, whereas the Ukrainians "as you are" includes all of the resources of NATO.  Russia can't waive a magic wand and have 10s of thousands of something magically appear on the battlefield.  Ukraine has the equivalent of a magic wand.

Further, the Russians have a manpower disadvantage in the extreme.  By not taking over Ukraine within the first few days or weeks of the war this meant that "come as you are" for the Ukrainians got extended to included drawing upon manpower reserves that are IN EXCESS OF RUSSIA'S ENTIRE STANDING MILITARY.  Even if Putin were able to mobilize Russia's conscripts and reserves, all that would do is try to even things up and maybe get a slight manpower edge over what the Ukrainians already have available to them.

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

   So as we proceed on this journey, I am wracking my brain to make a list of the "Dumbest Wars in History" but this one has to be on it and moving upwards rapidly.

My mind has been wracking the dusty memory banks to think of something equally stupid.  The Italian East African Campaign is one that keeps coming to mind, both in terms of the incompetence of how it was conducted as well as the ramifications that came from its defeat.

The other that comes to mind is the Six Day War.  As with the Italian campaign, the attackers chose their moment and when the dust settled they had lost everything they worked towards and more.

However, there were REAL reasons for both the Italian campaign and what became the Six Day war.  Putin's war on Ukraine was a complete fabrication of need.  There were so many other ways to go about achieving Putin's goals that didn't involve rolling the dice on a single military solution, even if failure wasn't as assured as it obviously was.

So yeah, Putin takes home the Gold for at least the "Dumbest War in Modern History".

Steve

[mosuri]

12 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

The forces there are NOT cut off.  The supply lines are difficult, but they exist.

Here's a map that appears to be more accurate than some of the ones out there:

Apologies if this a repeated topic -- I have read through the whole thread but probably forgotten half of it

How should we read those Russian tendrils spreading out? Advances along major roadways, obviously, but how much actual control of the area that represents? A unit at the head of advance and garrisons strung along, every village and crossroads perhaps? And convoys doing Mad Max runs from garrison to garrison? Or something more solid?

Can the Ukranians do a Raate road repeat and cut the red snakes into pieces to be defeated in detail? Or do they also suffer from too much rasputitsa-related movement restrictions outside of the roads for that not to be possible?

[sburke]

8 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

@sburke

To your high-ranked collection

Colonel Igor Nikolayev, commander of 252nd motor-rifle regiment (Boguchar, Voronezh oblast) of 3rd motor-rifle division. By other information he was a regimental commander of 137th VDV regiment, but probably this other officer with the same name and surname or just wrong information

He was killed 15th of March in Kharkiv oblast. Direct hit of artillery shell in his BMP. 

 

Colonel Nikolay Ovcharenko, the chief of engineer troops of Western Miliatary District. The screen tells he got lost 19th of March during building a pontoon crossing through Siverskyi Donets riber near Izium, Kharkiv oblast. Together with him was killed 18 and wounded 46 servicemen of 45th engineer brigade (Nakhabino, Moscow oblast). But this is not confirmed on 100 % for now.

 

 

Lt.colonel Alexandr Pazynich, the regimental comamnder deputy for human resourses of 14th Guard Fighter Aviation Regiment (Kursk, Su-30SM). Together with him got lost captain Yevgeniy Kisliakov. The crew lost probably 16th or 17th of March. 

 

 

I had Colonel Igor Nikolayev.  Added the other two.

[akd]

Trying to find something definitive, but there are ongoing rumors that Lieutenant General Aleksandr Sanchik, commander 35th CAA, was at some point (possibly as early as Mar. 2) permanently removed from the battlefield, either badly wounded or killed.

Edited March 20, 2022 by akd

[sburke]

7 hours ago, akd said:

Trying to find something definitive, but there are ongoing rumors that Lieutenant General Aleksandr Sanchik, commander 35th CAA was at some point (possibly as early as Mar. 2) permanently removed from the battlefield, either badly wounded or killed.

dang that would skew the scales a bit more.  Current list:

MG Andrey Kolesnikov, Russia’s 29th Combined Arms Army commander
Andrei Sukhovetsky, Deputy Commander of the 41st Combined Arms Army
Major General Vitaly Gerasimov, First Deputy Commander Of The 41st Army
Major-general Oleg Mitiayev, commander of 150th motor-rifle division
General-Lieutenant Andrey Mordvichev commander 8th CAA 

Guards Colonel Konstantin Zizevsky commander of the 247th Guards Air Assault Regiment 
Colonel Yuryi Agarkov, the commander of 33rd motor-rifle regiment (Kamyshyn, Volgograd oblast) of 20th Guard motor-rifle division
Colonel Alexander Vladimirovich Zakharov, 6th tank regiment commander
Colonel Sergei Porokhnya commander of the 12th separate guards engineering brigade
Colonel Sergey Sukharev, commander of 331st Guards Airborne Regiment (of the 98th VDV Division)
Colonel Igor Nikolaev Commander of 252nd Motor Rifle Regiment, the 3rd Motor Rifle Division.
Colonel Sergey Savvateeyev, Deputy commander of Rosgvardia SOBR
Colonel Nikolay Ovcharenko, the chief of engineer troops of Western Miliatary District.
Captain of 1st rank (=colonel) Andrei Paliy Deputy of Black Sea Fleet commander, 
Lt Colonel Denis Glebov, Deputy Commander of the 11th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade
Lt Colonel Dmitry Safronov, Commander of the 61st Separate Marine Brigade
Lt.colonel Alexei Khasanov, deputy commander of 31st Fighter aviation regiment
Lt Colonel Mikhail Orchikov was deputy commander of a motor-rifle brigade 19th motor-rifle division
Lt.colonel Alexandr Pazynich, the regimental commander deputy for human resources of 14th Guard Fighter Aviation Regiment
Lt.colonel Renat Gaisin
Lt.colonel Ilya Piatkin, 38 years  SOBR
Lt.colonel Roman Ryabov, 50 years  SOBR
Lt.colonel (likely) Mikhail Rodionov, 46 years   SOBR

Guards Major Burlakov Andrei Petrovich, Deputy Chief of Intelligence Staff - Chief of Intelligence Regiment
Major Sergey Krylov deputy battalion commander from the VDV's 331st Airborne Regiment

Deputy mayor Alexandr Fiodorov 103 missile brigade (Iskander-M) that Russian Iskander unit met with our SOF...

Captured
Lieutenant Colonel Maxim Kryshtop: Deputy Commander of the 47th Aviation Regiment 
Lt. Colonel Astrakhov Dmitry Mikhailovich:  SOBR

 

Edited March 20, 2022 by sburke

[Battlefront.com]

Article (originally in Russian) on the state of at least one of the Kadyrov units deployed to Ukraine:

https://www-radiosvoboda-org.translate.goog/a/kadyrіvtsiv-z-ukrayiny-povernuly-v-chechniu/31760938.html?fbclid=IwAR3r-vrf0x_tDO_w-EaSOzHyzoYvqkvkThZ77X36WT2Uqyq39eM5CQj538E&_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en-US&_x_tr_pto=wapp

This seems to be focused on the roughly 1200 men that were operating around Kiev.  According to the article (and other sources) they were withdrawn on March 13 after suffering significant losses.

I don't know if any of Kadyrov's forces are still in the Kiev area, but they for sure are actively fighting in Mariupol's eastern suburbs at the moment.

Steve

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

  Second, without making the areas they defend "airtight" they will continue to be plagued by attacks along their LOCs.  The Russians might try to make ironclad support corridors but given the ranges of the UKR weapons systems this is a huge undertaking of interlinked strong points just to get the supplies to some sort of front.  This will make the logistics problem worse. 

Assume a 2500 meter effective range for multiple Ukrainian ATGM systems which is actually pretty conservative. You have to maintain a 5km wide band of territory for every single supply rout. So that is basically a max size CMBS map wide. How many troops does it take to find and fix one hostile platoon on a full sized CMBS map with moderate terrain complications. Remember the platoons isn't trying to fight, just hide until a supply truck, or trucks wander thru. Your entire supply line is just one full sized CMBS map after another from fire base "We're ^###*%$# mommy" to the Russian border. Maybe a lot longer if Belarus wobbles even a little bit. Would one company of decent infantry be enough to even attempt it? DO the Russians have ANY infantry that can be described as decent? Or at least any left ? The Russian  math does NOT add.

[Sarjen]

More info on the work of the Belarus railway sabotage.

 

[Vet 0369]

7 hours ago, womble said:

A "Commissar Corp" would just divert some of the kickback money to a different patronage stream. Corruption is the accepted way of doing business in Russia, from top to bottom. It's so baked in to systems like theirs that it isn't even considered "wrong". The forms of patronage which are the root of the problem are so well established that they will take generations to root out to the levels seen in the less-corrupt* "West". It has, after all, taken "us" a couple of centuries to drag ourselves out of that mire, even to the extent which we have.

The very attitudes that support corruption as endemic in the society will work strongly against any attempt to decentralise the C2 of the Russian military. Ukraine has managed to leverage the existential threat of Russia to make reforms along those lines, it seems, but getting its army eviscerated isn't likely to provoke change in the same way in the RF.

* Yes, "less-corrupt". Corruption still exists, subtle and gross in form, in all societies. Ukraine isn't rated much better than Russia.

Yes, corruption exists everywhere at different levels. As far as I’m concerned, the most visible corruption in the U.S. are called “political action committees (PACs)” and “Lobbyists.”

[akd]

Protesters getting the boot in Berdyansk:

 

[Haiduk]

- Mariupol defenders reported Russians shelled the city with cruise missiles, launched from ships. Also Russians tried to conuct limited landing operation, using landing vessels, but after maneuvering near the beach, they just set smoke and withdrew. Probably they didn't want to risk, because some beaches of Mariupol since 2015 was defended by the sea and land mines. 

- Reportedly UKR troops pushed off LNR and Russians from Rubizne city

- Artillery of 58th mtorized infantry brigade in fourth time destroyed Ruissian pontoon bridge, which Russians built in the same place.

- Russians activated NW from Kyiv. I heard artillery shooting today. At lest one missile, launched from Mozyr, Belarus (probably Iskander) was intercepted over Kyiv today. The building was damaged, when it parts fell down. 

- Russian TV showed a video of clashes in Kachaly village in 7km NW from Borodianka town. Russian SOBR special police of Smolensk oblast there (on the photo)

  

Edited March 20, 2022 by Haiduk

[akd]

Said to be work of Korsar ATGMs:

 

[Holien]

1 hour ago, Combatintman said:

For those interested in the information operations space - ExTrac is worth a look:

I haven't got the bandwidth to delve into the detail of this stuff to establish its veracity; however, I can tell you for a fact that their analysis of the Afghan media space that I read today is absolutely bang on the money so on that basis I highly recommend it for those that are interested in this aspect of the conflict.

Amazing how many fall for these false narratives and then propagate it for the Russians as it fits within their internal narrative about some political parties. Just the number of folk that post that BS in this thread as some sort of justification for the Russian attacks saddens me.

[akd]

Been tracking some of the death / burial notices out of Russia that Rob Lee is gathering on his twitter feed.  My general impression is that these notices / burials are typically appearing more than two weeks after the date of death (where provided).  Something to bear in mind.

https://twitter.com/RALee85

 

[Baneman]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

My mind has been wracking the dusty memory banks to think of something equally stupid.  The Italian East African Campaign is one that keeps coming to mind, both in terms of the incompetence of how it was conducted as well as the ramifications that came from its defeat.

The other that comes to mind is the Six Day War.  As with the Italian campaign, the attackers chose their moment and when the dust settled they had lost everything they worked towards and more.

However, there were REAL reasons for both the Italian campaign and what became the Six Day war.  Putin's war on Ukraine was a complete fabrication of need. 

I still vote for the Battle of the Horns of Hattin as being the best equivalent - it has the lack of need, the sheer military incompetence as well as the massive political fallout.

[Commanderski]

No to be too off topic here but just spent the last 5 days in the hospital for some unexpected surgery. There is no news channel that covers this war like this thread does. I sure missed it and glad to be back.

Battlefront.com, your complete honest news source...

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

Assume a 2500 meter effective range for multiple Ukrainian ATGM systems which is actually pretty conservative. You have to maintain a 5km wide band of territory for every single supply rout. So that is basically a max size CMBS map wide. How many troops does it take to find and fix one hostile platoon on a full sized CMBS map with moderate terrain complications. Remember the platoons isn't trying to fight, just hide until a supply truck, or trucks wander thru. Your entire supply line is just one full sized CMBS map after another from fire base "We're ^###*%$# mommy" to the Russian border. Maybe a lot longer if Belarus wobbles even a little bit. Would one company of decent infantry be enough to even attempt it? DO the Russians have ANY infantry that can be described as decent? Or at least any left ? The Russian  math does NOT add.

"But Capt, we didn't control the entire route up to Bagdad..."

True but two very different things at play.  First off we adopted the Combat Logistics Patrol (CLIP) which is basically a fighting logistical unit that can push through attacks.  And second, we are talking about an entirely different level of opposition.  In Iraq and Afghanistan, we had an insurgency, which by definition is a marginalized group of sub-society who decide armed violence is a means to a political end.  They are in the minority, often working in lose networks and cells with limited support.  In Iraq, that band of disgruntled ex Iraqi military were still able to make life a living hell for logistical resupply in the early days of the insurgency.  In Afghanistan, the Taliban did it for 20 years despite everything we could throw at them...the Ukrainians are not even in the same league, in fact they are a different species entirely.

The UA's hybrid approach is built on a foundation of widespread resistance, which is not normally in the minority nor is it marginal.  Further, they are able to project hybrid forces behind those lines, armed with next-gen weaponry.  So a Russian CLIP is just going to get cut to pieces at range and we are back to "controlling corridors" where as has been mentioned the math does not add up.

And here I do express frustration with the endless stream of "experts" because they are either using the wrong math metrics (force sizes) or simply missing the math that matters.  [aside: When I see a "bro" with either ballcap/slick backed hair and their SF T-shirts on, I immediately stop listening because this is war college level stuff.  The US has an entire sub trade(s) quals that are groomed to do this sort of planning].

The Russian math hasn't really added up since day 1 in my book, but they might have another shoe to drop...you know so now both feet are naked.  

Edited March 20, 2022 by The_Capt

[The_Capt]

11 minutes ago, Baneman said:

I still vote for the Battle of the Horns of Hattin as being the best equivalent - it has the lack of need, the sheer military incompetence as well as the massive political fallout.

Well from the same production house the Russo-Japanese War has to also rank up there. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Japanese_War

[akd]

1 hour ago, sburke said:

Colonel Andrey Zakharov, 6th tank regiment commander

Looks like this should be Colonel Alexander Vladimirovich Zakharov.

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, sburke said:

dang that would skew the scales a bit more.  Current list:

MG Andrey Kolesnikov, Russia’s 29th Combined Arms Army commander
Andrei Sukhovetsky, Deputy Commander of the 41st Combined Arms Army
Major General Vitaly Gerasimov, First Deputy Commander Of The 41st Army
Major-general Oleg Mitiayev, commander of 150th motor-rifle division
General-Lieutenant Andrey Mordvichev commander 8th CAA 

Guards Colonel Konstantin Zizevsky commander of the 247th Guards Air Assault Regiment 
Colonel Yuryi Agarkov, the commander of 33rd motor-rifle regiment (Kamyshyn, Volgograd oblast) of 20th Guard motor-rifle division
Colonel Andrey Zakharov, 6th tank regiment commander
Colonel Sergei Porokhnya commander of the 12th separate guards engineering brigade
Colonel Sergey Sukharev, commander of 331st Guards Airborne Regiment (of the 98th VDV Division)
Colonel Igor Nikolaev Commander of 252nd Motor Rifle Regiment, the 3rd Motor Rifle Division.
Colonel Sergey Savvateeyev, Deputy commander of Rosgvardia SOBR
Colonel Nikolay Ovcharenko, the chief of engineer troops of Western Miliatary District.
Captain of 1st rank (=colonel) Andrei Paliy Deputy of Black Sea Fleet commander, 
Lt Colonel Denis Glebov, Deputy Commander of the 11th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade
Lt Colonel Dmitry Safronov, Commander of the 61st Separate Marine Brigade
Lt.colonel Alexei Khasanov, deputy commander of 31st Fighter aviation regiment
Lt Colonel Mikhail Orchikov was deputy commander of a motor-rifle brigade 19th motor-rifle division
Lt.colonel Alexandr Pazynich, the regimental commander deputy for human resources of 14th Guard Fighter Aviation Regiment
Lt.colonel Renat Gaisin
Lt.colonel Ilya Piatkin, 38 years  SOBR
Lt.colonel Roman Ryabov, 50 years  SOBR
Lt.colonel (likely) Mikhail Rodionov, 46 years   SOBR

Guards Major Burlakov Andrei Petrovich, Deputy Chief of Intelligence Staff - Chief of Intelligence Regiment
Major Sergey Krylov deputy battalion commander from the VDV's 331st Airborne Regiment

Deputy mayor Alexandr Fiodorov 103 missile brigade (Iskander-M) that Russian Iskander unit met with our SOF...

Captured
Lieutenant Colonel Maxim Kryshtop: Deputy Commander of the 47th Aviation Regiment 
Lt. Colonel Astrakhov Dmitry Mikhailovich:  SOBR

 

And for true comparison we should have the UKR equivalent....

[acrashb]

8 hours ago, womble said:

* Yes, "less-corrupt". Corruption still exists, subtle and gross in form, in all societies. Ukraine isn't rated much better than Russia.

A well-regarded benchmark is 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index - Explore the… - Transparency.org (congrats to Denmark Finland, and New Zealand!).

Ukraine at #122 is at least somewhat comparable to Russia at #136.  it will be interesting after the war to understand why Russia's corruption has so hobbled their efforts while Ukraine's has not, or at least not so visibly.  Also, corruption in Ukraine has been gradually trending better since 2014, roughly the moment Russia's influence was curtailed, and if this trend holds or more likely accelerates - assuming Zelensky is interested in anti-corruption he'll have tremendous political capital after the war - it could reach European norms in a relatively short time.

An interesting anecdote regarding corruption in the Ukraine: some time ago I was going to return a camera lens to a Ukrainian manufacturer for service.  I was told flatly to _not_ insure the lens (would have been slightly under two thousand dollars worth) because any package so marked would be held by customs until the recipient paid a bribe.  So I chose not to get the lens serviced, too much risk sending it uninsured.

Edited March 20, 2022 by acrashb