Russian army under equipped?

[Haiduk]

20 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:

Ukrainian Armed Forces performed well in some cases when facing the DPR/LPR militias. As apparent in the war when the DPR/LPR is reinforced by BTGs the UAF doesn't do so well. Of course though, units that are trained and execute a good plan could offer fierce resistance as in some cases, but overall there is much to be desired about their military.

It's a big mistake to compare  Ukrainian army in 2014 and in 2016 and further as well as Georgian army and Ukrainian. Yes, Georgian forces was better equipped in 2008, then we in 2014, but their training was directed only on suppressing of seperatists forces in almost police-type operations. They were not ready for direct engagement with all power of Russia, their military control system wasn't ready to that. 

During half-year Ukraine is continuously conducting large military maneuvers of combined forces. Last two - brigade level. For this year about 50 aircraft will be returned to service as well as SAM systems. The scale of maneuvers and military sector restoring says we prepare not so for Donbas returning, as to possible direct engagement with Russia, if Putin will want to repeat August 2014. The point of no return have passed after Ilovaisk, so our troops mentally ready to withstand with Russia. And if Putin will invade again (in "hybride" type or openly with aviation and fleet), his troops will pay too much price. Of course, we will be not capable to crash all Russia power, but we can inflict unacceptable losses and foil Putin's plans. How much troops, equipment, funds, state and army prestige Putin ready to sacriface for his plans ? Nobody know.   

Edited July 29, 2016 by Haiduk

[VladimirTarasov]

Steve,

I'm on phone due to vacation so forgive me for not being able to quote you all the way. I didnt't say Russia will absolutely make a drive for Kiev, I said it is possible. I don't know if I worded it wrong, but if you threaten and assault the capital of a city, you have victory terms on your side (usually). But anyways, it's more than possible for Russia to be able to deploy 80,000-100,000 troops into the Ukraine. 

Russia had the 58th army active towards the operation in Georgia, but the fighting force was 10,000 in the Ossetian front, a second front with 9,000 troops opened up too in Abkhazia. Which basically was a 1:1 ratio of a fighting force, anyways as you've said ratios dont really matter it's the scenarios that matter... But I needed to clear that up because you are making it sound as if Russia sent in the whole 58th army. It was a limited operation to force the Georgians away from Ossetia. And that's why I said an operation similar to Georgia when referring to Ukraine, not that it's gonna be like Georgia...

Also, the DPR/LPR lacked in 2014 training as well... Let's be honest here most of the DPR/LPR military are locals, these guys formed and haven't had time to train as long as they should until the ceasefires or when during the war. Of course the Ukrainian forces will do well against these guys... It would be embarrasing if they didn't. But as you can see, once a few advisors and support units are slipped in, the Ukrainian armed forces offensive operations do not work so well... 

 

 

[VladimirTarasov]

3 hours ago, Haiduk said:

It's a big mistake to compare  Ukrainian army in 2014 and in 2016 and further as well as Georgian army and Ukrainian. Yes, Georgian forces was better equipped in 2008, then we in 2014, but their training was directed only on suppressing of seperatists forces in almost police-type operations. They were not ready for direct engagement with all power of Russia, their military control system wasn't ready to that. 

Maybe I worded it wrong, but the army of Ukraine in 2008, could have defeated the army of Georgia in 2008 as well... How ever Georgian troops were definitely trained for conventional warfare in NATO standards. Their equipment on average was better than the Russian soldier fighting against them. What I'm trying to say is, if Russia sends a force in the equal numbers against Ukraine, the Ukrainian forces will be facing similarly to Georgia... Under heavy jamming, heavy accurate bombardment, loss of command structure, very tense offensives, ect ect.

 

4 hours ago, Haiduk said:

During half-year Ukraine is continuously conducting large military maneuvers of combined forces. Last two - brigade level. For this year about 50 aircraft will be returned to service as well as SAM systems. The scale of maneuvers and military sector restoring says we prepare not so for Donbas returning, as to possible direct engagement with Russia, if Putin will want to repeat August 2014. The point of no return have passed after Ilovaisk, so our troops mentally ready to withstand with Russia. And if Putin will invade again (in "hybride" type or openly with aviation and fleet), his troops will pay too much price. Of course, we will be not capable to crash all Russia power, but we can inflict unacceptable losses and foil Putin's plans. How much troops, equipment, funds, state and army prestige Putin ready to sacriface for his plans ? Nobody know.   

I dont get why when Russia is accused of doing a proxy war it is labeled "Hybrid" it is very funny. Of course Russia will take casualties in event of some type of war in Ukraine.. It is normal. How ever, as Steve said its all depending on the scenario. If its a counter offensive against an ATO, as history showed in the past, Ukraine will not be on the winning side, especially if this time the Russian Armed Forces is actively deployed.

[Kinophile]

To my uninformed eye (and I'm certain this is obvious to the more informed here) you do point out several vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian defence - primarily C4 and the RUS air force. 

Loss of C4 would have a bad knock on effect on comms dependent forces such as Air Force and Air Defense, which leads to the next big question -  how effective and integrated is the RUS air force with ground operations? Syria is the perfect training ground for this (open season for targets,  low grade AD). And going by Syria,  I'd say pretty damn well.

So a Ukrainian defence would be hobbled by a well coordinated SEAD and ground attack campaign waged by combat experienced pilots. 

I've little doubt that Ukrainian Ground Forces would give Russia and it's militias a very bloody nose but even just local air Superiority could lead to brigade level collapse. In modern mech warfare it seems,  if you can't communicate you're dead. And RUS attacks (physical, digital,  radip)  against UKR national higher level C4 could cause serious damage on the field.

This, to me, is the crux of the Ukrainian defence, no matter the improved training,  large reserves, combat experience. If you cannot  coordinate you cannot fight.

And it doesn't seem like NATO is providing much help in this area? 

So I'd say UKR will put up a good fight,  but if RUS commits hard in certain key areas the UKR defence will hollow our very quickly. Russia could then achieve military objectives to force a politically favourable peace and withdraw, leaving Ukraine is disorder,  disarray and demoralized,  burdened with war wounded, an eviscerated military and a trashed economy.

Re occupation I doubt Putin/Russia wants to conquer the Ukraine per se - but he certainly wants to off balance it and essentially deny it to the West. A chaotic,  unstable Ukraine is a win for him.  By comparison the US won't take invasion of Iraq then struggled with  the occupation -  but that is because of the moral and political imperative to es abolish a viable Iraq. Putin would not need to do that -  a disintegrating Ukraine in constant civil turmoil fits fine into his real politik.

A hard, successful war will do just that, without the need for a massive prolonged occupation. I suspect Russia could win and get out leaving a great damn mess behind and that would be a-OK for Putin. Essentially a punitive,  expeditionary war, creating the conditions for a second intervention later to create a Chechnya style regime. 

Edited July 29, 2016 by kinophile

[VladimirTarasov]

@kinophile The Kalibr missile systems used against ISIL, in Syria, also show another asset Russia can use from long range at sea.

The black sea fleet has Kalibr-M (2,500 kilometer range) carrying warships, and with the obvious Russian advantage against Ukraine in the navy, calling in strikes against; command points, military bases, military infrastructure, can be done in joint coordination with the air force, and navy to hit important targets at long ranges. 

[Lethaface]

5 hours ago, kinophile said:

To my uninformed eye (and I'm certain this is obvious to the more informed here) you do point out several vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian defence - primarily C4 and the RUS air force. 

Loss of C4 would have a bad knock on effect on comms dependent forces such as Air Force and Air Defense, which leads to the next big question -  how effective and integrated is the RUS air force with ground operations? Syria is the perfect training ground for this (open season for targets,  low grade AD). And going by Syria,  I'd say pretty damn well.

So a Ukrainian defence would be hobbled by a well coordinated SEAD and ground attack campaign waged by combat experienced pilots. 

I've little doubt that Ukrainian Ground Forces would give Russia and it's militias a very bloody nose but even just local air Superiority could lead to brigade level collapse. In modern mech warfare it seems,  if you can't communicate you're dead. And RUS attacks (physical, digital,  radip)  against UKR national higher level C4 could cause serious damage on the field.

This, to me, is the crux of the Ukrainian defence, no matter the improved training,  large reserves, combat experience. If you cannot  coordinate you cannot fight.

And it doesn't seem like NATO is providing much help in this area? 

So I'd say UKR will put up a good fight,  but if RUS commits hard in certain key areas the UKR defence will hollow our very quickly. Russia could then achieve military objectives to force a politically favourable peace and withdraw, leaving Ukraine is disorder,  disarray and demoralized,  burdened with war wounded, an eviscerated military and a trashed economy.

Re occupation I doubt Putin/Russia wants to conquer the Ukraine per se - but he certainly wants to off balance it and essentially deny it to the West. A chaotic,  unstable Ukraine is a win for him.  By comparison the US won't take invasion of Iraq then struggled with  the occupation -  but that is because of the moral and political imperative to es abolish a viable Iraq. Putin would not need to do that -  a disintegrating Ukraine in constant civil turmoil fits fine into his real politik.

A hard, successful war will do just that, without the need for a massive prolonged occupation. I suspect Russia could win and get out leaving a great damn mess behind and that would be a-OK for Putin. Essentially a punitive,  expeditionary war, creating the conditions for a second intervention later to create a Chechnya style regime. 

Grozny. Vietnam, Iraq, Lebanon. Afghanistan?

Edit: Ukraine 

Seriously; Ukraine has had plenty of time to prepare for Russian aggression. They won't be offering any pleasant welcoming gifts, but plenty of nasty surprises. How much casualties can Russia afford? 'Liberating' donbass is very different from 'threatening Kiev' and forcing surrender.

 

Edited July 29, 2016 by Lethaface

[sburke]

9 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:

I dont get why when Russia is accused of doing a proxy war it is labeled "Hybrid"

I think this is just a communication issue.  Proxy war is different than what folks refer to as Hybrid.  Hybrid originated with Crimea where it was not a proxy, but actual Russian units which Russia simply denied were theirs preceded by some other PsyOps work.  It was actually a pretty damned smart move that left their opponents in a confused state unable to coordinate a response.  Probably not going to be as effective in the future, but at the time it accomplished it's goals completely. 

The US action against Russia in Afghanistan would be more a straight up proxy.  We helped arm an indigenous group along with a very small group of advisers.  Russian support to Vietnam and N Korea during those wars would be somewhat along the proxy end, even though there was some more direct Russian participation. 

Western opinion is Donbass is not the same as DPR/LNR would not survive without direct Russian units in support. They are incapable of withstanding the Ukrainian army no matter how much material support Russian gives. Hell they wouldn't even have existed until Russian created the movement (the armed movement versus some sporadic dissatisfaction with corruption in Kiev and political backlash.)  It would be more akin to the US taking advantage of dissatisfaction in Afghanistan and sending in armed units to create an insurrection, then arming them with heavier weapons, providing support services units and actual military task forces when the "indigenous" units were at risk.  However I wouldn't label Ukraine as hybrid war anymore either.  Personally I consider it to be direct Russian occupation, but that is just my two cents.  Ukraine is not fighting some indigenous LPR/DNR force.  Those guys are a just a joke.  They are at war with Russia whether it has been formally declared or not.

[VladimirTarasov]

I read your comment, @sburke. I wont go into politics, though been there done that.

1 hour ago, Lethaface said:

Grozny. Vietnam, Iraq, Lebanon. Afghanistan?

Edit: Ukraine 

Seriously; Ukraine has had plenty of time to prepare for Russian aggression. They won't be offering any pleasant welcoming gifts, but plenty of nasty surprises. How much casualties can Russia afford? 'Liberating' donbass is very different from 'threatening Kiev' and forcing surrender.

 

This can be argued against, because you cant just say Ukraine will fair good against Russia while most units they've faced are militia units. And when they did go against unofficial forces, Ukraine hasnt faired good even with those unofficial forces not fully equipped or fully supported by what they regularly would be with if they were official. I'll gladly take a link to a detailed analysis where Ukrainian armed forces have faced a full true Russian military unit, and inflicted unacceptable losses. 

 

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, VladimirTarasov said:

I read your comment, @sburke. I wont go into politics, though been there done that.

This can be argued against, because you cant just say Ukraine will fair good against Russia while most units they've faced are militia units. And when they did go against unofficial forces, Ukraine hasnt faired good even with those unofficial forces not fully equipped or fully supported by what they regularly would be with if they were official. I'll gladly take a link to a detailed analysis where Ukrainian armed forces have faced a full true Russian military unit, and inflicted unacceptable losses. 

 

You've been getting close to the mentality of "well our last tactics worked, and the enemy has not learnt from it",  which I think is very unrealistic. Yes UKR did fair badly but they are very much a more coherent,  organized and motivated force now,  and crucially,  they are drastically improving year-on-year. They are not the same dog, and another kick will probably get a much more severe bite. 

Still, Russia has a large force capacitive edge that cannot be ignored (eg Kalibr) and will do a lot of damage. If UKR can hold on,  they'll "win"; that is, survive as a coherent society. 

[Battlefront.com]

Again, we need to see a specific proposal of how Russia would defeat Ukraine in order to analyize it’s strengths and weaknesses.  However, generally speaking, there are two fundamental mistakes in some of VladimirTarasov’s comments above:

1.  The presumption that Ukraine can be quickly, and fairly painlessly, forced to surrender relatively easily
2.  That Russian forces are superior enough in quality that they do not need to be significant in quantity

Addressing the first point... the assumption that Ukraine's forces would fold up as soon as Russia attacked is silly.  Despite being much weaker, poorly armed, poorly led, and overstreched from months of offensive activities beyond their capabilities they did not give up the fight when Russia launched it’s 2014 summer offensive.  In fact, they generally performed fairly well, with some major exceptions in the south.  I am convinced that Putin was very disappointed with the results.  At the very least, the war Russia waged against Ukraine in June and July went very poorly for the Russian side, which is why the large scale counter offensive of August/September was necessary in the first place.

Ukraine also did not give up the airport easily even after wave after wave of attacks, sometimes by Russian forces.  Ukraine also gave up Debaltseve only after weeks of strong attacks by militia and Russian forces.  In the end Ukraine was able to withdraw nearly all of its forces despite Russia working hard to cut them off and destroy them.

On the second point, about Russian superiority reducing the need for numerical superiority, this is just bad logic.  As the US learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, to win requires control.  Control requires soldiers on the ground with rifles.  Technology and superior weaponry can help reduce the numbers needed, but there are major limitations.  Especially if the enemy outnumbers your forces and is motivated to keep fighting.

It is true that Ukraine is not as well armed as the frontline Russian forces.  However, it is not true that Ukraine’s forces are less trained and they are certainly not less motiviated to fight.  In fact, Ukraine posesses many units which are battle hardened and extremely motivated.  For sure this does not describe all Ukrainian forces, but it does describe a pretty good sized chunk of the Ukrinian ground forces.  Although these forces do not posesses the same sophisticated weapons as their Russian opponents, what they have is good and they are able to use it fairly well.  Even in situations where Russia has deployed its top of the line electronic warfare, counter intelligence, and artillery control units.

The bottomline here is that if Russia were to invade Ukraine would be unlikely to surrender quickly or easily.  Russia would suffer thousands of casualties in a realatively short period of time.  A casualty count that hasn’t been seen since the First Chechen War.  It is unknown what such casualties would do to Russian combat potential, but it likely would require even more forces to be ready in reserve.  

The Georgian War is a horrible conflct to use for understanding what might happen in Ukraine.  Russia went into Georgia with roughly 10 soldiers for ever 1 that Georgia had, plus had another 20 soldiers it could fairly easily draw upon if need be.  The ratios on the ground (which were far greater than 1:1, BTW) mean nothing because Georgia had no chance of killing enough Russians to make a difference.   

To sum up... Ukraine is capble of fighting and has shown it is willing to fight.  That is fact.  What we do not know is how many Russians it would take to change that equation.  We also don’t know how many dead Russian soldiers it would take to cause a Russian defeat.  What we do know is that nobody should want to find out.  Especially Russians.

Steve

[AttorneyAtWar]

Morale is a huge part of this to, what is the Russian soldier fighting over there for?

How does he feel about the fact his government continues to deny the truth of there deaths in a conflict it started and doesn't have the decency of saying to the families where and how he or she died?

A Ukrainian soldier knows exactly what hes fighting for, the existence and survival of his nation post cold-war, he doesn't want to go back to being in a satellite/puppet country, that is a much stronger motivation that a militiamen to a battle hardened soldier can understand and hang onto.

 

Edited July 30, 2016 by Raptorx7

[VladimirTarasov]

10 hours ago, kinophile said:

You've been getting close to the mentality of "well our last tactics worked, and the enemy has not learnt from it",  which I think is very unrealistic. Yes UKR did fair badly but they are very much a more coherent,  organized and motivated force now,  and crucially,  they are drastically improving year-on-year. They are not the same dog, and another kick will probably get a much more severe bite. 

I am not getting close to that mentality at all, I'm not the only person on here that has used history to try to get a point. I dont get why you're assuming that.

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Again, we need to see a specific proposal of how Russia would defeat Ukraine in order to analyize it’s strengths and weaknesses.  However, generally speaking, there are two fundamental mistakes in some of VladimirTarasov’s comments above:

1.  The presumption that Ukraine can be quickly, and fairly painlessly, forced to surrender relatively easily
2.  That Russian forces are superior enough in quality that they do not need to be significant in quantity

Alright, Russia does not need to control all of Ukraine. It will not be occupying it as the US did in Afghanistan, it will be coming in to destroy the UAF, and complete goals that do not require a total commitment. Russia has strategic and tactical assets, that can totally throw the UAF into a state of operating in havoc. You keep acting as if UAF has faired extremely well and completed its objective inDonbas. And on top of that you act as if all of the counter offensives were full Russian military units this is not true at all, provide evidence and I'll agree. To say Russia has already used EW to full extent, full conventional warfare assets in Donbas is a total joke and is a total underestimation. The air port attack in Donetsk ended up in militia hands, with most of the forces using T-64Bs, BTR-70/80s, largely militia controlled and essentially no true Russian units. How ever, advisers are an absolute. Commander Givi of the Somalia battalion has been documented with his forces (majority locals) in the fight for Donetsk air port. They've repelled Ukrainian counter attacks as well. 

About Georgia, show me where there was 80,000 troops in Georgia proper and I will go to the mental hospital. At no point of time was there any Russian force larger than 19,000 in South Ossetia, Georgia, and Abkhazia... The initial attack was 10,000 troops, pouring in battalion at a time, into South Ossetia. Later another front in Abkhazia opened with 9,000 troops. And if you check the amount of troops on Georgia's side it was pretty much 1:1.

Georgian forces crumbled once their command fell apart, and that is where I'm bringing in a similarity to what could happen in Ukraine. Of course, Ukraine isn't Georgia, and it has different terrain, a larger armed forces, a more capable air defense network, better artillery units, ect ect. 

You said a specific proposal, to be honest the only way Russia can justify a full on attack into the ATO area, is if Ukraine launches another offensive. So let's say the Russian goal is to destroy this offensive, and inflict mass damage onto the forces in this ATO. Don't you think this is a realistic goal?

[Codename Duchess]

What does Russia accomplish by smashing the Ukrainian Army and then exiting the country? That's not going to bring Ukraine back into Russia's fold (quite the opposite). I guess it would secure the DNR, LNR, and Crimea further bit the first two are hardly strategic (nor does Russia seem in any big hurry or desire to do so via easier methods) and the latter is already secure.

I think an occupation of the country with the eventual goal of Russification is the only legitimate reason for a widespread Russian invasion. I see nothing to be gained and a lot to be lost by large smash and dash.

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, VladimirTarasov said:

Alright, Russia does not need to control all of Ukraine. It will not be occupying it as the US did in Afghanistan, it will be coming in to destroy the UAF, and complete goals that do not require a total commitment.

I have asked you several times to provide a specific scenario.  I have provided three already.  Please stop talking in vague circles and tell me a scenario where Russia wins.  Tell me where they attack, how they handle the entire front, force size, timeframe, and goals.

1 hour ago, VladimirTarasov said:

You keep acting as if UAF has faired extremely well and completed its objective inDonbas. 

It has.  The nation state did not dissolve as Russia intended.  The armed forces did not dissolve as Russia intended.  The Russian proxy states did not expand as Russia intended, and even shrunk from their maximum size.  Ukraine has not succumbed to Russia's heavy handed economic and political pressure to become a slave state to Moscow.

The war is not over, but so far Ukraine has managed to defeat Russia's strategic goals of crushing it's independence.

1 hour ago, VladimirTarasov said:

And on top of that you act as if all of the counter offensives were full Russian military units this is not true at all, provide evidence and I'll agree.

Oh good God... we're not going backwards, are we?  I am not going down that rabbit hole with you again.  It's a path to madness because the evidence has already been shown many times in such strength that there is no need to do it again.

Were all the forces in the summer offensive Russian military units?  No, but all of the important ones were.  On top of that probably around 50% of the DPR/LPR forces were a mix of Russia citizens.  Probably 95% of all the weapons and ammunition were Russian.  Overall conduct of the operation was 100% Russian.

1 hour ago, VladimirTarasov said:

To say Russia has already used EW to full extent, full conventional warfare assets in Donbas is a total joke and is a total underestimation.

No, but it has deployed all of its top-of-the-line assets in specific spots at specific times.  Ukrainian forces still managed to fight and fight successfully in those areas.

1 hour ago, VladimirTarasov said:

The air port attack in Donetsk ended up in militia hands, with most of the forces using T-64Bs, BTR-70/80s, largely militia controlled and essentially no true Russian units. How ever, advisers are an absolute. Commander Givi of the Somalia battalion has been documented with his forces (majority locals) in the fight for Donetsk air port. They've repelled Ukrainian counter attacks as well. 

Russian special forces were absolutely involved.  They were documented and they suffered casualties.  The point isn't that Ukraine lost the airport, the point is how long it took and how many casualties the Russian side suffered in the process.  It is what we call a Pyrrhic Victory.  Not to mention the fact that Russia wanted the airport intact.

1 hour ago, VladimirTarasov said:

About Georgia, show me where there was 80,000 troops in Georgia proper and I will go to the mental hospital. At no point of time was there any Russian force larger than 19,000 in South Ossetia, Georgia, and Abkhazia... The initial attack was 10,000 troops, pouring in battalion at a time, into South Ossetia. Later another front in Abkhazia opened with 9,000 troops. And if you check the amount of troops on Georgia's side it was pretty much 1:1.

So... you are saying the ENTIRE Georgian ground forces were on the front line, shoulder to shoulder, when the 10,000 Russian forces attacked?  Because that is the only way you get your absolutely meaningless 1:1 ratio. 

At the point of contact, how many forces did Russia have and how many forces did Georgia have on average?

How many forces did Russia have in the immediate area to call upon for combat operations if needed?  How many did Georgia have?

How many forces did Russia have to call upon in the event the immediate forces were not sufficient?  How many did Georgia have?

1 hour ago, VladimirTarasov said:

Georgian forces crumbled once their command fell apart, and that is where I'm bringing in a similarity to what could happen in Ukraine.

Why do you insist on looking at a totally different conflict with totally different variables to imagine what would happen to Ukrainian forces and national will to fight when I keep drawing your attention to what HAS ACTUALLY HAPPENED in Ukraine?!?  Ukraine has been on VASTLY more threat, more death, more destruction, and more political pressure than Georgia ever was and it's been under it for 2 and a half years.  Has Ukraine surrendered yet?  No.

More importantly, Ukraine already had it's command structure collapse once in this war so far.  It was in the face of the southern portion of the Russian 2014 counter offensive.  Ukraine was totally surprised by Russia's attacks into its rear, was in full retreat in parts of that front, lost a huge chunk of its forces in "kettles", was humiliatingly slaughtered after Putin's false promise of free passage, and lost large chunks of territory that had been painfully retaken over the previous two months.  And what was the result?  Ukraine rebuilt it's front and slowed/stopped the Russian offensive sufficiently enough that the frontline still exists 2 years later (and has slightly improved for the Ukrainian side).

1 hour ago, VladimirTarasov said:

You said a specific proposal, to be honest the only way Russia can justify a full on attack into the ATO area, is if Ukraine launches another offensive. So let's say the Russian goal is to destroy this offensive, and inflict mass damage onto the forces in this ATO. Don't you think this is a realistic goal?

I outlined three scenarios and this is the one that has the best chance of success for Russia.  However, it won't likely achieve Russia's strategic goals any more than the last time it stopped Ukraine from retaking Donbas.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, Codename Duchess said:

What does Russia accomplish by smashing the Ukrainian Army and then exiting the country? That's not going to bring Ukraine back into Russia's fold (quite the opposite). I guess it would secure the DNR, LNR, and Crimea further bit the first two are hardly strategic (nor does Russia seem in any big hurry or desire to do so via easier methods) and the latter is already secure.

I think an occupation of the country with the eventual goal of Russification is the only legitimate reason for a widespread Russian invasion. I see nothing to be gained and a lot to be lost by large smash and dash.

Exactly.  Russia's strategic goal for Ukraine is never going to happen.  It lost that opportunity in the Spring/Summer of 2014, if it even existed back then (I do not think it did).  Therefore, if Russia is smart it will balance further activities in Ukraine with the costs.  Which is why Russia is in such a tough spot.  Ukraine alone has forced this onto Russia and I am positive the Kremlin did not think it was possible.  It has dug itself into quite a deep hole and it has absolutely no way out of it on its terms.

The best scenario for Russia is that this "frozen conflict" keeps going.  It is extremely expensive for Russia's economy and international relations, but losing Donbas would not play well to Russian audiences.  And as much as Russia's propaganda can confuse and distort reality, it could not hide the fact that Donbas returned to Ukraine's control without Russia's blessing.

On the other hand, Ukraine is in a tight spot as well.  Militarily it can retake Donbas from the forces that are there, no problem.  If Russia rushed to defend it (again) this could be very costly even if ultimately Ukraine came out ahead.  The Donbas is also a basket case after 2.5 years of war and looting.  There's nothing but a huge financial and social problem waiting for it.  Currently Russia has to suffer the pain of owning it.  Yet this war can't go on forever and that means retaking it, abandoning it, or agreeing to Russia's terms.  None of these are good choices for various reasons.

And so Russia's plan to keep the Donbas a warzone will likely remain in place for the next year at least.

Steve

[VladimirTarasov]

22 minutes ago, Codename Duchess said:

What does Russia accomplish by smashing the Ukrainian Army and then exiting the country? That's not going to bring Ukraine back into Russia's fold (quite the opposite). I guess it would secure the DNR, LNR, and Crimea further bit the first two are hardly strategic (nor does Russia seem in any big hurry or desire to do so via easier methods) and the latter is already secure.

I think an occupation of the country with the eventual goal of Russification is the only legitimate reason for a widespread Russian invasion. I see nothing to be gained and a lot to be lost by large smash and dash.

Ukraine will not be returning to Russia's sphere no matter what. They are in another power's sphere now. Russia has no intentions on taking Ukraine, if you believe that, that is insane. Ukraine and Russia were together on many things, now Ukraine is basically against anything Russian.

Defending DNR/LNR territories, is good enough. You can achieve many side goals with this justification. Videos of bombed out towns, were more than enough to get Russian support of DNR/LNR.

So a goal of destroying the Ukrainian military in the ATO and leaving after getting a deal signed is more than enough for Russia. There's no point in occupying territories, if you can take out the enemy's power, and complete your justification. In this case, a counter-offensive to stop Ukraine from entering Donbas, possible follow up offensives to force Ukraine into agreeing on some terms.

[Codename Duchess]

Beware the folly of a quick, easy, cheap war.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

38 minutes ago, VladimirTarasov said:

Ukraine will not be returning to Russia's sphere no matter what. They are in another power's sphere now. Russia has no intentions on taking Ukraine, if you believe that, that is insane. Ukraine and Russia were together on many things, now Ukraine is basically against anything Russian.

Defending DNR/LNR territories, is good enough. You can achieve many side goals with this justification. Videos of bombed out towns, were more than enough to get Russian support of DNR/LNR.

So a goal of destroying the Ukrainian military in the ATO and leaving after getting a deal signed is more than enough for Russia. There's no point in occupying territories, if you can take out the enemy's power, and complete your justification. In this case, a counter-offensive to stop Ukraine from entering Donbas, possible follow up offensives to force Ukraine into agreeing on some terms.

Here's the problem with that logic:

1. Ukraine likely recognizes the only way it's forced to end the war is the destruction of its military forces.  It will likely attempt to deny Russia the opportunity to do so.  Russia may yet still badly damage/"militarily" destroy* the Ukrainian military in this scenario, but it would be after a rather lengthy conflict, going deep into a country that is not too pleased with Russian presence. 
    a. In this context, given the possibility of a Ukrainian insurgency, and looking at historical Russian COIN tactics, will likely utterly and totally poison Russian relations with the rest of the planet.
    b. If the Russian government's narrative is a short victorious war, and this is not forthcoming, and worse it's not forthcoming with some major losses, the Russian government will suffer greatly domestically.  Given the historical trend towards concealing losses and overstating victories, combined with social media access it won't take terribly long for the "official" line to be discarded and Russians to start following information that confirms their fears vs their hopes (so if Russia claims they've destroyed the Ukrainian military and victory will be at hand in three weeks, just like they've claimed for the last five months, the equally false Ukrainian claims of having killed off several thousand Russians and being on the verge of launching special forces raids into Russia proper begin to have equal legitimacy).

2. Looking at the historical Russian adherence to treaties it has signed in regards to the Ukraine, do you seriously think the Ukraine wouldn't think twice about totally shredding whatever peace treaty they signed and going in to liberate the eastern portion of their country the second Russia looks weak?  There is zero good faith, and the Ukraine would only be restrained by the extensive presence of Russian military forces.  Which is exactly what Russia has to do now only without having fought a conflict to secure the status quo.

There's no real point then to an actual conflict.  Short of invading, occupying and making the Ukraine into a puppet state, there's nothing Russia realistically can do to accomplish any of its goals in Eastern Europe through military force.

Arguably the best "play" would be a negotiated abandonment of the disputed areas.  They were only taken as part of a wider attempt to accomplish hegemony over the Ukraine.  This failed, and the moment in history that made it possible has passed.  Right now they offer nothing to the people holding them, the folks living there have suffered greatly and have simply exchanged one corrupt inept government for another one.  Russia gets nothing from the region economically, and it has a very significant political burden.  And holding the ground offers no strategic advantage.  

Turning around, likely under whoever comes after Putin engages with the Ukrainian government. Demands/requests certain minor concessions for ethnic Russians (bilingual signs in Russian ethnic areas, recognition of right to celebrate Russian holidays, blah blah whatever it is that ensures ethnic Russians get to continue identifying as ethnic Russians), agrees to withdraw Russian forces from the Eastern Ukraine.  Russia offers pensions and/or right of resettlement for anyone choosing to move to Russia post withdrawal.

This is realistically also the only likely way the Ukraine regains the territory barring a Russian collapse or "catastrophic distraction" (civil war, Chinese invasion, war against NATO elsewhere, whatever).  The ultimate fate of anyone remaining in the disputed region is below Russia's concern, as again it was only there to accomplish a mission that failed in 2014, and occupying the ground does nothing to make that mission succeed.  If the Ukraine honors the agreement, perhaps it gets used as a jumping off point for a new Russian-Ukrainian relationship.  If the Ukraine shoots every former leader/soldier from the defunct republics, and deports anyone who speaks in Russian, now the Ukraine is the bad guy and getting slapped with sanctions, or at the least torpedoing whatever aspirations it has towards the EU/NATO.  

*As a belated note, in military terms "destroyed" basically means the unit is not capable of doing anything until it has been reconstituted.  But if Russia is unable to prevent the Ukraine from simply reconstituting destroyed units, collecting up what survived, etc then the military will not remain destroyed which gets back to the whole "it's a pointless exercise" aspect.  

[kraze]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Russian special forces were absolutely involved.  They were documented and they suffered casualties.  The point isn't that Ukraine lost the airport, the point is how long it took and how many casualties the Russian side suffered in the process.  It is what we call a Pyrrhic Victory.  Not to mention the fact that Russia wanted the airport intact.

Not only russian special forces, but even regular marine troops too - to such extent that russian channels did a few slips showing them here and there

 

As for Debaltseve - we all seen a famous RT propaganda slip showing T72B3s but the same channel also shown a russian major general commanding the offensive (he was pretending to be a local "miner" as usual). Why would they send a high profile guy like that if not to command a very real regular troops?

Edited July 30, 2016 by kraze

[AttorneyAtWar]

I saw the VDV guys riding on the B3's before they got beat up pretty badly, I had no idea Russian marines were involved as well.

[Ivanov]

1 hour ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

 In this context, given the possibility of a Ukrainian insurgency, and looking at historical Russian COIN tactics, will likely utterly and totally poison Russian relations with the rest of the planet.

I think that no everyone is aware, that in Chechenya during the period of 1995-2004, about 10-15% of the civilian population got KILLED. Then you have to add the wounded and refugees. This is the WW2 Eastern Front level of casualties.

[kraze]

And in the end Russia ended up losing a second Chechen war badly to a point where the guy who was cutting russian soldier heads off when he was 16 is now an official state hero (and St Petersburg got a bridge named after his father, who was fighting russians as well), basically runs Chechnya without any russian input and is getting blns of $ yearly just to pretend to be loyal. In fact this year russian propaganda went as far as calling russian soldiers who fought the first war - bandits.

So yeah they can twist and turn history in a whatever way they like using TV even if it contradicts something everybody still remembers clearly. The question is how do people even swallow this using an example of Kadyrov becoming a national hero.

Edited July 30, 2016 by kraze

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

1 hour ago, Ivanov said:

I think that no everyone is aware, that in Chechenya during the period of 1995-2004, about 10-15% of the civilian population got KILLED. Then you have to add the wounded and refugees. This is the WW2 Eastern Front level of casualties.

Exactly

Which gets to a sort of preemptive bit of commentary:

Someone doubtlessly is going to say something about "but Ukrainians aren't Chechens/Ukraine and Russia are brothers!" etc whatever.

Here's factors that will drive a Ukrainian insurgency:

1. Some really deep and totally unmitigated historical grievances doing back to the Czars, getting really bad under the Soviets, and leading to today.  The reality of some of these grievances varies, some are totally 100% unvarnished "Russians are terrible" truths, some are modified to exclude that Ukrainians are terrible sometimes too.  It's not reality we are discussing, but a population that has a reason to hate Russians.

2. The country has a lot of loose guns and munitions right now.  More than anything else, what made the Iraqi insurgency tricky was you couldn't go 100 feet without finding UXO, abandoned caches, or other "donor" material.  It's hard to make a good IED from scratch, it's really pretty easy to strap three 152 MM shells together and wire them to a detonator of some kind.

3. The Russians have effectively made a magnet to draw ethnic Russians away from the rest of Ukraine.  This means they're going into a culturally similar, but still distinctly different place as outsiders.  Invading outsiders.  Who's fathers occupied the country, grandfathers raped it, great grandfathers exploited it etc, etc infinity if you're looking at it from a nationalist perspective.  The friction will be immense.  Russia would doubtlessly employ "loyal" Ukrainians from their side of the fence who will be treated just as much as outsiders, and likely subject to some really terribly disgusting creative retribution (the only thing worse than the invader is a traitor in most cultures).

4. Russia does not have the resources to isolate the Ukraine, or even parts of the Ukraine that it will occupy.  Weapons from interested parties, and the interested parties themselves will arrive.  This might be anything from western SOF, to folks who just have an ax to grind with Russians as a concept.  

5. It's really hard to get people to unify when there's a matter of policy or nuanced approaches.  When the outcomes are "subjugation by Russia" or "making dead Russians" a lot of the political frictions will dissipate, and you'll have Ukrainian communist party folks providing weapons to Ukrainian ultra right party fighters because they both agree a Ukraine without Russians is best.

Here's factors that will drive the Russians to warcrimes:

1. While Russian forces with doubtlessly start with some sort of "liberating our Ukrainian brothers!" information warfare, it's a message that for reasons discussed above will not resonate with the people they're "liberating."  It won't take more than a few trucks full of dead Russians from IEDs, dead 19 year olds found with parts cut off after they snuck off to loot, or just a persistent and seemingly omnipresent hostility (much of it perceived vs real) to totally negate whatever good will the Russians have towards Ukrainians.  

2. Looking at Russians tactics against everything, they favor overwhelming application of force.  Time and time again, it's placing the maximum amount of violence on a narrow axis to force the enemy to break.  The answer from the school house to experience in the field is always most force, smallest target.  Hammers and nails.

3. The nail will be a 17 year old hopped up on what happened to his sister last week, and a childhood of Russian bad acts.  He'll be hiding the bushes.  He'll have been enabled by three or four middle aged men who dug a whole for reasons.  If they're detained the hole will have a legitimate reason, but realistically you'll never even see these guys.  The hole will have contents built by a guy from Kiev who you'll never even know beyond the fact the contents keep appearing in places.  He was trained by someone who has an accent, might be American, might be British, might even be something exotic, but you'll only hear of that through hushed rumors.  The contents be dropped off by two cut off Ukrainian soldiers in a older model Lada.  The car will look like every other car in the Ukraine.  The hole will then be filled quickly by random middle aged men unrelated to the first set.  This will all be concealed by two elderly women who just happen to make innocent phone calls about their grandsons whenever Russians are on the road.  

The nail will explode the contents of the hole, and already be just one of dozens of 15-25 year old men fleeing the scene.  The surviving Russians will pour out of their vehicles, one of them will start shooting because he thinks he sees something.  Everyone else will shoot on the assumption the other guy shooting is shooting at a real target (this is generally called the "death blossom" with some derision in American circles).  The Russians may or may not search for the trigger guy depending on how jacked up they are, they might just death blossom until someone with some authority gets them to cease fire.  They will however have to deal with the crispy critters than they had breakfast with before someone used a 122MM round buried roadside to kill them.  One of the Russians who survived will blow his brains out in 2024 because he never stopped hearing Sergei screaming for his mother as he was reduced to a carbonized collection of former human parts.

The Russians are now the hammer.  They're mad as hell.  And looking at Russian discipline, and behavior around "insurgent" populations, if they kill the actual men and women involved in the attack, it's going to be simply because statistically if you kill/rape/whatever 10-15% of the people in this village, you might get one of the actual insurgents through chance.

This scene will repeat in dozens of places, maybe only once or twice every 24 hours, but it's what an insurgency looks like.

The Russian hammer will strike out, but the nail is illusive.  But when the only tool you've given someone is the hammer (and indeed, Russia is pretty sold on hammers), they will hammer, regardless of the unsuitability of the hammer in this situation.

Anyway.  I am rambling at this point.  I think it's profoundly foolish to pretend that a Russian invasion of the Ukraine would do anything but kill a lot of people, and make the world just that much worse off.  The Russian soldier belongs in Russia.  It's the only way this ends well.  

[Haiduk]

4 hours ago, kraze said:

Not only russian special forces, but even regular marine troops too - to such extent that russian channels did a few slips showing them here and there

 

As for Debaltseve - we all seen a famous RT propaganda slip showing T72B3s but the same channel also shown a russian major general commanding the offensive (he was pretending to be a local "miner" as usual). Why would they send a high profile guy like that if not to command a very real regular troops?

Exactly this photo doesn't represents REGULAR marine. Many Russian volunteers and mercaneries in DNR/LNR troops, which recently have served in VDV or marines are usualy wearing these chevrons on own uniform.

But regular Russian marines really fought in Ukraine in August 2014 and episodically in 2015. Marines units represented 61st marines brigade (Northern fleet, Murmansk region), 200th motor-rifle brigade of Coastal troops (Northern fleet, Murmansk region) and 810th marines brigade (Black Sea fleet, Sevastopol) 

[sburke]

3 hours ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

Exactly

Which gets to a sort of preemptive bit of commentary:

Someone doubtlessly is going to say something about "but Ukrainians aren't Chechens/Ukraine and Russia are brothers!" etc whatever.

Here's factors that will drive a Ukrainian insurgency:



Anyway.  I am rambling at this point.  I think it's profoundly foolish to pretend that a Russian invasion of the Ukraine would do anything but kill a lot of people, and make the world just that much worse off.  The Russian soldier belongs in Russia.  It's the only way this ends well.  

And it gets even more complicated for Russia in that it isn't just dealing with a Ukrainian insurgency, but it risks issues at home.  Lots of Putin bots wave the Russian flag about Crimea and how great it is that Putin stood up for Russia's territorial integrity...but then you start having the flip side. Russians who resent the cost that Crimea represents.  This is from last year.  Add that to the fact that the Crimea bridge is eating up a massive portion of Russia's infrastructure budget.

http://finance.yahoo.com/news/russia-battle-university-places-deflates-063000493.html;_ylt=AwrTcdlzIJ1XjWcAOnknnIlQ;_ylu=X3oDMTE0bjcxMW5vBGNvbG8DZ3ExBHBvcwMxBHZ0aWQDRkZVSTJDMV8xBHNlYwNzcg--

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-preservation-white-elephants

Nowhere is this philosophy more evident than in the Crimean Bridge, a combined railway and motorway passage that is now being built between Russia’s Krasnodar region and the Crimean city of Kerch. Its price tag of 228 billion Rubles (3.5 billion in today’s U.S. dollars) is comparable to that of the Oresund bridge between Sweden and Denmark (about 4 billion euros or 4.5 billion in today’s US dollars). While the Danish-Swedish bridge, in operation since 2000, was at the time of construction expected to recoup its cost by 2037 (it will likely take longer), the Russian-Crimean bridge did not even have a clear economic model behind it. It is simply being funded from the federal budget and is needed because, having annexed another country’s territory, one apparently needs to secure a passage to it (as there is no land connection between Russia and Crimea). The top contractor, Stroigazmontazh owned by Arkady Rotenberg (a personal friend of Vladimir Putin), will likely be paid in full. Lesser ones, including the venerable Mostotrest, a Stalin-era bridge-constructing behemoth that is doing most of the actual work, are in peril. In the meantime, it is already clear that the Crimean bridge will eat up 70 percent of this year’s funding for all roads and bridges in the entire Russian Federation.

(my bold)

Sooner or later self interest of Russians over the declining living standards is going to take center stage over Putin's military adventurism.  Fighting an insurgency will only make that worse.  At some point there will be a backlash on the "foreign instigated" food protests and Russians will start shooting Russians.  That news then gets back to soldiers at the front etc.  It is a death spiral Russia can not afford.

 

Edited July 30, 2016 by sburke