Russian army under equipped?

[Battlefront.com]

8 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

Pension fund is separate from the budget.

And running a deficit as well:

http://www.imrussia.org/en/analysis/economy/2396-russias-100-billion-pension-system-is-a-dangerous-zombie-part-1

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-07/russia-considering-pension-system-alternatives-as-deficit-widens

8 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

The policy stays, security related spending has priority.

Still, we are going into OT. Are you interested in additional data on the Russian Armed Forces ongoing expansion?

We are going off topic and yes, I am interested in the plans of the Russian Armed Forces.  I am also interested in being skeptical that it will all come to be without serious side effects or changes in those plans.

Steve

[Kinophile]

10 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Er, it already is.  A lot more than anybody realizes.  For example, having FSB break into US diplomats' houses to rearrange furniture and (in one case) kill the family dog certainly isn't playing nice.  Threatening the children of US diplomats certainly isn't seen as a no-pressure tactic. 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/russia-is-harassing-us-diplomats-all-over-europe/2016/06/26/968d1a5a-3bdf-11e6-84e8-1580c7db5275_story.html

Small potatoes, strategically. Harassment certainly but not enough to effect any real political pressure.

I'm thinking more like the Russian bombing of US proxies in Syria in full view of USAF.. Actual use of military force.

But yes, this is now OT, apologies.

Edited June 28, 2016 by kinophile

[Battlefront.com]

10 minutes ago, kinophile said:

Small potatoes, strategically. Harassment certainly but not enough to effect any real political pressure.

I'm thinking more like the Russian bombing of US proxies in Syria in full view of USAF.. Actual use of military force.

I do think we'll see more of this in the future, though I'm not sure where else besides Syria this is viable for Russia to pursue an actual military strike vs. buzzing ships and flying close to national airspaces with transponders off.

Steve

[ikalugin]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

We are going off topic and yes, I am interested in the plans of the Russian Armed Forces.  I am also interested in being skeptical that it will all come to be without serious side effects or changes in those plans.

Ok, from 2014 and 2015 reports, in those years:

- total of ~59k servicemen returned to combat training from guard duty and ~40k civilian personel were optimised due to optimisation of infrastructure (transfer of various stuff to civilian authorities, centralisation of storage).

(majority of data comes from 2015 report, it is possible that more manpower was freed up).

About growth: 2015-2020 plan proposes a ~1/6 growth in total manpower (through additional contract troops being hired), with Ground forces growing by ~1/3. The growth of the Ground Forces comes from both the growth of the Armed Forces in general and from internal optimisation.

I can add stuff about activation of new units and formations, if you are interested, as well as known infrastructure projects (which define basing).

 

Edited June 28, 2016 by ikalugin

[ikalugin]

About economics, they are OT in my opinion, unless you can illustrate that Russian State would collapse in the relevant time frame.

And when you discuss stuff like changes in reserves or company debt, please supply (direct) sources, as things are often misreported.

Edited June 28, 2016 by ikalugin

[John Kettler]

Steve,

I was unaware of the pretty outrageous harassment you described. The rule used to be that diplomatic harassment was responded to tit for tat. The Russians do not respect weakness, and Obama's refusal to play hardball is being seen as exactly that, be it in Syria or the streets of Russia. Putin sees Obama as pushable, so he's continually throwing his weight around in an effort to learn, as best he can, where the hard limits lie; where the jawboning and placation cease.

Miscalculation on his end is always a danger, and what especially concerns me is the potential limited use of nuclear weapons (delivery by Iskander-M) to restore the (favorable to Russia) status quo. I'm not talking about hitting the Ukrainian capital, but instead something more along the lines of a valuable, yet relatively isolated military target, with the twofold aims of inflicting great hurt, coupled with an emphatic message from Moscow. Since Russian doctrine provides for exactly such use of nuclear weapons, I believe that a Ukrainian move to join NATO might well result in one or more airbursts (to avoid massive fallout which would be blown deep into Russia) over relatively soft targets, such as supply depots. Unless, say, a US or NATO training team gets hit in the process, is NATO really going to take swift decisive action?

The history of its response to Russia's invasion, by whatever means, doesn't provide much confidence on this issue. Nor do I doubt that a Ukrainian back down on joining NATO following a very limited nuclear spanking by Russia would be seen by Putin as anything other than a return to the status quo and a great victory. Alternatively, Putin could send enough conventionally armed cruise missiles across the border to do considerable and persuasively dissuasive damage.

Regards,

John Kettler

 

[ikalugin]

 

1 hour ago, John Kettler said:

 

Miscalculation on his end is always a danger, and what especially concerns me is the potential limited use of nuclear weapons (delivery by Iskander-M) to restore the (favorable to Russia) status quo.

To nitpick - there is no evidence I am aware of that Iskander-M (ie - the quasi ballistic missile) has any non conventional payloads.

Edited June 29, 2016 by ikalugin

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, ikalugin said:

About economics, they are OT in my opinion, unless you can illustrate that Russian State would collapse in the relevant time frame.

As I said, there are three possibilities:

1.  Russia manages to fund it's military expansion without compromising the plan

2.  Russia does not manage to fund it's military expansion without compromising the plan

3.  Russia collapses

Within the next few years I think #2 is the most probable.  Though the harder Putin pushes #1 the more likely #3 happens.

Quote

And when you discuss stuff like changes in reserves or company debt, please supply (direct) sources, as things are often misreported.

I do not have access to direct sources as they are in Russian.  Plus, I trust analysis of corporation data (Russian, US, or otherwise) much more than I do direct data from the corporations themselves.  If you see something in an analysis that is incorrect, you can point out Russian sources that offer a different opinion. 

Simple math is you can't lose roughly half of 60% of national income without major problem for budgeting.  You also can't lose 50% of your currency's value without budgeting problems.  To think that Russia can go through this downturn (3 years already plus at least another 3 to come) without some major budget problems is fantasy.  How it handles the problems is yet to be seen.  So far military spending is holding steady and everything else is suffering.

Steve

[ikalugin]

Anything on the russian military stuff?

Btw, while we are in OT, did you see the reports on the state of Ukrainian defense industries in 2014 and 2015, on the inventory status (such as via comparison of 2013 and 2016 inventories)?

Edited June 29, 2016 by ikalugin

[Battlefront.com]

27 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

Anything on the russian military stuff?

I'm not sure what there is to comment on.  The plan to increase contract soldiers is proceeding pretty close to plan, according to your information.  This is not terribly surprising as Russia has increased the economic incentives to become a contract soldier at the same time that unemployment is rising.  It is not difficult to see that this makes recruiting easier.

Quote

Btw, while we are in OT, did you see the reports on the state of Ukrainian defense industries in 2014 and 2015, on the inventory status (such as via comparison of 2013 and 2016 inventories)?

I haven't read anything recently, no.  Anything interesting?

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

I do have a question about the distribution of contract personnel within a brigade.  Your earlier post says that there is at least 1 Battalion Tactical Group within a Brigade that is 100% contract personnel.  This implies that under normal circumstances units are organized as either contract or conscript, not mixed. That doesn't seem correct.  What are the details?

Steve

[ikalugin]

35 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I haven't read anything recently, no.  Anything interesting?

If you compare 2013 and 2016 inventories you get ~50 percent decrease on average, I can break it down by category. If you read 2014 and 2015 reports on the end of the year results, you would see complete failure of Ukrainian defense industry - the most obvious being Oplots (0-5 produced per year, depending on how you count them, meaning that there are more Armatas out there than Oplots).

 

31 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I do have a question about the distribution of contract personnel within a brigade.  Your earlier post says that there is at least 1 Battalion Tactical Group within a Brigade that is 100% contract personnel.  This implies that under normal circumstances units are organized as either contract or conscript, not mixed. That doesn't seem correct.  What are the details?

Are you talking about Brigade's subunits (currently there are 1-2 purely contract BTGs per unit such as BDE or Div which have conscripts in other subunits, in the future with the growth of the contract force there would be purelly contract units)? The idea is two fold:

- spread some contract troops around as specialists (ie NCOs).

- reform subunits (starting with 1 BTG) with contract troops, by 2021 the plan is to continue this untill a number of BDEs do not have any conscripts in them (some conscripts would be retained in the Ground Forces).

What is wrong with it?

Are you interested in formation of new units/expansion of old units, military construction? This is CMBS relevant, as there is atleast 1 additional Army type formation (most likely - 2) that is availiable for the CMBS timeline.

Edited June 29, 2016 by ikalugin

[John Kettler]

5 hours ago, ikalugin said:

To nitpick - there is no evidence I am aware of that Iskander-M (ie - the quasi ballistic missile) has any non conventional payloads.

While it is, on paper, a fair point, the reality is that the Iskander-M, if purely conventional, would be the sole exception I know of when it comes to Russian TBMs going clear back to the FROG series, your 2K6 Luna (FROG-3/5) 9K52 Luna-M (FROG-7) 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab) and R-400 Oka (SS-23 Spider), every last one of which had/has a nuclear option.

With a listed payload of 480-700 kg, Iskander-M seems adequate to deliver the same nuclear warhead type formerly atop the R-400. US and NATO planners would be foolish to ignore this, especially since Putin has on several occasions made a point of moving Iskander-M close to Russia's border with those nations he wished to intimidate following the issuance of veiled/not so veiled nuclear attack threats. The warhead is already proven, so it would only be necessary to loft a ballistics and weight identical dummy payload to test warhead separation. Evaluating such a launch would be quite challenging to even US ballistic missile assessment because there would be no opportunity to get COBRA BALL into range if the Russians did their test firings well inland, which I take as a given. That would smart, though today's missile assessment collection means are vastly beyond the Cold War hardware. Hyperspectral imaging, for example, offers capabilities beyond imagining relative to what was available before. And if the technology is being talked about in open source for coastal imaging from space, just imagine what the US military and other agencies have, what it can do and when they got it! 

Regards,

John Kettler

[ikalugin]

Nuclear payload requires specialist modifications for the launcher and missile (namely - climate control for the warhead). Such systems, to my best knowledge, were never seen on the launchers, nor were they ever mentioned in any reports. Thus it is highly unlikely that Iskander-M has a nuclear payload of any kind.

Also, Iskander-M launcher cannot take full length (and thus INF-treaty violating) cruise missiles, it is too short.

p.s. you forgot SCUDs. I can go to the reasons behind nukes being everywhere, but they would be too boring

Edited June 29, 2016 by ikalugin

[Kinophile]

15 hours ago, ikalugin said:

About economics, they are OT in my opinion, unless you can illustrate that Russian State would collapse in the relevant time frame.

And when you discuss stuff like changes in reserves or company debt, please supply (direct) sources, as things are often misreported.

I myself did so -  direct quote  from RUS MoF,  showing decreasing total within its second of two SWF. 

Personally, though,  I think Russia is a long way off (say 3 years) suffering sufficient internal turmoil to prevent the Armed Forces continuing  their full tilt rebuild/rearm.

State control is too solid,  supporting cores are too coherent and the various elites are still being nicely taken care of.

Russian rearmament will continue,  unimpeded. 

Edited June 29, 2016 by kinophile

[Kinophile]

Re Kontrakti v Conscripts - 

I'm curious,  is there enough of a difference to warrant listing them as separate classes within CMBS? 

Rather than just experience,  as another variable,  ie Training  or Skill?

Although I do suspect BFC folds those concepts into the experience/motivation variables. 

I assume the first generation Kontrakti were not hugely better than the general Conscripts,  but that as time and combat experience has accumulated they have significantly widened the gap in terms of capabilities and staying power. 

Leading from this, is there an estimated  percentage for Kontrakti in the RA by 2017?

[BTR]

17 minutes ago, kinophile said:

I'm curious,  is there enough of a difference to warrant listing them as separate classes within CMBS?

Experience handles these conceptual differences already, and handles them quite well. The percentage relation may vary depending on sizing decisions going forwards. The estimated total number of professional soldiers is not to change from 2017 onward, and looking at historical figures so far all is going according to plan. 

[Sgt Joch]

21 minutes ago, kinophile said:

Re Kontrakti v Conscripts - 

I'm curious,  is there enough of a difference to warrant listing them as separate classes within CMBS? 

 

no, it gets thrown into the mix, much like a typical German army 1944 unit with a mix of veterans and green rookies is rated as "regular". CM is already flexible enough to accommodate these variables by playing with experience, morale and leadership.

 

[ikalugin]

3 hours ago, BTR said:

Experience handles these conceptual differences already, and handles them quite well. The percentage relation may vary depending on sizing decisions going forwards. The estimated total number of professional soldiers is not to change from 2017 onward, and looking at historical figures so far all is going according to plan. 

That is the old plan, look into the 2015 correction.

[ikalugin]

https://hasstef.cartodb.com/viz/bf38e8bc-3dc9-11e6-855e-0e3a376473ab/public_map

Iskander-M unit deployment map, by of one of my online comrades using open sources. Red - BDEs not rearmed with Iskander series (ie those that retain tochkas), there is another BDE set expected this year. In addition to 1 BDE and 1 Divizion (battalion) sets ordered pre 2011, 10 more were ordered in 2011 for total of 11 1/3 BDE sets.

Note, where Iskanders are actually permanently deployed.

We may produce another map, with new units and formations.

Edited June 29, 2016 by ikalugin

[Battlefront.com]

12 hours ago, ikalugin said:

If you compare 2013 and 2016 inventories you get ~50 percent decrease on average, I can break it down by category. If you read 2014 and 2015 reports on the end of the year results, you would see complete failure of Ukrainian defense industry - the most obvious being Oplots (0-5 produced per year, depending on how you count them, meaning that there are more Armatas out there than Oplots).

Because of the war Ukraine has decided that more tanks and vehicles is the way to go.  IIRC they can refurbish 2-3 T-64s to almost Oplot standards for the price of 1 Oplot.  It is the same reason Russia is planning on upgrading large numbers of T-72s even after full production of Armata starts.

As for inventory levels, the losses from 2 years of war are substantial.  The more relevant question is if Ukraine has enough combat ready vehicles for the war effort, not how many are rusting in warehouses.  It has been a while since I looked at the details, but I think the answer is that it does.  If so, the Ukrainian defense industry has not failed.

12 hours ago, ikalugin said:

Are you talking about Brigade's subunits (currently there are 1-2 purely contract BTGs per unit such as BDE or Div which have conscripts in other subunits, in the future with the growth of the contract force there would be purelly contract units)? The idea is two fold:

- spread some contract troops around as specialists (ie NCOs).

- reform subunits (starting with 1 BTG) with contract troops, by 2021 the plan is to continue this untill a number of BDEs do not have any conscripts in them (some conscripts would be retained in the Ground Forces).

What is wrong with it?

OK, so the plan is to concentrate all contract soldiers in one BTG so it can reform it, then move them to the other BTGs to reform them as more contractors are available?

If this is correct, the only problem with this approach is what if the entire Brigade is mobilized for war.  It means a very big difference in capabilities between the internal parts of the Brigade.  Redistributing the contractors at this point would be even worse.

12 hours ago, ikalugin said:

Are you interested in formation of new units/expansion of old units, military construction? This is CMBS relevant, as there is atleast 1 additional Army type formation (most likely - 2) that is availiable for the CMBS timeline.

If there is a new organization we are definitely interested in learning more.

 

5 hours ago, kinophile said:

I myself did so -  direct quote  from RUS MoF,  showing decreasing total within its second of two SWF. 

Personally, though,  I think Russia is a long way off (say 3 years) suffering sufficient internal turmoil to prevent the Armed Forces continuing  their full tilt rebuild/rearm.

State control is too solid,  supporting cores are too coherent and the various elites are still being nicely taken care of.

Russian rearmament will continue,  unimpeded. 

This is the likely course of events, though there are huge unknowns ahead.  But as I said earlier, the more Putin uses resources for the military instead of social services, the more potential there is for internal discontent.  It's inline with the fundamental law of physics that "for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction".  Starving the public sector of funds at a time when they need it most, then cracking down harder on civil liberties, is something history shows usually ends badly for the ruling elite.  In democratic societies the inability to crack down on civil liberties (in a significant way, at least) means the ruling elite usually gets deposed before really bad stuff happens.

Steve

[ikalugin]

48 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

If there is a new organization we are definitely interested in learning more.

Ok, I would be looking into making an infographic on the lines of the Iskander one made by a comrade of mine. The problem is that such activity can be viewed as illegal, thus I would consult before publishing it, to be on the safe side.

 

48 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

OK, so the plan is to concentrate all contract soldiers in one BTG so it can reform it, then move them to the other BTGs to reform them as more contractors are available?

Not exactly, the plan is to:

- spread contract troops around the units as specialists (already done).
- build up contract troops only BTGs in the units (1-2 currently per unit).
- increase the ammount of contract troops only BTGs untill a number of units are contract troops only (in process, as conscripts are retained some units would retain conscripts in some of their BTGs).

48 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

If this is correct, the only problem with this approach is what if the entire Brigade is mobilized for war.  It means a very big difference in capabilities between the internal parts of the Brigade.  Redistributing the contractors at this point would be even worse.

Then you use different BTGs for different missions within the Unit's mission.

Edited June 29, 2016 by ikalugin

[ikalugin]

52 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Because of the war Ukraine has decided that more tanks and vehicles is the way to go.  IIRC they can refurbish 2-3 T-64s to almost Oplot standards for the price of 1 Oplot.  It is the same reason Russia is planning on upgrading large numbers of T-72s even after full production of Armata starts.

As for inventory levels, the losses from 2 years of war are substantial.  The more relevant question is if Ukraine has enough combat ready vehicles for the war effort, not how many are rusting in warehouses.  It has been a while since I looked at the details, but I think the answer is that it does.  If so, the Ukrainian defense industry has not failed.

I guess you are interested. Long story cut short - Ukrainian Defense Industry did not fill the losses, much less allowed additional equipment for Armed Forces (and paramilitary forces) expansion. This is so because the production plans were not executed, nor is there any evidence that the situation would improve in the relevant time frame.

I would make a detailed post about this later, citing relevant sources.

 

Edited June 29, 2016 by ikalugin

[HUSKER2142]

 

 

 

 

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, ikalugin said:

I guess you are interested. Long story cut short - Ukrainian Defense Industry did not fill the losses, much less allowed additional equipment for Armed Forces (and paramilitary forces) expansion. This is so because the production plans were not executed, nor is there any evidence that the situation would improve in the relevant time frame.

I would make a detailed post about this later, citing relevant sources.

 

I would be very interested in @Haiduk's input on that.