Russian army under equipped?

[Battlefront.com]

John, there's a number of factors that made the Soviet Union weaker in reality than on paper. It's sufficient to simply point out this fact and that it's a fairly consistent part of Russia's military history.  Going into detail takes us off topic.

Steve

[Sublime]

Jeez John can you please stop citing Suvorov the guys a quack and his Iceberg theory is nonsense. Maybe some of his info was credible when he defected now he.s an artficat trying to produce money.

And yes Ive watched his lectures etc. The guy has no real evidence of... anything.

And you dont need Suvorov to prove your point about Russian lack of wealth vs the West. Theres plenty of off topic lit that mentions Soviet outrage in Nazi Germany that people with so much would invade Russia, soldiers mailing lightbulbs home never having seen one at home and not knowing they needed sockets ( thats anecdotal from Beevor I believe )

Edited August 3, 2016 by Sublime

[kraze]

Have you actually read Suvorov?

He uses nothing but quotes from official soviet state media of the time available to everyone to double check.

It's not a "theory" - all he does is just puts together a thousand of quotes made by Kremlin itself into a single book.

[Kinophile]

20 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Ukraine must surrender in order for Russia to win. 

l dont fully buy this, as a formal or vital requirement.

To my non-expert mind, Russia doesn't need a defined capitulation - just a incapable, chaotic and weak Ukrainian government and society that can be pressured, bribed and manipulated away from Western influence. It's much better for Putin to keep the Ukrainian political structure in being but destabilized,  allowing for blossoming corruption, infighting and eventually a creeping coup. This gives him a lot more options and ties into his apparent general preference for multi dimensional conflict with a politically favourable result. 

So, if this is a viable end goal then any Russian offensive should revolve around body blows to the Ukraine's political, military and economic structure, rather than traditional outright territorial conquest. 

This scenario fits closer to my non-professional understanding of Putin's methodology -  he likes politucal uncertainty, a fluid military situation and diminished leadership on the part of his opponents. 

To break this down into the three main spheres of influence on a society - 

1) Military: Russian doesn't need to (and as noted above by others, should not try to) conquer vast tracts of Ukrainian territory or attempt to eliminate the UGF as a functional entity.  It could, however focus on severely damaging or Kettering (and then bombarding into pieces) the ATO theatre forces. A heavy defeat or (continuous slaughter of trapped units)  of the UGF's most active, well equipped and effective forces would cause a serious political crisis in Kiev.

Other attacks threatening widely spread targets would stretch Ukrainian reserves  and C4 capabilities to the maximum. Add in Spetsnaz agitation and civ/Mil infrastructure sabotage to amplify the chaos. 

2) Economic: Simultaneous and continuous long range strikes against civilian infrastructure (critical stuff like power grids, plants, transport,  factories and symbolic ones like the Parliament)  would exacerbate the instability by driveing up unemployment, crushing civilian incomes and ruining day to day life. 

This builds into 

3) Political: Ukrainian society is very anti-Putin right now,  but anything can change with enough pressure. A good win for Putin would be to insert/insinuate his own local man in charge and rule by proxy, a la Chechnya,  but with significant checks and balances to prevent a Ukrainian Kadyrov getting too much control. The proposed federation system would create perfect conditions for continuous political  turmoil with only occasional unity. 

If Putin cannot have a united Ukraine with him,  then a disjointed and chaotic Ukraine at least denies the Ukraine to the West and will soon provide an opportunity to take control. This process here avoids going for a big, simple win  and is more about building and creating the situation via military, economic and social pressure to achieve political control. 

Edited August 3, 2016 by kinophile

[hattori]

I'm pretty sure Russian forces destroying Ukrainian civilian infrastructure is a sure way to make Ukrainian society even more anti-Putin.  Does anyone have examples of where a country invades another, destroys a ton of infrastructure and actually manages to win over the populace?  That seems to fly in the face of human nature.  (I am feeling extra dumb today, perhaps I am overlooking some obvious examples).  I think Ukrainians would rightly blame Russia for all their problems if Russia tried this stuff.

I actually think a unifying force in society is a common enemy.  I could be very wrong, but I would suspect any real Russian attack would actually temporarily bring Ukraine together, drive them more into the arms of the West, not what Putin would want.

 

[AttorneyAtWar]

23 minutes ago, kinophile said:

1) Military: Russian doesn't need to (and as noted above by others, should not try to) conquer vast tracts of Ukrainian territory or attempt to eliminate the UGF as a functional entity.  It could, however focus on severely damaging or Kettering (and then bombarding into pieces) the ATO theatre forces. A heavy defeat or (continuous slaughter of trapped units)  of the UGF's most active, well equipped and effective forces would cause a serious political crisis in Kiev.

 

Defeats and encirclement's of that size would require a large Russian commitment in terms of troops and the ability to maneuver over large parts of Ukrainian territory. This opens them up to more casualties and leads to what Steve has been talking about in terms of domestic and economic issues back in Russia.

 

Edited August 3, 2016 by Raptorx7

[Kinophile]

To clarify,  for Putin it's only the elite he needs to be pro Putin. So long as his proxies can build an effective suppressive regime (eg chechnya) and don't lose their nerve,  then he can call it a win.  Even partial control is fine -  anything that interferes significantly with Western influence. The objective is not to make Ukrainians end lured if Putin, but at least obey/submit/shut up. 

Casualties are inevitable and I suspect need to hit a significant threshold to actually start having an effect on a society as politically compromised as Russia's. However,  defeats are very dangerous. A few strong victories can gloss over a lot of dead soldiers. 

[VladimirTarasov]

I dont think casualties will go anything that will make us shake our heads. Remember once Russia gains air dominance its largely game over. Once Iraq lost its air defense, it was game over. If NATO intervenes in such a conflict in Ukraine, and destroys Russian AD, its game over. So it is my opinion, that Russian forces on average will fare well against Ukrainian forces. How ever I'm not saying air power will be a God of a battlefield, it plays a very important tactical role. In Syria for example, there are many cases where RuAF saved Syrian units in defensive operations, and also help propel them in offensive operations.

Of course you will have urban operations where a Ukrainian unit will depending on variables like tactics, be able to halt a Russian assault and be able to inflict heavy casualties.

[AttorneyAtWar]

36 minutes ago, VladimirTarasov said:

I dont think casualties will go anything that will make us shake our heads. Remember once Russia gains air dominance its largely game over. Once Iraq lost its air defense, it was game over. If NATO intervenes in such a conflict in Ukraine, and destroys Russian AD, its game over. So it is my opinion, that Russian forces on average will fare well against Ukrainian forces. How ever I'm not saying air power will be a God of a battlefield, it plays a very important tactical role. In Syria for example, there are many cases where RuAF saved Syrian units in defensive operations, and also help propel them in offensive operations.

Of course you will have urban operations where a Ukrainian unit will depending on variables like tactics, be able to halt a Russian assault and be able to inflict heavy casualties.

Air dominance isn't something easily achieved even if the opponents air force has been destroyed.

Russia after defeating Ukraine's air force will have to carry out a concerted SEAD/DEAD effort on a moving front line, this coupled with IR threats in the form of manpads and SPAAA could lead to a war of attrition the Russian air force is not interested or capable of keeping up with. Fixed wing aircraft will obviously have an easier time if proper SEAD has been carried out on the majority of Ukrainian SAM's but that certainly isn't a given. These kinds of AA threats make rotary or low flying CAS almost not worth the risk, especially at a tempo that Russia would need to keep up with a large commitment in terms of troops across a large swath of territory.

Edit: Forgot to mention that Russia's lack of smart weapons also makes lower flying CAS necessary for accuracy, ESPECIALLY in the CAS role where you don't want to hit your guys.

Edited August 3, 2016 by Raptorx7

[Kinophile]

That low level AA is definitely a major crimp in any use of AIR force in game. 

[JUAN DEAG]

20 minutes ago, VladimirTarasov said:

Remember once Russia gains air dominance its largely game over.

The prospect of Russian air dominance in Ukraine is highly optimistic considering that during the Russian Invasion of Georgia the Russians lost 7 aircraft (one Tu-22M3 long-range bomber, one Su-24M Fencer fighter-bomber, one Su-24MR Fencer E reconnaissance plane and four Su-25 attack planes) in less that 5 days of fighting. This was against Georgia, a country of only 2 million and no grand systems of aerospace defence with no foreign support.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian government has put the modernization and procurement of long-range radars and air defence and missle defence systems at an absolute priority.

[Kinophile]

30 minutes ago, JUAN DEAG said:

The prospect of Russian air dominance in Ukraine is highly optimistic considering that during the Russian Invasion of Georgia the Russians lost 7 aircraft (one Tu-22M3 long-range bomber, one Su-24M Fencer fighter-bomber, one Su-24MR Fencer E reconnaissance plane and four Su-25 attack planes) in less that 5 days of fighting. This was against Georgia, a country of only 2 million and no grand systems of aerospace defence with no foreign support.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian government has put the modernization and procurement of long-range radars and air defence and missle defence systems at an absolute priority.

Very sensible of them.

Edited August 3, 2016 by kinophile

[Krater]

2 hours ago, JUAN DEAG said:

The prospect of Russian air dominance in Ukraine is highly optimistic considering that during the Russian Invasion of Georgia the Russians lost 7 aircraft (one Tu-22M3 long-range bomber, one Su-24M Fencer fighter-bomber, one Su-24MR Fencer E reconnaissance plane and four Su-25 attack planes) in less that 5 days of fighting. This was against Georgia, a country of only 2 million and no grand systems of aerospace defence with no foreign support.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian government has put the modernization and procurement of long-range radars and air defence and missle defence systems at an absolute priority.

Keep in mind that

a) Georgia was 8 years ago.  In the last 10 years, Russian pilots went from flying about 25-30 hours per year to 125-150 hours a year. 

c) Georgia actually had a reasonably good air defense system, for country of it's size.  Ukraine has taken a key role in modernizing Georgian air defense network, providing best examples of it's then-current production -  Buk-M1 SAM complex, 36D6-M radar, Kolchuga-M passive radar system and Mandat electronic warfare system, which were tied into single integrated network.  Broadly speaking, it's quality was on par with current Ukrainian air defense, except for S-300 which Georgia did not have.  Judging by Turchinov's public statement in 2015, Ukrainian air defense manufacturing sector is in very bad shape and would have to be rebuilt from scratch.

[sburke]

1. I'll believe Russia's air power is overwhelming when I see it.  So far the overall performance in the conflicts we've seen including Syria have not been particularly "awesome". 

2. Assuming no western power will intervene in an all out Russian attack is the kind of planning that got Russia where it is now.  (Sorry those pilots are volunteers and they just happen to be flying the aircraft we loaned Ukraine. They are not American air force units.  2 can play the "denial of what everyone knows" game. Maybe they bought those aircraft online the same place the DPR guys bought their arms.)

3.What is Russia gonna do about it?  Escalating against an enemy vastly more powerful than you is a losing game.

[John Kettler]

Sublime,

You reject Suvorov/Rezun when I cite him as a primary source because of his, to you, loony WW II books claiming Stalin planned to attack Hitler? Isn't that the very definition of throwing out the baby with the bathwater? Like it or not, he was there. He was a company commander in a MRC. As an officer, he received strict orders on how to behave should NATO forces be encountered. What has any of that got to do with his GPW books? Have you ever read Andrew Cockburn's The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine? Guess what? Interviews with numerous former Russian soldiers very much confirms the things Suvorov/Rezun says about various issues within the Red Army. Cockburn's interview with PEOPLE magazine may prove informative to you.  Where your "favorite" Russian defector, for example, cites the theft and consumption of 100 % grain alcohol intended for the MiG-25's windshield deicing system, Cockburn reports an identical theft of alcohol used to clean precision machined turntable parts which allow a surveillance radar to rotate. Remember, a diminished threat does neither the Pentagon nor the powerful defense industry any good, so how is that inflating the threat?

Now, let's talk about one of his seemingly inflated claims, as seen by you. In his Inside the Soviet Army Suvorov/Rezun talked about a superb piece of maskirovka in which the Russians were hiding the fact that their SAM units were considerably larger than we thought. As the resident Soviet threat Analyst, I immediately took this to my bosses, who were quite alarmed by the implications of this when it came to SAM loss modeling, SEAD requirements, Russian AD resilience under attack and by extension, the impact on the overall defense of NATO. They were right to be concerned, for a year later we had new SECRET level SAM launcher counts reflecting what Suvorov/Rezun said. Moreover, one of the late editions of SOVIET MILITARY POWER (SMP), the Pentagon's declassified and publicly available intel brief on the Russian threat, there was an entire section devoted to the TVDs exactly as he had presented them.

Understand, too, that every annual issue of SOVIET MILITARY POWER was the result of vicious infighting within and without the Intelligence Community over whether or not to talk about a topic, what to say, what not to say. How much to tell the world when the KGB and GRU are going to parse the text word by word, read between the lines, pore over every photo and drawing, then use those things as part of not just a broad assessment of what we know, but how we know it? Sure, we can show an overhead of Military Installation 102, but if we do, that might reveal something about our recon sat capability. Therefore, let's make do with a drawing or even a sketch.

The full-page painting of the Russian behemoth Typhoon SSBN was declassified from S/NOFORN/WNINTEL DIA painting made using all sort of intel data and appeared over the strenuous objections of many spooks, but the Reagan administration wanted to make a point about the threat and to tell the Russians we knew what they had and what it meant. I was a Soviet threat Analyst then, and I gasped when I saw what I knew to a certainty was a classified image. To drive the point home, the SMP authors turned a Typoon on end in a line drawing and compared its length to the Washington Monument! The inclusion of the Suvorov/Rezun derived TVD material was thus the US's way of saying. "Okay. You fooled us before, but now we understand how you really are set up and plan to wage war." So tell me, Sublime, should we believe him or believe you?

His The "Liberators" is a very rare inside look at the modern Red Army when it encountered a world which only a handful of Russians had ever seen as ordinary citizens, not during the GPW. Travel outside of Russia was a prize beyond imagining for the average Russian. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was hardly in the same category as the looting of Germany during and post GPW because most of Germany had itself been mauled by the war and because, and this is important, it was not an attack on the hated enemy but a restoration of the status quo, as seen by the Russians, of the government of an important ally in the Warsaw Pact.

kinophile,

What you seem to be suggesting is that Russia practice against the Ukraine exactly what Pakistan has done to Afghanistan for a long time: keep the area in so much turmoil that it can never develop into a stable country and thus, a threat. You seem also to be suggesting something akin to the "frozen" conflict in eastern Ukraine, but on an enormously larger scale. That, I think, would tie up a significant portion of the Red Army and cost Putin a fortune. Nor, I believe, would it get him off the sanctions rack. Presumably, the "Ketterlng" which you mentioned refers to the cauldrons of encircled units? That one threw me when I hit it.

hattori,

WW II experience shows blowing up things people care about only makes them more intransigent. Any doubts on that score have certainly been borne out in Iraq, where the US destroyed the power grid and, I believe the water treatment and sewage processing facilities in its bombing campaign.

Regards,

John Kettler

Edited August 4, 2016 by John Kettler

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Re: Air War

The problemset the Russians are approaching is not dissimilar from NATO in 1999, as the equipment is broadly the same, although NATO of 1999 still had some pretty major edges over the Russians (stealth aircraft, sheer proliferation of smart munitions in quantity), and a much higher plane to target/threat ratio.  This is worth reflecting on in terms of executing an effective DEAD campaign, or anything beyond local SEAD, simply because it's a very demanding mission, and the Russians have a very limited pool of assets to accomplish it with (a rather small collection of "modern" airframes, and a lot of Soviet platforms), and a much reduced ability to hit military targets from "safety."  

I suppose where I'm going with this is the Russians may not have the resources to accomplish a full air campaign.  NATO was able to manage Kosovo through legions of airplanes, some deep penetration assets, and even then was largely only hitting things too big to hide or move.  A Russian air campaign likely has the same problem, only without the sort of tools that NATO brought to the fight, will be obliged to enter the Ukrainian threat envelope a lot more often, for a lot longer.  While it would be unreasonable to expect the Russian air force to be completely defeated, it may simply not have enough planes, pilots, and munitions for the sort of campaign required to be successfully carried to conclusion fast enough to be relevant (or if Russia salvos SSMs into Kiev, kills a lot of people, but the war is over in a week, then there's not nearly as much the west can do.  If it's week four and images of dead Ukrainian civilians and bombed hospitals are all over the BBC, strange things might start happening to Russian aircrew and their birds.  It's not like the Russians would really know if F-22s hopped the border, zotted an entire flight of Russian planes, and then returned to base after an "exercise."  

[Kinophile]

Within this thread we seem to be swinging between "Russia is strong enough"  v. "Russia is too weak". Its very close to that adage of how Russia is never how it appears,  exactly.

Taking that in mind, let's start from the middle and describe some basic points that we CAN agree on, in principle,  but can DISAGREE on innscale/effectiveness. 

I suggest (and please feel free to counter-suggest):

1) Russia/Putin wants a weak/submissive Ukraine 

2) The Donbass War has backfired -  the Ukraine is now stronger, more united and resistant to Russia than ever before.

3) Russia has no apparent exit strategy 

4) Russia could inflict significant military damage and defeats on the UGF's, but not quickly enough, consistently enough or deeply to "properly" defeat the Ukraine as a nation state. BUT that damage could lead to political opportunities. 

Thoughts? 

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

I don't think he political opportunities outweigh the cost.  

1.  Anything short of an unambiguous victory is insufficient for Russian prestige.  If the Ukraine is well mauled, but defiant and enough Russians come home in boxes, Putin and his people's image of strength is destroyed and his legitimacy is no longer enough to stand on.

2. It's a lot of things that will have "cost" (human lives, military equipment, political ill will for decades) for "potential."  Spending a few bucks every year to maybe win the lottery is silly, but fairly modest cost that may have a remote chance of major success.  Going to for reals war is a great cost even if it's a resounding victory for an outcome that is deeply uncertain.

3. Russia has no exit strategy, but there's nothing so terrible about the status quo to demand one time now.  It's a problem, but right now most of the damage is done, or at least steady state.  Until things get a lot worse for Russians I wouldn't expect much change.  

[John Kettler]

panzersaurkrautwerfer,

Should I be using the ellipsis version of your handle now? Any sustained air loss rate over 3% will rapidly destroy that air force. I can think of no way the Russians could hope to conduct effective SEAD/DEAD without sustaining many times that rate and very quickly among practically priceless highly trained crews and their equally scarce and pricey aircraft. To the best of my knowledge, the Russians have very little of a counterpart to the US Wild Weasel SEAD/DEAD capability; certainly nothing of its size, professionalism and institutional knowledge, nor its technical and weapon capabilities. Consequently, any such Russian effort against the Ukrainian ADS is going to be a guaranteed vertical battle, not just an uphill fight!  

This isn't to say the Russian Air Force doesn't have ARMs, but all the ARMs in the world don't buy you much when the other side is watching you through a CCTV or FLIR or with the radar on dummy load and capable of being switched on in an instant. Nor do I recall Russian ARMs having the memory that HARM has of where the target was. I believe they are more like Shrike and fall out of the sky when the target radar signal is lost. Within broad limits, the UA has much the same AD equipment as its foe and is as well versed in maskirovka, flak traps, SAM traps and the like. The Stinger drove Russian ground attack planes out of their effective delivery envelopes in Afghanistan, practically defanging them as a result, and you rightly point out that the relatively precision weapon poor Russians are therefore going to have to come down into the widely proliferated MANPADS threat envelope in order to winkle out the UA fire units. This doesn't bode well for their SEAD/DEAD campaign as a result.

Regards,

John Kettler

Edited August 4, 2016 by John Kettler

[VladimirTarasov]

Re Georgian war,

Communications, and lack of coordination equipment was the result of those planes being shot down, out of those 7, 2 were hit by friendly fire indicating lack of air-ground coordination. All those issues are fixed, and the Russian air force is more than capable enough to do missions in Ukraine, be it SEAD, strikes, or CAS. Syria is a good show case, for some aspect on how the Russian air force has improved since Georgia.

[Battlefront.com]

11 hours ago, kinophile said:

l dont fully buy this, as a formal or vital requirement.

To my non-expert mind, Russia doesn't need a defined capitulation - just a incapable, chaotic and weak Ukrainian government and society that can be pressured, bribed and manipulated away from Western influence. It's much better for Putin to keep the Ukrainian political structure in being but destabilized,  allowing for blossoming corruption, infighting and eventually a creeping coup. This gives him a lot more options and ties into his apparent general preference for multi dimensional conflict with a politically favourable result. 

This is what Putin has been trying to do for 2.5 years now, at great cost to the Russian state, and it's failed.  Miserably.  In some ways he's done the opposite.  The primary reason is that Ukraine hasn't surrendered and Russia's pressure, including invasion, has not worked.  I'll get to that more below...

11 hours ago, kinophile said:

1) Military: Russian doesn't need to (and as noted above by others, should not try to) conquer vast tracts of Ukrainian territory or attempt to eliminate the UGF as a functional entity.  It could, however focus on severely damaging or Kettering (and then bombarding into pieces) the ATO theatre forces. A heavy defeat or (continuous slaughter of trapped units)  of the UGF's most active, well equipped and effective forces would cause a serious political crisis in Kiev.

Other attacks threatening widely spread targets would stretch Ukrainian reserves  and C4 capabilities to the maximum. Add in Spetsnaz agitation and civ/Mil infrastructure sabotage to amplify the chaos. 

Here's the problem.  Sometimes in life there's no room for anything short of finality.  If Russia fails to knock Ukraine down and out "for good", then anything it does militarily will likely fail short, mid, or definitely long term.  Yet the effort needed to take Ukraine out completely is practically beyond Russia's physical capacity.  At best it is life threateningly risky for the Russian state. 

11 hours ago, kinophile said:

2) Economic: Simultaneous and continuous long range strikes against civilian infrastructure (critical stuff like power grids, plants, transport,  factories and symbolic ones like the Parliament)  would exacerbate the instability by driveing up unemployment, crushing civilian incomes and ruining day to day life. 

A war of terror is difficult for Russia to achieve with anything other than ground forces.  At least not on a scale that is going to seriously hurt Ukraine economically.  There's also the risk of the West getting directly involved if Russia resorts to this sort of war.  Plus, it's generally the best way to get the enemy populace to fight harder.  Battle of Britain ring a bell?

11 hours ago, kinophile said:

3) Political: Ukrainian society is very anti-Putin right now,  but anything can change with enough pressure. A good win for Putin would be to insert/insinuate his own local man in charge and rule by proxy, a la Chechnya,  but with significant checks and balances to prevent a Ukrainian Kadyrov getting too much control. The proposed federation system would create perfect conditions for continuous political  turmoil with only occasional unity. 

Doubt it.  Putin's been barely, and some say questionably, able to do this in Donbas even though Russia directly controlled it for the last 2 years.  And that's the area that was, prior to the invasion, most pro-Russian and most anti-Kiev.  Any other territory besides that is going to be quite hostile to Russian occupation.

11 hours ago, kinophile said:

If Putin cannot have a united Ukraine with him,  then a disjointed and chaotic Ukraine at least denies the Ukraine to the West and will soon provide an opportunity to take control. This process here avoids going for a big, simple win  and is more about building and creating the situation via military, economic and social pressure to achieve political control. 

This is what he has been trying to do for years now.  Hasn't worked yet because Ukraine hasn't surrendered to Russia's pressure.  Which is why I say that Russia loses as long as Ukraine doesn't surrender.

11 hours ago, Raptorx7 said:

Defeats and encirclement's of that size would require a large Russian commitment in terms of troops and the ability to maneuver over large parts of Ukrainian territory. This opens them up to more casualties and leads to what Steve has been talking about in terms of domestic and economic issues back in Russia.

 

Yup.  Can't have success without doing what is necessary to achieve it.  But achieving it involves massive exposure to risk.

9 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:

I dont think casualties will go anything that will make us shake our heads. Remember once Russia gains air dominance its largely game over. Once Iraq lost its air defense, it was game over. If NATO intervenes in such a conflict in Ukraine, and destroys Russian AD, its game over. So it is my opinion, that Russian forces on average will fare well against Ukrainian forces. How ever I'm not saying air power will be a God of a battlefield, it plays a very important tactical role. In Syria for example, there are many cases where RuAF saved Syrian units in defensive operations, and also help propel them in offensive operations.

First, the Coalition could have crushed the Iraqi forces without a single aircraft.  It would have been slower and caused more Coalition casualties, but militarily Iraq was not defeated by air power.  Second, the impact of the Coalition air power was largely due to precision weapons, something which Russia has very little of and it is possible can't have any time soon due to sanctions and other pressures on its armaments industries.  Which leads to third... Russia's airforce performance in Syria has been mixed.  Certainly it has had a positive effect, but the more positive effect has been flooding Assad with weapons to continue fighting a ground war.

39 minutes ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

1.  Anything short of an unambiguous victory is insufficient for Russian prestige.  If the Ukraine is well mauled, but defiant and enough Russians come home in boxes, Putin and his people's image of strength is destroyed and his legitimacy is no longer enough to stand on.

Exactly.

39 minutes ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

2. It's a lot of things that will have "cost" (human lives, military equipment, political ill will for decades) for "potential."  Spending a few bucks every year to maybe win the lottery is silly, but fairly modest cost that may have a remote chance of major success.  Going to for reals war is a great cost even if it's a resounding victory for an outcome that is deeply uncertain.

Plus, there's the "win the war and lose the peace" prospect even if Russia should somehow win the lottery on the military side of things.  12 years in Iraq has shown that the victory slogans don't work so well when the enemy doesn't disappear when you want them to.

39 minutes ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

3. Russia has no exit strategy, but there's nothing so terrible about the status quo to demand one time now.  It's a problem, but right now most of the damage is done, or at least steady state.  Until things get a lot worse for Russians I wouldn't expect much change.  

This is the point I keep returning to time and time again.  Russia has already lost the war against Ukraine and hasn't a clue how to get itself out of the pickle it's in.  Going to war on a larger scale could possibly work, but it also requires an even more difficult exit strategy if things don't go well.  At best.  A big failure means the end of the Russian state as we know it.  I'll have some fun with this...

Russia's game in Ukraine is much like a dystopian game called "Ride For Your Life!".  You play by going to a rather gritty city, handing over a large sum of money, then get into a car to test your luck.  Depending on factors largely outside of your control there are one of three outcomes:

1.  You get dropped off at a mediocre pizza joint and have a forced date with a minor celebrity.  She's only obligated to stay with you for as long as it takes to eat the pizza.  Then she is allowed to do whatever she wants, which is probably to go home and leave you with the bill.

2.  You get roughed up and dropped out of the car somewhere at night.  There's a chance you'll be in a really bad neighborhood and a pretty good chance you'll have some, if not all, of your clothes missing.  It's up to you to figure out how to get home safely, which first requires figuring out where you are and how to get home from there.

3.  You get driven into a junkyard, are locked in the car, and can't do a darned thing about the huge electro magnet that picks the car up and puts it into a car crusher.  You do have a cellphone and you can call for help, but chances are since you were stupid enough to play this game that nobody is going to come to your aid anyway.

Chances associated with each?  5% chance of winning the date, 30% chance of getting stuck in the car crusher, and 65% chance of being lost without much sense of how to get home safely.

Where's the chance of winning fabulous prizes and glory?  This one comes without that possibility, sorry.

 

52 minutes ago, kinophile said:

Within this thread we seem to be swinging between "Russia is strong enough"  v. "Russia is too weak". Its very close to that adage of how Russia is never how it appears,  exactly.

Yes, and Russia portrays itself as a military and political equal to the rest of the world combined.  It definitely is not how it appears.

52 minutes ago, kinophile said:

Taking that in mind, let's start from the middle and describe some basic points that we CAN agree on, in principle,  but can DISAGREE on innscale/effectiveness. 

I suggest (and please feel free to counter-suggest):

1) Russia/Putin wants a weak/submissive Ukraine 

2) The Donbass War has backfired -  the Ukraine is now stronger, more united and resistant to Russia than ever before.

3) Russia has no apparent exit strategy 

4) Russia could inflict significant military damage and defeats on the UGF's, but not quickly enough, consistently enough or deeply to "properly" defeat the Ukraine as a nation state. BUT that damage could lead to political opportunities. 

Thoughts? 

No disagreement, except that your last point should be "BUT that damage could lead to political opportunities, though not necessarily for Russia".

There should also be this one:

5) if things go really badly, there's a chance of major problems within the Russian Federation.  Perhaps not immediate, but balls could be set in motion.  Putin is certainly not the only one that wants to run the show.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

9 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:

I dont think casualties will go anything that will make us shake our heads.

Bad assumption, but let's say the casualties are "light" by Russian standards... 5,000 killed, wounded, and missing from a 100,000 force attacking into Urkraine.  By modern standards 5% would be pretty good.

Add to this a crumbling economy, increasing repression, and never ending reminders of how corrupt the government is.  Add to this worsening problems in the Caucuses.  Add to this further actions by the West that make some aspects of Russian lives worse.  Oh, and did I mention the Ruble's value yet?  I didn't?  Well, that's because it would have no value

Finally, add no outright victory.  Nothing to show for all this except some slogans and distorted accounting presented by state controlled media that makes it sound like Russia defeated the United States.

I'm not saying this is enough to cause a revolution (short term), but I don't think governing Russia would be made easier by these things.  And since Putin and his buddies' lives depend on ruling a fairly calm Russia, this is a risky game to get involved in.

Putin considers the fall of the Soviet Union and the greatest geo-political disaster of all times.  An ill thought out war that couldn't be won at a time of economic and political instability is what directly led to this disaster.  Putin would be wise to remember that.

Steve

[Kinophile]

Good points. 

[Sublime]

@kraze oh yes Ive read Suvorov. Maybe you missed the part in my short post aboout having listened to his lectures and read stuff by him including his account of going into Czechoslovakia. He may have has valuable intel on the Soviets 30 or 40 years ago thats about it. 

He simply doesnt take official Soviet documents.  Oh and "takes stuff from Soviet State Media at the time".  Dude we.re talking the SU.s propaganda organ at the height of Stalins power. Those Pravda issues arent fit to be toilet paper. There are no official Soviet docunents saying "we re invading Germany next year" at all. The closest you can come was the Russian fantasy that any major invasion would immediately be stopped and large scale counterattacks needed to be launched.

But his theories on Stalins plan a la Germany are pure conjecture and suspect at best and he presents them as fact.

Anyways o/t but yes Ive read the guy as again I said in my paragraph and 2 sentence post.

 

@John Kettler exactly my point. I have read the liberators. And yes he had some intel that waa valuable 30 or 40 yrs ago. Now he needs money and isnt a prized US security asset.  But you made my point for me. His intel is 30 or 40 yrs old. And all the Stalin stuff is was conjecture.

I wont be postin about this anymore bc it is off topic. However before  I stop Im not making any assertions besides Suvorovs detailed sinsider information is relevant a la early 80s. Thats old John the guy probably has better contacts than me but I especially doubt the US govt is answering his calls or calling him. 2 invading Czech was done completely than an invasion of the west. Im not saying anyone shoild believe me but since you wanna play game John all Im gonna say that its hard to believe any posts you made when not to long ago you were claiming proof the Nazis used a nuclear VBIED at Kursk on the GDF

Edited August 4, 2016 by Sublime

[Sublime]

19 hours ago, hattori said:

I'm pretty sure Russian forces destroying Ukrainian civilian infrastructure is a sure way to make Ukrainian society even more anti-Putin.  Does anyone have examples of where a country invades another, destroys a ton of infrastructure and actually manages to win over the populace?  That seems to fly in the face of human nature.  (I am feeling extra dumb today, perhaps I am overlooking some obvious examples).  I think Ukrainians would rightly blame Russia for all their problems if Russia tried this stuff.

I actually think a unifying force in society is a common enemy.  I could be very wrong, but I would suspect any real Russian attack would actually temporarily bring Ukraine together, drive them more into the arms of the West, not what Putin would want.

 

France during WW2 with the Allies comes to mind. But theyd already been occupied by a foreign power. Otherwise no nothing springs to mind for me either tbh.