Russian army under equipped?

[HUSKER2142]

 

 

 

 

 

 

[John Kettler]

The July 15, 2016 piece, "Just How Dangerous is Russia's Military?" from The National Interest addresses the issues of real Russian military capability, its wildly oscillating perceptions from a the west's, especially US, perspective and related matters. What it also does is look at the Russian military, not just in the generally unfavorable to it comparison with the US, but also with regard to Russia's neighbors. The picture which emerges in that assessment is attention getting. Finally, if energy prices remain where they are, and Russia is still in Ukraine and Syria's still on the fire, then it looks at the hard choices the Kremlin faces in terms of how it allocates resources and at what other cost.

Regards,

John Kettler

 

[Peter Cairns]

Steve,

Your earlier comment about Putin Blinking when he had a chance to Invade in 2014 is one I on balance disagree with. 

My own take is that he took a good hard look at what it would take to do it, what he had available and concluded that the Russian army just wasn't up to the task.

I am with you in believing that it's not about Ratios but you start with the size of the force, what it is equipped with, where it is and their combat effectiveness and then build and assess capability based on that.

So far we have looked a bit at forces and equipment and even deployments on this thread but not near enough about capabilities.

My view is quite simple, with about 300k men the Russian Army could probably pull together no more than 100k to invade Ukraine and to have any chance of  pulling off an modern combined arms invasion against a capable and determined opponent and for that you need more than units and tanks, you need;

Good Accurate Intelligence,

Good Planning and Effective Command & Control  Structures,

Good Well Trained, Educated Effective Officers with Experience,

Highly Adaptable Well Led Units at Operational Level,

A High Quality NCO Corp with Effective Junior Officers at Tactical Level,

Well Trained and Motivated Troops on the Ground.

A High Quality Effective, Logistical and Support Organisation.

A Robust, Adaptable, Responsive and Effective Supply Chain to Keep the while show on the road.

In every one of these crucial areas, the difference between whats on paper and a real fight, Russian despite years of attempted reforms, is inadequate.

Report after report including those published by the Russians themselves, show rampant corruption, terrible equipment shortages and availability, terrible living  conditions and treatment of soldiers, an almost total breakdown in respect and discipline between, offers, NCO's contract troops and conscripts and what might be termed logistical sclerosis.

In short an army probably incapable of doing anything more than, well what it has already, in quick surprise actions in areas it has support and the opponent in weak like Crimea and supporting an ally against a low capability opponent like in Syria.

Much like Iraq under Saddam, Russia can bully a weak neighbour and do a smash and grab, but can't fight a major war.

In fact I'd go as far as to say Russia's recent actions, in the Ukraine, Syria and in increasing Air and Sea Operations in the Atlantic aren't so much shows of strength as attempts to mask it's weakness.

 

Peter.

[VladimirTarasov]

That is one of the worst assessments of the Russian military I have read in a month.

[Peter Cairns]

Vladimir Tarasov,

 

Yes it really is in a dreadful state......

 

Peter.

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, Peter Cairns said:

Your earlier comment about Putin Blinking when he had a chance to Invade in 2014 is one I on balance disagree with. 

My own take is that he took a good hard look at what it would take to do it, what he had available and concluded that the Russian army just wasn't up to the task.

In Spring of 2014 it could have easily taken a big chunk of Ukraine with relatively little force.  Even a 1990's Russian military could have achieved it for two reasons:

1.  The Ukrainian Army was only partially mobilized, disorganized, poorly led, poorly equipped, and riddled with Russian agents.  In the face of a determined, large scale combined arms attack by Russia it would have fallen apart like a wet cardboard box.

2.  Ukraine's citizens had not yet figured out that Russia is not its "brother". It wasn't mentally prepared to fight with Russians.

Short term, at least, Russia could have invaded and held territory with a fairly modest sized force.  Emphasis on short term.  Which is something Russia is OK with.  It would have set up puppet states (as it has done in Donbas) with just enough force in place to make it difficult to oppose Russia's will.  Long term I don't think it would work, but Russia definitely was capable of trying.

Fast forward to July and both of these things had been reversed.  Especially the attitude towards Russia and its intentions.  From this point on the opportunity for striking quickly with minimal force disappeared completely.  With each passing month the equation has changed even more in Ukraine's favor.

Quote

I am with you in believing that it's not about Ratios but you start with the size of the force, what it is equipped with, where it is and their combat effectiveness and then build and assess capability based on that.

So far we have looked a bit at forces and equipment and even deployments on this thread but not near enough about capabilities.

My view is quite simple, with about 300k men the Russian Army could probably pull together no more than 100k to invade Ukraine and to have any chance of  pulling off an modern combined arms invasion against a capable and determined opponent and for that you need more than units and tanks, you need;

Good Accurate Intelligence,

Good Planning and Effective Command & Control  Structures,

Good Well Trained, Educated Effective Officers with Experience,

Highly Adaptable Well Led Units at Operational Level,

A High Quality NCO Corp with Effective Junior Officers at Tactical Level,

Well Trained and Motivated Troops on the Ground.

A High Quality Effective, Logistical and Support Organisation.

A Robust, Adaptable, Responsive and Effective Supply Chain to Keep the while show on the road.

In every one of these crucial areas, the difference between whats on paper and a real fight, Russian despite years of attempted reforms, is inadequate.

"Inadequate" is debatable, but I agree that it seems Russia's upper limit on a large scale, competent offensive is about 50,000.  However, depending on scenarios Russia doesn't necessarily need more than that.  Provided, as I have argued, it goes in with superior weight of numbers.  Which is why I don't think Russia could handle anything more than a fairly limited offensive in the Donbas or a similarly scaled move such as the 2014 attack along the Azov coastline.

Quote

Report after report including those published by the Russians themselves, show rampant corruption, terrible equipment shortages and availability, terrible living  conditions and treatment of soldiers, an almost total breakdown in respect and discipline between, offers, NCO's contract troops and conscripts and what might be termed logistical sclerosis.

The overall condition of the Russian military has dramatically improved in the last few years.  In particular housing, pay, and clamping down on brutalizing conscripts do appear to have had good results.  Incomplete, but still good.  Which is the point I've been making for years.  Russia's "tip of the spear" forces are pretty good in almost all respects.  Not übermen, but definitely competent by NATO standards.  Then there's a huge drop off in all categories for the next class of units still in the process of reform, and another big one for the units that are at the back of the line.

For scenarios like taking over eastern Ukraine or the Baltics the "tip of the spear" guys are inadequate in number to get the job done on their own.  Therefore, any medium to large scale Russian attack will rely on lower quality units for combat ops as well as occupation duties.  Depending on the scenario, that reliance could be disastrous.

4 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:

That is one of the worst assessments of the Russian military I have read in a month.

Then it should be easy to correct him   I've learned a lot from Russians who have corrected misconceptions/biases coming out of the West, so I'd be very happy to have you take on Peter's points.

Steve

[VladimirTarasov]

7 hours ago, Peter Cairns said:

Report after report including those published by the Russians themselves, show rampant corruption, terrible equipment shortages and availability, terrible living  conditions and treatment of soldiers, an almost total breakdown in respect and discipline between, offers, NCO's contract troops and conscripts and what might be termed logistical sclerosis.

In short an army probably incapable of doing anything more than, well what it has already, in quick surprise actions in areas it has support and the opponent in weak like Crimea and supporting an ally against a low capability opponent like in Syria.

Much like Iraq under Saddam, Russia can bully a weak neighbour and do a smash and grab, but can't fight a major war.

In fact I'd go as far as to say Russia's recent actions, in the Ukraine, Syria and in increasing Air and Sea Operations in the Atlantic aren't so much shows of strength as attempts to mask it's weakness.

Rampant corruption is a thing of the pass, if an officer is corrupt his days are limited he will be found in the end. There are many evidence that show the Russian military has increased in competence and effectivity. If you look at the reforms and snap drills that have basically flattened low level readiness and corruption. You will notice that Russia has been turning its force into a more effective force. How ever you can take isolated events and bloat it up to make the Russian military look in a miserable shape. It is not in a miserable shape, everything is improving as time goes on. Russia is not a bully, how ever that will take us to another off topic full of no reasoning what so ever. I had wrote a very detailed reply to you but something made me log out the website and my whole reply was gone. So you'll have to forgive me for a summarized reply.

[John Kettler]

Husker2142,

This one is something of a run-up to the "Suvorov Attack," which I watched completely and appreciate your providing, though I didn't really understand the scoring. What I love about this one below are the AFVs and other Russian military goodies on display before you get to the stands. Aside from wanting to smack the camera guy (or put a vodka in him) to stabilize him, there are some wonderful sequences here. That fun starts just before 3:00 and runs until ~8:30.

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Guys,

I thought, judging from the key frame, this was about Spetsnaz, but even my almost zero Russian told me that couldn't be right. It translates as "Arsenal" and is apparently a TV news magazine. This is from July 31st, 2016, and just about drove me nuts for joy. The straight military stuff I can generally follow, so I gobbled up the TWS on an AK, suppressed AK, UAVs, radars, high gain microwave command links, VDV training and all sorts of other grog juiciness, but I wanted to weep because I couldn't follow interviews with two GPW veterans. Presuming I didn't screw up in remembering the insignia one wore, he was a retired Army colonel general and Hero of the Soviet Union. The other one was from the Black Sea Marines. I think. If you have any interest at all in Russian military matters, block out half an hour and watch this.

Regards,

John Kettler

 

 

[JUAN DEAG]

2 hours ago, John Kettler said:

Presuming I didn't screw up in remembering the insignia one wore, he was a retired Army colonel general and Hero of the Soviet Union. The other one was from the Black Sea Marines. I think. If you have any interest at all in Russian military matters, block out half an hour and watch this.

This show is about the army of Republic of Belarus, not Russia.

[Peter Cairns]

We seem to have three distinct views; Me, Steve and Vlad the Inhaler ( He takes a sharp intake of breath every time one of us posts)

The difference between me and Steve seems to be that we both agree they would struggle to mount a 100K combined arms offensive but he feels they have improved enough to field 50K effectively. 

Now I haven't had a head to head disagreement with Steve for about five years (and lost badly) but I'll lay out my reasons why I am not as confident that the Russia Army has improved as much as it needs to to mount an effective offensive even with a 50K force.

Firstly a rough comparison with the UK. With a just under 300k Army, 50K represents about 20% of the total front line strength  and that is actually quite a lot to assemble in one place from across the the worlds largest Country without stripping out every quality unit in the Country. The UK equivalent with an army of about 90k (and falling!!!) would be about 18k. 

Now in Steve scenario Russia is deploying into a near neighbour an unlikely proposition for Britain, although at peak we had about 14k in Northern Ireland all be it out of an army of about 115k at the time. But in every way I put the quality and effectiveness of the British Army ahead of Russia, the only advantage Russia has is in size, and yet Britain would struggle to effectively deploy as much as 18k, a Gulf war 1 & 2 plus force and if we can't do it without a struggle I doubt Russia could.

Secondly After almost forty years of watching Russia, all be it not professionally, they have consistently over estimated their capabilities, underestimated their many difficulties and crucially over hyped their successes in improving their forces and overcoming things like graft and incompetence. Not one claim made about reforms  made in the last decade or more has turned out as planned or lived up to the claims of success. 

The big difference between me and Steve is probably that I am more sceptical about Russia's attempts to tackle it's myriad problems bearing fruit.

For me the reason for that scepticism is two fold;

Firstly that If it had made real headway in the armed forces we would also see it in the civilian economy and we just haven't. There may be fewer murders in the news, but thats more because those they used to just kill rivals now have consolidated political and economical power rather than changed. Corruption hasn't been curtailed it's been institutionalised.

In this respect rather than The Army being less ineffective and corrupt like civil society, the corruption in civil society has become more like the armed forces, a way of life widely accepted as the norm.

The second reason for the difference is that I can't see a agent for change.

Much as Putin might like to rule by decree and act like his word is law, I think he knows their is a big difference between calling for an end to the problems in the Armed Forces and actual change. You need an effective agency to deliver it and it needs to be motivated and resourced and for there to be a real will across the organisation it is tasked with changing to come on board.

Like the Joke about how many psychologists does it take to change a light bulb.....Just one but the Bulb has to want to change!

I can't see any evidence that there is with the Russian state, let alone the Army, a body with the strength, skill or resource to tackle a problem on this scale, which is why I take the view that recent reforms in the last five years haven't gone anywhere near as far as they need to raise the effectiveness of the Army to near where it needs to be to put 100k effectively in the field.

Do I agree with Steve's figure of say 40-60K? I don't rule it out but I'd be inclined to put it at about 10% of standing strength being about the limit of what you could field without compromising effectiveness against a capable enemy....30K.

Peter.

[Battlefront.com]

10 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:

Rampant corruption is a thing of the pass, if an officer is corrupt his days are limited he will be found in the end. There are many evidence that show the Russian military has increased in competence and effectivity. If you look at the reforms and snap drills that have basically flattened low level readiness and corruption. You will notice that Russia has been turning its force into a more effective force. How ever you can take isolated events and bloat it up to make the Russian military look in a miserable shape. It is not in a miserable shape, everything is improving as time goes on.

I generally agree with all of this.  And if you stopped here we could have had a rare exchange without me having to point out how utterly wrong you are   But you said this...

10 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:

Russia is not a bully

The long list of Russia's victims, in particular the former Soviet states, have a very different opinion of Russia.  Ukraine certainly doesn't think killing and wounding thousand of civilians, destroying billions in infrastructure, and illegally annexing its territory are acts of friendship.  Then there's pretty much the entire industrialized world that also thinks Russia is a "bully state". 

I know Russian media makes sure there are plenty of conspiracy theories to explain away these facts, but an intelligent mind should wonder if maybe the rest of the world is correct.  At the very least an intelligent mind should doubt the credibility of media outlets which deny easily proven facts (like Russian forces in Ukraine). 

10 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:

I had wrote a very detailed reply to you but something made me log out the website and my whole reply was gone. So you'll have to forgive me for a summarized reply.

Damn, I hate it when that happens!  Sorry about that.

Steve

[Vanir Ausf B]

Utilizing forces from the Western and Southern military districts, Russia could conceivably field an invasion force of up to 40 battalion tactical groups.¹ I don't know what that translates to in terms of total personnel since I am not sure what the actual personnel count for a BTG is, but if we assume for the moment that a BTG is roughly 1/3 the size of a US brigade combat team that would be 50-60,000 troops. As for quality:

Overall, assessing the extent to which Russia has closed the qualitative gap related to combined arms is challenging. The overall quality and readiness of Russia’s armored formations continues to be an open question. The best Russian formations are likely near or at the level of the best Western armored units, but there is likely a precipitous drop-off in terms of war-fighting abilities and equipment as one moves down the Russian order of battle.²

1 https://www.csis.org/analysis/evaluating-future-us-army-force-posture-europe-phase-i-report, pg 12

2 https://www.csis.org/analysis/evaluating-future-us-army-force-posture-europe-phase-ii-report pg 41

 

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, Peter Cairns said:

We seem to have three distinct views; Me, Steve and Vlad the Inhaler ( He takes a sharp intake of breath every time one of us posts)

Let's not start crossing the line into the territory of name calling, though I'm assuming you meant this in good natured jest.

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The difference between me and Steve seems to be that we both agree they would struggle to mount a 100K combined arms offensive but he feels they have improved enough to field 50K effectively. 

The differences between our positions is more subtle than that, but I'll detail that as we go.

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Not one claim made about reforms  made in the last decade or more has turned out as planned or lived up to the claims of success. 

Absolutely.  I am also of the opinion that Russia's capabilities do not match its stated claims.  One constant in Soviet and Russian government statements is that if it has to do with a matter of national pride, pretty much forget about objectivity.  It will instead be heavily weighted towards an image rather than what really exists.  Fantasy is very much a substitute for reality when it comes to official statements.  And there's plenty in the West that are happy to go along for the ride because it benefits them in some way.

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The big difference between me and Steve is probably that I am more sceptical about Russia's attempts to tackle it's myriad problems bearing fruit.

The difference is (and here's the subtle part) I think it is "good enough" to do certain things relatively competently that it couldn't have done even 5 years ago.  The big surprise for military experts about Russia's Syrian campaign is that it exists at all more so than it's been able to keep up a fairly steady tempo.  Is it all that Russia claims it to be?  Hardly!  But it's undeniable that it is there and it is having a military impact (as well as an impact on civilians, of course).

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For me the reason for that scepticism is two fold;

Firstly that If it had made real headway in the armed forces we would also see it in the civilian economy and we just haven't.

Corruption is still rampant within the Russian military, but it's not as debilitating as it once was.  A similar change is happening in Ukraine, though it still has a long way to go.

The deal Putin made with his enforcers (civilian and military) is rather simple... corruption has to remain within certain parameters and those parameters are tighter the more critical the activity is to Putin's wishes.  The Kerch bridge, for example, had roughly 1/3 of its budget disappear, but Putin doesn't care as long as the bridge gets built on time and doesn't collapse.  The same thing happened with the Sochi Olympic venues.  The fact that the plumbing for Olympiads wasn't hooked up to anything and the contractors that put it in weren't paid aren't issues Putin cares about.

The military goes along similar lines.  There's plenty of graft going on, but as long as the military is reaching goals set for it by Putin then it's OK.  However, the difference is that the military is under more careful scrutiny and therefore the leeway is less than it is even for something like the Kerch bridge.

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Much as Putin might like to rule by decree and act like his word is law, I think he knows their is a big difference between calling for an end to the problems in the Armed Forces and actual change. You need an effective agency to deliver it and it needs to be motivated and resourced and for there to be a real will across the organisation it is tasked with changing to come on board.

This Russia has, within limits.  The reforms that have been pushed through since 2008 have been extremely painful to the military which had been totally happy being bloated, corrupt, and militarily ineffective.  Something like 200,000 officers were kicked out all at once, schools were reorganized, programs launched to meet equipment deficiencies, money put into upkeep/maintenance, and (most importantly) *REAL* steps were taken to make service in the Russian military attractive to volunteers.  Pay was increased, the worst Human Rights abuses of conscripts were curtailed, housing (generally) improved, food became regular and better quality, etc.

By NATO standards there's still a very, very long way to go before Russia can be considered an equal man for man, however the tip of the spear guys are at least getting within the ballpark.  They are probably better equipped and ready for action than most NATO reserve forces.

Let's also remember that we're also talking about Russian forces going up against Ukraine's forces, not NATO's. 

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I can't see any evidence that there is with the Russian state, let alone the Army, a body with the strength, skill or resource to tackle a problem on this scale, which is why I take the view that recent reforms in the last five years haven't gone anywhere near as far as they need to raise the effectiveness of the Army to near where it needs to be to put 100k effectively in the field.

Effectively putting 100,000 in the field against a NATO country against NATO forces?  Effectively putting 100,000 force anywhere other than based within European Russia?  Correct.  Russia could not handle either.  But putting 100,000 force into Ukraine in 2014 against the Ukrainian force that existed at the time?  Yup, it sure could have done it.  It would have been messy, slipshod, and embarrassing (in a way similar to the war with Georgia) at times, however it could have achieved its short term aims.  Long term?  It would likely have failed because of many factors I've already touched upon, but short term in Spring 2014 it could have crushed Ukraine.

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Do I agree with Steve's figure of say 40-60K? I don't rule it out but I'd be inclined to put it at about 10% of standing strength being about the limit of what you could field without compromising effectiveness against a capable enemy....30K.

Er, who said anything about Russia not "compromising effectiveness" in my scenarios? I also think "capable enemy" is the key element you're not fully taking into account in the various scenarios.  It's why I keep saying that Russia vs. Ukraine 2016 would have a very different outcome than Russia vs. Ukraine 2014 given exactly the same strategic goals.  Spring 2014 Russia could have marched in with 100,000 and taken over a massive chunk of Ukraine.  Spring 2017 it would struggle to do more than arrest an all out Ukrainian offensive.

As for logistics, let's not forget that Russia has been keeping the DPR/LPR adequately stocked with ammunition, weapons, vehicles, food, etc. for over two years.  By all accounts it is doing a pretty good job at it. And there's plenty of corruption going on within the DPR/LPR, though admittedly less since Russian special forces went in and straightened things out a bit (especially with the Cossack groups). 

Steve

[John Kettler]

JUAN DEAG,

Thanks! That explains why I kept hearing "Belarusi" mentioned, but I thought it was referring to it as an ally of Russia. I'm fairly certain one of the GPW interviews was with someone who fought in the Battle of Moghilev, which I believe was on the approaches to Moscow.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Peter Cairns]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

 

Steve,

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

let's not forget that Russia has been keeping the DPR/LPR adequately stocked with ammunition, weapons, vehicles, food, etc. for over two years.

True but I'd argue their is a big difference between shipping supplies to a largely static paramilitary force in territory they hold and keeping a modern armoured or mechanised division on the move in an offensive.

Peter.

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, Peter Cairns said:

Steve,

True but I'd argue their is a big difference between shipping supplies to a largely static paramilitary force in territory they hold and keeping a modern armoured or mechanised division on the move in an offensive.

Peter.

Absolutely.  And that is, basically, the difference between a large scale Russian invasion in Spring 2014 vs. one in Spring 2017.  The 2014 scenario would have likely seen Russian forces quickly achieving their territorial objectives without much fighting.  The push would have lasted a few days tops and could have been supplemented by seizing local sources of fuel, food, and water along the way if necessary.  Once they got to where they needed to be then it would be similar to Donbas, only without major logistics demands because the war would likely have been effectively over.  At least in the short term.

By contrast a large scale offensive in 2017 would meet significant resistance right from the start.  Logistics would be stressed, at least in locations, before the operation's overall territorial objectives were achieved.  If they were even achieved.  And that starts everything down the downslope towards military disaster mid to long term.  Perhaps even short term.

 

In my opinion the large scale "snap drills" the Russians are so proud of prove, without any doubt, that it has the capability to conduct very large, complex maneuvers on relatively short notice.  To think that they don't have this capacity is to ignore rather plain facts.  However, snap drills are just that... drills.  They are not simulated warfare and they certainly aren't the real thing.  Instead they are carefully orchestrated to test basic capacities and produce bragging rights.  Nowhere in these snap drills do the Russians simulate major losses, Bastogne-like pockets of resistance, successful enemy counter attacks, etc.  The closer the Ukraine invasion scenario mimics ideal conditions, the greater the chance that operational objectives will be achieved roughly as anticipated.  The more the Ukraine invasion differs from a peacetime maneuver, the less likely the operation will be successful.  The larger the scope of the operation the more the risk of failure goes up.  That's the difference between Spring 2014 and Spring 2017 scenarios.

Think about it this way.  Crimea 2014 was basically a peacetime "snap drill".  It faced ZERO opposition and was fairly small in scope.  If Ukraine's forces had responded it is unlikely they would have affected the outcome given their disposition and condition in February 2014.  Because there was ZERO opposition, the militarily the Crimean operation did not achieve anything that Russia had not achieved in peacetime drills.  It simply reminded the world that under certain conditions Russia could act quickly and decisively against a militarily unprepared and inferior neighbor.

The 2014 counter offensive, which did meet heavy opposition, was a mixed success.  Where Russian achieved operational surprise and superiority of numbers it had very good success.  Where it ran into tougher head on resistance things didn't go nearly as well.  It is difficult to assess the overall military success/failure of the counter offensive because Russia claims it never happened, therefore we are denied even the smallest amount of official information to examine.  My opinion is that Russia had far less success than it wanted, but enough to stabilize a situation which was for sure going against it's interest prior to taking action.  Similar to its activities in Syria the action bought Russia time, not victory.  Russia would be foolish if it thought even that could be achieved in Ukraine now.

Steve

 

[VladimirTarasov]

17 hours ago, Peter Cairns said:

We seem to have three distinct views; Me, Steve and Vlad the Inhaler ( He takes a sharp intake of breath every time one of us posts)

 sometimes

58 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Absolutely.  And that is, basically, the difference between a large scale Russian invasion in Spring 2014 vs. one in Spring 2017.  The 2014 scenario would have likely seen Russian forces quickly achieving their territorial objectives without much fighting.  The push would have lasted a few days tops and could have been supplemented by seizing local sources of fuel, food, and water along the way if necessary.  Once they got to where they needed to be then it would be similar to Donbas, only without major logistics demands because the war would likely have been effectively over.  At least in the short term.

You're right here, Ukraine is definitely more ready for a Russian invasion than it was in 2014. How ever, I wouldn't go as far as to say that they will fair well against an air campaign together with multiple offensives in 2017. They still have many issues, how ever these issues are not as bad as 2014. 

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

By contrast a large scale offensive in 2017 would meet significant resistance right from the start.  Logistics would be stressed, at least in locations, before the operation's overall territorial objectives were achieved.  If they were even achieved.  And that starts everything down the downslope towards military disaster mid to long term.  Perhaps even short term.

Significant resistance will be met of course, this is natural. However there isn't much resistance that logistics will face, Ukraine doesn't have the air force to target logistics effectively. They do have MLRS and artillery of the like which could target logistics services, how ever this isn't much of a problem unless they will be targeting static targets. Other issues could be ambushes if security for logistic routes are not secured how ever I don't think this will be much of a problem, this will vary depending on the scenario. Ukraine's logistics will be in way more trouble than Russia's, aviation will be their main threat. Of course I understand that Ukraine has capable air defenses, and if the Russian Air Force plays dumb and doesn't take the time needed to find SAM threats, losses can be inflicted upon the Russian Air Force. Which can slow down the momentum of the Russian army.

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

In my opinion the large scale "snap drills" the Russians are so proud of prove, without any doubt, that it has the capability to conduct very large, complex maneuvers on relatively short notice.  To think that they don't have this capacity is to ignore rather plain facts.  However, snap drills are just that... drills.  They are not simulated warfare and they certainly aren't the real thing.

I agree with you 100% drills aren't meant to simulate combat like how it would be in real life, how ever it does help determine readiness rates, and the ability for maneuver increases. And it does offer training on needed levels. Of course you cannot compare actually being in a shootout to training, I'd like to think shootouts are the craziest moments in battles. Even if you're a good shot and do everything by the book, all it takes is a random spray of bullets to kill you. Although, Syria shows training is also needed, combat experience doesn't cut it.

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Think about it this way.  Crimea 2014 was basically a peacetime "snap drill".  It faced ZERO opposition and was fairly small in scope.  If Ukraine's forces had responded it is unlikely they would have affected the outcome given their disposition and condition in February 2014.

 Just about, thank god no shootouts took place. The Russian military overwhelmed Ukrainian garrisons before any plan could even take place IMO. 

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

The 2014 counter offensive, which did meet heavy opposition, was a mixed success.  Where Russian achieved operational surprise and superiority of numbers it had very good success.  Where it ran into tougher head on resistance things didn't go nearly as well.

There is too much battles with not enough information to determine what was actually real Russian, mixed, or plain militia units. T-72B3s in Militia hands are Russian units, how ever that doesn't mean just because we see a platoon of T-72B3s the whole tank unit is a Russian company or battalion. It could be a mix, maybe a small amount maybe a large amount. I'm open to any analytics of a battle however.

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, VladimirTarasov said:

You're right here, Ukraine is definitely more ready for a Russian invasion than it was in 2014. How ever, I wouldn't go as far as to say that they will fair well against an air campaign together with multiple offensives in 2017. They still have many issues, how ever these issues are not as bad as 2014. 

The Georgians didn't have an airforce worth talking about, had a tiny military, and was defending a very small geographical area.  Yet Russia ran into huge and unexpected problems with the operation.  It was never going to fail because it simply was too big to fail, but the details were not good.  This led to 7 years of intensive and very expensive reforms.  Those reforms have definitely (in my view) fixed the problems with a Georgia like scenario.  What we don't know is if the reforms have gone far enough towards taking on a much larger challenge.  The more the scenario differs from Georgia the less certain one should be. 

Which is why I keep coming back to the main point that I am confident that Russia can handle a local counter attack if it chooses to suffer the political and economic fallout from it.  I am not confident it could do much more than that.  Russia hasn't had such combat experiences since the Chechen Wars and we know that neither went well.

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Significant resistance will be met of course, this is natural. However there isn't much resistance that logistics will face, Ukraine doesn't have the air force to target logistics effectively.

This is a narrow view of how logistics can be negatively affected.  There are other conditions such as weather, road conditions, distance, diversity, quantities, coordination, etc.  Georgia is a perfect example of this.  The Georgians were almost completely unable to disrupt Russia's supply lines, but Russian logistics were found to be quite bad.  Again, we know that Russia has made major improvements since 2008, including the ability to keep the DPR/LPR and Syrian operations reasonably supplied.  But what Russia is able to do on a large scale under adverse conditions is definitely not tested yet.  Based on my knowledge of logistics, military ops, and Russia's traditional military weaknesses I am not optimistic that it could handle a large invasion of Ukraine without major problems.  The bigger the invasion, the more resistance, the longer it goes on the less confidence I have that Russian logistics would hold up.

A small example of this is documented cases of Russian units getting lost inside of Donbas.  The Russian Major that was captured because he drove into a Ukrainian checkpoint by mistake is the highest profile goof.  And it happens even to the United States, which is by far the best logistical force in the world.  The story of the 507th Maintenance Company (Jessica Lynch) is well known to anybody who studies the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003. 

The ability to minimize problems like this and further to not affect overall combat ops is very difficult to achieve.  Yet it is critical to have if one wants to operate a large scale offensive against a determined defender.  I personally doubt Russia has the logistics resilience necessary to do this sort of operation in 2017 Ukraine without significant risk of failure.

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I agree with you 100% drills aren't meant to simulate combat like how it would be in real life, how ever it does help determine readiness rates, and the ability for maneuver increases.

Absolutely.  If soldiers are well trained for something there is a chance they can perform those tasks under combat conditions.  If they are not adequately trained, the chances are very low that they will.  Training has been a traditional problem within the Russian and Soviet militaries, therefore it is not surprising that improving training standards is an important part of the last 7+ years of reforms.

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 Just about, thank god no shootouts took place. The Russian military overwhelmed Ukrainian garrisons before any plan could even take place IMO. 

Partly, but mostly the lack of shooting was the result of Kiev giving strict orders for its soldiers to not fire back.  Even when directly provoked by Russian forces.  As I've said earlier in this thread (and lots of other places), Russia wanted some amount of armed resistance as part of its cover story for the invasion.  Ukraine very wisely did not play the game as Putin wanted.

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There is too much battles with not enough information to determine what was actually real Russian, mixed, or plain militia units. T-72B3s in Militia hands are Russian units, how ever that doesn't mean just because we see a platoon of T-72B3s the whole tank unit is a Russian company or battalion. It could be a mix, maybe a small amount maybe a large amount. I'm open to any analytics of a battle however.

In July through September 2014 it is almost certain that 100% of the T-72B3s, T-90s, BTR-82A, etc. seen in Ukraine were manned by regular Russian military units.  Separatists, which were in large part Russian military personnel "volunteers" and "vacationers" at the time, crewed older models of T-72s and T-64s.  The use of old hardware was part of Russia's deniability plan.

Steve

[VladimirTarasov]

55 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The Georgians didn't have an airforce worth talking about, had a tiny military, and was defending a very small geographical area.  Yet Russia ran into huge and unexpected problems with the operation.  It was never going to fail because it simply was too big to fail, but the details were not good.  This led to 7 years of intensive and very expensive reforms.  Those reforms have definitely (in my view) fixed the problems with a Georgia like scenario.  What we don't know is if the reforms have gone far enough towards taking on a much larger challenge.  The more the scenario differs from Georgia the less certain one should be.

Of course, the main problems of this was coordination problems, and communications, and quality of equipment. The Georgian troops were very well coordinated how ever, being superior to the Russian peacekeeping battalion and Ossetian troops, they weren't able to fully secure their objectives. Russians troops with poorer equipment fared very well against these troops even when they were pouring in a battalion at a time through the Roki tunnel. Other issues notable are the Russian air forces embarrassing losses... the 5 air craft downed by enemy fire, add on two friendly fire incidents... However minus these faults the Russian air power was able to secure air superiority after successful SEAD operations. These issues forced Russia to modernize the Russian military because no matter how successful it was, there were embarrassing issues revealed. 

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

his is a narrow view of how logistics can be negatively affected.  There are other conditions such as weather, road conditions, distance, diversity, quantities, coordination, etc.  Georgia is a perfect example of this.  The Georgians were almost completely unable to disrupt Russia's supply lines, but Russian logistics were found to be quite bad.

You're right that the Georgians did not disrupt any of Russia's supply lines, but I don't think the Russian logistics were bad at all during the war. The Roki tunnel was basically the only entrance into the area, the mountain roads are pretty narrow, so slow logistics did happen in the beginning. Is there an event I'm missing on? I'm not sure supplies were in bad condition. 

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

A small example of this is documented cases of Russian units getting lost inside of Donbas.  The Russian Major that was captured because he drove into a Ukrainian checkpoint by mistake is the highest profile goof.

That was a total goof... Embarrassing.

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

And it happens even to the United States, which is by far the best logistical force in the world.  The story of the 507th Maintenance Company (Jessica Lynch) is well known to anybody who studies the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003. 

Indeed America is the most sophisticated in logistics in quite a few areas in logistics, a very organized force. I don't know about the 507th company story, I'll read on it now though.

[Sublime]

Vlad the 507th story in a nutshell is the US was going hell for leather for Baghdad and some bypassed Iraqi units basically ran into some rear echelon US personnel who were not meant to be "tip of the spear" combat troops(including a female soldier J Lynch) and so some parts of the 507th basicallly either took a wrong turn or simply got ambushed in the vacuum between the US combat units and the supply units racing to keep pace.

Because of the ambush the US suffered casualties but also more importantly several US soldiers were captured.

[VladimirTarasov]

23 minutes ago, Sublime said:

Vlad the 507th story in a nutshell is the US was going hell for leather for Baghdad and some bypassed Iraqi units basically ran into some rear echelon US personnel who were not meant to be "tip of the spear" combat troops(including a female soldier J Lynch) and so some parts of the 507th basicallly either took a wrong turn or simply got ambushed in the vacuum between the US combat units and the supply units racing to keep pace.

Because of the ambush the US suffered casualties but also more importantly several US soldiers were captured.

Sounds crazy, I was reading about the Gulf wars sometime ago, and it is crazy how low the coalition casualties are compared to the Iraqis. What happened with the US POWs?

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:

Sounds crazy, I was reading about the Gulf wars sometime ago, and it is crazy how low the coalition casualties are compared to the Iraqis. What happened with the US POWs?

11 dead, 6 captured.  One was recaptured in a special operations mission, the rest were liberated when Iraqi resistance had near totally collapsed a couple of weeks later.

The short of it is the convoy took a wrong turn because the GPS system was not street specific like the units which are in civilian vehicles.  They most likely startled a local defense force and were hit it hard.  It was over before it started, as they say.

The point of mentioning it was simply to underscore how difficult it is to supply a fast moving mechanized force over great distances even when the enemy has little proactive means of disruption.

Back to the logistics issue.  I skimmed a few analysis of the war and found that issues related to logistics seem to be blamed more on poor command/control than anything else.  In particular it was noted that the shifting of forces into Georgia itself produced some headaches which were identified for reform.  I found this article about the reforms themselves (2010):

https://russiamil.wordpress.com/2010/07/25/reconfiguring-supply-and-logistics-in-the-russian-military/

This is the most relevant piece:

As previously organized, the Rear Services was comprised of departments for medicine, transportation, fuel, food, clothing, leisure,  personnel, etc. In other words, it included all logistical support components except armament. As a result, there were frequent situations where one department that needed to transport equipment to the troops had to coordinate with a different department that would actually provide the transport. General Makarov noted that not infrequently, this resulted in situations where needed equipment could not be delivered to the armed forces in a timely manner.

The article discuses employing outsourcing (as is done in the West) and other details.  The end concludes:

There are still questions about how this model would work during deployments, as the system currently being introduced is designed primarily for use at military bases.

I honestly don't know where things stand today.  As I've said it seems that Russia has been able to keep the DPR/LPR adequately supplied over the past 2 years, but it has been largely a static front with only occasional spikes of fighting so that's something to consider.

Steve

[John Kettler]

This is about as pertinent as it gets. US Army Foreign Military Studies Office OSINT report which draws extensively on official Russian sources.

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/Collaboration/international/McDermott/Russia-NuclearPolicy.pdf

Russia’s Conventional Military Weakness and Substrategic Nuclear Policy

By Roger N. McDermott

Senior International Fellow, Foreign Military Studies Office

Roger N. McDermott is a graduate of the University of Oxford specializing in defense and security issues in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). He is a Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC. McDermott is on the editorial board of Central Asia and the Caucasus and the scientific board of the Journal of Power Institutions in Post- Soviet Societies. His articles appear in scholarly journals including the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, and his weekly assessments of security developments in Central Asia, Eurasia Daily Monitor (Jamestown Foundation), are read by policy planners. He is also the co-editor of the book, Russian Military Reform 1992-2002 (Frank Cass: London/Portland, 2003). McDermott is also conducting extensive policy oriented research into Russian defense reform, and will publish a book on the ‘new look’ Russian armed forces, as well as a chapter in a forthcoming Routledge book based on an FOI conference in Sweden on Rus- sian military development (October 4-5, 2010), in which he examines Russian perspectives on network-centric warfare (Roger McDermott, Bertil Nygren and Carolina Vendil-Pallin (editors), The Russian Armed Forces in Transition: Economic, Geopolitical and Institutional Uncertainties, (Routledge: London), 2011).

Here is an excerpt from the report. SSNW is an acronym for substrategic nuclear weapons. Taken from parts of Pages 6 and 7
 

"Concern is expressed by NATO member states not only about the numbers of Russian SSNW, but
also their possible deployment close to their borders. On February 8, 2011, Lithuanian Defense Minister Rasa Jukneviciene alleged that Russia had moved SSNW into Kaliningrad, bordering both Poland and Lithuania. “We want major nations to start negotiations on reducing the number of such weapons. It’s no secret that such weapons are deployed near us, in Kaliningrad. And to our east as well,” Jukneviciene told Lithuanian public radio. Moscow had dismissed similar allegations in November 2010. She made no reference to whether in Lithuania’s assessment may have been in response to NATO’s decision in Janu- ary 2010 to extend its Eagle Guardian military exercises to the Baltic States to rehearse their defense.27 In January 2011 Jukneviciene told Interfax: “The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the direct proximity to our borders is a natural source of concern. Certainly, we are concerned. This does not help develop neighborly relations and build up mutual understanding,” she said, adding “We are concerned that Russia’s military doctrine approved (I do not know at which level) the possible use of nuclear arma- ments in response to the use of conventional armaments. That looks highly disproportionate. Unfortu- nately, there are no international conferences to regulate the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and to create a mechanism of verifications. We are interested in such agreements. We also think that their absence is a major flaw of the arms control system.”28 While NATO members expected progress towards reducing such weapons, influential Russian officials were calling for the modernization of SSNW. Euro- pean advocates of the removal of all SSNW from Europe, including European Russia, fail to answer how this would impact on Asia, or take account of the short timescale to redeploy them.

In an interview in Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye in November 2010, on the 55th anniversary
of the testing of the RDS-37 thermonuclear bomb in Semipalatinsk, Andrei Kokoshin, Duma member and former Secretary of the Russian Security Council, reaffirmed that for the foreseeable future nuclear deterrence will remain the keystone of Russian security policy. Kokoshin also affirmed that an alterna tive to nuclear deterrence will not be possible even in the distant future. On this basis, Kokoshin not only advocated the continued modernization of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, but also specifically included “tactical and operational tactical nuclear weapons systems.” Kokoshin argued that nuclear deterrence must be supplemented by the development of a system of pre-nuclear (pred yadernogo) or nonnuclear deterrence based on precision-strike conventional weapons. Far from contemplating the elimination of SSNW, Kokoshin recommended that Moscow should include substrategic weapons in the overall mod- ernization of Russia’s nuclear deterrent.29 Such views, however, are by no means isolated and reveal deeper sensitivities within the security elite concerning the nuclear-conventional imbalance.

7

Elsewhere, Kokoshin consistently argues that, though the Russian conventional armed forces are being reformed and modernized, which in turn places fresh demands to reverse the decline in the domestic de- fense industry, this is unlikely to result in a rapid revision of Russia’s nuclear posture. Moreover, modernizing Russia’s armed forces will require not only the projected 20 trillion rubles in the State Armaments Program (Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya – GPV) to 2020, but also pay increases for the officer corps, contract personnel. Developing the air-space defense (vozdushno-kosmicheskaya oborona) as a branch of service will add additional burdens on federal budget expenditure. It is possible, given Kokoshin’s vehement advocacy of nuclear modernization also extending to include SSNW, that this is already reflected in the GPV to 2020.30"

And on Page 11 we find.

"The 2010 Military Doctrine sets out the main condition for the use of nuclear weapons: “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.” "

Seems to me that a Ukrainian attack on Russia's proxy force right across the border might well fall under the above rubric.
 

Regards,

John Kettler

 

Edited August 10, 2016 by John Kettler

[VladimirTarasov]

15 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Back to the logistics issue.  I skimmed a few analysis of the war and found that issues related to logistics seem to be blamed more on poor command/control than anything else.

You're right about that actually, but it wasn't a major problem although a important issue.

15 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I honestly don't know where things stand today.  As I've said it seems that Russia has been able to keep the DPR/LPR adequately supplied over the past 2 years, but it has been largely a static front with only occasional spikes of fighting so that's something to consider.

Logistics have improved, everything is more organized than it was in 2008. We can assume it is way better than before the reforms. In Syria, I've noticed great logistics being provided by the Russian military, lessons are probably being taken from that conflict.