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And that is where the "classical" western view was wrong, sadly it was not corrected with the new materials that became availiable in late 80s and early 90s.

Classical Soviet view of the problem was a bolt out of the blue attack, after short (48-96 hours from the political decision being made) preparation. The reasons for this are simple - force density and engeniering/defensive preparation. Density (which would increase as both sides reinforce their groupings) has a non linear relationship with casualty rates (ie casualty rates grow faster than density), per same force ratio and other factors. Engeniering/defensive preparations are self explanatory, for example you should look at the time tables for the deployment of minor NATO members in NORTAG.

as a p.s. The potential invasion force has well above 100k troops in the readily availiable direct combat units of Ground Forces alone.

Edited by ikalugin
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On 29.07.2016 at 5:39 AM, Battlefront.com said:

I will ask this again.  Stop talking in vague chest thumping and start talking specifics.  Please outline various scenarios that specify what force sizes (NOT ratios) would Russia mass, where, and with what goals?  I've made several specific scenarios and I have not seen a response yet.  This conversation is pointless unless we talk specifics.

Steve

Missed that post.

The problem is that we disageee on the specifics. From my point of view the absolute manpower figures are useless and the only way to discuss scenarios is to discuss them in force ratios and specific unit/formation set ups. The reasons for this I have outlined above. However in order to prove that point I need to write a long post, something I don't have the resources for now (but I will in the future).

In my material about the Russian build up I have (in part) outlined likely Russian Armed Forces units that would participate in the operations. I assume that you are fammiliar with standard Russian OOBs. To make a legitimate scenario using that approach I need to write up the structure for Ukrainians as well, which is quite hard to.

p.s. another problem is that we have radically different perspectives on the Ukrainian civil war in general, which leads to different views on, for example, capabilities of Ukrainian Armed Forces (and other relevant forces) and the separatist forces. In order to challenge those views I would need an objective factual base, which I am in process of collecting.

p.p.s. in fact it is not even limited to Ukraine - same goes with, say, Georgia. General consensus is that Russia did not achieve numerical (or qualitative) superiority in Georgia (including the split off areas), much less introduce 80k troops into Georgia. Which makes me wonder, where did you get that 80k figure? Which units that 80k figure is made out of (units and subunits that have entered Georgia are known by their unit numbers)?

Edited by ikalugin
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More on the force ratios and such:

The Russian Forces infographic is in the works (and is more or less finished), but it is possible that it would not be released by itself due to the reasons stated above (ie - legal prosecution). Thus, sadly, you may have to wait untill the compehensive fictional scenarios (much likes the materials you can find here: https://ru.scribd.com/doc/312855400/Decisive-Action-Training-Enviornment-Version-2-2) are ready.

The readily availiable direct combat units of the Ground Forces in potential invasion force meet Steve's creteria for "100k manpower" (in fact are exceeding that creteria by a good margin).

The same units in the potential invasion force have a significant quantative (and to lesser extend qualitative) advantage in terms of equipment (for example 3/1 ratio in tanks) when compared to the entire Ukrainian Forces.

The same units in the potential invasion force have a much better structure and placement - in cohesive units and well placed vs incohesive group of dispersed subunits enfixed in a vulnerable geographic region.

p.s. Ukrainian airforce is about the only easy thing about Ukrainian Armed Forces - you can account flight worthy aircraft by number.

Edited by ikalugin
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About the scenarios.

The land bridge scenario is not credible, as there is a bridge into Crimea under construction, morever it would generate lengthly open flanks with good road network penetrating said flanks.

The LDNR support (ie where they are expanded to the entirety of their admin regions) is again not credible, as it does not benefit Russia in any way.

The only scenario that I see as credible is about:

  1. destroying the Ukrainian state's ability to wage war.
  2. destroying/displacing Ukrainian leadership.
  3. creating a border buffer zone under pro-Russian control.

In this scenario Russia would reduce the potential threat generated by the new Ukrainian regime. It also avoids any COIN operations, as we are not occupying any anti-russian regions or any regions at all for that matter.

The current change of posture (with the build up) implies that this is the scenario we are preparing for. So far I am not aware of the relevant change in posture by Ukraine (or NATO), for example creation of the viable defensive groupings north/east of Kiev. Unless such change happens Ukrainian defense against massive russian invasion is not credible.

Edited by ikalugin
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9 hours ago, MikeyD said:

Its still my contention that Russia's original aim was to secure the entire rail corridor down the length of south eastern Ukraine to supply Crimea.

The original aim was to cripple Ukraine's ability to govern itself and to ensure Crimea remained firmly in Russia's grasp.  My view is Russia only decided to annex Crimea after it realized it's attempts to cause a counter revolution failed.  Russia would have preferred not being directly responsible for any Ukrainian territory.  But Plan A was a failure so Plan B went into effect, which also failed to deliver.  I have lost track, but I think Putin is on Plan Q or so by now ;)

5 hours ago, ikalugin said:

Did I miss anything?

Looks good to me.

5 hours ago, ikalugin said:

p.s. the reason why I plan to do force comparisons bases on units vs manpower is because manpower is not representative of the combat power - 10k people with 3333 mosins does not have the same combat power as a modern motorised rifle division.

Neither absolute numbers nor ratios take combat power into effect.  Generalized ratios also make it more difficult to establish tactical ratios.  Ratios also do not properly convey scale and potential sacrifice.  In a battle that is 1:1, what does 20% losses mean?  Unknown without the headcount.

5 hours ago, ikalugin said:

p.p.s. the final product may take form of a hypotheoretical scenario with the names (and a number of other details) changed, to avoid legal prosecution.

Of course!  There is supposed to be interesting, not dangerous for you.  Of course the fact that you could be prosecuted for using open source information is not lost upon us in the West.

2 hours ago, ikalugin said:

Missed that post.

The problem is that we disageee on the specifics. From my point of view the absolute manpower figures are useless and the only way to discuss scenarios is to discuss them in force ratios and specific unit/formation set ups. The reasons for this I have outlined above. However in order to prove that point I need to write a long post, something I don't have the resources for now (but I will in the future).

From an analysis standpoint the proper approach is to count up the forces on both sides and allocate them to roles in an operation.  In this way you have the information needed to answer any question, including force composition, experience, terrain considerations, etc.  Ratios are a natural byproduct of this approach.

Ratios without context are almost completely useless.  Any discussion that uses ratios, and only ratios, has no chance of being productive.

2 hours ago, ikalugin said:

In my material about the Russian build up I have (in part) outlined likely Russian Armed Forces units that would participate in the operations. I assume that you are fammiliar with standard Russian OOBs. To make a legitimate scenario using that approach I need to write up the structure for Ukrainians as well, which is quite hard to.

Yes, this is definitely the larger problem.  It is easier to make assumptions about what Russian forces are committed to battle because the force structure is more uniform.  Obviously you still have to take into consideration factors such as outdated equipment, % of contractors, etc. but with Ukraine you have to consider all of these factors and an organization that is less unified.  It is similar to analyzing late WW2 German units and American units.  Americans are very easy to document because they were more uniform, the Germans were anything but.

2 hours ago, ikalugin said:

p.s. another problem is that we have radically different perspectives on the Ukrainian civil war in general, which leads to different views on, for example, capabilities of Ukrainian Armed Forces (and other relevant forces) and the separatist forces. In order to challenge those views I would need an objective factual base, which I am in process of collecting.

No, it's worse than that :)  We have radically different views on the conflict.  For starters, it is NOT A CIVIL WAR!  The only reason the armed conflict started is because Russia sent in Girkin and his men to start one.  The only reason Ukraine didn't regain control of the Donbas in 2014 is because Russia put in sufficient ground forces to stop it.  The only reason the DPR/LPR forces are functioning is because of Russian leadership, logistics, and even manpower ("vacationers", "volunteers", and direct armed forces deployments).  The only reason the war has continued for 2 more years is because Russia continually restocks the DPR/LPR with weapons and (more importantly) ammunition.  The only reason Ukraine doesn't launch an offensive is the concerns about Russia's response.

So you are correct that it is difficult to have an intellectually honest discussion about this conflict because only one side is paying attention to facts and using those facts to base conclusions on.

2 hours ago, ikalugin said:

p.p.s. in fact it is not even limited to Ukraine - same goes with, say, Georgia. General consensus is that Russia did not achieve numerical (or qualitative) superiority in Georgia (including the split off areas), much less introduce 80k troops into Georgia. Which makes me wonder, where did you get that 80k figure? Which units that 80k figure is made out of (units and subunits that have entered Georgia are known by their unit numbers)?

I have already explained this.  Russia had more forces available to commit into battle than Georgia did.  Which means that no matter how well Georgia fought, Russia could replace it's losses while Georgia could not.  In warfare this is usually the most important factor in determining victory.  Georgian forces understood this fact and it no doubt contributed to their panic and haste to sue for peace.  They knew that if they continued the fight Russia could control the entire country if it wanted to.  Better to stop fighting before that happened.

Of course the collapse of the Georgian forces was a huge factor.  Had it fought competently there was a chance, even though tiny, that Russia would have stopped attacking with Georgia being in a better position to control the terms of peace.  Obviously the collapse of their forces means we aren't talking about those possibilities.

 

 

Steve

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2 hours ago, ikalugin said:

More on the force ratios and such:

The Russian Forces infographic is in the works (and is more or less finished), but it is possible that it would not be released by itself due to the reasons stated above (ie - legal prosecution). Thus, sadly, you may have to wait untill the compehensive fictional scenarios (much likes the materials you can find here: https://ru.scribd.com/doc/312855400/Decisive-Action-Training-Enviornment-Version-2-2) are ready.

The readily availiable direct combat units of the Ground Forces in potential invasion force meet Steve's creteria for "100k manpower" (in fact are exceeding that creteria by a good margin).

The same units in the potential invasion force have a significant quantative (and to lesser extend qualitative) advantage in terms of equipment (for example 3/1 ratio in tanks) when compared to the entire Ukrainian Forces.

The same units in the potential invasion force have a much better structure and placement - in cohesive units and well placed vs incohesive group of dispersed subunits enfixed in a vulnerable geographic region.

p.s. Ukrainian airforce is about the only easy thing about Ukrainian Armed Forces - you can account flight worthy aircraft by number.

Yes, this all sounds correct to me.  Russia absolutely has a superior military in terms of overall size, equipment, and organization.  What is more guesswork is how this large force would work in an single combined offensive when someone competent is shooting back.  This is a lesson we can take from the Georgian War. 

Russia went into Georgia thinking it would have no problems, which turned out to be very wrong.  The problems they encountered were so bad that the entire armed forces had to be restructured and refocused.  We do not know how well the reforms have overcome some of Russia's systemic military deficiencies, though for sure they have overcome many.  Probably the most important ones, in fact.

Then there are the other issues about Russian popular support for a war of this size, especially if there are significant losses.  There is still the problem of what Russia could gain from such an offensive that it doesn't already have without one.  The West's response was underestimated when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 and after, which is another reason to make Russian leadership concerned about such an offensive.  And then there's the problems with Russia's "exit plan" strategy.  It is difficult to think of one that will work and retain advantages it does not already have.

In other words, Russia's invasion of Ukraine could wind up being similar to the Coalition's invasion of Iraq -> military success, political failure.

2 hours ago, ikalugin said:

About the scenarios.

The land bridge scenario is not credible, as there is a bridge into Crimea under construction, morever it would generate lengthly open flanks with good road network penetrating said flanks.

I agree that it is the most difficult of the three scenarios.  I also think it would not be attempted, but of course it is a possibility.

Quote

The LDNR support (ie where they are expanded to the entirety of their admin regions) is again not credible, as it does not benefit Russia in any way.

Agreed.  However, such an attack is the one that is most viable from Russia's standpoint because it involves the least effort and risk, yet does have the potential to achieve some limited goals.

Quote

The only scenario that I see as credible is about:

  1. destroying the Ukrainian state's ability to wage war.
  2. destroying/displacing Ukrainian leadership.
  3. creating a border buffer zone under pro-Russian control.

I agree, which is why I think Russia has not changed its strategy since Summer of 2014.

Quote

In this scenario Russia would reduce the potential threat generated by the new Ukrainian regime. It also avoids any COIN operations, as we are not occupying any anti-russian regions or any regions at all for that matter.

The reality is that most all of Ukraine is anti-Russian now.  This is the single most important thing that Putin has achieved for your country... Ukraine has plenty of reasons to hate Russia.  If you think Russian forces would be greeted as anything other than hostile occupation forces you are horribly mistaken.  Putin discovered that even in Donbas the overt support for Russia was insufficient, which is why Girkin was sent in.  The attempts to pry these areas away from Ukraine through faked political response on the ground was an utter failure because there was not sufficient support for it. 

I watched the first phase of Russia's war against Ukraine (late winter, early spring) very carefully, perhaps average of 4 hours each day during this period, so I am absolutely sure of what I say.  You might be foolish enough to believe the propaganda that large parts of Ukraine long to be dominated by Russian control, but I do not think Putin is.  He knows better.

Quote

The current change of posture (with the build up) implies that this is the scenario we are preparing for. So far I am not aware of the relevant change in posture by Ukraine (or NATO), for example creation of the viable defensive groupings north/east of Kiev. Unless such change happens Ukrainian defense against massive russian invasion is not credible.

Any assumption that Ukraine would be "caught napping" is not credible.  Ukraine will have some amount of warning that an attack is likely and therefore has the option to redeploy forces.  The question is how much would it redeploy and where before the Russian attack happened.  That is quite difficult to estimate.  However, we do know that Ukraine has always withheld significant forces from the ATO to ensure that it does have the ability to challenge a Russian attack outside of the ATO area.  It is not credible to think that 100% of these forces would sit in their bases as Russian forces massed for an obvious attack.

Steve 

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Ratios and density (and relative depth and other factors) determine operational results, including relative losses. The combat unit or formation effectiveness is determined by relative losses. Thus the results of high intensity military operations are only weakly dependent on absolute strengths, especially those in manpower.

The approach I see you use only uses manpower. Not only is this approach bad (as it does not lead to combat power comparison), it is misleading as the ratios (and combat power comparison) it provides is faulty, see the example I have used above where I have compared 10k troops with 3333 mosins against 10k troops in an MRD. If you plan to use absolute figures, they should be in units with given OOBs, as then you can get ratios and denseties (and all the other factors).

I would not go into the political discussion (as it is toxic), my point was that your views on LDNR and Ukrainian force capabilities differ from mine radically. As an example - I would view the 2 LDNR operational commands as valid formations within the overall force.

 

Edited by ikalugin
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I would try avoid political discussion (as it is toxic).

The problem is that there would be only 48-96 hours between the political decision being made and invasion happening. The ability to do this comes from:

  1. change in posture.
  2. change in capabilities

The former comes from redeployment of old units and formation of new ones. I have illustrated it on my original infographic. The later comes from the change in the overall force composition (more contract troops), unit structure (focused for rapid deployments) and from training. An example of this training was the movement of 65k troops (1+ VDV divisions, 6+ combat brigades of Ground Forces) over 72 hours (from units being alerted to the end of redeployment) across the distance of 3000km, mostly by rail road. You can read more here:

http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46133

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4 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

Ratios and density (and relative depth and other factors) determine operational results, including relative losses. The combat unit or formation effectiveness is determined by relative losses. Thus the results of high intensity military operations are only weakly dependent on absolute strengths, especially those in manpower.

I have probably been studying military history since you were either very young or perhaps before you were born.  I received my degree in history.  I can say, categorically, that what you just wrote is completely and utterly wrong.  I also work with military data professionally for 17 years straight, in case you haven't noticed ;) Ratios are "rules of thumb" at best.  Without context they mean absolutely nothing.  Similarly, headcounts without more detailed context means very little. 

However, to start a conversation it is better to use headcounts because they are easier to work with.  Plus, ratios can only be developed AFTER assessing hedacounts, so there is no point to talk ratios without headcount.

4 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

The approach I see you use only uses manpower.

It is only the starting point.  From there one must analyze, in absolute numbers, the different categories that make up the larger aggregate number.

4 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

Not only is this approach bad (as it does not lead to combat power comparison), it is misleading as the ratios (and combat power comparison) it provides is faulty, see the example I have used above where I have compared 10k troops with 3333 mosins against 10k troops in an MRD.

And "3:1 in tanks" is more informative?  That's nonsense.

Either way, the only method for determining likely outcome is to do a detailed headcount and categorization.  Tanks, for example, would have to be counted by type and then assessed based on the type's relative value.  Without this analysis neither headcounts nor ratios mean very much.

 

4 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

I would not go into the political discussion (as it is toxic), my point was that your views on LDNR and Ukrainian force capabilities differ from mine radically.

Which is logical because you do not have an accurate view of the conflict as a whole, so it is unlikely you have a good grasp of the details.

4 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

As an example - I would view the 2 LDNR operational commands as valid formations within the overall force.

Yes, there are two operational commands that are composed of a mix of Ukrainians, Russian nationalists, and Russian military personnel.  The command structure is ultimately controlled by the Russian armed forces at all levels, but not necessarily in every detail.  The fighting capabilities of these commands has been tested in the past 2.5 years and has consistently performed very poorly overall, though competently in some instances.  On the whole the force is there mostly to man checkpoints and profit from the absence of rule of law.  At least most of the Cossacks have finally been purged or brought under control, so qualitatively the force is probably better than it was last year simply because the "bottom feeders" that were there only to loot have been removed.

Steve

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10 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

I would try avoid political discussion (as it is toxic).

The problem is that there would be only 48-96 hours between the political decision being made and invasion happening. The ability to do this comes from:

  1. change in posture.
  2. change in capabilities

The former comes from redeployment of old units and formation of new ones. I have illustrated it on my original infographic. The later comes from the change in the overall force composition (more contract troops), unit structure (focused for rapid deployments) and from training. An example of this training was the movement of 65k troops (1+ VDV divisions, 6+ combat brigades of Ground Forces) over 72 hours (from units being alerted to the end of redeployment) across the distance of 3000km, mostly by rail road. You can read more here:

http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46133

We have had discussions about warning time in the various Baltic threads.  Using the Crimean invasion as an example...

1.  Putin ordered the invasion on the 22nd or, if you believe him, the early hours of the 23rd.

2.  Open source began reporting that the invasion was happening later on the 23rd.

3.  Russian special forces seized the Crimean Parliament on the afternoon of the 27th.

4.  The first "Green Men" began appearing a few hours later on the 28th.

5.  Additional Russian forces entered Crimea over several days and even weeks.

This was a phased invasion that did not require significant forces to be ready for offensive operations all at one time.  Even with this favorable situation there was about 4 days of warning before Russian forces first appeared in an offensive capacity.

For a large scale conventional attack I think it is fair to say the timeline would not be less than 4 days, but in fact significantly higher.

In any case, the Russian attack on Crimea was not a surprise to people like me.  Therefore, as soon as the situation changed in Kiev it was clear Russia would do something.  As soon as covert operations started on the weekend of the 22/23rd it was clear that something was going to happen.  By the 24th it was clear it was to be a military invasion of some sort.  By the 28th it was obvious that Russia was invading.

Compare this to the situation now and it should be very plain to see that Ukraine will have some period of days of warning. Perhaps weeks or months, depending on the political situation that predates the actual invasion.

To think that Russia could launch a total surprise offensive on the scale of 100,000 forces within 96 hours is fantasy.

Steve

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ikalugin,

Fair point on Russian doctrinal changes. Shall look into that more, although I've already done a fair bit of reading of what Russia's strategic doctrine was during the Cold War, and this unprecedented set of now declassified interviews of senior serving/retired Russian military and political officials is must reading.

The National Security Archive's The Nuclear Vault

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb285/

Also, since there's been a COF discussion of sorts, I was wondering whether you ever saw the COF equation used by the Russian military? I saw it way back during the Cold War, and I want to say the author's name was something like Afantsev.

Regards,

John Kettler

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ikalugin,

Botched that. Was trying to write Afantseyev or close. So far, my Google Fu is not cutting it. For sure it's not some writer of Russian folk tales. Had another thought about staying out of the dock. During the Cold War, and presumably now, in the military journals of the various Russian services the way internal military topics were discussed was to employ the catch phrase "According to foreign military experts." After that might appear some bombshell, as did in Morskoi Sbornik (Russian Navy journal to those who've not heard of it) a discourse on 60 knot subs and 200 knot torpedoes. Regarding the latter's "theoretical" nature in the mid-80s, people should look up the revolutionary Shkval. It might be something far more benign, unless, say, you happened to be someone in a vanilla helo or flying tank whose demise was being articulately discussed in the same manner!

For your purposes, if you so chose, you might say something like:

"In assessing Russian military potential for near zero or zero warning large scale combat operations in Ukraine, if deemed necessary by Russian authorities, foreign military experts note the following in-place operational groupings..."

There is a wealth of material in western open sources, such as The Military Balance, published annually by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), the just now found by me Russian Military Studies Archive, which covers current and past Russian military matters, FMSO (Foreign Military Studies Office, part of the US Army), FOI (a Swedish academic project highly germane to what you're doing), RussiaDefence.Net (relevant thread), Russian Military Reform (Dr. Gorenburg, a heavy hitter at Harvard), Russia Defense Policy, etc.

Whatever you ultimately decide, I look forward to seeing it!

Regards,

John Kettler

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14 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I have probably been studying military history since you were either very young or perhaps before you were born.  I received my degree in history.  I can say, categorically, that what you just wrote is completely and utterly wrong.  I also work with military data professionally for 17 years straight, in case you haven't noticed ;) Ratios are "rules of thumb" at best.  Without context they mean absolutely nothing.  Similarly, headcounts without more detailed context means very little.

I've only been watching this discussion from the sidelines but it does remind me of my time as a fresh faced history undergraduate back in 2002. We once had the same kind of discussion about those with greater numbers have the advantage. One first year, (not me :) ) stated this 'fact' more or less along the lines around the ratio arguement listed above. The lecturer responded with: "Yes that's why the Zulu's decimated the British garrison at Rorke's Drift, and the French won at the Battle of Agincourt."

A discussion followed about the myriad of factors you as a historian have to take into account before generating generating your wider narrative. In this case, terrain, wheather, logistics, relative quality of troops/command/weapon systems on each side etc etc etc. Essentially it's very rarely purely a numbers game. The raft of different factors (and whether it's from Primary or Secondary source material) that are raised is also why we have multiple interpretations of the same battles.

Years later, now I'm an Economist that spends most of his working day warning people about other people's numbers and to ensure decisions are made from combining quantitative and qualitative evidence sources. This fascination of trying to boil everything down to numbers is really a weird 21st Century machination that's become more pronounced. I personally blame this on the rise of the internet/social media and the need to try and get all arguements down to 140 characters before the reader's attention span is diverted elsewhere. (Not to mention Hollywood...)

 

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10 hours ago, Ithikial_AU said:

A discussion followed about the myriad of factors you as a historian have to take into account before generating generating your wider narrative. In this case, terrain, wheather, logistics, relative quality of troops/command/weapon systems on each side etc etc etc. Essentially it's very rarely purely a numbers game.

Exactly.  On paper the Soviet forces in 1941 were superior to that of the German in terms of numbers, home field advantage, reason to fight, and in many cases quality of equipment.  The Soviets also had vastly superior strategic planning.  But poor training, ridged (and bad) doctrine, fear of taking initiative (NKVD didn't like that much!), fear of failure, etc. doomed millions of Red Army soldiers to their deaths and almost lost the Soviet Union the war.  Ratios can not account for these things, neither can headcounts.  Context is everything, but it starts with counting what is on each side.

One of the primary variables we have to consider is morale.  We have pretty good recent evidence to show that even in the face of major losses and battlefield setbacks that Ukraine can effectively keep fighting. We do not have good contemporary Russian examples to draw from.  However, we do know that Russian forces are not supermen :) 

In the summer of 2014 there were two company sized groups of Russian forces that were neutralized by well executed Ukrainian artillery attacks.  One was VDV, the other Motorized Rifle.  From various accounts the units were shocked and even a bit panicked after the attacks, then were withdrawn.  This was prior to, and probably one of the reasons for, the larger Russian assault into Ukrainian territory in August. 

Russians die just as easily when hit by artillery as Ukrainians do.  This we know.  We also know that even an incompetently led, under equipped Ukrainian force that was overstretched from months of fighting was still able to cause significant casualties to theoretically superior forces.  This we also know.  What we do not know is how a larger Russian force would handle the casualties a much better Ukrainian force can theoretically cause.  We also don't know what the Russian public would do once they realized the casualties or how long it would take for their actions to be meaningful.  Based on reliable polling of Russian people, they do not want a war in Ukraine.  It is unlikely that Russia could create a lie good enough to convince the Russian people that the war is both justified and necessary. 

3:1 superiority of tanks doesn't mean much if there's a revolution at home!

Steve

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It seems to me that the truth lies somewhere between the two major viewpoints articulated in this thread.  Yes, Ukrainian army improved very significantly since 2014 and early 2015.  Most of it's soldiers and officers have experienced combat conditions.  The supply situation is considerably better.  Many areas of major deficiency have been addressed.  However, I would also agree with ikalugin  and VladimirTarasov that Ukrainians have not faced the full spectrum of Russian capabilities, particularly in SSM, cyberwarfare and air.  Ukrainian air force and air defenses have not been tested at all, and I do not believe they can stand up to full scale Russian attack.  I would expect Russia would be able to establish air superiority over Eastern Ukraine within several days, air dominance within one to two weeks over same and air superiority over central Ukraine in the same period.  That will significantly inhibit maneuver capabilities of Ukrainian ground forces, deny them ability to fall back westward  and enable their destruction as combat capable formations. 

 

The key question is what happens afterward?  I don't believe Russia is interested in seizing Kiev, but rather to force Ukraine to sue for terms.  Barring commitment of either Western forces or truly humongous levels of military aid (think "lend-lease" in scope), Ukraine would be faced with being unable to exercise sovereignty over greater parts of Central, Southern and Eastern Ukraine.  This doesn't mean Russian troops will be garrisoned in Kharkov, Dnipro etc. but rather that Ukrainian forces (military and National Guard) will be denied ability to operate there.  The situation might resemble that of early 2014 in Donetsk/Lugansk, when Ukrainian administrative control coexisted with separatist military control.

I believe that in those conditions, and barring Western military assistance sufficient to restore the situation, Ukrainians may well agree to give up some aspects of it's sovereignty to re-establish it's territorial integrity.  Think Germany in the 1920s - restrictions of size/armament of armed forces, foreign forces deployed on some parts of it's territory, etc.  That would be a significant feather in Putin's cap, and would enable him to claim victory in the conflict.

Edited by Krater
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Krater,

Your scenario is certainly plausible, but it requires that most things go right for the Russian side and not much goes right for the Ukrainian side.  Again, plausible though not inevitable.  Here's an alternative.

While it is true that Ukraine's forces have not faced the full might of a Russian offensive, they have come pretty close to it at the tactical level.  The results of those conflicts show me that Russia's strengths are not as overwhelming in reality as they are on paper.  Similar to how Russia's strengths on paper should have crushed the Chechens in the First Chechen War.

On the other side, with the exception of the proportionally small force that Russia used in Donbas 2014-2016 and the even smaller force fighting in Syria, Russia's forces have not faced combat of any type.  This is compared to the Ukrainian forces which have extensive combat experience, ranging from full mechanized combat to more limited activities.

More importantly, the size force we're talking about for Russia requires them deploying units which are still in the process of transformation.  That means outdated equipment (i.e. equal to what Ukraine has) and large amounts of conscript soldiers which traditionally have not performed well when pushed into combat.

Tactically, I think, this gives Ukraine a significant edge in fighting capacity.  How much does this counter balance Russia's superiorities?  Unknown, but it could prove critical just as the motivation factor proved critical in the First Chechen War in particular.

With that in mind...

I can see a scenario where the Russian forces move into Ukraine in force and have good success in some places, difficulties in others, and outright tactical defeats in some other places.  The result would probably be 2000-5000 casualties within the first week or so.  It would also lose significant numbers of vehicles and definitely some aircraft.  Ukraine, however, would lose probably twice that amount and it's airforce would be nearly eliminated.  The Ukrainian front would not hold.

Russian forces would advance into Ukraine and would be continually counter attacked and delayed by stubborn Ukrainian resistance.  This would cause Russia more casualties and delays in "finishing off" the Ukraine's ability to keep the war going.

During this time the West would be acting covertly and overtly.  Covertly critical weaponry would appear on the battlefield very quickly, such as ATGMs (perhaps not Javelins) and MANPADs.  Overtly there would be massive political and economic pressure put on Russia.  This should not be dismissed as irrelevant, though for sure some of these things would have more effect later than on the immediate conflict.

Then there is the partisan angle.  If anybody thinks that Ukraine doesn't have caches of weapons and plans to wage a partisan war, they should not.  As Russian forces move across Ukrainian territory they will find their convoys ambushed.  Soldiers will die, supplies won't get where they need to in time, and forces will need to be diverted to secure the territory taken.

In total I think the Russian offensive won't go badly, but it won't be over quickly nor without significant losses.  Too much for the Russian public to ignore, especially in places that are already trouble spots (Caucuses in particular).  It is very difficult to say how quickly these types of things will become a significant problem for the Russian government, however I expect it to be roughly proportional to how badly Russia's forces fare in Ukraine.  The more casualties they take, the longer they are there, and the more resources that are diverted to the war effort... the more emboldened opposition to Russian domestic rule will be.

Although it is possible that Ukraine would sue for peace and give in to catastrophic Russian demands, I do not think it will.  Even at its weakest and worst organized the Ukrainian government stood up to Russian aggression on its soil.  I expect it would be even less likely to give up easily now than before.

All Ukraine has to do to win a war against Russia is to not surrender.  That is as true for 2014-2016 as it will be in the future.  Remember, Ukraine doesn't have to win... Russia does.  If Russia is denied a victory then by definition it loses.  It would be painful for a little while, but long term Russia would be forced to withdraw.  Why give away sovereignty if Russian withdrawal is the inevitable outcome?

Steve

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Current task of Kremlin - in any way to make main thing. Not seize all Ukraine in military way and even not so-called Novorossia. This is impossible for Russian economy to keep here over  500 000+ army and RosGuard troops with perspective of continuosly partisan warfare. So, what want Kremlin now and what try to achieve by situation "niether war nor peace" in Donbas ?   

Ukraine must be a federation - all country or minimum with Donbas with "special status". What is "federation" or  "Special status" like short version of federation ? Every region will has own internal politic and economic relations (of course with Russia). Everey region wil elect own representatives, which will provide pro-Russian policy in Ukrainain Parliament and can maintain blocking of way in NATO and EU by "veto" right. This is all. Another - own "peoples police", language, hystory aspects are secondary. For Russia need that Ukraine will return in "sphere of Russian interests" and again will be a part of "Russian world". Russia don't need in obsolete Donbas coal mines and industry (except some unique factories), but need military production complex in Kharkiv, Dnipro, Mykolaiv. So if Russia will invade openly, yes, they will try to as quick as possibly defeat main Ukrainian forces on East, paralize troops control, possibly summon riot in Kyiv (Aaaa! Stupid Poroshenko's generals lead to disaster!) and force Ukraine to sign new "Minsk pact", but in this tyme more hard - full powere reset, immediate law about fedaration etc. Of course, many people to this type already will be demoralized and will be just one - that this war is over. Even now, by social polling only 25-30 % want continue of ATO to full liberation of Donbas. About 15 % - for peace and agreement with separatists, but about 45-50 % is a "swamp", which don't have any firm opinion. And this swamp, which "tired from a war" will be a base for pro-Ruissian policy restoration.

So, as you see, Russian can even not attack Kyiv direction (though can do it from new base), but just destroy UKR troops in Donbas area, which will launch domino-effect in capital and lead to serouos changes, benefit to Russia

Single scenario, when full scale war with Kyiv and L'viv bombardment by Iskanders and Calibers, tank rush and Russian landing ships near Odesa is possible if after Putin will come some crazy follower of "Russian world" like Strelkov  or "hawks" from Putin's team 

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This is most certainly what Russia would have in mind if it invaded openly.  The question is what this would do to Ukrainian public opinion.  It could go down the drain and people want to outright surrender.  Definitely it is possible.  However, it is also possible that it would go in the other direction.  Especially if Ukraine's armed forces have some success on the battlefield.  It is impossible to say one way or the other, but it has to be the former for Russia to get what it wants.  If it is the latter, and Ukraine sticks it out for even a couple of months, then I think Russia will lose.

As for the opinion polls, it is based on the current situation of seemingly endless and even pointless war for territory that most of Ukraine doesn't care about.  The minute Russian forces, with Russian flags flying, try to take over places like Kharkiv and Dnipro, the situation will be very different. 

Think about the polls before Russia invaded Crimea.  If someone asked the average Ukrainian in 2013 "do you think Russia is an enemy?" the majority would probably have said no. Ask the same question now and the opposite answer is very different.  A poll last year found only 8% of Ukrainians want closer ties to Russia.  Conditions changed, opinions changed.

From what I've read, Ukrainians were even more surprised than Russians to find how united they were against Russian aggression.  From what I've seen of the spirit of resistance and national unity within Ukraine since 2014, I'd be surprised if Ukraine surrendered easily to Russia.

Steve

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Steve,

You left out that small matter of the officer purge in your list of why the Russian military looked good on paper, yet was savaged by the Germans in 1941. Your point about artillery vulnerability is apt, and attackers are more exposed to its effects than defenders. Also, I would note something Suvorov/Rezun personally experienced in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 when he was part of the force sent in to crush the Czech Spring. This was the highly erosive effect on morale of going from Russia into Czechoslovakia. On the Russian side, the roads were dirt, the homes shabby and ill kept. He describes Czechoslovakia as like entering another world. As soon as the Russia forces crossed the border, they were no longer choking in the dust of a churned up dirt road. Instead, it was paved. The homes were impressive, well kept  and, I believe, had manicured yards, too. The food was plentiful and much better than in Russia. This completely undid the Party line about liberating the Czech people from repression.Suvorov/Rezun says in his The "Liberators" the Red Army was unraveling so fast in the face of this extreme disconnect that the only way to keep things together at all was to get the troops out of the cities, away from the very articulate Czechs and their challenges to, well, practically everything the Russians thought was true, then back to Russia as quickly as possible. He went on to say something to the effect of "If that's what happened in Czechoslovakia, invading a NATO country would destroy the Red Army." For there, what was encountered in Czechoslovakia would seem backward by comparison.

The above phenomenon may've been blunted to some degree by the internet and such, but if Russia's going into western Ukraine, this might be a significant factor. What is the difference in the standard of living between the two countries? Whose populace has better access to and higher quality of food? How are the roads? The houses? If Suvorov/Rezun is to be believed, and I find him highly credible since he was not only there but in the thick of it (downtown Prague when the Czech Central Bank was seized), these soft factors could be of huge import in assessing the potential effectiveness of a Russian invasion. 

Regards,

John Kettler

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There's something else to keep in mind.  As I said, Ukraine must surrender in order for Russia to win.  Look at the current situation in Donbas.  Does anybody think this is what Russia wanted?  It is involved in an expensive, open ended war while it's economy tanks and international pressure to punish Russia is likely to be strong for several more years.  It also is pretty clear that Ukraine will never willingly go back into Russia's orbit, nor will it even succumb to Russia's blatant attempts to control it's politics.  If Russia doesn't win a war with Ukraine outright and quickly then it will find itself with all the same problems as Donbas and a lot more problems heaped on top of it.
 

If Russia thought it could get what it wanted by invading it would have done it by now.  If it did attack it would be out of desperation and that means it that makes things even more favorable for Ukraine.

Steve

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