Russian army under equipped?

[ikalugin]

32 minutes ago, kinophile said:

Copy,  thank you. 

Yea, the build up is not targeted at Baltics, it is targeted at Ukraine (like I have said earlier).

This makes me wonder, which NATO assets are availiable for operations in Ukraine within the relevant time frame? How fast can they respond and what are the political conditions for their use?

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, ikalugin said:

Yea, the build up is not targeted at Baltics, it is targeted at Ukraine (like I have said earlier).

This makes me wonder, which NATO assets are availiable for operations in Ukraine within the relevant time frame? How fast can they respond and what are the political conditions for their use?

For the timeframe of the original CMBS story we assumed that NATO would need about 6 months to put significant force into Ukraine.  That's primarily because US armor was not present in Europe at the time.  It would also take time to get European forces into a better state of readiness.

What is available now and by next year is still a little cloudy.  Some of the forces are specifically designed to defend the Baltics and would not go into Ukraine under any circumstances.  Some forces that could theoretically go into Ukraine would go to reinforce the Baltics to discourage, if not repulse, Russian attacks there. 

Within about two months I'd guess that NATO would be able to put together a force of 3-4 Armored Brigades, 2-3 Medium Brigades, and 3-4 Infantry Brigades.  The US contribution would likely be 2 Armored Brigades, 1 Medium Brigade, and 2 Infantry Brigades.  NATO countries would make up the rest.  The bulk of the US forces would be available within roughly 2 weeks.

Air, artillery, and support units would also be present in large numbers, of course.

Steve

[Haiduk]

 

11 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Within about two months I'd guess that NATO would be able to put together a force of 3-4 Armored Brigades, 2-3 Medium Brigades, and 3-4 Infantry Brigades.  The US contribution would likely be 2 Armored Brigades, 1 Medium Brigade, and 2 Infantry Brigades.  NATO countries would make up the rest.  The bulk of the US forces would be available within roughly 2 weeks

Today Sea Breeze-2016 maneuvers have begun. Near Odesa USMC NMCB 133 landed, so I think they are not simply here.  

[ikalugin]

Thanks. The obvious question is - how would NATO (and US specifically) get 2 months warning? What would be the political conditions for such a deployment?

What are the other NATO forces?

Where the US forces would come from?

Edited July 27, 2016 by ikalugin

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

Thanks. The obvious question is - how would NATO (and US specifically) get 2 months warning?

Impossible to say.  But you must keep in mind that Russia has already given NATO 2 years to prepare.  Before Russia's invasion of Ukraine there were no Abrams tanks in Europe any more.  Soon there will be enough for at least 2 ABCTs, probably 3.  One is full time so that would be available (in theory) within a few days.  The other two would take about 2-4 weeks to be ready for combat.

Russia's history of invading its neighbors is pretty well know.  There is a period of propaganda that gets progressive more and more hostile.  Russian politicians also become more aggressive and focused on the intended target.  This does not guarantee Russia will invade, but it does act as a warning.  For those of us paying attention to these things, we saw Russia's preparations to invade Ukraine months in advance.  NATO was "asleep at the wheel", but they are now wide awake.

To really get things going on the NATO side they would be looking for significant redeployment of forces.  Even though Russia has an invasion sized force along Ukraine's border, it would have to move more forces around.  This would be harder to detect and with a shorter warning time than for something like the Baltics, but it would be noticed.

All combined I think this might give NATO only a few weeks notice even with good inside information (i.e. spying) of Russian intentions.  That is enough to get most of the personnel to Europe, but not enough to have the full force ready for combat.  This would likely mean a similar situation as our Black Sea story where Russia's initial invasion is not opposed by NATO forces, then NATO forces take up rearward positions waiting for the full force to arrive.  Once enough of that force arrived the NATO force would likely go on a limited counter offensives.

This assumes that Russia's initial invasion goes pretty smoothly.  While possible I think it is unlikely.  In the case that things don't go so well then NATO forces would probably engage in counter attacks before the full force was available.

There is no one answer as it really depends on the exact conditions.

2 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

What would be the political conditions for such a deployment?

This is the major unknown.  With the Baltics it is easier to estimate the response, with Ukraine it is more difficult.  If Russia attacked right now, I don't think NATO would get directly involved at all (weapons, ammunition, training... definitely).  However, if Russia attacked after certain other things happened then NATO countries might be more willing to go to war in Ukraine.

2 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

What are the other NATO forces?

There is the newly formed Very High Readiness Joint Task Force of roughly 5000 soldiers which is in the process of forming.  The UK has pledged 3000 soldiers and armor for immediate deployment to the continent if need be.  Then there is the existing NATO Response Force.  In total it is about 30,000 personnel.

Of course there are many more forces available to NATO within a short period of time, but definitely we are talking about months to get ready to fight.

2 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

Where the US forces would come from?

The forces that would not be in the Baltics are likely as follows:

1 x ABCT = permanently stationed in Europe (the exact unit is dependent upon the timing of rotations, of which there are 2 per year)
1 x ABCT = full time personnel deployed from the US to crew prepositioned equipment (could be any number of units)
1 x SBCT = permanently stationed in Europe (2nd Armored Cav)
1 x IBCT = permanently stationed in Europe (172nd Airborne)
1 x IBCT = part of US strategic readiness force (most likely 82nd Airborne)

In addition the US could quickly move one more IBCT into Europe very quickly using pieces of other Brigades.
1 x IBCT Equivalent = parts of US strategic readiness force (Ranger Battalion, 101st Airborne, etc)

This would perhaps be held back as a reserve force, along with other Active units that could be shipped over with 2-4 months warning.

Deployed into the Baltics would be 1 x ABCT (from prepositioned equipment) and most of the newly created 1 x IBCT equivalent  deterrent force spread out between Estonia and Romania.

Steve

 

[sburke]

Beware who you piss off Steve, you never once mentioned the Marines. . 

[Kinophile]

10 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

his is the major unknown.  With the Baltics it is easier to estimate the response, with Ukraine it is more difficult.  If Russia attacked right now, I don't think NATO would get directly involved at all (weapons, ammunition, training... definitely).  However, if Russia attacked after certain other things happened then NATO countries might be more willing to go to war in Ukraine.

Weapons, ammunition etc would be candles in the wind agiinst a proper RUS invasion of the Baltics, no? It would require more, a full Air & Sea war at least to properly support these NATO members.

Which...the Ukraine is not. 

To my uninformed mind, is it not actually the other way around - NATO would go to war for the Baltics, as fellow members, but would "only" provide logistical, data, weapons support to the Ukraine in the event of invasion?

[ikalugin]

Thanks for the information. I would think about it.

The problem is that due to the change in posture the delay between the political decision and invasion would be days, not weeks or months. I would illustrate this point in further materials, as well as exercise materials (such as suprise readiness check results).

I would make a longer post at a later point.

Edited July 27, 2016 by ikalugin

[ikalugin]

On a related note, what would be the political trigger for NATO deployment to Ukraine in your opinion?

Same regarding the indirect support.

Edited July 27, 2016 by ikalugin

[Haiduk]

20 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

On a related note, what would be the political trigger for NATO deployment to Ukraine in your opinion?

Same regarding the indirect support.

A threat of completely military defeat of Ukraine with perspective of pro-Russian government - West spent many resourses for support of escape of Ukraine from Russian orbit, so can try to save situation. But I think probability of this very low. West doesn't want to confront with Russia in "hot phase" 

Indirect support we already have - instructors, maneuvers, non-lethal equipment (just today we have received dozens of RQ-11B, and to the end of week next AN/TPQ-49 will arrive) 

[VladimirTarasov]

Steve,

Your numbers sound solid, Gulf War had a similar build up.

Russia would be using assets from Kaliningrad to engage targets using for example 9K720s and assets like it, NATO must also resond to this threat as well which could also make the whole situation a mess. Do you think NATO would straight on invade Kaliningrad? 

 

[ikalugin]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

A threat of completely military defeat of Ukraine with perspective of pro-Russian government - West spent many resourses for support of escape of Ukraine from Russian orbit, so can try to save situation. But I think probability of this very low. West doesn't want to confront with Russia in "hot phase" 

Current posture change already generates that threat.

Evidence: entire Ukrainian force lacks numerical superiority in major equipment items (ie tanks) over the potentially hostile forces close to (and in case of LDNR forces - inside) the pre 2014 borders. This means that, with the low theatre force density, a potential adversary can conduct offensive operation from peace time positions, without preparations.

Without the change of Ukrainian (and NATO) peace time posture this threat would persist.

p.s. the above argument was based on my infographic and tank figures provided by you earlier in this thread. My infographic is actually very conservative, for example there is evidence that one of the MRDs I have marked close to Ukrainian pre 2014 border is actually a TD with an additional detached motorised rifle brigade in close proximity. Then there are follow on forces to consider.

Edited July 27, 2016 by ikalugin

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, sburke said:

Beware who you piss off Steve, you never once mentioned the Marines. . 

Heh.  There would likely be some form of involvement of the Marines, I'm just not sure what form it would take.  They could keep Russia quite concerned about long flanks or they could slug it out inland.  But in the immediate term they could only do one or the other.

2 hours ago, kinophile said:

Weapons, ammunition etc would be candles in the wind agiinst a proper RUS invasion of the Baltics, no? It would require more, a full Air & Sea war at least to properly support these NATO members.

Which...the Ukraine is not. 

To my uninformed mind, is it not actually the other way around - NATO would go to war for the Baltics, as fellow members, but would "only" provide logistical, data, weapons support to the Ukraine in the event of invasion?

Yes, that's what I said   There could be circumstances to do more than weapons and support for Ukraine in the event of an invasion, but it is less certain.  Invading the Baltics would be Article 5 and no way would the US (and others) back down from military counter measures.

2 hours ago, ikalugin said:

Thanks for the information. I would think about it.

The problem is that due to the change in posture the delay between the political decision and invasion would be days, not weeks or months. I would illustrate this point in further materials, as well as exercise materials (such as suprise readiness check results).

I would make a longer post at a later point.

I think you misunderstand.  It is very unlikely that Putin will wake up one day and, to the surprise of everybody, issue orders to invade Ukraine, the Baltics, or any place else.  Russia does not behave this way.  When it invades it is premeditated and if you know what to look for the signs of invasion are clear.  It usually starts MONTHS before the actual invasion.  In part because of Russian actions prior to Feb 22 I understood Russia was in the process of invading Crimea 5 days before the first Green Men appeared in Simferopol.  This was clear to me because even I know what to look for.  The intelligence agencies and true military analysts are far more qualified than I am, so I am sure they knew even earlier.

The Russian war against Georgia similarly was under way about 5 days before the artillery exchange gave them an excuse to invade.  In both cases the invasions happened after a period of escalating propaganda and political activities coming from the Kremlin.

The advantage Russia has with Ukraine is that it has already invaded.  It has thousands of forces inside Donbas operating in various capacities already.  It has tens of thousands of forces massed on the Ukrainian border already.   In theory it could invade beyond Donbas within hours of a decision from Putin.  However, the force is not sufficiently large enough to ensure a quick victory or, in fact, a victory at all.  This means Putin would have to decide roughly 10 days before an invasion so that forces could be redeployed from other parts of Russia, get into position, and then finally attack.  While some of this activity could be masked, given how closely Russia's activities are being monitored I do not think it would be effective enough to fool Ukraine or NATO.

2 hours ago, ikalugin said:

On a related note, what would be the political trigger for NATO deployment to Ukraine in your opinion?

Same regarding the indirect support.

NATO forces going into Ukraine at the start of a conflict is unlikely under any situation other than Russia waging open warfare against NATO someplace else.  For example, if Russia attacked the Baltics there would be NATO forces put into Ukraine without a doubt.  Other than that I don't see realistic scenarios where NATO would go into Ukraine in the short term.  Maybe if the war dragged on and Russia did something exceedingly stupid elsewhere, but not in the initial invasion period.

This is not true for providing financial and military aid.  That would happen pretty much straight away if Russia invaded.  I am guessing when Lavrov and Putin made threats against NATO if it provided weapons they were told by Western leaders, in private, "OK, we'll back down from sending lethal aid... but if you openly invade we will".

To summarize... it is very difficult to see NATO getting directly involved in a war within Ukraine provided Russia didn't give NATO a strong reason (invading Baltics, sinking a NATO warship, shooting down a NATO plane, etc.).  However, it is VERY easy for me to picture weapons, equipment, munitions, and even special forces showing up to help Ukraine more directly.

This is exactly as Haiduk sees it...

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

A threat of completely military defeat of Ukraine with perspective of pro-Russian government - West spent many resourses for support of escape of Ukraine from Russian orbit, so can try to save situation. But I think probability of this very low. West doesn't want to confront with Russia in "hot phase" 

Indirect support we already have - instructors, maneuvers, non-lethal equipment (just today we have received dozens of RQ-11B, and to the end of week next AN/TPQ-49 will arrive) 

Yes.  As Russia's war against Ukraine drags on NATO is doing more to help Ukraine's forces.  If Russia were to openly invade this would accelerate very quickly.

1 hour ago, VladimirTarasov said:

Steve,

Your numbers sound solid, Gulf War had a similar build up.

For Gulf War 2, yes.  Gulf War 1 took much longer because the size of the force required mobilization of part-time military units (National Guard, Reserves) that had been neglected since the Vietnam War.  IIRC some US units required 4 months of training in Saudi Arabia before they were considered ready for even supporting operations.  In a way Gulf War 1 was similar to Russia's war against Georgia.  In both cases the wars uncovered big problems with readiness.

Quote

Russia would be using assets from Kaliningrad to engage targets using for example 9K720s and assets like it, NATO must also resond to this threat as well which could also make the whole situation a mess. Do you think NATO would straight on invade Kaliningrad? 

I doubt NATO would attack into Kaliningrad.  However, Russia could not afford to fight a two front war against NATO (it can't afford to fight a one front war) so I think Russia would not try to widen the conflict outside of Ukraine unless NATO did first.  And I don't think NATO would want to widen the war either, so I think the Baltics would remain very tense but no major military action.

Steve

[ikalugin]

A quick comment, Steve, what kind of force ratio (in the first and second operational level echelons, when compared to the defender's overall force) do you believe is sufficient to conduct offensive operations, in the attack from the cold scenario? I would note that the scenario:

- has a low operational density of forces.

- the bulk of defender's forces are in well known locations and are enfixed.

- the attacker's mobile grouping sits on the operational flank of the defender's primary force concentration.

(I won't go into the air war, initial salvo exchange or the quality of troops just yet).

Edited July 28, 2016 by ikalugin

[Battlefront.com]

3 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

A quick comment, Steve, what kind of force ratio do you believe is sufficient to conduct offensive operations, in the attack from the cold scenario?

This is a difficult question to answer without knowing two things:

1.  The strategic goals of the offensive

2.  To what degree those goals require confronting Ukrainian forces

There are other questions to consider, but those are the two primary ones that would determine force size. 

The least ambitious attack would be to expand the pseudo states of Luhansk and Donetsk to their prewar boundaries, hurting Ukraine enough in the process that they would sue for peace.  This requires Russia has to confront well entrenched, highly experienced forces on their home turf AND defeat them AND defeat them strongly enough to stop the military confrontation from continuing.  To do that Russia would likely need a force size significantly larger than the Ukrainian forces in place and in immediate reserve because it must smash the ATO forces pretty much everywhere simultaneously for this to work.  I'd say a force of at least 100,000 minimum.

If Russia instead wants to expand it's holdings of Ukrainian territory to secure the coastline of the Sea of Azov from Dnepr to Russia it could attack with significantly less initial force, however it is difficult to see how this sort of attack would result in a quick victory for Russia.  50,000 troops (25,000 from Crimea and 25,000 from opposite Mariupol) might be sufficient to secure the territory in the short term, but then what?  If I were in Ukraine's position I would throw my reserves and newly raised units to keep the invasion force busy and then I'd have the forces in the ATO go on a general offensive, culminating in cutting down to the Sea of Azov.  This means Russia would probably have to put at least 10,000 or more forces into DPR/LPR to have any hope of slowing down an ATO general offensive and perhaps another 10,000 to arrest it.  That's a force size of 70,000 and is only sufficient to not immediately fail, not a force large enough to hold the territory long term.  100,000 + would be minimal and even then I'm not sure it would be enough.

If Russia decides it needs to defeat Ukraine totally and utterly it would have to drive towards Kiev above the ATO, take on the ATO from within DPR/LPR, and come out of Crimea to move up the Dnepr.  The amount of force necessary would be probably in the 100,000 range just to make the attack viable (roughly 1/3 in each of the three attack points).  There would also need to be significant forces to deal with urban centers and stubborn areas of resistance as well as flanks during the initial attack.  Not to mention having to deal with partisans.  Hmmm... maybe 200,000 minimal and even with that it is difficult to imagine that this would completely destroy Ukraine's will to fight unless the attack was a stunning success, which I am doubtful it would be.

Remember that beating the enemy's army on your turf is very different than beating the enemy's army on his turf. Ukraine has shown that it is not a push over.  It is willing to fight and die for its territory.  It is also strongly united against Russian domination.  A quick attack with a minimal sized force is not going to do well against such an adversary.  Maybe back in Spring 2014, but now now.

Russia can only get what it wants in Ukraine through a total war in which all of Ukraine is militarily occupied by a competent and well resourced military force which works well with a competent civilian occupation apparatus.  Including the occupation forces, I'd say Russia could not even have a prayer of defeating and holding Ukraine with less than 500,000 in total.  That would be about 200,000 in initial military forces and 300,000 in non-military and newly raised military forces for occupation duties.  It would also likely be a hostile occupation forever, which means forever occupying the country militarily.  That never, ever works.

Of these options I think the only viable one for Russia is a limited war within the existing ATO to force Ukraine to give up the Donbas.  However, this is not what Russia wants and therefore why would it do it?  Russia doesn't want the Donbas for itself nor does it want it independent.  Defeating Ukraine's ATO forces won't force Ukraine to take Donbas back under Russian dictated terms, so this sort of attack would be beyond stupid.

3 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

I would note that the scenario:

- has a low operational density of forces.

Ukraine has significant reserves that can be brought into the fight quickly.

3 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

- the bulk of defender's forces are in well known locations and are enfixed.

The attack and supply routes of the Russian forces are also known and limited.  Remember the losses Russian forces suffered during the initial phase of the counter attack in the summer of 2014.  You know, the ones that Russia doesn't admit happened because Russia denies it invaded

3 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

- the attacker's mobile grouping sit on the operational flank of the defender's primary force concentration.

That is Russia's biggest initial strength.  But the big question that follows is "so what?".  Germany crushed France in 1940 in record time with relatively minimal losses.  As we say in English, "He Hitler, how'd that work out for you in the end?"

Russia's problem is that it's goals are unobtainable.  It wants Ukraine to return to the Russian orbit and be a servant to Moscow's wishes.  This is not going to happen. Therefore, ultimately, Russia can not get what it wants from Ukraine.  Not with 100,000 forces, not with 200,000 forces.

Steve

[ikalugin]

You are giving forces:

1) in absolute figures.

2) in manpower figures.

And not in ratios. Sorry to nit pick, but can you please answer my answer and state the ratios?

p.s. we can discuss the state of Ukrainian Armed (and other relevant) Forces later, as I would provide relevant materials. For now we can talk in relative numbers (ie ratios). If you are willing to share such materials (TOEs, unit positioning and strength) yourself, feel free to do so and base your arguments on them.

Edited July 28, 2016 by ikalugin

[ikalugin]

As a note to the previous post.

(I appologise for the style, I have some minor health problems at the moment and could not sleep, sleep depravation leading to a marginal degration of my cognitative ability)

The problem with the absolute figures is that they only provide force density, without providing the force ratio (with the defender's strength not stated). This means that we cannot discuss the likely outcomes of operations using absolute figures for one side.

The problem with the use of manpower figures is that it does not represent the combat power of sides, the obvious example would be using manpower for a mechanized force made out of combat units without accounting for rear services (and other such troops) and comparing it to the manpower of a non mechanized force with rear services and units that are not combat effective (low readiness due to training or spatial dispersion), especially in a low force density operational area. Hence, if you plan to use absolute figures, a much better way (in my opinion) would be to count combat units and formations (ie how many manuever units of a given strength the sides have), major equipment items in those units and formations (ie arty and tank ratios)

Edited July 28, 2016 by ikalugin

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

That is Russia's biggest initial strength.  But the big question that follows is "so what?".  Germany crushed France in 1940 in record time with relatively minimal losses.  As we say in English, "He Hitler, how'd that work out for you in the end?"

I'd argue it worked out fine...it was only his attack into Russia that stripped the occupying forces to bare minimum in France. Until Russia started giving headaches, the effectiveness of French resistence was minor at best. Without that eastern drain his attack into and occupation of France would have been a very cheap victory for a very very fat prize.

But this is a distraction from a very interesting discussion.

Edited July 28, 2016 by kinophile

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, ikalugin said:

You are giving forces:

1) in absolute figures.

2) in manpower figures.

And not in ratios. Sorry to nit pick, but can you please answer my answer and state the ratios?

Absolute numbers are more accurate and meaningful, which is why I used them and not ratios.  It is also not important to look at starting ratios because that is the least important thing to consider when trying to figure out how wars end.  For example, the Iraq War started out with a 1:1 ratio between Coalition and Iraqi forces.  After the total defeat of the Iraqi forces the US wound up having to station more forces in Iraq than the invasion force and still had problem governing even with hundreds of thousands of allied Iraqi and tribal security forces also on its side.  So the ratio started at maybe 1:1 and then went to something like 10:1 at its peak and even that wasn't enough.

Quote

p.s. we can discuss the state of Ukrainian Armed (and other relevant) Forces later, as I would provide relevant materials. For now we can talk in relative numbers (ie ratios). If you are willing to share such materials (TOEs, unit positioning and strength) yourself, feel free to do so and base your arguments on them.

I don't have time for plotting things out, only looking at things from a higher level.  My arguments are based on the war so far and the sense of what each force is capable of.

1 hour ago, ikalugin said:

As a note to the previous post.

(I appologise for the style, I have some minor health problems at the moment and could not sleep, sleep depravation leading to a marginal degration of my cognitative ability)

Don't sweat it   I hope you get better soon.

Quote

The problem with the absolute figures is that they only provide force density, without providing the force ratio (with the defender's strength not stated). This means that we cannot discuss the likely outcomes of operations using absolute figures for one side.

Sorry, I assumed you already know what the Ukrainian figures are. Haiduk is the better guy to provide this information. From memory, there is roughly speaking 30,000 directly in the ATO front lines with roughly 20,000 in near reserves and rotations.  Along the front with Crimea is around 10,000.  Hmmm... north of the ATO maybe another 15,000?  I am less sure about that.  Total is about 70,000 of about 250,000 + ground force (the total size authorized is higher, but unlikely reality). 

In the event of a full scale conflict with Russia all of Ukraine's resources would be available to fight Russia in the east with only a small force needed to guard against Transnistria.  Ukraine also has several hundred more that are trained and have military, even combat, experience that could be drawn into service very quickly.  Therefore, Russia needs to be prepared to not only deal with the forces directly in front of it, but also those behind them and those behind them.  This is the lesson the Germans learned after invading the Soviet Union.  Killing and capturing millions of Soviet soldiers in the first few months didn't matter because there were millions to replace them.  Germany had no plan on dealing with a prolonged war against such resources.  For Russia to invade and beat Ukraine it can not make the same mistake.

 

Quote

The problem with the use of manpower figures is that it does not represent the combat power of sides, the obvious example would be using manpower for a mechanized force made out of combat units without accounting for rear services (and other such troops) and comparing it to the manpower of a non mechanized force with rear services and units that are not combat effective (low readiness due to training or spatial dispersion), especially in a low force density operational area. Hence, if you plan to use absolute figures, a much better way (in my opinion) would be to count combat units and formations (ie how many manuever units of a given strength the sides have), major equipment items in those units and formations (ie arty and tank ratios)

Ratios does absolutely nothing to address these issues either.  In fact, I think ratios make it more difficult to assess such things.

46 minutes ago, kinophile said:

I'd argue it worked out fine...it was only his attack into Russia that stripped the occupying forces to bare minimum in France. Until Russia started giving headaches, the effectiveness of French resistence was minor at best. Without that eastern drain his attack into and occupation of France would have been a very cheap victory for a very very fat prize.

But this is a distraction from a very interesting discussion.

The point is if you don't have a plan to win the peace, the military victory doesn't matter.  The US hopefully learned this lesson with Iraq.  War was effectively over within a few days, the mess that came from it is now going on 13 years with no end in sight.  If Hitler had stopped in summer of 1940 I can promise you that would not have been the end of Germany's problems.  Like the Soviet Union's occupation of Eastern Europe it might have taken a few decades to sort out, but it would have.  Nazi Germany was not a sustainable state.

Steve

[VladimirTarasov]

I'd assume a campagin in Ukraine would be similar to Georgia 2008, but with the Russian Air Force way more efficient ground forces as well. Russia could essentially use naval superiority, air superiority, and superiority in the ground forces to take on a force larger than it's fielding against UAF, similar to the Georgian war. Even with the Georgians trained, better equipped in the ground forces term, and motivated, they all fled in panic and fear when their commands were destroyed and they faced a large successful fast momentum.

Ukrainian Armed Forces performed well in some cases when facing the DPR/LPR militias. As apparent in the war when the DPR/LPR is reinforced by BTGs the UAF doesn't do so well. Of course though, units that are trained and execute a good plan could offer fierce resistance as in some cases, but overall there is much to be desired about their military.

A direct Russian involvement with full artillery support, air support would largely lead to successes. During the Ukrainian war the borders with Russia towards the north east did not have much of a defensive force And in that route there is a high way "M02" which Russian forces could advance straight to Kiev in 2-3 weeks (if facing stiff resistance), and threaten the capital and you know just like in Georgia, get a political solution done, lopsidedly in Russia's favor. 

Steve, I dont think Russia plans on fighting an insurgency in Ukraine in an event of war, so I'd expect short powerful goals like threaten Kiev, destroy Ukrainian Armed Forces near Donbas, and an expansion of DPR/LPR territories. Or a more simple goal, for example, push Ukrainian forces out of artillery range (60-90 kilometers) from Donbas, and destroy their military forces threating Donbas territories. 

 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, VladimirTarasov said:

I'd assume a campagin in Ukraine would be similar to Georgia 2008, but with the Russian Air Force way more efficient ground forces as well. Russia could essentially use naval superiority, air superiority, and superiority in the ground forces to take on a force larger than it's fielding against UAF, similar to the Georgian war. Even with the Georgians trained, better equipped in the ground forces term, and motivated, they all fled in panic and fear when their commands were destroyed and they faced a large successful fast momentum.

Oooo... it's very dangerous to assume that

Population of Georgia in 2008 was roughly 4m.  Ukraine is roughly 40m.  Size of armed forces of Georgia that Russia confronted was about 10,000.  Depending on the scenario Russia would be immediately confronting somewhere around 70,000 minimum, 150,000 in the upper range (this includes National Guard, which for sure would be mobilized).  Georgian forces had almost zero combat experience while the bulk of Ukrainian forces have some and many have years.  Georgian forces had never, ever fought against a mechanized enemy force, Ukraine has been fighting such forces for more than 2 years.  Georgia never fought the Russian Army, Ukraine has been fighting it for 2 years.  Georgia never thought Russia would attack, Ukraine has obviously no such illusion.

The total area of Georgia is about 70,000 km2 in size, Ukraine is roughly 600,000 km2 in size.  Russian forces occupied roughly 2500 km2 (I made a rough estimate) and did not have to deal with major population centers.  Whatever scenario you picture for Russia in Ukraine, 2500 km2 is a joke.

Russia invaded Georgia with about 80,000 troops.

So what you're saying is that you expect Russia to fight an experienced, prepared enemy force 7-15 times larger than that of Georgia, in a battle space that is vastly larger, against an enemy that has been fighting with Russia for 2+ years already without showing any signs of quitting and come out on top quickly and painlessly?  With what size force?

1 hour ago, VladimirTarasov said:

Ukrainian Armed Forces performed well in some cases when facing the DPR/LPR militias. As apparent in the war when the DPR/LPR is reinforced by BTGs the UAF doesn't do so well. Of course though, units that are trained and execute a good plan could offer fierce resistance as in some cases, but overall there is much to be desired about their military.

This is not accurate.  Ukrainian forces, even the crappy equipped, poorly trained, poorly led, and inadequately supplied forces in the summer of 2014 did very well against Russian forces using T-72B3 and even T-90s.  And in terms of fighting DPR/LPR forces, Ukraine almost always crushed them because the DPR/LPR was (and still is for the most part) worse.  The Russian counter offensive in 2014, when Ukraine was at it's weakest and most vulnerable, ran into significant problems with progress and absolutely did not knock Ukraine out of the war.  DPR/LPR forces, always backed by Russian ground forces, also had a miserable time ejecting Ukrainian forces out of the Donetsk airport.  Debaltseve was another example where Russian line units had a difficult time against Ukrainian forces.

So again, what sized Russian force do you think it would take to force Ukraine to surrender?

1 hour ago, VladimirTarasov said:

A direct Russian involvement with full artillery support, air support would largely lead to successes. During the Ukrainian war the borders with Russia towards the north east did not have much of a defensive force And in that route there is a high way "M02" which Russian forces could advance straight to Kiev in 2-3 weeks (if facing stiff resistance), and threaten the capital and you know just like in Georgia, get a political solution done, lopsidedly in Russia's favor. 

For sure Russia could make good progress north of the ATO, but I doubt very much you'd see Ukraine "throw in the towel" quickly or easily.  You are comparing a very favorable situation of Russia's past with a vastly worse situation for it and thinking they are roughly equivalent.  That is very bad thinking.

1 hour ago, VladimirTarasov said:

Steve, I dont think Russia plans on fighting an insurgency in Ukraine in an event of war, so I'd expect short powerful goals like threaten Kiev, destroy Ukrainian Armed Forces near Donbas, and an expansion of DPR/LPR territories. Or a more simple goal, for example, push Ukrainian forces out of artillery range (60-90 kilometers) from Donbas, and destroy their military forces threating Donbas territories. 

And what fantasy force would be necessary to achieve this?  This is why I am talking in absolute numbers instead of ratios.  Tell me how many ground forces of the Russian Federation would be necessary to GUARANTEE this outcome?  In 2008 Russia used a force of 80,000 to assure it has little to no chance of defeat against a force roughly 10 times smaller.  Is Russia planning on invading Ukraine with 800,000?  Since that is more than twice the size of the current Russian Army, I doubt it. 

Russia can certainly attack into Ukraine with a much, much smaller force than this.  But the smaller the force the larger the risk.  Going for a large offensive in Ukraine with anything less than 200,000 forces is, in my opinion, unlikely to achieve the conditions necessary to cause Ukraine to surrender.  It is certainly not enough to destroy the Ukrainian armed forces.  And it would be very difficult to imagine such an invasion force being able to hold the territory it secured against Ukrainian counter attacks without significant reinforcement.

Russia's chance to invade Ukraine was best in Spring 2014 when it was disorganized and poorly equipped to fight.  Now it would be state suicide for Russia to attack Ukraine on anything except a very limited tactical/operational level unless it fully mobilizes for war.  What political conditions do you think it would take to have the Russian people support calling up hundreds of thousands of reservists to fight a prolonged war in Ukraine?

Steve

[VladimirTarasov]

"Population of Georgia in 2008 was roughly 4m.  Ukraine is roughly 40m.  Size of armed forces of Georgia that Russia confronted was about 10,000.  Depending on the scenario Russia would be immediately confronting somewhere around 70,000 minimum, 150,000 in the upper range (this includes National Guard, which for sure would be mobilized).  Georgian forces had almost zero combat experience while the bulk of Ukrainian forces have some and many have years.  Georgian forces had never, ever fought against a mechanized enemy force, Ukraine has been fighting such forces for more than 2 years.  Georgia never fought the Russian Army, Ukraine has been fighting it for 2 years.  Georgia never thought Russia would attack, Ukraine has obviously no such illusion.

The total area of Georgia is about 70,000 km2 in size, Ukraine is roughly 600,000 km2 in size.  Russian forces occupied roughly 2500 km2 (I made a rough estimate) and did not have to deal with major population centers.  Whatever scenario you picture for Russia in Ukraine, 2500 km2 is a joke.

Russia invaded Georgia with about 80,000 troops.

So what you're saying is that you expect Russia to fight an experienced, prepared enemy force 7-15 times larger than that of Georgia"

Truly you are right if we are talking about a war where Russia is going to capture all of Ukraine.... We're talking about certain goals that can be achieveable. If Russia is going to threaten Kiev with a thrust it will be using a high way to follow through to the assault, not going through all the terrain features of Steppes and forests. I said similar to Georgia not that its the same that would be the word "equal", I'm not saying Russia is gonna use 10,000 troops like in Georgia. So please dont try to dumb me down, I wasn't being literal.

The DPR/LPR already has 20K-30K in active service this is more than enough as a defensive force to launch operations from with actual Russian ground forces. Add units from the southern and western military district and Russia can easily reach the 1:1 ratio in the ATO... Obviously we have a better and larger air force and navy than Ukraine too. The advantage would be on our side even with a 1:1 ratio. Total war be it Russia can active her reserve units. To say UAF can even beat the Ru armed forces is a total joke and the war in Donbas proves it. But since you believe that the DPR/LPR army is mostly all Russian soldiers of course you will be lead to those conclusions. 

[Kinophile]

Well no,  he doesn't -  it's common knowledge within this forum and in RL that the Donbass separatists have their own armies of c15-30K combined total (as you note similarly above) along with strong c. 10,000+k Russian support and combat units integrated with them or operating independently. 

The ratio of Rus/Sep fluctuates constantly,  as I understood  it. 

[Battlefront.com]

12 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:

Truly you are right if we are talking about a war where Russia is going to capture all of Ukraine.... We're talking about certain goals that can be achieveable. If Russia is going to threaten Kiev with a thrust it will be using a high way to follow through to the assault, not going through all the terrain features of Steppes and forests. I said similar to Georgia not that its the same that would be the word "equal", I'm not saying Russia is gonna use 10,000 troops like in Georgia. So please dont try to dumb me down, I wasn't being literal.

You have still made absolutely no case for this sort of drive working.  To make a case for a straight drive against Kiev you have to first show that it would be physically possible.  Second, you have to demonstrate that such a drive could achieve the end result that makes the attack worth risking.  You have done nothing of the sort, but did make some vague references to how well Russia did against Georgia.  Therefore, I demonstrated that the primary reason things worked against Georgia is that Russia had a ratio of 10:1 against an unprepared enemy with almost nowhere to run to once the Russian hoards pushed into the country.

Please describe the Russian attack strategy and fill it in with numbers (not ratios, which are useless).

12 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:

The DPR/LPR already has 20K-30K in active service this is more than enough as a defensive force to launch operations from with actual Russian ground forces.

Based on past history, the DPR/LPR forces aren't competent enough to do more than man roadblocks and shake down locals for money.  It could only hold the territory against a vastly reduced Ukrainian force, not the one that faces it today.

12 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:

Add units from the southern and western military district and Russia can easily reach the 1:1 ratio in the ATO... Obviously we have a better and larger air force and navy than Ukraine too. The advantage would be on our side even with a 1:1 ratio. Total war be it Russia can active her reserve units. To say UAF can even beat the Ru armed forces is a total joke and the war in Donbas proves it.

Sorry, you have demonstrated a lack of fundamental understanding of this war since the start.  The Russian counter offensive of September had mixed results.  The airport battle went horrible for Russia.  The Debaltseve battle was also an operation that did not go very well.  Ukraine is capable of fighting and tactically beating Russian regular armed forces.  Enough to win a short war against a well resourced Russian offensive?  Maybe not.  But if Russia doesn't achieve a quick victory, I do not project Russia coming out ahead.

Again, this is not my opinion of Spring 2014.  If Russia has pushed 30,000 forces into Donbas in May I don't think Ukraine would have come out very well.  But things have changed DRAMATICALLY since then.

12 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:

But since you believe that the DPR/LPR army is mostly all Russian soldiers of course you will be lead to those conclusions. 

Not at all.  Current estimates of Russian fighting units in Ukraine number in the low thousands at the moment.  Logistics and specialized forces are much larger.  But at times, and in specific places, the only significant fighting forces in the Donbas have been Russian Army.  The 2014 counter offensive was nearly exclusively Russian forces.  Debaltseve was ultimately decided by Russian armed forces. 

If Russia puts enough forces into Ukraine, in the right places, at the right time, with the right goals, and with some luck it could achieve positive short term gains.  But the idea that Ukraine will once again be a slave state to Moscow is not going to happen.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

I will ask this again.  Stop talking in vague chest thumping and start talking specifics.  Please outline various scenarios that specify what force sizes (NOT ratios) would Russia mass, where, and with what goals?  I've made several specific scenarios and I have not seen a response yet.  This conversation is pointless unless we talk specifics.

Steve