In Deadly Combat--How'd the Germans do what they did?

[John Kettler]

Am almost done with Bidermann's book, which I believe is the best war memoir I've ever read. What I don't understand, though, is how the 132nd Infantry division (and smaller formations) was able to survive, let alone attack effectively, when facing situations like 5 x RD, 2 x Rifle Brigade and 2 x Tank Brigade at divisional level or Rifle Regiment with tank, artillery and Katyusha support (plus lots of random air attacks) vs a depleted company fighting from snow holes. I understand that baseline manpower is definitely a factor, with a German infantry division having considerably more men than the RD opposing it. This would naturally reduce the force ratios, yet we still wind up later on with the 132nd fighting on though so cut up that an entire regiment is shattered, and the survivors are used to bring the other two up to strength--against one fresh Russian formation after another.

Even by Russian standards, these sorts of force ratios should result in the wiping out of the smaller force and with minimal casualties to the larger. But that's not what happens in engagement after engagement. Small cut up German units not only hold off huge Russian attacks, but savage the Russians in rapid counterattacks or even triumph in expensive frontal assaults. Nor do I believe Bidermann is making stuff up. He comes off as anything but a braggart and writes unflinchingly of the horrors,misery, deprivation and degradation of war. How could the soldiers of the 132nd do, and keep doing, such militarily incredible things?

In Kobylyanskiy's excellent From Stalingrad to Pillau, he tells of how, even right in Prussia to the end of the war, Russian soldiers were subject to the dread drapsmarsch or bugout. If immediate action wasn't taken when soldiers started to bolt in the face of a German counterattack or attack, the whole formation on up the chain would almost instantly progressively disintegrate as the soldiers broke contact and fled, in turn inspiring others to imitate them. Perhaps this is part of the explanation of what Bidermann reports, but then how is that to be reconciled with one combat action in which the Russians came at them for seven days and nights nonstop? From what I can tell, the Germans seemed to have enormous amounts of MG ammo, as seen in the incident when the HMG gunner had slaughtered so many Russian attackers (with loads more still coming) that during one fight he practically broke down and quit. He paused briefly, saying "I can't kill anymore," then went back to scything down Russians.

I'm certainly willing to concede that there is much that happens in real war which CM can't model, but I'm sure that were we to set up some of these engagements, the Russians would mop the floor with the Germans. The real HMG that killed hundreds of Russians in one engagement while operating, I believe, from behind frozen logs, would likely have a life expectancy of a handful of turns, yet was there day after day, attack after attack, and this would be even more true for a single Pak 40 which racked up kill after kill for days and couldn't be located by the Russians. Were we to set up, say, a winter attack, in fallen snow, a Russian RR vs a depleted German company in foxholes, with the RR supported by Katyusha fire, artillery and fighter bombers, the Germans would be crushed in short order.

Is there something I'm missing here, or this something like an extended hot streak which is enhanced by discipline, true comradeship, iron will and devotion to duty? I would really like to understand what made it possible for the men of the 132nd to do what they did, under ever worsening conditions on every level and with acute personnel shortages, never mind the whole strategic disintegration in the East?

Regards,

John Kettler

[JasonC]

Well first he's lying. So there is that. You say you don't think he'd make things up only because you don't know the genre - blood and guts and hardship are the window dressing to get you to believe the line. Its propaganda. But that said, yes the Germans had a good defensive system and the Russians were more boneheaded than most about running into it.

Here is my description of that system off another sight, in response to a somewhat similar question. Though the immediate context was whether board wargame designs can get this stuff right.

"Michael - it is worth discussing why the Germans used their thin front, depth, hiding firepower, local counterattack defense, and whether wargames actually capture the tactical reasons behind that system.

First, the system dates to the second half of WWI, as the principle of the denuded front. The primary point was to avoid enemy artillery firepower by depriving them of a massed infantry target in a predictable place in ready range of the attacker's artillery, which was assumed to be superior - that is why they were the attacker, operationally.

So, very first point - any game that fails to depict how losses to enemy artillery rise in nearly direct line with friendly force density is not going to get to first base. They won't see the primary motivation for going thin in the first place. Located enemy that is concentrated just loses outright to the King of Battle, the guns.

The second discovery was that a network of sheltered machineguns and planned artillery fire - the latter role in WWII frequently being played by reactive fires from low level mortars at company and battalion - was inherently stealthy. The attackers simply felt like they were pushing into air and region of general danger, coming from all points on the compass, but hard to locate and harder to penetrate by local concentration.

Why hard to penetrate by local concentration? Because the mortars are not defending their own position, but projecting fire 1-2 kilometers in every direction from multiple starting points. The MGs are crossing fire lanes with their neighbors, so that defense vs a close approach to gun B is actually provided by guns A and C 400 yards to either side, more than by fire coming from gun B itself. This means local concentration in front of gun B, which might be thought likely to silence gun B more rapidly, in fact has no such effect. They can't see or get to gun B unless somebody else first gets to or silences A and or C. Then if they do get to B, it doesn't help them - it helps somebody else opposite A and C, where B was firing.

Both mortars and sustained MG fire - and in WW II, large antipersonnel minefields as the third pillar of the German defense in depth - multiply their effectiveness as enemy target density rises.

Thus the sign of the contribution to combat effectiveness of local concentration by the attacker is reversed. That is the whole point of the defense in depth. Massing firepower wastes shells and at most takes out a few thinly spread, unlocated, hard targets manned by only handfuls of men. Massing manpower increases the effectiveness of every antipersonnel mine, every defender's 81mm mortar shells, every belt of MG ammo fired from a distant flank that the defense can muster.

Thus, second point, any operational combat resolution system that does not understand those relationships is going to get the effect of massing against such a defense, either in a firepower sense or an infantry numbers sense, completely wrong. Further, any system that gives perfect intel about enemy positions to both sides from the outset, and has no spotting rules to prevent easy engagement of distance enemies, is likewise going to get everything completely wrong.

The defense is made deep to use a portion of the numbers not needed due to the thinness along each bit of front, and also to increase the local variation the attack will hit. The point is that the attack is not to know ahead of time, as he decides to mass his infantry in sector B, whether doing so will just send a mass of men into a minefield, or under a mortar registration, or whether it will actually hit a manned portion of the defense.

Finally, the role of the instant local counterattack must be understood in the context of the attacker's available adaptations to that system of defense. The attacker is effectively invited to go thin himself, slow down, and cautiously pick his way forward, all spread out. That way he recons everywhere and presents no massed mortar targets. But by the same token, he is not dense anywhere, at least along his forward edge. At most he has higher density behind his advance screen, here or there.

It is in that context that an instant local counterattack by formations as small as one platoon take on their meaning. They are meant to trump the countermeasure of the enemy sending one half squad to check everything. The defenders are violently *varying* their own local density, in space and in time. The impact comes from the surprise of hitting an outlier of density, compared to what was expected.

They first set the average density in the basement. If the attackers respond to that fact by lowering their own local density and slowing down, then the defenders pick shots and concentrate there, higher than the attacker. The attacker is not expected to get the same advantages from a higher local density that the defense gets, because the attacker does not know where these knots of higher concentration are. In other words, the defense is manipulating a concentration *difference* that interacts with the basic *information* difference that offensive vs defensive stance involves.

Concentrated and known is a vulnerable mortar target and useless. Concentrated and unknown outmatches unconcentrated infantry.

Again, if the system can't simulate those relations, it cannot depict the defense system involved."

FWIW...

[Erwin]

Another very interesting/useful analysis, Jason.

It makes me impatient for larger maps and scenarios so we can apply these lessons.

So far, nearly every scenario in CM2 has been essentially bore-sight range due to use of terrain to restrict LOS on small maps and we very rarely get to see how battles were in RL when they had 2K+ ranges and HMG's and Nashorns/Marders/88mm ATG's could fire without being KIA immediately.

[womble]

Something that'll affect the survivability of ATGs and enfilading MGs directly in CM is the "borg" spotting capability of the player. Static assets like MG nests and ATGs die quickly to CM players because they can drop mortars or arty on them pretty effectively and quickly. Do the Russians suffer in this regard, or are all their HQs "support eligible"? I was thinking that the longer ranges available also mean longer stretches of open ground to be crossed, potentially under fire, so infantry have to move rather than spot, and tanks might be quickly rendered unable to see by dint of them being smoking wrecks to properly-sited ATGs. It's usually the infantry that spot the ATG threat, and if forward observers are scarce among Russkie formations, it might mean a realistic german defense model poses a nearer-to-historical threat to a Russian attack.

[wadepm]

Agreed. The scenarios we have so far (but I haven't seen them all of course) take place after all of the interesting maneuvering that Jason describes. Nashorns, when they make their appearance, won't last 10 seconds...

However, to do this justice will probably require maps that are probably 4 kms wide and 8 kms deep. But the forces will still be pretty small so I would expect the engine could still handle it. Has anyone made such a scenario?

[sburke]

Another very interesting/useful analysis, Jason.

It makes me impatient for larger maps and scenarios so we can apply these lessons.

So far, nearly every scenario in CM2 has been essentially bore-sight range due to use of terrain to restrict LOS on small maps and we very rarely get to see how battles were in RL when they had 2K+ ranges and HMG's and Nashorns/Marders/88mm ATG's could fire without being KIA immediately.

I suspect the first time someone designed such a a defense for a player to attack into we'd be buried in complaints about how hard it was along the lines of Courage and Fortitiude. The reaction of the community or parts of it about difficult scenarios (C&F and a few in CMFI come to mind) effectively discourages the community of those who create.

[tdogg]

I have no problem with difficult scenarios especially if they are historical and the designer is trying to portray the scene that was faced in RL. If the scenario is meant to be a struggle to advance blood bath, then give us the manpower to absorb the casualties. Some battles were just losers whether it's history or combat mission, I still play'em to see what it's like.

[Erwin]

Well, obviously there must be ways to attack successfully on a large map with long LOS as it was successful in RL. One needs the correct tools for the job. Air, smoke etc...

CM2 scenarios to date have all been "knife fight" exercises (usually assaults) leading to a sense of repetition and deja vu for all but the most innovative designs.

[sburke]

Actually there you go. The point Jason was making is that a thorough defense has major advantages that become very difficult to overcome. Some times the attacker simply doesn't have the resources or command experience to succeed. You are now caveating that defensive position by requiring the tools necessary to defeat it not the tactical skill. I know people who beat school of hard knocks on the first try. I am not one of them. The scenario is difficult not impossible. And yet the vitriol on that particular scenario has poisoned the atmosphere for designers. Players rarely feel they should have to be better tactically, they invariably claim they weren't supplied with the right tools.

And it was NOT always successful in RL otherwise this thread wouldn't even exist.

And to be honest, despite my extremely modest contribution to the scenario community I do take offense at that characterization. That is a very sweeping negative critique of a community you are begging to do work for you. Pretty bad form I think.

[Pete Wenman]

CM2 scenarios to date have all been "knife fight" exercises (usually assaults) leading to a sense of repetition and deja vu for all but the most innovative designs.

Do you really think this is true - really !!!

P

[Erwin]

Well for me at least, yes.

There are some really good scenarios and campaigns that are memorable. Most others feel like am doing the same thing over and over again. But, maybe it's just me getting burned out. I didn't set out to upset sburke. Apologies if I did.

[MikeyD]

The thing about memoirs recording the daring exploits of units that survived the Eastern Front, bear in mind that's something of a self-selecting group. Nobody's going to write a memoir that ends "...and we were all annihilated down to the last man." Which leaves out 70%+ of the German units that had fought on the Eastern Front. Also first person accounts of enemy casualties inflicted are notoriously far off. From Caesar to the Kuwait war, initial accounts are sometime off by a factor of 10. I recall an after-action report following a Japanese counter-attack on a Marine position claimed ten times more Japanese tanks destroyed than the Japanese had brought to the battle. Sometime fog of war can be very thick indeed.

[JasonC]

Excellent point MikeyD. Still, the Russians did lose something like 4-5 times as many men as the Germans in the war in the east, and were still regularly losing 3 to 1 after they had all the operational advantages and odds etc. They just weren't very careful or clever tactically. The Germans were good on defense, everyone encountered that. But the western Allies didn't lose 3-5 to 1 getting through them; the Russians did.

I submit a big part of that is that the Russians let the German defensive system work as designed, more than the western Allies did; their junior officers and whole command system just didn't adapt to it nearly as much. They are still trying super concentration of infantry on the attack sector, for example, when the defense is a 105mm barrage, not infantry opposite. (Some of their late war set-pieces succeed anyway, to be sure, because they get better at counterbattery, etc).

[Yeknodathon]

The Germans waz just uber and the had best stuff and totally p0rned the rest and were superior in all things like war things and like it was a real close thing and they will come back real soon in War Z nazi zombie tanks and rulz as undead.

[m0317624]

I know people who beat school of hard knocks on the first try. I am not one of them. The scenario is difficult not impossible. And yet the vitriol on that particular scenario has poisoned the atmosphere for designers. Players rarely feel they should have to be better tactically, they invariably claim they weren't supplied with the right tools.

I was one of those who beat it first try. I still think it was a badly designed scenario in an even worse campaign, though it's saving grace is that at least it is not as godawful as Razorback Ridge.

And these scenarios are badly designed because in School of Hard Knocks, as in Razorback Ridge, it does not matter how excellent the player's tactical skills are. The way the maps are constructed and the starting forces arrayed forces the player into heavy losses that quite simply would not have happened if he was allowed to do the setup himself on a map that extended further to his rear. Both scenarios simply start the player's units in crappy positions in full sight of entrenched German lines with loads of support weapons and artillery, and this in a campaign that offers unrealistically few reinforcements and supplies to achieve the requested objectives without tons of luck. You can't even realistically avoid Razorback Ridge, as the mission that leads up to it and should offer the choice to avoid it is incredibly bugged.

Both scenarios are essentially nothing but a few die throws. In Hard Knocks, if the player's opening artillery bombardment kills the German FO, he can advance his infantry with few losses. If the three AT guns don't kill a tank in the turn they open fire, they'll have died without achieving anything and the tanks will easily kill the forward defensive line. If you succeed all 4 die rolls, the scenario is a cakewalk, if you fail more than two it's an exercise in frustration. The same for Razorback Ridge: if the infiltrating platoon is strong and well-supplied, you easily take out the German rear. If your spotters immediately spot the support positions on both map edges, they'll get shelled to oblivion without doing anything. Again, if you succeed these three die rolls the scenario is a cakewalk but if you fail more than one it's naught but frustration.

The failure of C&F is not that it featured strong defense in depth that was hard to overcome. It features no such defenses, as it takes place on maps far too small and there is usually only one or two lines of troops clumped together as easy artillery targets, and in fact the most powerful part of the defenses in these scenarios is the limited map space the player is allowed to use. It's failure is that the only difficulty was absolutely unrealistic and artificial, forced purely by limitations which emphasized this is a game. I've faced much better in depth defensive positions in CM scenarios and still enjoyed myself immensely. And if this has somehow "poisoned the atmosphere" then it seems some scenario designers have been drawing completely wrong lessons out of C&F by putting the flaws with the players instead of the designer.

And to be honest, despite my extremely modest contribution to the scenario community I do take offense at that characterization. That is a very sweeping negative critique of a community you are begging to do work for you. Pretty bad form I think.

C&F was part of a product we paid for, not some favor towards the community, hence it deserves all the criticism it got for its absolutely sub-par quality. The same goes for criticism about any other campaign or scenario bundled with these games.

As for the use of the term "begging to do work for you", you seem to have a very misplaced idea about the role and importance of community scenario designers. Maybe look at yourself first before attacking others for "bad form". A scenario should be shared because one wants others to enjoy themselves, not because it is some sort of gracious favor toward the lesser people. And if the vast majority of people don't enjoy a scenario, the designer needs to accept that the flaw lies with the scenario, not the players, and simply learn from his past mistakes.

[PanzerMike]

There are some really good scenarios and campaigns that are memorable. Most others feel like am doing the same thing over and over again. But, maybe it's just me getting burned out. I didn't set out to upset sburke. Apologies if I did.

Erwin, could you name some of those scenarios that are memorable to you? And why did they stand out? Just curious.

I have made 9 published scenarios to date (one included in Red Thunder, the others uploaded to the repository just to please the community). I started making scenarios right after Market Garden was out (so a little less than a year now). I guess I am still quite new at it, compared to some of the old hands here.

I have tried to make different kind of scenarios (assault on MLR, assault on outposts, city fight, attack on hastily prepared defenses, vanguard forces in rear areas etc.), just to prevent players from feeling that they are doing the same over and over again. I have not really made a scenario yet with armor engagements at really long ranges, though I have tried to give more maneuvering space in scenarios that are armor heavy.

As also has been discussed before, feedback on scenarios is rather scarce (to put it mildly). Only a few players give feedback, often the same people (bless them). So knowing if your work is well liked or not is kinda hard.

Edit: sorry to derail your thread John

[Melchior]

Too add to JasonC's post, modern defensive measures were the very reason tanks became so important during the 20th century. Those overlapping machine guns fields and anti-personnel traps were extremely effective against men, but against a tank your attack options are heavily restricted. Most units simply did not posses weapon systems that could do much to a tank. Much like how Knights in medieval europe presented a very serious, and likely very fatal, opponent to a peasant levy because they were just so damn hard to kill with the weapons available.

Anti-tank guns can inflict a lot of casualties on armor, but the war revealed tanks still usually came out on top, especially as their average weight increased. A big reason for this is simply that anti-tank guns are not very flexible, not very practical above a certain weight threshold, and not common enough to be everywhere all at once on the front.

For example, in around 4 years the Germans managed to build a ridiculous number of Pak 40s, some 40,000 of them. And totally included them in their elaborate defensive planning. The conclusion the German Army came to about towed anti-tank weapons was that this still simply wasn't good enough. Their were too many holes in a defense armor could still maneuver through. Hence why the German would seek to awkwardly duct-tape and weld every Pak 40 they had to basically any chassis that could carry it.

Reality was for most of the 20th century the only thing that could stop a horde of tanks was another horde of tanks.

The thing about memoirs recording the daring exploits of units that survived the Eastern Front, bear in mind that's something of a self-selecting group. Nobody's going to write a memoir that ends "...and we were all annihilated down to the last man." Which leaves out 70%+ of the German units that had fought on the Eastern Front. Also first person accounts of enemy casualties inflicted are notoriously far off. From Caesar to the Kuwait war, initial accounts are sometime off by a factor of 10. I recall an after-action report following a Japanese counter-attack on a Marine position claimed ten times more Japanese tanks destroyed than the Japanese had brought to the battle. Sometime fog of war can be very thick indeed.

I read Rebentisch's 23rd Panzer Division recently and I must say I totally agree. 23rd isn't a bad source, it's a very detailed, but Rebentisch pretty shamelessly embellishes the fighting capabilities of the German Army in the book. More than once he describes the Russians as a bunch of incompetent vodka-drunk lunatics who would gleefully send thousands of men off on pointless suicide missions. Sadly like a number of popular German accounts of the war the pungent stench of Nazi rhetoric about "untermensch" is detectable in the writing I think.

[Erwin]

Going strictly off memory and a check of my saved game folder (so there may well be other scenarios/campaigns that I really enjoyed but which have been deleted (the saved game files) and forgotten. The reason I like certain scenarios is that they are different/more original from the majority. Eg: I like scenarios where the designer has arranged for "mini-dramas" around the map - so one has several small clashes to overcome while on one's way to the major objective. What I find in too many scenarios is there is the one big objective and the one big assault and it feels like WW1 warfare without maneuver or the satisfaction of gaining small victories along the way.

CMBN:

Road to Nijmegan

KG Engel

KG Himmelfahrt

A Bloody Ride

Die Letzte Hoffnung

And while it was frustrating, I liked School of Hard Knocks scenario from C&F as mastering it after one or two tries was great training and humbling, since I had thought I was a good player. It was also one of those rare large scenarios that I also really enjoy. For that reason I also very much enjoyed the final mission of that campaign.

CMFI:

Venafro - haven't succeeded at it but I think a great trainer for urban combat.

Troina v2

FGM Something about Lucia

(Haven't played as much CMFI for some reason)

CMRT:

Blood on the Tracks

Railyard at Pitrovsk

Rettet Soldat Reinhart could be xnt, but currently has some flaws

Hammer's Flank has some good missions

I am certain there are lots of other scenarios/campaigns I haven't yet played that are xnt. But, the above are the ones I have played that I enjoyed (or are still enjoying).

[Gromit]

It's been quite a while since I was active in the community here, and CM in general. Guess I am busy with other things. John, glad to see your latest post here is thoughtful and open to different view discussion/acceptance. Without getting derailed here, in the past I found that wasn't usually the case. Enough said.

With regard to your observations, it does kind of make one wonder just who has the right of it when comes down to what really happened on the Ost Front and why.

Seems to me the Soviets did a bangup job of strategic setup, smoke-and-mirrors and execution, i.e., they had some very capable generals. But once you narrow it down to the local level, on a tactical and possibly operational level, the Soviet warmachine starts showing those classic flaws that existed in 1941 and they never really got solved. I am no expert, but their use of manpower and support was less than optimal. However, it does fit who the Soviets were. I get the feeling the German troops at the local level just prayed that strategically their generals wouldn't get flanked or caught flat-footed. Otherwise they felt pretty confident that locally they would have a fair chance of surviving the onslaught. Basically, I think the Soviets never got around to updating their tactical level capabilities, the Germans knew that and them intimately and took advantage of it. I imagine Stalin and the generals felt the effort to convert their army from what it was in 1939 to something closer to the other major powers just wasn't worth the cost. If Mother Russia had been more the size of say France, their outlook on manpower and prosecution of war would have been very different.

With regard to CM, history is replete with examples of every kind of engagement, from cakewalk to stonewall. Point is, the randomness involved in battles, encased in the fog of war makes it difficult to portray such actions with any degree of success. Steve has often made the point that map size (read engine/graphic capability) is a severely limiting factor for CM for the foreseeable future. It places hard boundaries on how close a designer can get to depicting WW2 tactical actions, any actions. So, it puts additional strain on a designer to try and get around these limitations. Typically, they don't. Too much time and effort for someone doing this on the side, a few hours a night or week perhaps.

With regard to randomness and the role it plays in simulations, I will use an example from a different source. If any of you have had the pleasure of playing Chad Jensen's Combat Commander boardgame by GMT, you already know where I am going with this.

CC is an excellent game that is fairly easy to learn, exciting and for a game that has limited fog-of-war, unpredictable and scenarios can be completed in around 1-3 hours typically. In a nutshell, the design incorporates events and random occurrences; from a fire starting or sniper targeting a random hex to reinforcement troops or a pillbox suddenly appearing in front of your squads. It combines this with a combat system that feels right to me (and many others based on the game's popularity).

Predictably, the naysayer wargamer grognards in the community poo poo'ed the game as lousy because they couldn't maintain control of their units. Too random they said. Unrealistic they cried. Baloney I say! Combat Commander is probably the best game around to simulate the basic elements present in a tactical WW2 firefight. It doesn't get everything right or even close to perfect, but do we even need to go there?

I can't wait for the day when CM or its equivalent can take on the task of simulating actions on a broader front with enough depth to allow historical tactics and maneuver. I actually don't think we are all that far from achieving it, but Steve and Charles are better judges of that I think.

Nice discussion guys.

[kensal]

An account from General Mellenthin, emphasising the importance of fire discipline, holding fire until the greatest number of attacking forces were within the kill zone, ensuring that the attack suffered heavy casualties quickly:

At 0630, on 16 October the Russians launched their attack against the positions of XLVIII Panzer Corps; I happened to be in one of the forward observation posts of 19 Panzer Division, and had to stay there for fully two hours.

The artillery bombardment was really quite impressive. No movement was possible, for two hundred and ninety guns of all calibres were pounding a thousand yards of front, and during these two hours the Russians expended their normal ammunition allowance for one-and-a-half days.

The bombardment reached as far back as divisional battle headquarters, and the two divisions holding the corps front were shelled with such intensity that it was impossible to gauge the Schwerpunkt. Some Russian guns fired over open sights from uncovered gun emplacements. After the two hours bombardment our trench system looked like a freshly ploughed field, and in spite of being carefully dug in, many of our heavy weapons and anti-tank guns had been knocked out.

Suddenly Russian infantry in solid serried ranks attacked behind a barrage on a narrow front, with tanks in support, and one wave following the other. Numerous low-flying planes attacked those strong-points which were still firing. A Russian infantry attack is an awe-inspiring spectacle; the long grey waves come pounding on, uttering fierce cries, and the defending troops require nerves of steel.

In dealing with such attacks fire-discipline is of vital importance.

The Russian onslaught made some headway but during the afternoon the armoured assault troops, whom we were keeping in reserve, were able to wipe out those Russians who had penetrated the defence system. We only lost a mile or so of ground.

On subsequent days the Russian break-through attempts were repeated in undiminished strength. Divisions decimated by our fire were withdrawn, and fresh formations were thrown into the battle. Again wave after wave attacked, and wave after wave was thrown back after suffering appalling losses.

But the Russians did not desist from their inflexible and rigid methods of attack. On our side artillery and armour bore the main burden of the fighting. Our fire plans were flexible, allowing for concentrations where they were most needed, and designed to break up the Russian columns before they could advance to the attack.

Wherever a deep penetration occurred it was quickly patched up, and a few hours later counter-attacks by our tanks were delivered against the flanks of the bulge. This battle continued for more than a week and the defensive strength of XLVIII Panzer Corps began to dwindle. 8 Army moved up its last reserve — 3 Panzer Division – to the danger point.

[Melchior]

Milnerds always claim to want realism but in the end what they really want to do is live out power fantasies. This is what so called "munchkins" do in P&P rpgs or why the Mechwarrior games all suck because of laser boating. That's why loads of awful milsims degenerate into a disastrous micro-management exercise with broken user interfacing and stilted, boring combat carried out by robots. They're click-fest games built into shallow, predictable gameplay environments that encourage rote-understanding of mechanics and little else.

They want a game they can easily win with a "right answer". They don't want confusion, fragility, or luck. Even though a close study of war and human conflict reveals how huge those factors are. I mean god forbid we should humanize war right? People might actually realize why it's so horrible then.

[JasonC]

kensal - sure that is easily the most famous passage on what the German generals wanted NATO to think the eastern front was like. But then the man relating it, von Mellenthin, is a proven liar who always left out every part of every operational history in which forces he commanded lost. He falsifies the dates of important engagements, he falsifies how far his formation got, what stopped them, etc. He plays up every tactical success endlessly as typical, then closes a chapter with a laconic "but the Russians had superior numbers and broke through somewhere else and we had to withdraw". If possible blaming it on allies or treason or on lack of realism in the higher command above him. Baron Munchausen had better tactics than his opponents too - he could scout out their positions riding a cannonball, and get back with his report by hopping a ride on one of the cannonballs fired back at his side by the enemy.

About the only parts of Mellenthin's description that are true are (1) that the Germans sometimes held fire to break an attack nearby rather than opening at long range and (2) that they relied on artillery to beat Russian infantry numbers.

The parts about relying on armor and counterattack are mostly nonsense, though - the Germans didn't have the tanks and their operational employment of their armor, from the early fall of 1942 clear to the end of the war, was abysmal. (Manstein's backhand is the only real exception, post 42). Tactically it was still the strongest part of their force, to be sure, and it did have a pretty good reaction time to a bleeding part of the front if it was available. But operationally it rarely was, because it was committed with too offensive a mission over and over and over.

As for the statement that "wherever a deep penetration occurred it was quickly patched up", and that counterattacks always won and saved anything in danger, meant to be taken as typical - it is just nonsense. As 2-3 days on one occasion it might be accurate - of the eastern front for 3 years, it is a joke. The Russians punched holes hundreds of miles wide and ran 400 miles into them - repeatedly.

[MeatEtr]

Am almost done with Bidermann's book, which I believe is the best war memoir I've ever read.

Regards,

John Kettler

It's been many years since I read it, so don't remember much. I did enjoy it no doubt, but also remember thinking it was overrated. Still worth a read though.

[Michael Clarke]

I would highly recommend, to all whom are interested, the book:

"Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-1945"

Here is an author who skillfully interweaves tactical accounts within the broader operational narrative. I found the accounts more believable than "In Deadly Combat", and the operational descriptions much more readable than let's say, "Panzer Leader".

Raus's mantra is what he calls "Zone Defense Tactics". Simply put, this is an evasive maneuver where a first main battle line is abandoned to a second main battle line, when the anticipated Soviet attack was imminent. The purpose of such a maneuver was to avoid destruction of the main force from Soviet artillery preparations.

What follows is his account of the July 14/1944 attack by the Soviet First Ukrainian Front against his ArmeeGruppe Raus:

The Russians did not disappoint us with regard to the location of the main attack but began their offensive on 14 July, two days later than expected. Interrogation of prisoners confirmed that the attack had been postponed by forty-eight hours at the last moment. As a result of this delay, the evasive maneuver had to be repeated on three successive nights. On the night of 11-12 July the Russians either did not notice the withdrawal because our rear guards left in the forward positions successfully simulated weak harassing fire, or they lacked the time and tactical flexibility to react to this sudden change. On the night of 12-13 July they attacked several evacuated positions with combat teams up to regimental strength and pushed back our rear guards.

Even this turn of events, however, had been anticipated. Strong counter-thrusts, supported by massed artillery fire from the regular firing positions, sealed off these Soviet penetrations, and at dusk on the night of 13-14 July our infantry once again occupied the front lines. As expected, the Russians resumed their attacks during the night to determine whether or not we would continue to occupy the positions. When these night attacks had been repulsed along the entire line, and the Soviets had convinced themselves that the positions were being held in strength, the fighting broke off and the front calmed down. After midnight our advanced positions were evacuated for the third time, and when First Ukrainian Front unleashed its main fire concentration at dawn it struck empty positions. The divisions that had retired into their battle positions suffered hardly any losses and—supported by assault guns and Tiger Battalion 531—were able to drive back nearly all Russian forces that had advanced beyond the empty positions. Our artillery preserved its entire firepower because the shelling and aerial bombardments hit the empty battery positions that had assumed the role of dummies. Not a single gun, not a single command post, was hit. Telephone communications from army headquarters down to regimental levels suffered no disruption. The former positions that had been evacuated, on the contrary, were in poor shape, the towns badly damaged by air attacks, and the debris of bombed buildings blocked main roads through several villages. Nevertheless, traffic continued to move along the previously designated alternate routes and halted only intermittently when Soviet aircraft scored direct hits on individual convoys.

Our reserves had not been touched by Russian air attacks, since they had used the darkness to move into locations unknown to the enemy. On the other hand, advancing Soviet infantry was hit by the defensive fire of artillery and rocket launchers that were fully intact and well supplied with ammunition. Reeling from this concentration, the Red Army infantry attempted to disperse and take cover but walked straight into the minefields we had positioned behind the front-line battle positions. This took the initial momentum out of the attack and prevented the Russian infantry from concentrating its effort in a single direction. First Ukrainian Front's advance slowed down and became hesitant, and practically all its territorial gains had to be abandoned when our troops, having evaded the destructive effect of the initial barrage, started to counterattack that afternoon.

Distress signals from the beleaguered Russian infantry brought their tanks to the scene. Like a cataract released by the sudden opening of a dam, the massed tanks poured across the Seret River into the historic battleground of Yaroslavichi, where exactly thirty years before, during the summer of 1914, Austro-Hungarian and imperial Russian cavalry divisions had clashed head-on in the last major cavalry charge in history. History now repeated itself, as once again the Russians enjoyed numerical superiority, and once again the battle ended in a draw. In 1914 the defenders achieved this result by the use of new machine-gun and artillery tactics, whereas in 1944 we introduced zone defense tactics to overcome our inferiority. On 14 July alone, First Ukrainian Front lost eighty-five tanks to our minefields. The number of disabled tanks increased rapidly, and the entire Soviet armored advance broke down when it came within reach of our carefully deployed antitank and flak guns. The losses assumed truly disastrous proportions when General Breith proceeded on 15 July to counterattack with the 1st and 8th Panzer Divisions.

I found the account interesting because it illustrates what was achieved when a defensive doctrine specifically designed to negate the Soviet artillery advantage was implemented.

Some take-aways from the doctrine: A dummy main line is evacuated before the artillery starts to fall; extensive minefields between the dummy line and the main line; artillery pre-registered to fire in front of the main line + on the occupied dummy line; AT+Flak strongpoints at the main line to parry Soviet armor breakthrough. Vicious, destabilizing infantry counterattacks are launched wherever Soviet hesitance is identified. Armored counterattacks to regain the dummy line. Sounds sort of like the optimal CM:RT German defensive battle eh? :cool:

As an aside, "In Deadly Combat" was one of the very first books on WW2 I ever bought. I remember it as being a vivid and entertaining read.

[wadepm]

If Mother Russia had been more the size of say France, their outlook on manpower and prosecution of war would have been very different.

Yes, it would have been over in a couple of months. The Soviets had size (both land and population) and used it all the way to the end. They didn't need to finesse things.