In Deadly Combat--How'd the Germans do what they did?

[Londoner]

A "typical" Russian infantry unit in june 44 was probably composed of about one-third freshly arrived 18 year olds, a second group less than one-third composed of veterans, some of which could be in their 40s who would have been with the unit since 41 or 42 and the rest in their late teens, early 20s who would have been with the unit a few months up to 2 years.

If we're talking about the actual combat infantry companies, not the parent units they're attached to, I'd be very surprised if typically a third of them were men who'd been there from 41/42.

[Londoner]

Or even "up to", surely 5-10% would be a more accurate figure?

Going by CM definitions one could argue even the last group - men "in their early 20s who would have been with the unit a few months up to 2 years" could generally be considered green, although as you say, that's open to interpretation.

Additionally would it be harsh to say training method/tactical doctrine and even combat experience (i.e. at least what's disseminated down to rank and file) differs between German and Soviet enough so to not make the below CM definitions entirely comparable?

Conscript: draftees with little training and no combat experience whatsoever.

Green: draftees with little training and some combat experience or reservists with

some training and no combat experience. Green can also represent professional

soldiers whose training is substandard in comparison to another force.

Regular: professional soldiers who went through extensive, quality training

programs, but lack combat experience. Or, Regular can represent troops that

received mediocre training that have a fair amount of combat experience.

[Erwin]

To bring things back to CM2 game issues, would a 1944-45 Soviet unit be essentially similar to a German or WAllied unit in 44/45?

ie: in the CMRT '44 game is it appropriate to split Soviet squads and do scouting in the same way as one do with US or Germans? I have a thread elsewhere where I described my lack of success is using steamroller tactics - keeping squads intact and together as platoons and trying to attack en masse, ignoring casualties, but relying on overwhelming mass and firepower to carry the day.

However, because currently AI pathing causes all troops to follow each other into minefields (or other ambushes) like lemmings, I found the steamroller approach too costly.

If it is appropriate to handle late war Soviets like Germans or WAllies, then that would mitigate the problems experienced.

[Sgt Joch]

And were these Booty troops distributed among the Companies/Platoons as replacements, or thrown together in separate Companies/Platoons with more experienced officers to lead them?

Dunn does not say.

[Sgt Joch]

If we're talking about the actual combat infantry companies, not the parent units they're attached to, I'd be very surprised if typically a third of them were men who'd been there from 41/42.

I said up to one third, it could be lower. Dunn analyses unit records, so you can see snapshots of what units looked like.

He mentions a platoon roster dated august 30, 1944 that was captured by the Germans. Out of 15 men, 6 were drafted in 1941, 6 in 1942 and 3 in 1943. Presumably some were Booty troops.

[YankeeDog]

I have read several first-person accounts of "Booty Troops" being absorbed into Soviet formations. (Odd name for them, but if you insist...)

In all cases I have read, the new additions were just integrated into squads/platoons in ones and twos, not used to create completely new formations.

Also worth noting that in many of the cases I have read, the new recruits had previously been part of the Red Army but had been cut off by the big encirclements of 1941/42, and/or had been fighting the Germans as partisans. So quite a few of them were not combat "noobs."

[76mm]

Regarding "Booty troops", again according to Dunn, they probably broke down into two groups.

The first group would be men in their late 20s or 30s who had previous military training pre-war and some of which had served with Partisans. They were the ones who were sent directly to front line units. The Soviets classified them as "untrained", but they were really re-called reservists. Again whether they should be classified as low motivation regulars or green is debatable.

The second group of "Booty Troops" were young men in their teens or early 20s who had no prior military training. Again according to Dunn, evidence suggests most were probably sent to basic training like the regular replacements.

A "typical" Russian infantry unit in june 44 was probably composed of about one-third freshly arrived 18 year olds, a second group less than one-third composed of veterans, some of which could be in their 40s who would have been with the unit since 41 or 42 and the rest in their late teens, early 20s who would have been with the unit a few months up to 2 years.

I don't have a good feel for which proportion of replacements fell into which categories, although as mentioned, while in theory the booty troops were supposed to be sent back for training before being assigned to units, in practice this was often not done.

And yes, they were sent to experienced units so that each squad would have a couple of veterans to stiffen and train the new booty troops.

Also, from what I've read, there were few soldiers left from 1941 by 1944, the attrition rate was just too high. I've read many of the available memoirs of Soviet front-line soldiers, and most of them didn't last more than a year or two on the front before being invalided out or finding a more cushy REMF job.

Also, while some of these booty troops came from partisan units, my understanding is that many or even most did not, and that in any event most partisan units had very little actual combat experience to speak of, although presumably they had at least rudimentary weapons training.

[Pelican Pal]

To bring things back to CM2 game issues, would a 1944-45 Soviet unit be essentially similar to a German or WAllied unit in 44/45?

ie: in the CMRT '44 game is it appropriate to split Soviet squads and do scouting in the same way as one do with US or Germans? I have a thread elsewhere where I described my lack of success is using steamroller tactics - keeping squads intact and together as platoons and trying to attack en masse, ignoring casualties, but relying on overwhelming mass and firepower to carry the day.

However, because currently AI pathing causes all troops to follow each other into minefields (or other ambushes) like lemmings, I found the steamroller approach too costly.

If it is appropriate to handle late war Soviets like Germans or WAllies, then that would mitigate the problems experienced.

I would say that it is always appropriate to handle Soviet troops similarly to Germans or Western Allies. The basic idea of how the Soviets did things was essentially a level up from everyone else. So a squad does the job of a fireteam, platoon does the job of a squad, company of a platoon. So you handle them the same, but you use a larger force.

That, unless I am mistaken, is kinda the basis of the Soviet steamroller/poor low level command.

What that doesn't mean is that they are all entirely stupid and have to keep a 10 man squad in a 8X8 meter square.

So split squads, but keep them closeish to each other. A squad covering 40 meters of ground isn't unsoviet. A platoon being split into fireteams and the covering 100-150 meters of ground isn't unsoviet. Breaking off a scout squad to walk 50 M in front isn't unsoviet. I think it would be reasonable for a SL to tell Boris and Andrei to walk a fair distance forward of a squad or say "go check out that farmhouse".

It is important to remember that in CM troops are unrealistic close to each other.

Edit:

I guess there is a question of what you mean by "handle like western troops". Generally I think of it as a lot of low level independent movement.

[Erwin]

Ok thanks... It's good to know that.

[JasonC]

YankeeDog wrote "any firearm, even bolt-actions, will fail in the field after a pretty short time if not properly cared for". I deny it. There is a standing joke on the subject among shooters.

AR-15 or M-16 - precision weapon, requires careful maintenance, makes a pew pew pew sound, kinda helped in a few cold war altercations at least until the politicians decided to cut and run.

AK-47 - rugged weapon, requires minimal maintenance, make a bam bam sound, won a few revolutions.

Mosin Nagant - crude weapon, "what is this maintenance of which you speak?", makes a BOOM sound, won Stalingrad.

[JasonC]

On booty troops and the comment that "they were sent to experienced units so that each squad would have a couple of veterans to stiffen and train the new booty troops", it is more like the reverse. They were never a majority of any formation. They filled out the ranks depleted by losses, and would typically form a third or so of the privates. They learned on the job from the experienced men. They were taken up gradually, just as losses were incurred gradually.

On attrition, the Russians routinely lost a third of the committed men in a large operation lasting just a few months. But most of those were wounded (or sickness, non battle etc) and returned to duty after a few months out of the line. It was normal for a soldier to "churn" through the front, serving for a few months, getting hit, being in the rear for a few months recuperating then given lighter duties, rear echelon tasks, or sent to train people if an NCO, then go back to the front again and face the risks all over.

The average soldier did not view combat commitment as a death sentence and most of them didn't die. They did expect to fight until they got hit, and most of them did get hit at one point or another, many of them two or three times over the whole war. If a wound was serious enough they'd be invalided home, but the normal result was months off the line in relative safety. Russian wounded and non-battle casualties for the whole war come to enough to turn over the standing, front line strength 3 times over.

There was always a stream of those men returning to duty, so in any unit up to a third of the manpower would be men who came out of the hospitals or other rear area comb outs relatively recently. There was a second stream of new recruits, both "booty" troops in the late war and the new age classes throughout Russia. A remaining third or so that were survivors still in the line that had lived through the whole previous operation unscathed.

[JasonC]

Londoner - most of the "conscripts" actually did have some training, it was just limited to a few weeks. Enough to organize them into units, issue them their kit and their weapons, do basic weapons familiarization, and above all to learn proper subordination to their officers and NCOs. That is the main thing a fresh recruit does not know - it is not that they don't know one end of the rifle from another, it is that they start with too nonchalant an attitude toward what needs to happen when a sergeant screams at them. They need to learn they are dead in seconds if they do not jump.

Green on the other hand cannot be passed by any degree of training. A formation is green if it hasn't seen the elephant, even if you trained them for six months in proper schools with good cadres etc. This is primarily a psychological toughness thing, not a matter of learned skills. Regular troops have seen men die horribly and learned that they will too if they don't keep their wits about them as that is happening. Green troops haven't and they will be shocked to their core when they see it for the first time. Nothing can train for that; it is a pure matter of horror and conditioning. The fear that generates has to turn into anger and aggressiveness; until that has happened they aren't "blooded" regulars.

I wish it on no man, it should go without saying...

[Londoner]

Londoner - most of the "conscripts" actually did have some training, it was just limited to a few weeks. Enough to organize them into units, issue them their kit and their weapons, do basic weapons familiarization, and above all to learn proper subordination to their officers and NCOs. That is the main thing a fresh recruit does not know - it is not that they don't know one end of the rifle from another, it is that they start with too nonchalant an attitude toward what needs to happen when a sergeant screams at them. They need to learn they are dead in seconds if they do not jump.

Green on the other hand cannot be passed by any degree of training. A formation is green if it hasn't seen the elephant, even if you trained them for six months in proper schools with good cadres etc. This is primarily a psychological toughness thing, not a matter of learned skills. Regular troops have seen men die horribly and learned that they will too if they don't keep their wits about them as that is happening. Green troops haven't and they will be shocked to their core when they see it for the first time. Nothing can train for that; it is a pure matter of horror and conditioning. The fear that generates has to turn into anger and aggressiveness; until that has happened they aren't "blooded" regulars.

I wish it on no man, it should go without saying...

Oh agreed, re training - as you said earlier, the ability to operate/maintain a bolt action rifle is negligible - it's the (forgive a Humanities grad') people stuff that's important.

Certainly can't argue with the latter - always believed the old Normandy myth about green units and getting off boats. However for the sake of CM/game considerations don't we have to agree on definitions?

[John Kettler]

Erwin and Pelican Pal,

During the Cold War, the Russians were still doing things pretty much as they had during the GPW. This quote from the 1976 DIA pub The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company(U) is apt.

https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/19793744/DIA-Soviet%20Motorized%20Rifle%20Company.PDF

"There has been no radical change in Soviet squad tactics

despite noticeable improvements in weaponry and APC design."

It's quite easy to demonstrate the Cold War Russian army was, save for some unavoidable changes forced upon it, doing things pretty much as during the GPW--and is still doing them. The Georgians, for example, fully exploited the Russian linear artillery deployments to perform very effective counterbattery fire during the Russo-Georgian War. And CNN, in covering US claims Russian artillery was shooting from Russia into Ukraine, recently showed (without realizing it wasn't M46s) a 152mm Msta-B gun line. If anything, the infantry attack formations may be tighter than discussed and shown, starting on page 43.

Based on everything I've read, to run a Russian squad like a German one or US one is simply wrong and virtually (no pun intended, but I'll take it) guaranteed to create ahistoric outcomes. Even Cold War Russian squads had an SL only. No ASL. No fire teams. A rather substantial difference from the US and Russia, I'd say. I've already explained the remarkable and consistent way the Russians allocate troops and officers within a given size formation (source: a former MRC CO). Now, factor that in with what you learned in the DIA pub and reflect upon how utterly unlike Germany and the US the Russian way of war was.

Regards,

John Kettler

[JasonC]

"Odd name for them, but if you insist"

Actually the term "booty troops" was a German one, not a Russian one. At the time. Just FYI.

[Nidan1]

edit.................

Green on the other hand cannot be passed by any degree of training. A formation is green if it hasn't seen the elephant, even if you trained them for six months in proper schools with good cadres etc. This is primarily a psychological toughness thing, not a matter of learned skills. Regular troops have seen men die horribly and learned that they will too if they don't keep their wits about them as that is happening. Green troops haven't and they will be shocked to their core when they see it for the first time. Nothing can train for that; it is a pure matter of horror and conditioning. The fear that generates has to turn into anger and aggressiveness; until that has happened they aren't "blooded" regulars.

I wish it on no man, it should go without saying...

Wouldn't you agree that in the time frame 1943 to the end of the war in Europe. Especially at the time of the Normandy landings, that it was the American and to some extent the Canadian forces who had the most number of "green" troops. As you said, training aside a soldier is "green" until he has actually seen and survived some level of combat action.

Even the 12th SS Panzer Division had mostly green infantry troops with a liberal addition of East Front veteran NCO and officer types, but would that unit in its entirety be labeled "green", certainly not veteran, but somewhere in between.

My point being that troops who have not been in combat themselves can "feed" off the confidence and savvy of combat veterans that are also part of their platoon or squad. There has to be some level of consideration for the fact that there are some veteran troops mixed in with the green ones. How many depends IMO opinion on the country involved, how you could model that in the CM world, I guess would be to have mixed levels of experience among platoon members as well as additional leadership bonus', which for the most part is being done by scenario designers now.

I can also say that from personal experience that having a veteran or two or three in your outfit, while it doesn't completely make up for the lack of combat experience in novice troops, does increase confidence and trust levels, and shows that one can survive the madness if you just rely on what you have been taught.

[Pelican Pal]

My view of how to run a Russian platoon is kind of a compromise between the limits of the CM game engine and the actual historical facts as I know them.

I don;t think it is too far fetched to assume that a Russian 10 man squad could cover 50 meters of ground (5 meters between each man). Nor do I think it would be entirely unheard of for the SL to tell Vasily to check out that farmhouse sitting ominously quiet at the edge of the woods.

Now take that idea of how a squad works and put it together with how CM forces unrealistic unit densities constantly and I've created a compromise.

Russian squads can be split to cover additional ground, however they should maintain C2 to their parent formation as much as possible. So while I split Russian squads I keep their tactical movement together as if they were still one squad. I also increase the basic maneuver unit I would use for anything. So if I would use a German fireteam I use a Russian squad. If I were to use a German Squad I will use a Russian platoon and so on. I believe it keeps them sufficiently rigid while ironing out some of the infantry simulation problems that CM has.

[JasonC]

"troops who have not been in combat themselves can "feed" off the confidence and savvy of combat veterans that are also part of their platoon or squad."

Having veteran cadre helps, certainly. But no it isn't a substitute for actual combat experience. And lots of other formations were green late in the war.

When 17SS first fought the US outside Caretan, they were green. There were some veteran German Fallschirmjaegers in the area, mostly fought out after being in action against superior numbers for several days. And the 17SS had some vet cadre, though less than you might suppose. But the men in the line were not only entirely new to combat, they were also very young. They had been through training, but they were young men in their first action.

And lots of them just flat out ran. They attacked with cadre and armor and all that, but the US paras in front of them didn't just get out of their way, and then US armor showed up and their own armor started losing. And the young green SS guys took to their heels in response.

People don't typically think of a mobile SS formation in the middle of 1944 as being "green", but in fact they were. The division had never fought before, and the young men in the ranks were straight from basic training.

This isn't the only such example. A similar thing happened with the first German panzer division forces sent to stop the Russian breakthrough to the west of the Dnepr after the fall of Kiev. A motorized panzergrenadier regiment got off the trains and went into action along the main Russian route of advance. Veteran formation, but coming back into action after a rebuilding spell off the line. As a result of which, most of the men in the ranks were completely green. And then the Russians hit them with tanks, before their own had arrived and detrained and linked up with them. The regiment disintegrated on contact.

There is no substitute for having actually seen the elephant. Good training, cadres, being eased into action in a quiet section of the line for a spell, fighting a first major engagement in favorable rather than bad operational conditions - all help. But the first time any untried unit fights for real, and takes real casualties, how well the men react is anybody's guess. You can't assure they will handle it well by arranging those priors - at best, you improve your odds they can handle it.

One man's understanding of this issue...

[JasonC]

Pelican Pal and the others wanting to nerf Russian infantry - I think you need to read some of the Russian lessons learned reports on tactical methods that the Russians circulated to their officers during the war. And to follow the practices of the Russian infantry recon (predecessors of the modern Spetnaz), battle pathfinders, storm companies, and their tank riders and combat pioneers, come to that. They were not rigid. Not remotely.

They had highly evolved methods that substituted the right weapon and balls of brass for numbers, exploiting stealth and terrain, to get a few guys as close to enemy positions as possible, to take them out with special weapons. They had elaborate systems of coordination between bases of fire that used LMGs, ATRs, light guns, and mortars to suppress, and small assault teams of tommy gunners and pioneers. They had a full pillbox reducing "drill" based on such coordination, that risked only a team at a time on a given axis, to get someone close through dead ground, to use explosives to finish off a pillbox.

Their recon guys did night infiltration as their main mission, and would split down to pairs, and would move a quarter of an mile an hour through the enemy positions. Slow creep, silent as possible, motionless for half a minute at a spell to just listen. They'd keep that up for 4 hours straight to be inside the enemy position before dawn. The same tactics would be used by pathfinders the night before a dawn attack, to put single squads directly opposite enemy listening posts, undetected.

The tank riders were habitually understrength from losses and did jobs that called for a full squad with 3 to 6 guys. Getting a tommy gun or a grenade thrower within 35 meters was way more important than how many there were; just one making it would silence an enemy position. That was the whole point of their weaponry - it is economy of force, ahead of time. If massed firepower was needed the tanks supplied it, not the infantry via numbers. They just needed to be able to check everything.

The motorcycle recon also split as fine as you please to check every route. They were scouting for tank columns that stayed concentrated, but they themselves split as much as the road net required to scout every single route. If they were checked anywhere they stopped, and relied on their friends on the other routes to turn that check, or the tanks to pick one and break through it. They didn't do anything by massing and firing rifles in volleys, expecting numbers to matter.

Infantry recon, storm company tommy gunners, tank riders, and pioneers were a third of the Russian infantry arm, between them. Sure the line rifle companies *did* rely on numbers and persistence on an assigned frontage, but they were not remotely the whole story of Russian infantry tactics. And the later you get in the war, the more those line rifle companies are relying on infiltration tactics, or firepower support arms to shoot them in.

Don't try to write stupidity into the game system and push that on the Russian infantry.

[Pelican Pal]

Don't try to write stupidity into the game system and push that on the Russian infantry.

I'm not sure where I am trying to nerf Russian infantry or where I am trying to write stupidity into the game system.

From my understanding a basic Russian platoon would not act like a German or W. Ally platoon. Generally they would use a platoon to do what someone else might have a squad do. Is this not correct? It has been said repeatedly on this forum by forum members and BFC. In fact the CM:RT manual actually states something to that effect. In which case it would be ahistorical to send a squad off to act independently of the platoon. Am I wrong?

I also would like to point out that I am only speaking of the average rifle platoon. Not any specialized scout formation.

[JasonC]

Yes, you are wrong. It is a bit of prejudice, not much more. There may be some formations and periods that fit that stereotype, but as a blanket statement it is just false. A veteran Russian platoon could do anything and everything a western or German platoon of the same skill level could do, and there were plenty of such formations with those skills in the Russian army. Just as there were boneheaded green formations in the German army, and raw conscripts pressed into service with minimal training, late in the war. All armies are varied rather than uniform.

[Nidan1]

......edit

When 17SS first fought the US outside Caretan, they were green. There were some veteran German Fallschirmjaegers in the area, mostly fought out after being in action against superior numbers for several days. And the 17SS had some vet cadre, though less than you might suppose. But the men in the line were not only entirely new to combat, they were also very young. They had been through training, but they were young men in their first action.

And lots of them just flat out ran. They attacked with cadre and armor and all that, but the US paras in front of them didn't just get out of their way, and then US armor showed up and their own armor started losing. And the young green SS guys took to their heels in response.

That is one example...and nicely portrayed in an episode of "Band of Brothers as well.

How then do you explain the fanatical resistance put up by the Hitler Jugend Division against the British around Caen? Certainly the young Grenadiers, mostly teenagers in 1944, had never seen combat before, but yet they fought with the characteristics of combat veterans.

Both the 12th and the 17th were SS units, trained and led by veterans and equipped with the latest weapons. Both would be considered green by the factors we are discussing here, but could be considered superior to a comparable Wehrmacht formation. However, one unit broke fairly quickly under pressure and the other fought for weeks also under intense pressure.

IMO there are many factors other than just not being shot at before that influence the performance of novice troops in their first taste of combat.

[Saferight]

All armies are varied rather than uniform.

This statement sums up the whole discussion.

the 12th and the 17th were SS units, trained and led by veterans and equipped with the latest weapons. Both would be considered green by the factors we are discussing here, but could be considered superior to a comparable Wehrmacht formation. However, one unit broke fairly quickly under pressure and the other fought for weeks also under intense pressure.

I really doubt 17th SS was even in the same league as the 12th. It was mostly comprised of conscripted volksdeutche and not exactly superbly equipped.

[Nidan1]

I really doubt 17th SS was even in the same league as the 12th. It was mostly comprised of conscripted volksdeutche and not exactly superbly equipped.

Not entirely true....some of its members were Romanian German conscripts which were brought in to bring the division up to strength in 1944. It was raised from scratch in 1943. Green in the context of this discussion?, probably.

You are right about its equipment. The division was rushed to Normandy, and a lot of its armor and mechanized equipment took awhile to catch up. They did fight fairly well in Normandy from June through August, when they were pulled off the line. I still contend that combat experience is not the sole element to predict how a unit will fight. On an individual level it may be true that exposure to combat will make a soldier tougher and more likely to survive. But unit cohesion and effectiveness in combat is based on training, comraderie, leadership and undefinable elements that take over in the chaos of a battle.

[Cuirassier]

Posted by JasonC, from a previous, similar thread re: the state and performance of German mech divisions in Normandy. Below is Jason:

"To cut through the straw men and baiting, a little at least...

There is how green or veteran a unit was at the start of the campaign, and there is how well it was equipped, and there is how well it actually fought. The first two influence expectations about the last, but there is independent variation in that third item. Overall, there is variety - as usual. In that variety, there is nothing special about the SS mobile divisions.

17SS was green, poorly equipped for a mobile division, gave a poor initial performance and later improved to about average.

1SS was veteran, very well equipped, fought well.

12SS was green, well equipped, fought well.

9+10SS were regular, middling equipped, fought relatively poorly for mobile divisions.

Lehr was new to combat but experienced personnel, the best equipped mobile division in the German armed forces, and fought well.

2nd Panzer was veteran, well equipped, and fought only middling well, plagued by piecemeal commitments.

21st Panzer was new as a division, weirdly equipped (middling, non-standard items), fought pretty well early but lost much of its strength in that early fighting.

116th Panzer was green as a division, well equipped, and fought very poorly (committed late, bad performance both in Mortain and defensively).

The best of them was Lehr, in actual performance and in experience level of the men.

The second was 1SS.

The worst was 116 Panzer, despite being well equipped and committed as a unit, though late in the campaign.

The next worst was 17SS.

9SS and 10SS were below average for mobiles; 2nd Panzer underperformed its experience and equipment levels in this specific campaign (it was strong again later). 12SS was above average in performance for its prior experience level, just par for its equipment level, which was strong.

Were any one of these the best performing armor formation in the Normandy campaign? No. That accolade arguably goes to the US 2nd Armored division, which was a veteran formation at the start of the campaign, and fought rings around them all. It made Cobra a clean breakthrough, fought its way through half a dozen formations in the process including major armor in the later portions of the breakout, was instrumental in defeating the Mortain attempt, bested 116 Panzer, 2nd Panzer, 1SS, overran half of France, etc. There weren't any slashing Guderians on the other side of the hill, but "Hell on Wheels" made it look like 1940 again. Of course it had help, and a favorable operational chance - the outstanding armor formations always do when they get their chance to shine."

FWIW