In Deadly Combat--How'd the Germans do what they did?

[JasonC]

Raus is another proven storyteller. But yes, the denuded front - which he likes to pretend he invented or something - has been working against artillery prep fires since 1916. Kinda thought I covered that in my first post...

[JasonC]

wadepm - first the last, Russia had only twice the manpower of Germany. First to last, Russia had only equal industrial capacity to Germany. But it mobilized more men than that ratio, it sustained casualties above that ratio without any fall off in field strength from the end of 1942 to the end of the war, and it outproduced Germany in tanks by 2 to 1 from that equal industrial base. The Russians were flat out better than the Germans at force mobilization and they tried epically harder than the Germans did. That, not size or prewar population, was the main source of their edge in combat in the second half of the war. With an assist in the last year or so from the western allies, to be sure.

You don't take 4-5 to 1 losses from 2 times the base and win by numbers alone.

The big helpers were German own goals from arrogance in the first half of the war, very poor operational direction from Germany in the critical phases (fall 1942 campaign, and Kursk to and over the Dnepr - throughout which all the smart generals who got things right got sacked, while the pangloss yes-men remained), and then the aforementioned western allied assist in the final year.

[DavidFields]

Actually there you go. The point Jason was making is that a thorough defense has major advantages that become very difficult to overcome. Some times the attacker simply doesn't have the resources or command experience to succeed. You are now caveating that defensive position by requiring the tools necessary to defeat it not the tactical skill. I know people who beat school of hard knocks on the first try. I am not one of them. The scenario is difficult not impossible. And yet the vitriol on that particular scenario has poisoned the atmosphere for designers. Players rarely feel they should have to be better tactically, they invariably claim they weren't supplied with the right tools.

And it was NOT always successful in RL otherwise this thread wouldn't even exist.

And to be honest, despite my extremely modest contribution to the scenario community I do take offense at that characterization. That is a very sweeping negative critique of a community you are begging to do work for you. Pretty bad form I think.

Wow...wow...."poisoned"....ever think that maybe a mistake in execution/presentation occurred, learn from it, and be appreciative?

In my opinion, hard does not equal unfun, easy does not equal fun. Realistic can be fun.

But the attitude behind many of the scenario/campaign designers is, frankly, astonishingly unfun.

Great people though they all may be, and understanding this is a generalization. BTW, whoever did the CMRT scenario Assault--nice job with a clear and interesting briefing, pre-battle subtle info on the battlefield, and economical and clever battle situation.

I have read PT's explanation of his philosophy of design. Besides what I disagree with, as I recall, it was about 40 lines of un-indented text. It is unfun to even read!

Now, a campaign which broke down the German defense elements that JasonC describes. Put them together in a sequence so that a reasonably adept Soviet player could win the first time through (it's not that I don't like replays. I don't like it if the only way one can win is by knowing the enemy forces. Dead of the Night is very elegant, fun, and replayable.) Give hints to the Soviet player, perhaps, to make success more likely--not to deceive the player. Give them enough forces to win--the Soviets did win, even against those German tactics.

Vary the difficulty from easier to harder in the campaign. (I was stunned when someone made the obvious, to me, suggestion that campaigns should be ranked in difficulty according to their hardest battle and someone on the design staff ?disagreed?)

To me, JasonC has handed you a conceptual framework for some fascinating campaigns. Educational, incidentally or not, but also entertaining--as much as war and the dying of soldiers can be--which is not always, and sometimes I need to step away for awhile. But it is ultimately about the projection of power and the, sometimes vain in multiple senses, uses of intelligence to project that power.

Yes, per my sig, everyone has inherent worth and dignity. But the poutiness is unbecoming. Read. Learn. Improve.

And this is not about my CM2 gaming skills, in my opinion. (or me reading, learning, improving--I am on this forum constantly to do just that) It is about other's ability and enjoyment.

No, I don't develop scenarios/campaigns. I just upgraded my CMBN/CMFI, so as to help Battlefront to be supportive. I don't want to inflict emotional anguish--to the very fiber of my being that is not me-- but I fervently wish to see a different campaign design philosophy so as to generate a larger, and even new, base of interest in WW2 tactical warfare. In that, and others could disagree, I see myself as very pro Battlefront.

[wadepm]

Jason, I agree with what you said. But we were talking about if Russia were the size of France. In the initial advance Germany took an area at least twice the size of France and destroyed at least the equivalent of The 1940 French army. Game over. But you only get to fight France once...

[Melchior]

wadepm - first the last, Russia had only twice the manpower of Germany. First to last, Russia had only equal industrial capacity to Germany. But it mobilized more men than that ratio, it sustained casualties above that ratio without any fall off in field strength from the end of 1942 to the end of the war, and it outproduced Germany in tanks by 2 to 1 from that equal industrial base. The Russians were flat out better than the Germans at force mobilization and they tried epically harder than the Germans did. That, not size or prewar population, was the main source of their edge in combat in the second half of the war. With an assist in the last year or so from the western allies, to be sure.

You don't take 4-5 to 1 losses from 2 times the base and win by numbers alone.

To be honest I think more than any other reason, (though plenty were contributing factors) the biggest reason Operation Barbarossa failed was because the Red Army didn't simply collapse outright like the French Army did. A lot units were bypassed, surrendered, or destroyed sure, but enough of the Red Army simply held on and kept fighting and that totally broke the Wehrmacht's tight, fragile timetables. The war sort of revealed that surrounded units that simply keep fighting even if poorly can screw an advance if they're in the right place. Hitler simply planned on the Red Army collapsing as fast as the Allies did in France and when that didn't happen everything spun out from there.

I mean their are people who believe the Invasion of France might had turned into a disaster at Sedan if the French had only reacted to it. They just made no effort. I don't find that idea terribly unreasonable.

[sburke]

@Rankorian are you kidding? PT has produced quite a few campaigns, JasonC has not only created none but expressed in a very negative manner what he thinks of creating anything for this community. You criticize PT's thoughts on scenario creation in that kind of tone and in the same post suggest someone else implement JasonC's design?

Poutiness as your termed it may be unbecoming, but good lord what the hell then is the above?

[Wodin]

In deadly combat was the first German memoir I read. A great book indeed.

[Sgt Joch]

couple of points:

1. "Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-1945" is good, but I find he is more pertinent in 41-42 when he was at division level and relating events he saw first hand. Once he gets to Corps and Army level in 43 or 44, he seems to be relating events he heard second or third hand, some of which are directly contradicted by other sources I have seen.

2. One very good document on German doctrine is Wray's "Standing Fast: German defensive doctrine on the Russian Front during the Second World War" available here:

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll2/id/1743

3. If you read Wray and other sources, you will see the Soviets did improve tactically on the attack from incompetent in 41 to competent in 43-45. They were probably always behind the Germans, but the gap kept narrowing as the war progressed.

4. Yes, the Soviets had problems cracking a perfect German defense, but the reality is that as the war progressed, the Germans were too short of men and equipment to set up text book defenses except in certain key areas. The Soviet response was to avoid the heavily defended areas and drive through the weak spots instead.

For example, if you look at "Bagration", Army Group Centre was only able to setup strong defenses along the four main highways: Vitebsk, Orsha, Brobuisk and Mogilev. In between they were relying on the terrain and Panzer reserves to clean up any Russian advance.

The Soviets knew that the Germans tended to pull their forces out of the first trench lines before an offensive to avoid the initial barrage. In response, the Russians started sending company/battalion sized probes just to see if the trenches were occupied. If they were, they would pull the probes back and start a conventional offensive, if not they would drive through.

On june 22, the Russians started probes throughout most of the attack front. North of Vitebsk, many probes went right through the german lines which were very lightly held. The local commander just kept right on going with the offensive and dispensed with the barrage.

Around Orsha, the june 22 probes failed and the initial june 23 assaults made slow progress. However, between Orsha and Vitebsk, in terrain which the Germans considered impassable, the Russians broke through the thin German defences. (Note: this is where the Soviet campaign in CMRT is located and we have made an effort to model the German defences as they probably were in that area.)

Once the front was broken, either north of Vitebsk or between Vitebsk and Orsha, the Russians quickly rearranged their plans to push their tank forces through. The Germans were then forced with a tough choice: stay in their defenses and be encircled or retreat west onto open ground.

The reality is that once you get to the CMRT time frame, a battle where the Russians just throw masses of men at a text book German defense is more the exception than the rule.

[JasonC]

I agree with every word of what Sgt Joch wrote. I agree with not one word others in the thread wrote.

In particular, it was nit the resistance of surrounded Russian forces that mattered in 1941. Yes they continued to resist. But they also died and died rapidly, because artillery ammunition cannot be conjured into existence by an act of will, and infantry without artillery completely surrounded by infantry with artillery is just powerless. No, the difference in 1941 was made by entirely new formations outside of any encirclement fighting effectively, plus the German own goal of no replacement stream or real mobilization, plus German logistical unreality, fantasy in the place of planning, plus the German high command sacking every commander reacting sensibly to all of the above as supposedly defeatist, plus just plain epic sacrifice and determination on the part of the Russian line, despite the epic incompetence of their officers in that era.

Some of that may fit what the previous poster was trying to say, just with differences of emphasis. Fine. But it wasn't that the surrounded resisted so fiercely. They resisted, yes, it didn't matter because they were powerless. But new forces outside the pockets had been mobilized and replaced them - while the Germans screwed up everything but the operational handling and tactics. (I mean logistics and mobilization and realism and commanders sacked etc. When you fire a Guderian, a Rundstadt, and a von Bock all in a month or two, don't be surprised when disaster follows).

[John Kettler]

Returning to Bidermann, anyone who refers to his dictator CinC and political leader as "brown corporal" isn't exactly leading the torchlight parades at Nuremberg. He makes it clear in several places he found the Hitlergruss to be militarily inappropriate; hated giving it, both because it violated centuries of soldierly tradition and feeling it soiled him, and lauds the Landsers' cleverness in avoiding giving it by carrying their mess tins in the hand which saluted. In describing Marshal Schoerner, a dyed-in-the-wool Nazi if ever there was one (got on famously with that other avowed Nazi, Rudel), he makes it clear how utterly unlike a proper Prussian officer Schoerner was; how uncaring of the men in his charge; how utterly ruthless and possessed of the same blinders as those worn in Berlin.

I don't believe he paints a rosy (Nazi) picture. Even in the early part of Barbarossa, he's talking about death. Death everywhere. the smell of death. The evidence of death and its numerous forms. Dead Russians. Dead Germans. Killing. Being killed. Almost being killed. Wounds of all sorts, including those fished for. Dead horses, dead trucks and armor. Tank crews gunned down as they exited their burning steeds. The random killing inflicted by Russian air power. The murderous effects of a Stuka attack. Katyusha and the "bellowing cow." Artillery. Mortars.

Death, loss and sorrow--first on the Front; later Front, homeland and points between-- permeate the book--to the point where the depression affected ought not to read the book. And it gets worse as the war continues its meat grinding juggernaut path. The point about survivors' memoirs is well taken, but even on the Russian side, something like 1% of all those who entered the GPW at the beginning survived to end it. Bidermann wasn't fighting for Hitler, but for a victory which, given years of Nazi inculcation, made sense to him. Until it didn't. Survival was made possible by excellent training, painfully acquired toughness, resilience and battlefield smarts; knowing how to squeeze every possible benefit from ever less, but ultimately from intense, sustained war-long cameraderie, of a kind simply not found in American units generally, given the way they were organized, trained and committed to battle. For German soldiers injured in battle and then recovered, going back to their unit was the norm (some stayed in-unit rather than risking being reassigned following hospitalization), whereas the American soldier was most likely going to a repple-depple. An entirely different approach to providing the manpower needed.

Turning now to the tactics of the thin front, Bidermann explicitly addresses this very issue, talking about how the Germans were so short of men and weaponry that only key locations could be defended, coupled with poor unit density for assigned frontage and severe and worsening manpower problems occasioned by no replacements, from early on, for established units. He also talks about how difficult it was to hold the line against not only Russian infantry, but their full array of weaponry--when artillery was short on ammo or even unavailable and antitank weapons few and far between. Speaking of weapons, I think he may've described encountering bazooka toting Russians. He refers to a shoulder launched something and would presumably know what a Panzerschreck was. He calls a Panzerfaust a stovepipe, but his description of it was unambiguous. His take on the T-34 is noteworthy, but that didn't stop him from taking them on with 'fausts, to great effect. These atop his three Pak-36 kills!

Regards,

John Kettler

[Wodin]

Jason C..you don't agree with even one word of anyone elses post in this thread except Sgt Joch!!!

It was actually the first memoir I read and I did enjoy it:)

[Michael Emrys]

Returning to Bidermann, anyone who refers to his dictator CinC and political leader as "brown corporal" isn't exactly leading the torchlight parades at Nuremberg.

But I take it all this was written after the war. After the shooting was over and the memoirs began coming out, especially those of ranking officers, they were at great pains for a variety of reasons to distance themselves from Hitler and the hard core Nazis as far as possible. But like most of the German population, they were happy enough to go along with the Nazi program so long as it was winning. I don't find this to be a peculiarly German trait, but as it happens historically they were in it up to their eyebrows at this time. That and its consequences are lessons that I wish more people would take to heart.

Michael

[Sgt Joch]

JasonC is a very wise man.

[YankeeDog]

The only thing I would add to Sgt. Joch and JasonC 's comments is that starting somewhere around second half of 1943, Stavka and Stalin become increasingly confident the Allies are going to win the war eventually, and their strategic focus gradually shifts from how to win the war and ensure the survival of the Soviet state, to how to grab as much territory in Europe as possible before the end of the war. This is a gradual shift; it doesn't happen all at once.

And as the endgame becomes increasingly apparent, Stalin is more and more willing to trade Russian lives for European territory. Stalin never really trusted the Western Allies and he wanted to make sure facts on the ground backed up what he believed to be the Soviet Union's due in post-war Europe. Stalin wanted to make absolutely sure the Soviets are the first to Berlin, And Vienna. I'm sure he would have met the Western Allies at the Rhine in March in exchange for 1 million more Soviet lives, if he could have.

I believe this strategic focus this explains some (not all) of the apparently foolhardy Soviet tactics during the Third Period of the War. Stavka pushed the Generals very hard to be aggressive on the attack, so they can grab as much territory as possible, and this filtered all the way down the command structure, affecting tactical decisions on the battlefield. Stavka's Strategic worldview resulted in high-risk, high-reward tactics, leading tactical commanders keep pushing forward on the attack even when overextended and lacking support, etc.

[Sgt Joch]

Two more points that would partly explain the higher level of Soviet casualties:

1. The Soviets were a lot more aggressive in their use of infantry and less concerned about minimising casualties. This was partly because of the political system which did not have to worry about public opinion and partly because they had a large pool of, as I recall, 1.5-2 million 18 year old conscripts coming into the army in each of 1942, 43 and 44, more than enough to cover casualties in those years. In fact, IIRC, the Russians started disbanding units and sending men back to civilian production in late 44.

In contrast, the Germans had a potential pool of only around 600,000 young men turning 18 each year. The British and Canadians were both facing a manpower crisis in 1944 and had trouble replacing casualties. The U.S. and CW also, being democracies, had to be careful to keep casualties to a justifiable level.

2. The Soviet infantry junior leadership at the team/squad/platoon level was not as competent as in the U.S./CW and German armies. There are many reasons for this (education, casualties, promotion), but there was always a shortage of qualified, experienced NCOs and junior officers. This was the main reason why the Soviets switched from a 4 platoon to a 3 platoon company in 44.

[Michael Emrys]

The Soviets were a lot more aggressive in their use of infantry and less concerned about minimising casualties. This was partly because of the political system which did not have to worry about public opinion and partly because they had a large pool of, as I recall, 1.5-2 million 18 year old conscripts coming into the army in each of 1942, 43 and 44, more than enough to cover casualties in those years. In fact, IIRC, the Russians started disbanding units and sending men back to civilian production in late 44.

I'm trying to reconcile that statement with what I have read elsewhere that the majority of Soviet rifle divisions were at half strength or less from this stage of the war until the end. Care to have a go at that?

Michael

[MikeyD]

More than once he describes the Russians as a bunch of incompetent vodka-drunk lunatics...

This statement may be less a fabrication than observational bias. Usually you don't see GOOD soldiers scampering about in the open to get shot. The GOOD soldiers are crawling along the ditches and hidden behind the terrain features. It would indeed be the incompetent vodka drinkers that are presenting themselves to be shot.

[YankeeDog]

I'm trying to reconcile that statement with what I have read elsewhere that the majority of Soviet rifle divisions were at half strength or less from this stage of the war until the end. Care to have a go at that?

Michael

A lot of this is due to the Soviet preference for using new recruits to form completely new divisions, while leaving existing divisions in the field and grinding them down until they were basically nothing, as compared to the Germans (and others), who were more likely to use replacements to bring depleted divisions back up to strength.

[Sgt Joch]

I'm trying to reconcile that statement with what I have read elsewhere that the majority of Soviet rifle divisions were at half strength or less from this stage of the war until the end. Care to have a go at that?

Michael

interesting question.

From what I have read, the Soviets had a very informal approach to TOE. The formal TOE for a Rifle Division was around 9,500 and around 10,500 for a Guards Rifle division, but in practice the Russians used 3 TOE: 4,000, 6,000 or 8,000. 4,000 and 6,000 men division were used on non-active fronts and 8,000 men divisions were used on active fronts. The difference between a 8,000 and, say, a 10,500 man division was mostly in the supporting arms which were concentrated at a Corps and Army level.

Also the Russians, unlike the U.S., did not feed replacements to divisions in action. The divisions would fight and a certain point would be pulled out from the front, receive replacements, reorganise and only then be sent back in to action.

So for example, the 11th Guards Army which is the one featured in the CMRT Soviet campaign, arrived in the Orsha area in early may. It received, IIRC, 20-30,000 new recruits, which were integrated into the various units, trained together for 5-6 weeks and went into action on june 22 with an average divisional strength of 7,200 men.

So yes, if you look at 1944, only IIRC, 25% or so of the divisions were at 8,000, the rest at 4 or 6,000 and you had many on active operations that were below strength. However, this was how the Russians operated their army to maximise use of manpower. The divisions used in a major offensive were usually at full strength when it started.

p.s. - I also had a chance to re-check my notes, the Soviet Army took in 2 million new recruits in 1943 and 3 million in 1944-45 combined.

[JasonC]

JK and Michael - propaganda doesn't mean pro Hitler. The army has its own "line" on the whole war, in which blaming Hitler for everything that went wrong - and Goering, even - featured prominently, while the Heer was supposedly pure as the driven snow and committed solely to the good of Germany and virtue and puppies and all that. Meanwhile they were actually out machinegunning every Jew they could round up while drunk out of their minds, and stringing up every local man if anyone shot at a German within 50 miles. As for death and more death supposedly deviating from that line, um no, only American comic books think that whitewashing death and misery out of war is the way to praise it. Read Junger - the genre normally glorifies the psychological toughness that stands up to horror - while wallowing in that horror as much as any slasher movie; that is not ceasing to be propaganda it is itself propaganda, and is still peddling the line that the Landsers are virtuous and tough because of everything they went through, etc. They had to walk uphill to work both ways in a driving crapstorm of shrapnel at 4000 to 1 odds and got a turnip on Sundays; you need a heart of stone not to see that as praise and glorification.

[Londoner]

American comic books think that whitewashing death and misery out of war is the way to praise it. Read Junger - the genre normally glorifies the psychological toughness that stands up to horror - while wallowing in that horror as much as any slasher movie; that is not ceasing to be propaganda it is itself propaganda, and is still peddling the line that the Landsers are virtuous and tough because of everything they went through, etc. They had to walk uphill to work both ways in a driving crapstorm of shrapnel at 4000 to 1 odds and got a turnip on Sundays; you need a heart of stone not to see that as praise and glorification.

There's obviously rational, pragmatic, societal reasons for that, read Burke - An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-face Killing in Twentieth-century Warfare.

[Londoner]

Two more points that would partly explain the higher level of Soviet casualties:

1. The Soviets were a lot more aggressive in their use of infantry and less concerned about minimising casualties. This was partly because of the political system which did not have to worry about public opinion and partly because they had a large pool of, as I recall, 1.5-2 million 18 year old conscripts coming into the army in each of 1942, 43 and 44, more than enough to cover casualties in those years. In fact, IIRC, the Russians started disbanding units and sending men back to civilian production in late 44.

2. The Soviet infantry junior leadership at the team/squad/platoon level was not as competent as in the U.S./CW and German armies. There are many reasons for this (education, casualties, promotion)*, but there was always a shortage of qualified, experienced NCOs and junior officers. This was the main reason why the Soviets switched from a 4 platoon to a 3 platoon company in 44.

* My bold.

This is really the problem (for the most part), in relation to John's original post and question. Apologies for moaning at poor old Ian L in our RT games - designers simply aren't choosing enough green and conscript troops (with leadership minuses) in their force choices.

Every RT game I've played thus far has consisted of a Soviet force with (for the most part) well led regulars and vets. We all know by '44 operational Soviet management was an entirely different creature but its staggering casualties amongst, to be frank, an organisation with significant illiteracy all the way through the war should typically be reflected/represented accordingly on the CM tactical battlefield.

As for ranges/maps mentioned earlier - try Hunting for the Bug. Just got my first 2000m RT kill (Ian again, sorry) and felt oh so very smug.

[LukeFF]

designers simply aren't choosing enough green and conscript troops (with leadership minuses) in their force choices

Green, perhaps, but not conscript. Yes, on the whole the Red Army of WWII perhaps wasn't as well-trained as other armies, but right now we are dealing with 1944. This isn't 1941-42, with the Soviets throwing masses of badly-trained men into the fight.

[76mm]

Green, perhaps, but not conscript. Yes, on the whole the Red Army of WWII perhaps wasn't as well-trained as other armies, but right now we are dealing with 1944. This isn't 1941-42, with the Soviets throwing masses of badly-trained men into the fight.

Not necessarily true. Many of the replacements fed into the Red Army during late 43 and 44 were peasants, etc. from areas recently liberated by the Red Army. Many, if not most, of these replacements had virtually no military training, and often they were not even provided with uniforms or weapons. Of course they ended up being slaughtered in droves.

[womble]

Given that people reckon there should be plenty of Green troops in the Allied forces in Normandy, and accepting that the Soviets weren't as well trained as them, where should the bar be set other than Conscript?

While I'd agree that there shouldn't be very many, if any, Conscript grade formations on either front, it seems to me that there's room for more Conscript grade troops in Russia than France/the lowlands.