Vanir Ausf B

AFAIK all vehicles can traverse light forest. Plot very short movement lines, however. Otherwise the TacAI tends to be creative about the path it takes.

I actually have a map just made for urban ops. It has no AI plans or set up zones, I only made it to see what I could do with the editor. I think it turned out pretty well.

Literally nothing in this post is true. I think the one firing that was politically related was McChrystal... but that was for blatant disrespect. We're not the sort of military where you can say the president is a ****ing idiot publicly and get away with it. President Bush had Admiral Fallon fired for less than that.

The Soviets wouldn't have even had an air force to speak of after the first month or two. As for ground forces, if you add up the US, UK and and French troops in Europe on VE day they are nearly a match for the Red Army.

Any resulting sanity loss from TRADOC's World Equipment Guide 2011. Despite all the goodies modeled in the game, I believe you'll be blown away by what else is out there on the OPFOR side of the house. Threats are conveniently ranked by tier, too.
 
Ground Systems
 
WEG 2011 Vol 1 Ground Systems - APAN Community ...
 
Update for Vol 1. Please understand these are change pages and new ones only, not a revised book.
 
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll11/id/2089
 
Air and Air Defense Threats
 
WEG 2011 Vol 2 Airspace and Air Defense Systems - APAN 
 
Naval Threats
 
http://www.soldf.com/download/freebooks/WEG%202011%20Vol%203%20Naval%20and%20Littoral%20Systems.pdf
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

since when have you become a moderator? You behaviour towards JK seems to be verging on stalking IMO. Does you no credit.
A football phrase comes to mind "play the ball not the man"

Having lived in Korea...eh.  The government is so in the pocket of those businesses I think you'd be hard pressed to see a shift left to a meaningful degree.  And the nationalism of South Koreans (Koreans in general!) is something to behold.  
 
And you're really underestimating how BAD DPRK is these days.  It's not simply a matter of giving them several dozen Type 98s, and some rations and you're good to go.  The primary use of many military formations is not training or even military tasks, but has been more or less turned over to fishing, harvest tasks, or mining.  Reports from defectors indicate that 10-20 rounds per soldier per year is the accepted training standard for rifle marksmenship, and much of the "advanced" gear claimed exists in a secure magic bunkers that their commanders swear exists hidden under the base that no one is allowed to see ever.  
 
You would really have to see a disastrous catastrophic fall with an equally meteoric rise from the North before you see anything sort of resembling parity.
 
When I was over there what we worried more about wasn't them coming down, it was the more likely possibility that we would have to go North.  There's no happy ending to a sudden collapse of the DPRK government, and the reality is someone would have to go in, secure the dangerous stuff like nuclear or chemical weapons sites, restore order, put down the various "True Korean Republic" or "Juche State of Joy and Love" fiefdoms set up by the various DPRK generals, and do it all in a country so improvised that simply dealing with all the disease and total lack of functional infrastructure was going to be a bigger roadblock to mission success than the former DPRK forces.  
 
Also just the reality of working with a population and infastructure so badly degraded and managed to be called maldeveloped vs underdeveloped.  There's virtually nothing remaining in terms of efficient or practical industry, and the people's education is amazingly poor which precludes a rapid handover of much of anything advanced.  Most estimates show that in the event of a ROK takeover, the best way to keep running the country would basically be the same, only without deathcamps for several years simply because it's too hard to change so much so fast, so it's going to have to run very badly for some years to avoid having everything just collapse into dark(er?) ages.  
 
This is really the question of what China would do comes in.  China hates the DPRK.  With a passion of a thousand suns.  However right now they're happier to have it contained and on a sort of leash than in a state of turmoil.  If the DPRK starts a war, China is almost certainly not coming in to help the DPRK (and depending on the circumstances may actually fight nominally allied to the ROK and US).  In a collapse situation thought it might be something modest, like invading in a few KM into the DPRK to secure a buffer zone, to a more ambitious plan to go all the way to Pyongyang while the US and ROK try to claw through the DMZ, install a recently discovered son of Kim Il-Sung who's shockingly pro-Chinese and call it good.  
 
China is pretty opaque about what it would do.  I think the  buffer state option is most likely though as it presents lowest risk to China, offers a high degree of control, but leaves the cost of putting North Korea back together again in the hands of the US and ROK.  

"During the period 1-10 July plans were made for-the capture of Hill 192. Aerial photos showed us that the enemy had certainly transformed the hill into a major strong point. Deep communication trenches were observed behind most of the larger hedgerows, but due to good camouflage and well concealed positions the exact location sof firing points, machine gun and mortar positions, and anti-tank positions could not be determined. We found out after the hill's capture that some german dugouts were as deep as twelve feet with underground passageways to concealed, firing positions within the hedgerows. The firing slits from these firing positions were covered by vines growing out of the hedgerows. Machine guns were located under hedgerows at junctions in order to cover all possible approaches."
 
This is from a paper written in 1947 by the CO of 1 Bn, 38 IR, 2nd Div, available at http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/singleitem/collection/p124201coll2/id/429/rec/1.
 
""I snapped the turret to the left and put an HE on delay into the corner of the hedge.  It passed through the bank and exploded in the middle of a machine-gun nest.  The Jerry gun that had been pointed through a small slot on the bottom of the hedge fired no more."
 
Taken from:  Yeide, Harry.  The Infantry's Armour:  The U.S. Army's Separate Tank Battalions in World War II, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, 2010, Pg 165
 
There is also a great picture of a German MG position dug INTO the embankment on pg 81 of the War Department's Historical Division's St. Lo, published in 1947, and available at https://archive.org/stream/St-Lo#page/n89/mode/2up. Too lazy to try and post it, though.  Also some good ones on pgs 83-84.
 
I'm not saying that all hedgerow positions were so constructed, but certainly some were. 
 
And as for the power of the entrenching tool, I was in the infantry for over 15 years, and have dug many a hole, all too often in rocky and root-filled ground.  Given several days, I could certainly dig at a bare minimum a fire position (and living quarters, and communication trenches), in thick embankment,  As c3k mentioned, I too would be more than happy to demonstrate!
 
But again, it is sort of a moot point, as the engine will currently not allow us to co-locate fortifications and linear features.  So how do we, in the game, give hedgerow defenders the protection from small arms that they seemed to enjoy, to the degree that the winning formulas devised for cracking such defences ALL involved large amounts of HE, both direct and indirect?

Damn your intern is good.  You are going to give her credit aren't you?

Hi,
 
I know this topic has been perhaps discussed quite a bit on these forums.  Many threads can be found on how well/poorly CMx2 models realistic bocage terrain combat typical of France 1944..
 
Here are a few:
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/100779-the-unofficial-bocage-defense-thread/ (I probably could have tacked this post to that thread)
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/114392-new-bocage-for-normandy/
 
You see threads like this http://community.battlefront.com/topic/98423-fortifying-bocage-possible-let-me-show-you-a-trick/ tryingto address the "deficiency" in the CMx2 engine of depicting "dug-in bocage defenders/fortifications":  Apparently there is a perception among many players that it is an unfortunate limitation that CMx2 does not readily allow slit trenches/foxholes to be placed on one side of a hedgerow so that the defenders in them can readily trace LOS/LOF through the hedgerow to engage enemy on the otherside just like they could if they were normally positioned against the hedgerow without any entrenchment.
 
I think many players consider it a flaw in CMx2 to not allow entrenchments to be placed in bocage terrain so that it allows the dug in defenders to engage targets on the other side like this:
 

 
This is basically a fight in place entrenched position behind bocage.  Personally I too had this perception and I now realise that it was primarily based on playing the first ever Close Combat which featured exactly this type of concept.
 
I had reason to consider all this when addressing how foxholes, trenches and sandbags are/can be used tactically used in CMx2 in bocage style terrain in this thread: http://community.battlefront.com/topic/118866-tactical-use-of-foxholes-sandbags-and-trenches-cmx2/.  I also discussed a bocage map with the scenario/map maker who said  he wanted ti see how accurately CMBN models bocage fighting but it became apparent pretty quickly that the kind of dug-in fortifications that were used by the Germans so effectively in bocage terrain could not really be applied in CMx2.
 
Foxholes/slit trenches and boacge did of course co-exist together in Normandy 1944 but after some research and consideration, I think many of us may actually have the wrong perception (as exemplified above) as to exactly how they were actually used and implemented and subsequently how we expect to use them in CM.
 
First lets get some "official" references to bocage and entrenchments in France 1944.
 
These excerpts are from "Busting the Bocage: American Combined Arms Operations in France, 16 June-31 July 1944" (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA211817)
 
"The Germans employed their direct-fire weapons to trap American infantrymen in a deadly hail of cross fire and grazing fires coming from all sides. Machine guns were the primary weapons
of the German defense. At the opposite corners of each field, the Germans emplaced heavy machine guns in positions dug into the earthen embankments of the hedgerows."
  "The Germans also implemented other measures to improve their scheme of hedgerow defenses. They habitually dug slit trenches into the hedgerow embankments to protect themselves during American artillery and mortar barrages. Furthermore, German commanders linked together their defensive positions with wire communications that allowed them to coordinate the defense of their sector."
  That is all that is really said about entrenchments in that paper and none of this refers to Germans actually using entrenchments to actually fight in from behind the bocage.  Shelter from the ever present artillery and mortar barrages appears to be the primary function and reason for their existence.     Surprisingly I have not been able to find too may photos of actual 1944 France bocage entrenchments or "bunkers" either.  Here is one, though it simply is not just a slit trench/foxhole. It's actually is occupied by US troops (with very odd camo pattern).
 

 
If anyone has any specific accounts that seem to indicate the use of bocage entrenchments used as actual fighting positions post them here for discussion.  I know there may be many references of first hand accounts that might loosely refer to tough "dug in defenders" in the context of boacge fighting in 1944.  It is clear that it might give the impression that the defenders were actually occupying entrenchments (fighting in place) when defending.  It seems more likely a reference to the entrenchments that were dug around the bocage which provided shelter during arty barrages as already outlined.
 
I know that the hedgerows in France varied in size and shape in both height and width.  There is an image floating around that claims to capture what a "typical" hedgerow looked like.  It is referenced here: http://www.lonesentry.com/normandy_lessons/
 

 
I thought it might be useful to illustrate my interpretation of what I think the majority of accounts of "dug in bocage defenders" actually were referring to.
 
From what we understand most of the bocage fighting occurred with one side taking up a crouched or standing positon up against the bocage on one side, firing over or through gaps in the bocage against an enemy some distance away on the opposite side of the bocage.  The natural cover and concealment offered to units in this deployment is evident.  Primarily, it makes disengaging from combat very easy should things get nasty.  Step away from the bocage and you almost immediately break the LOS/LOF the enemy may have on you allowing easy redeployment elsewhere along the bocage or even just complete withdrawal back to another position.
 
This would be the default type of engagement in seen in the 1944 bocage battles and CM seems to model this quite well.
 
If the order was to hold position and the enemy start dropping in an arty barrage, given there was no other nearby cover against artillery fire, I am sure many soldiers would have sought what natural protection they could get by lying flat in this ditch.
 
Lets now consider what a defender might do if they had the time to improve their defensive position along the bocage.  Given that artillery/mortar attack was probably the biggest threat facing German infantry in the bocage, it makes sense to think that they would probably first look at ways of improving their suitability against such attacks.  It seems apparent that the ditch that was already typically there was probably a good start for digging a slit trench/foxhole to shelter from artillery attack as some of the work had already been done.  You could argue that perhaps it would be/was better to simply retreat away from the bocage line all together and seek cover elsewhere. This may have been true in at least some instances where it was practical, but I am sure there were many situations where this was not only impractical but not expected by the COs.  Either way, a shelter against artillery that was literally located on the battle line was makes sense.  Of course in all cases the type of ground/soil that is being dug certainly may have been a prohibitive in some cases (too hard, roots, rocks etc) and in  some cases very easy to dig.  With a drainage ditch however you would at least think it would be somewhat softer beneath it compared to anywhere else.
 
So if we assume that was the case, then I imagine that something like this was actually what was happening  in the majority of accounts (80-90%?) you might hear that loosely refer to "German defenders dug in to the bocage":
 

 
This is not a defend in place position.  It was shelter against artillery. Typically the deeper the defender dug, the safer the shelter, it was all based on how much time was available to do so, but I think this would have been as basic as it got. This type of position could even be readily prepared even if the enemy already had LOS/LOF on the bocage itself. It still left the defender an option to withdraw from the position and still benefit from the cover afforded to them by the fact that they are on the opposite side of the bocage to the enemy.  You could imagine that in some instances troops may have tried to improve it by placing any logs or the like over the top to act as a kind of "roof"  Just by looking at this it seems a stretch to think that defenders in these trenches could/should be able to engage enemy on the other side.  Considering that the base of bocage was typically a mesh of roots, rocks and earth, just trying to bore/cutout/blast a firing slot through the 6'-10' thick bocage at essentially ground level  would have been no easy task, let alone the norm (I'm sure it was thinner in some cases).
 
Now I have heard references to more elaborate "bunker' type structures and networks in the bocage of '44, that afforded overhead protection though I don't think I have found any when I tried searching.   If they did occur, I can imagine that they were all based on expanding on what I think was the basic common entrenchment you see above.
 
Given time (something German defenders in the bocage of '44 didn't have too much of), it seems plausible that the next logical improvement that could be made to this shelter was perhaps some form of this:

 
 
This gives more of an overhead shelter from artillery fire.  I do not think digging this type of shelter out was at all easy let alone possible in some/most(?) cases.  It all depended on how deep the mesh of roots/rock extended beneath the bocage.  The photo above seems to be one of these types.
 
Given even more time to prepare (I would say perhaps a week or two or more), perhaps the next evolution of this entrenchment may have looked something like this:
 

 
The depth of course could be deeper to allow easier access through the "tunnel" that provided sheltered access to either side of the bocage but I am just illustrating the concept.  It is only when a slit trench is dug on the immediate opposite side of the bocage like this that I can realistically imagine what perhaps a defend in place dug in bocage defensive position might of looked like. You can imagine perhaps even a long trench system running along this opposite side of the bocage with perhaps a few "feeder tunnels" that safely connected them to the defensive side of the bocage to both withdraw and reinforce relatively safely.  Of course the tunnel itself would also provide shelter from any artillery attack.
 
With even more time and resources, you could imagine perhaps sandbagging the forward trench if need be or even using logs, branches and camouflage to perhaps make some kind of makeshift bunker. Perhaps this happened but again it all depended on time available, the terrain and resources available.
 
If you just dig a slit trench on the forward attacking side of the bocage without a direct avenue to withdraw to the opposite safer side of the bocage, then fighting from this position would be literally like fighting with your back up against a wall. To withdraw from or reinforce this position, the soldier would ultimately be exposed to direct fire from attackers and be required to instead pas between the opposite sides of the bocage via a break in the bocage (natural or otherwise).  I can however imagine a slit trench system on both the front and rear sides of the bocage linked by a trench that was dug at one of these breaks in the bocage.  In is worth remembering that, unlike digging on the defensive side of the bocage, digging anything on the forward side of the bocage when the enemy already have range and LOS of the bocage line would itself be a hazardous/prohibitive proposition. This reinforces perhaps why such types of entrenchment systems were probably much less common and prevalent than the original type I have illustrated.
 
I think I may of heard of instances or references to "elaborate entrenchment systems" in the bocage fighting of '44.  I would probably think it worked and evolved to be something like how I have explained.
 
So in summary, apart from perhaps these rarer, more "elaborate entrenchment systems" (which I still don't have any accurate references of or to), it appears to me that CMx2 actually is probably not really that far off in giving players the ability to simulate realistic implementation of entrenched positions in bocage,  Placing entrenchments or foxholes on the defensive side of bocage for the primary purpose of providing a local refuge against artillery and mortar fire is/was perhaps the most realistic and common role entrenchments had during the fighting in the hedgerows. If there is something lacking, it would be that you can not always place foxholes directly adjacent to a bocage because of other terrain features in proximity to the bocage.
eg.  in the case where you can't place foxholes/trench between two rows of bocage that effectively together form a lane.
 
I definitely don't think the depiction of combining both hedgerow cover, cover from an entrenched position and LOS/LOF through the hedgerow (like in the screenshot at the top and Close Combat!) is a realistic depiction of what "entrenched" bocage fighting in Normandy during 1944 was.

To be fair, US rockets are prohibited in QBs because their purchase price is screwed-up and has never been fixed, so in that case I think we can blame BFC. German rockets are many times more expensive and consequently not as much of an issue.

No need. It's already been fixed for the next patch.
 

Command: Modern Air/Naval Operations (Sometimes shortened CMANO or CMNO)
 
 
A game about watching strange icons moving on a map and spreadsheets at the same time 
 
Alternatively, it could be looked at as a Database you purchase, that happens to have a game attached to it

I have never played a single player game of Combat Mission since shock force. Only ever multiplayer the best possible AI. So I would not pay for single player features.

Teamsters Union strikes again!

All this angst over the OP's  test results without anyone questioning if maybe the OP's test was complete crap?
 
I set up a test that matches the OP's description and ran it 20 times. Results:
 
M1A2 spots first: 6
T-90AM spots first: 13
1 tie
 
If you're bored:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/ddmta7sd0a9ryh2/What%20a%20waste%20of%20time%20001.bts?dl=0
 
[/thread]
 

All this angst over the OP's  test results without anyone questioning if maybe the OP's test was complete crap?
 
I set up a test that matches the OP's description and ran it 20 times. Results:
 
M1A2 spots first: 6
T-90AM spots first: 13
1 tie
 
If you're bored:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/ddmta7sd0a9ryh2/What%20a%20waste%20of%20time%20001.bts?dl=0
 
[/thread]
 

TEST:    T-90am (elite, undisturbed, standing still in a tree line, clear weather, day) vs  M1A2 (veteran, moving in open field, 2.5-3 km away)   (number of tries: 10. Map: Death Valley).   ---------------------------   Well, despite of all conditions above and CLEAR LOS, T-90 almost never discovers M1A2 first! Even more, in plenty of times the T-90 does not see the damn muzzle flash after m1 starts shooting!   Logically thinking, even with only binoculars you cannot miss an incoming and shooting tank in  open field, not speaking about more sophisticated tank optics.     Moreover,     Tank destroyer 9p157-2 Krizantema-S with millimeter-wave external RADAR built especially to  detect armored objects(!!) in all weather and smoke, is blind just like T-90. Always getting  killed by (?) signs from open field 3 km away.      Same for recon vehilce BRM-3K which has radar as well. Not mentioning various BMPs that somehow manages to detect enemy infantry in woods better than  detecting IFV  in open 100 meters ahead.     CMBO was great long time ago. CMBB was good. CMSF is ****    But CM Black Sea is a funny Super Mario game, not a "tactical simulator" as promised. 

I think it is still relevant even for CMBS-type conflict overall force ratios. Even without any mobilization Russian Ground Force fields more than 2000 MBTs (248 * 1 TkDiv + 82 * 1 MRDiv + 124 * 3 TkBde + 41 * 34 MRBde). With rapid (1-2 months, i.e. can probably be done within the escalation period prior to conflict) limited mobilization of pre-deployed reserve units this can be increased by an additional ~700 MBTs (124 * 1 TkBde + 41 * 14 MRBde). Then additional units can be mobilized as necessary from long-term storage at central vehicle reserve bases to replace the frontline losses and reinforce areas of the border where regular units have been withdrawn (the total number of MBTs in storage is about 11000; even if only half of that is operational, that is still enough to equip over 130 MRBde-sized units (though they will be progressively worse equipped - after ~40-50 brigades supporting equipment will start running out in this order: first sophisticated ADS (i.e. better than MANPADS, though since Air Force would still have hundreds more long range SAM systems to provide overall coverage that is not such an issue), then self-propelled artillery (the towed systems would last quite a while), then MLRS, then SP ATGM systems, then APCs, then lastly IFVs (I guess the infantry will have to remember their grandfathers' tank riding experience - by this point the ERA-equipped tanks will probably run out too )). Okay, that last point is probably more relevant for a global type of conflict, but it serves to illustrate that there is a significant reinforcement capability, and some limited mobilization would probably take place even in a regional CMBS-type conflict (especially with such an opponent - who warrants its use more than NATO?).

Overall, given these factors and that Ukrainian theater is much closer to Russia than to North America both operationally and logistically (an interesting question in its own right, but generally it seems much easier to bring reinforcements by rail even from Siberia than to ship them over Atlantic), I would expect Russian forces to be easily able to maintain at least a 3-4 to 1 numerical superiority ratios over US forces, and depending on the number of prepositioned US units at the beginning of the conflict, maybe up to 10+ to 1. Which would translate into a tactical ability to engage any US unit with a larger level unit, or maybe even two of them (meaning 1-2 battalions per company, 1-2 brigades per battalion, etc.). Of course, US would probably be able to utilize its greater situational awareness to achieve temporary tactical numerical parity or even some superiority in particular sections of the battlefield, but operationally I would expect these ratios to hold throughout the campaign.

One factor that remains to be considered is what use the more rapidly deployable SBCTs and IBCTs would be (in this type of conflict with mostly linear combined arms engagements) compared to ABCTs and Russian units. They can probably be used defensively if equipped with enough Javelins, and can conduct some screening and reconnaissance, but they are obviously not a powerful offensive tool that a mechanized unit is. If a successful "Javelin-countering" factor is introduced (like IR camouflage or all-aspect APS) I would be tempted to discount them almost completely for not significantly contributing to the overall operational picture. Similarly for the USMC MEUs/MEFs that seem very light on heavy armor (no pun intended ). For the same reasons, I am not counting Russian airborne, air assault and naval infantry units (airborne and marines are mechanized, but not as heavily as one would wish for). Or am I missing something here?

Yes, this is how I counted: 3 CABns * (1 CO MBT + 2 tcoys * 14 MBTs) = 87 * 13 ABCTs = 1131 MBTs (and rounded it up just in case).

Feel inclined to share them with the rest of the forum sometime?

(sigh)...
can dress them up... but cant take them anywhere

The TacAI will occasionally use Javelins against soft targets in extremis, but the player cannot order it. It is deliberate, not a bug. A request has been made to change it to where the player can order it but it hasn't happened so far.

It's not that the machine gun boost was only applied to German machine guns, it's that it was applied differently to machine guns mounted on vehicles, which is what you are using. The rate of fire for vehicle mounted machine guns is still at pre-boost levels, which is roughly 60% of boost level. The game engine cannot separate rates of fire for a vehicle's machine gun and main cannon, so buffing the Stuart's machine gun ROF would also buff its 37mm ROF.
 
To compensate for this the accuracy of vehicle mounted machine guns was significantly boosted. The upshot is that vehicle mounted machine guns are quite deadly with direct fire but kinda suck at area fire.

I have finally got some time to look into this. Despite being an uncooled device it is not clear to me that the TIM 5000 is necessarily less capable than the Catherine FC. It does have a lower resolution, but it sees further into the infrared spectrum than the Catherine FC and has a more powerful zoom.

Catherine FC
Spectral Band: 8-12 μm
Field of view (FOV):
Wide FOV : 9° x 6.7° Narrow FOV : 3° x 2.2° Electronic zoom (x2) : 1.5° x 1.1°
Image resolution: 754 x 576
 
TIM 1500
Spectral band: 7.5 - 14 mm
Format 640 x 480 28 mm pitch
Field of view (horizontal) Wide 10.1°; Narrow 3.3°
Electronic zoom 2x, 3x, 4x

Tank operations in urban areas for dumbys:
 
1. Use your infantry to lead. They can better move through hard cover, and are good sensors (or their eyeballs and situational awareness is pretty good)
 
2. Clear on line, everytime.  When you move your infantry forward, try to keep infantry broadly in a line across the front.  This achieves two things:
  a. IRL, it's clearance of fires.  If I know the next squad over is literally 90 degrees to my right, I'm not trying to guess if the shadowy figures in the windows to my 1 o'clock are friendly or not.
  b. It keeps enemy AT assets from slipping through.  If you're advancing unevenly, or bypassing buildings, there's a chance the last remaining conscript with -2 leadership with an RPG-7 is going to smoke your Abrams with a rear shot.  By clearing on-line you ensure that behind your troops there's nothing but ruins and bodies
 
3. Hold your armor  back, and identify armor-friendly avenues of approach.  This prevents the enemy from trying to mass AT assets because he knows broadly where your tanks are, but you should know how to get your tanks to the front as fast as possible.  This pairs well with the clearing on-line because it ensures that all these avenues of approach are clear of hostiles, so fast moving your tank is a no-threat exercise.
   a. Alternately, do not hold it back, but keep it just behind your infantry as an overwatch piece.  Infantry clears to the next intersection, then tank moves up to said intersection and holds there until the infantry gets to the next intersection up.  Repeat until in Moscow.
 
4.  When your infantry identifies something worth tanking to pieces, then bring the tank forward to start using direct fires.  Often the best technique is use the infantry to suppress the target while using a "target" command on the enemy position (assuming it's a building) to bring it down on the OPFOR's head.  Then keep the tank in overwatch while infantry moves in.
 
 
Some things just to remember:
 
1. No one likes it when a building falls on them.  Don't be afraid to flatten a few buildings you can see tracer fire from, or even knock a building down to give your tank a new LOS (this is historically pretty common, in Aachen US engineers would blow up buildings, or otherwise knock down walls to open new firing angles for tanks)
2. There's no infantry carried AT systems in CMBS that reliably can kill most tanks from the front.  Javelin is the only one that could but it is not so hot from close ranges.  As long as you clear, and secure the flanks your tank will be king of murder mountain.
3. All of these tactics also apply well to IFVs, just be mindful the IFV is still likely to respond poorly to the AT4/RPG type threats from the frontal arc.  Conversely autocannon fire is murderously effective against infantry.  
4. Tanks are great spotters for artillery given their robust coms, and unlike an infantry type spotter, he's not going to get suppressed by small arms fire from the target.  Suppressing with the tank's MG's, then doing a full battery precision strike on the enemy who's pinned down in the target building is often very effective (I'm not sure I really need all six shells hitting, but I find it tends to ensure building destruction, and rarely leaves survivors).  
 
 
The American military has remained successfully fairly apolitical.  The only military coup type situation I could see is a civilian government that is either in flagrant violation of the Constitution (King Barack* the 1st kind of flagrant), or if called to do really bad mojo (King Barack* decrees the state of West Virginia will be decimated for its insolence!).  The military has remained rather loyal regardless of who's in charge (with the Bush and Obama years offering a good contrast between super-supportive, and not supportive of the military) and outside of some crazy stuff, will likely remain so. 
 
*This is no way an attempt at sniping at the current president.  If this was 2002 I'd be writing "King George W the 1st" or 1998, "King Bill." I don't really like the current president, but I recognize he's the legitimate leader of the country, and concede he's at least trying to do what's best for America in a legal and moral manner, I just differ with him on a lot of issues just what the "best" is.  Which gets further into the mindset, if he ordered me to go to Hati in my few remaining weeks on active duty, I would do so without question because it's my job to obey the orders of the commander and chief (within the confines of the Constitution) and he has the authority to do so.  I just don't think there's that feeling in the military of being a part of the government with a say in how the country is run, vs being a tool of the government to carry out policy set by the civilian administration within a legal framework.  

Continued.