New module - Combat Mission:Afghanistan?!

[Thomm]

In any case, it must be a fascinating experience for Charles to code the NATO module, CM:Normandy, and CM:Afghanistan at the same time.

I envy him. Not.

Best regards,

Thomm

[Moon]

We will put up an official announcement and website once it's ready to be announced, yes.

[Alex]

The release date moved up to 1st fourth of 2010.

[souldierz]

I stumbled on a Russian war movie called 9th company.It follows some young men fighting for the USSR through training and then to the battle field in Afghanistan.

I thought maybe some of you might be interested to see it if you haven't already.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VFFtkLT8O44&feature=related

[Pandur]

yea i saw it in russian. i didnt understand a single word but from what i saw i didnt liked it too much. it comes verry close to early 80ies war action movies in the last 3rd of the movie. first half of the film was good though, but after the plot is build up it slids way down in my opinnion.

[Amedeo]

If you look for a realistic war movie about the Afghanistan war, get a copy of: "Afghan Breakdown" (Afganskii Izlom).

Way, way better than "9 Rota" or "The Beast"...

[MikeyD]

Its December 27, the 30th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan today! Here's a photo off the BBC on the anniversary to get us in the mood.

[Sergei]

It's quite depressing that there is still no peace there, 20 years after Soviet withdrawal.

[Battlefront.com]

I liked "The Beast" despite the 5 man tank crew for a 4 man tank

Steve

[MikeyD]

I'm bumping this only because it had migrated to the third page, and I am enthusiastic about this title, whenever it manages to get here.

I've been pondering why I'm as enthused as I am. I think its the 'overlay effect' - same region, same placenamess, same situations, same tactical problems as seen in the news today but involving different opponents thirty years ago.

[General_solomon]

I'm bumping this only because it had migrated to the third page, and I am enthusiastic about this title, whenever it manages to get here.

I've been pondering why I'm as enthused as I am. I think its the 'overlay effect' - same region, same placenamess, same situations, same tactical problems as seen in the news today but involving different opponents thirty years ago.

agreed, is there a solid release date.

[Sixxkiller]

agreed, is there a solid release date.

Solid release date and BFC? Surely sir your ale is stronger than mine!

[MarkEzra]

Solid release date and BFC? Surely sir your ale is stronger than mine!

or.... Not a "snowballs" chance in hell

[John Kettler]

This is news to me, and I'm fascinated by what I see, especially since I was busy siphoning up data on the Afghanistan War at the time as a Soviet Threat Analyst. Call the war a gold mine for the intel analysts! I still have the issues of Soldier of Fortune magazine in which David Isby and others showed and described their latest finds from there: body armor, silenced pistols, flechette artillery ammo, BM-27 submunition carriers, PFM-1 butterfly mine, etc. Those of you interested in Afghanistan would do well to get Isby's Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army, Fully Revised Edition, which has a wealth of material on such things. I note with interest in the weapon list what I think is the Russian super defensive grenade, usable only from heavy cover or an AFV because of its huge casualty radius. First read about that in Jane's Defense Review, which is where I also read of how the Spetsnaz got creamed in their camp by the muj, creating an intel windfall.

As intriguing as all the new gear is, I find myself even more interested in the scenarios, for at the time, we got precious little usable data on the fighting. "Fierce fighting in the Salang Tunnel" isn't much when it comes to providing tactical insights, but we could grok the taking off TC heads with everything from jezails on up, with SMLEs being particularly favored. And I remember how thrilled we were to get video of a successful Stinger attack. Speaking of which, the MANPADS SAM list should include the Redeye and the Blowpipe, both of which preceded the Stinger, the last of which fundamentally upset the correlation of forces by depriving the Russians of effective helicopter use and CAS. Redeye was tail chase only and was copied as the SA-7 GRAIL, and Blowpipe was furnished in only small quantities ISTR, but could engage frontally, being an MCLOS system, but it had major problems with crossing targets.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowpipe_missile

Chemical warfare ought logically to be in, but it doesn't appear to be. Afghanistan is where the Russians operationally used the revolutionary fungus-derived Yellow Rain biotoxin, Blue X incapacitant and many other nasty things. See Seagraves, Yellow Rain for the gories.

As for The Beast, I saw it in audience trials before it even had a proper musical soundtrack. Instead "Mars" from Holst's "The Planets" was used. Israel supplied the tank, T-62s (which these weren't) aren't that roomy (I've been in one), and I've certainly never seen or read anything about that impressive automatic defense mode. The film grew from the play Nanawatai, which, I believe, was first performed by the Los Angeles Theatre Company.

http://www.warriorsinc.com/FilmFacts.cfm?ProjectID=7

Wiki on the film, with some grog goodness.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Beast_of_War

Dale Dye on how they got the tanks,

http://www.warriorsinc.com/FilmThoughts.cfm?ProjectID=7

And on training the crewmen

http://www.warriorsinc.com/FilmTrain.cfm?ProjectID=7

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Some further thoughts on the new game.

Players used to being the Americans are likely in for a whole series of rude awakenings, starting with fire support. Units of a given size have what they have, and that's it. A battalion commander has 82 mm mortars (or maybe Vasilek), a regimental commander has 120 mm mortars and a battery of Grad-V (baby BM-21 http://www.military-today.com/artillery/grad_v.htm ), and so forth. They're his, and that's how he fights. And get used to tiny command staffs, with associated brittleness in the face of casualties. Only officers will have maps.

If we believe Suvorov/Rezun, and I do based on what he did before joining the GRU (commanded both a tank company and a motorized rifle company, later was in G-2), commanders have no right to request additional support. Rather, support assets are allocated from higher formations based on the mission and combat situation. In the case of an attack, units not progressing may find themselves stripped to the bone, while the unit actually grinding on, however cut up, is going to receive everything higher commanders can get their hands on, clear up through Front reserves. The Russians believe in reinforcing success and in the crushing concentration of combat power where that success is occurring. To do otherwise is not only wasteful but is criminal. Not kidding!

Likewise, air support is found at a much higher level than the U.S. player is used to and follows the same basic allocation scheme. Helicopters are much scarcer (except maybe in air assault brigades) and are found at division and above. Actual fixed wing CAS and strike aircraft are owned by the Front commander and tasked as he wishes in accordance with his battle plan.

I highly recommend anyone planning to play this game start by reading Suvorov's Inside the Soviet Army. It was an essential reference in my Soviet Threat Analyst days, and I firmly believe it's still a must. The Russian way of war requires a radical reframing for those used to the U.S. way. How radical? From a Cold War period journal for Russian officers: "Initiative lies in conformity to the plan."

In closing, I feel it important to stress that the Russians didn't use their Category 1 troops and toys (save for SPETSNAZ and such) when they attacked Afghanistan. Rather, they maintained surprise by simply sending into battle the troops and forces in the Turkestan Military District (TMD) following mobilization. The TMD consisted mostly of Category 3 divisions, which explains a lot of the sloppiness seen early in the invasion. This needs to be reflected by the scenario designers.

Regards,

John Kettler

[normannobrot]

Ah! Its 1C - the guys who do "Theatre of war" which BFT publish. Gee, these guys really know how to spring surprises!

Hmmm, I wonder if this will be made available to western customers?

What new content would an Afghan war module need than what is available in CMSF?

Edit to add: I guess that the models that the Russians use in Afghan would in any case be better than Syrian Army versions since they would not be 'export versions'.

Now, if we only had some 80s western gear 'CM Cold War' becomes one step closer to being possible.

Final edit to add: err, is this for real? Can't find any mention on 1c's site or the links on the russian website. Please post a link to the preview Panzershlange.

yeah, now were talking buddy, 80's vehicle's yeah !! maybe a m113 apc? or a m60 paton tank? or even a sheridan, all to my suprise arent in the game already.

[John Kettler]

normannobrot,

Welcome aboard!

People,

Wanted to add that another relevant read is The Third World War: August 1985: The Untold Story, by Hackett. The reason is that Suvorov was a new and significant contributor to an already formidable advisory group from the first book, The Third World War: August 1985, but this one has a distinctly Russian viewpoint clearly on display and beautifully illustrating some of the concepts I've been discussing.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Sergei]

Wanted to add that another relevant read is The Third World War: August 1985: The Untold Story, by Hackett. The reason is that Suvorov was a new and significant contributor

Wouldn't that automatically negate everything positive about the book? It's like saying there's a novel about the race to space where one of the advisors was Erich von Däniken.

[hcrof]

Speaking of which, the MANPADS SAM list should include the Redeye and the Blowpipe, both of which preceded the Stinger, the last of which fundamentally upset the correlation of forces by depriving the Russians of effective helicopter use and CAS.

I hate to make a statement without backing it up but I thought that the consensus was that the effects of the stinger is vastly overrated and although they initially caused problems, new tactics and countermeasures were devised so that in a few months helicopter and CAS use was back to normal(ish). I looked at some records of losses of helicopters etc and very few were downed by MANPADs

Chemical warfare ought logically to be in, but it doesn't appear to be. Afghanistan is where the Russians operationally used the revolutionary fungus-derived Yellow Rain biotoxin, Blue X incapacitant and many other nasty things. See Seagraves, Yellow Rain for the gories.

Again, apparently overstated. There were rumours of chemical weapon use during the initial invasion but these were never substantiated. Bodies found without a mark on them were often killed by thermobaric overpressure and not by chemical agents.

As for Suverov, I found his book very interesting and certainly believe his stories when he talks about his personal experiences with respect to training and relations between officers, NCOs and men. When he moves out of his area of expertise (i.e into politics) he starts to pass off rumour and speculation as fact. I honestly don't think he had any better knowledge of the higher workings of the Soviet system as we did. He just got a different perspective.

[John Kettler]

Sergei,

Are you referring to Suvorov's Hitler preempts Stalin's planned attack book? If so, I understand, but it is very difficult to gainsay the man in other areas, given what info he had access to, who he worked for, where and what he was required to know by rote. See particularly Inside the Aquarium and Inside Soviet Military Intelligence.

hcrof,

Thanks to yet another glitch, this is my third reply to you. One died in a major crash, while the other just vanished.

Former covert insider Dr. Jack Wheeler commenting on Stinger's intro and effectiveness.

http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=59402

Here's the key part (Fair Use)

"The president then called Bill Casey and said he just didn't care what the excuses were anymore. Any reason given by McMahon was to be disregarded. He signed an executive order to that effect on Feb. 18. Two weeks later, McMahon resigned. I was in Angola at UNITA's Jamba headquarters in April when the Stingers arrived. The Soviet-Cuban offensive was stopped, thanks to them.

Now the way was cleared for Stingers to the Afghans. The Paks (Pakistanis, particularly the ISI Inter-Service Intelligence boys who controlled all mujahedeen arms shipments and led the CIA around with a ring through its nose) got in the way and delayed things – so much so that in August I saw the mujahedeen on the ropes with my own eyes.

Finally, on Sept. 26, 1986, the first Stinger missile was fired by an Afghan freedom fighter – and it shot down a Hind just like in the movie. The launcher of that first Stinger ended up proudly displayed in Charlie Wilson's office.

The CIA/ISI vainly tried to see that Stingers were only given to Gulbuddin, but now Charlie, Reagan, Humphrey, Casey et al were on to the scam, so the entire weapons flow along with the Stingers was redirected to Jamiat and other groups actually fighting. The mujahedeen erupted out of the refugee camps, poured back into Afghanistan, and the war was back on.

It was the Stingers that won the war, just like the movie shows, just as I told Charlie my conclusion after my first travels with the mujahedeen in 1983, "Take the Soviets out of the air, and the Muj will defeat them on the ground."

After the loss of hundreds of Soviet war craft and pilots from late '86 through '88, the Soviets retreated in defeat. Less than nine months after final retreat from Afghanistan on Feb. 15, 1989, the Berlin Wall was down, Eastern Europe liberated and the Cold War won. "

Here is an excellent long two post discussion of Stinger effectiveness from a variety of perspectives, followed by other juicy discussion.

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=79176

From a lessons learned in Afghanistan article, written by an active duty officer

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/sovietexperience.aspx

(Fair Use)

"Surface to air missiles acquired by the Mujahideen from covert U.S. weapons programs proved problematic for Soviet aviation operations. The introduction of more effective surface to air missiles including the Stinger in 1986 significantly affected Soviet air operations in Afghanistan. The Stinger, a U.S. made man-portable system, weighs 34 pounds, is 5 feet long, and has a maximum range of 5,800 meters and maximum altitude of 3,500 meters. Their use forced the Soviets to greatly increase attack air speed and stop spending time over target. Fighters and bombers were forced to increase attack height from 2,000-4,000 feet to around 10,000 feet.[25] The Mujahideen, despite not having received a great deal of training on the missile, were able to hit Soviet aircraft out to a distance of 4,800 meters and up to 2,000 meters in elevation.[26] The greater altitudes forced upon Soviet close air support aircraft due to the effectiveness of the Stingers significantly reduced the accuracy of their bombing. The added danger of flying over target areas thought to have Stingers as part of their air defense arsenal increased the threat to Soviet pilots. As a result, "Soviet pilots proved far less willing to fly as many missions or as demanding high-risk sorties".[27] The sharp decrease in the ability of fixed-wing aircraft to find and kill targets allowed the Mujahideen to move through the country far more easily and restore their supply lines.

The main targets of the Mujahideen were Soviet helicopters, which also proved to be vulnerable to the Stingers. This meant according to author and historian Lester Grau, "The Soviet Command had to severely limit the employment of helicopters, especially during daylight".[28] The forced changes in Soviet aviation tactics had profound effects on the battlefield. Helicopters were less effective in providing direct fire support as pilots reduced the amount of time over targets thought to have Stingers.

More than just combat missions were affected. Casualty evacuation, once predominantly executed by helicopters, was significantly reduced. A Soviet combatant remembered, "Until 1987 all of our wounded were evacuated by helicopter to the hospital in Kabul. The arrival of Stinger missiles put an end to our massive use of choppers. We were forced to cram the injured into armored carriers-fifteen in each one-and send them down the local roads to Kabul."[29] Certainly, the fear of being wounded and not having adequate casualty evacuation capability had a negative effect on the soldiers fighting on the ground."

Vids include:

Stinger impact's so severe aircraft taking off and landing require HIND escorts, one of which gets hit. Pilot interview.

Multiple interviews with Russians and Muj commander VO re Stinger impact on the war

(Starts ~4:40)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kxqrZYn5DHM&feature=related

Stinger's impact, including former head of DIA.

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

hcrof,

Am resuming my discussion regarding Suvorov after posting while I could! I fought the battle to get people to pay attention to what he was saying, and was in military aerospace long enough to see it incorporated into official threat assessments, notably in SAM OOBs. The Suvorov difference? 50% more SAM launchers for certain SAM types!

He talked about the IT-1 tank destroyer, and here it is.

He talked about the Grad-V, and here it is. There was an absolute firestorm over this issue in International Defense Review, for the "experts" flatly refused to accept it. Suvorov replied with a drawing. Guess who was right?

http://www.military-today.com/artillery/grad_v.htm

Suvorov talked about an IT-130 and of the elaborate disinformation undertaken to convince the West Russia had given up on such powerful weapons. See Major Warford's Master's thesis, The Threat of the Premium Tank, p. 72 et seq. in the original pagination for an extended discussion of this issue.

http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA255552

Here's what got exposed during the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the ancestor of the IT-130. (color pic)

http://208.84.116.223/forums/lofiversion/index.php/t24720.html

He talked about this one, but provided no sketch. I give you the "mythical" Sprut B 125 mm antitank gun!

http://www.warfare.ru/?lang=&catid=240&linkid=1571&linkname=Sprut-B-Antitank-Gun

Then there was the Vasilek, widely thought to be a whole cloth fabrication. Suvorov replied with an excerpt, years after it went into service, taken from a Russian military journal about troops exercising with automatic mortars. The first pic I saw of it reminded me of a baby 105 mm howitzer.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2B9_Vasilek

Here's a better one in a SPETSNAZ weaponry site.

http://www.spets.dk/spets_vaaben.htm

Jane's confirms what Suvorov said about how the Vasilek was hidden for almost a decade.

http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Infantry-Weapons/AM-2B9-Vasilek-82-mm-automatic-mortar-Russian-Federation.html

I'll close with the supersonic Tu-123 Yastreb reconnaissance drone, widely viewed by Western military specialists as proof Suvorov had flat out lost it. See Section 5.4 Tupolev Reconnaissance Drones.

http://www.vectorsite.net/twuav_05.html

Will address Yellow Rain next.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Clavicula_Nox]

Let me ask a question of the grogs. How much of the stories and "legend" about Ahmad Shah Massoud are true?What would have changed if he had never been assassinated?

[John Kettler]

hcrof,

There are two principal views on Yellow Rain: Russian mycotoxin bioweapon or Meselson's "bee poop" explanation. The first article considers both in the light of recent developments. I commend to your attention what the SNIE (Special National Intelligence Estimate) has to say.

http://cns.miis.edu/stories/020805.htm

T-2 (tricothecene) is what interests us.

http://www.romerlabs.com/mycotoxins.html

History and Significance here goes way beyond what I read in the Seagraves book. If you can stand to, read the rest. Ick! I say this as someone who used to have to monitor "bugs and gas" professionally--and found it nauseating.

http://www.mold-survivor.com/t_2_mycotoxin.html

And before the Afghanis, the Hmong were the targets, and Seagraves figures prominently in getting the word out. Somewhere around here I have English editions of Thai newspapers with long, grisly articles about the genocidal campaign waged against the Hmong. A most useful post.

http://www.hmongnet.org/faq/yellowrain.html

Would the Russians make and use such an awful weapon? Consider this guy. He ran a facility to create genetically engineered super efficient anthrax for applications including ICBM delivery.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ken_Alibek

His testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress is harrowing.

http://www.house.gov/jec/hearings/intell/alibek.htm

Even worse is this article, which places the topic firmly into context. From this, factoring in the goodies from the SNIE and numerous ghastly (unless you enjoy blood spewing from every orifice) on the scene reports, it is abundantly clear that Yellow Rain fits known Russian events, known Russian research and is part of a spectrum of biological weapons extending from tactical through strategic applications.

The Bioweaponeers

http://cryptome.info/0001/bioweap.htm

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Clavicula_Nox,

I'm no expert, but I can tell you that Shah Massoud was one of the few causes for hope in Afghanistan. The Panjshir Valley, from which he clobbered the Russians during the Afghanistan War, was fertile, well-tended, prosperous by Afghani standards, with civil government that worked, moderate Muslims in power, respect for women and schools for both sexes. Can't recall whether the schools were separate or not. Bluntly put, Shah Massoud AKA "The Lion of the Panjshir," was a horrible affront and embarrassment to the Taliban, which is why he was killed, apparently by AQ suicide bombers at the behest of Bin Laden.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmad_Shah_Massoud

Regards,

John Kettler

[hcrof]

Very interesting posts John. Firstly, the Stinger issue. I think that this article is an excellent overview of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan and I learned a few things from it too. I didn't know that BMDs were too light to set off mines! However the part that you quoted doesn't change my opinion of the Stinger at all, the key word here is 'problematic'.

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/sovietexperience.aspx

(Fair Use)

"Surface to air missiles acquired by the Mujahideen from covert U.S. weapons programs proved problematic for Soviet aviation operations. The introduction of more effective surface to air missiles including the Stinger in 1986 significantly affected Soviet air operations in Afghanistan. The Stinger, a U.S. made man-portable system, weighs 34 pounds, is 5 feet long, and has a maximum range of 5,800 meters and maximum altitude of 3,500 meters. Their use forced the Soviets to greatly increase attack air speed and stop spending time over target. Fighters and bombers were forced to increase attack height from 2,000-4,000 feet to around 10,000 feet.[25] The Mujahideen, despite not having received a great deal of training on the missile, were able to hit Soviet aircraft out to a distance of 4,800 meters and up to 2,000 meters in elevation.[26] The greater altitudes forced upon Soviet close air support aircraft due to the effectiveness of the Stingers significantly reduced the accuracy of their bombing. The added danger of flying over target areas thought to have Stingers as part of their air defense arsenal increased the threat to Soviet pilots. As a result, "Soviet pilots proved far less willing to fly as many missions or as demanding high-risk sorties".[27] The sharp decrease in the ability of fixed-wing aircraft to find and kill targets allowed the Mujahideen to move through the country far more easily and restore their supply lines.

The main targets of the Mujahideen were Soviet helicopters, which also proved to be vulnerable to the Stingers. This meant according to author and historian Lester Grau, "The Soviet Command had to severely limit the employment of helicopters, especially during daylight".[28] The forced changes in Soviet aviation tactics had profound effects on the battlefield. Helicopters were less effective in providing direct fire support as pilots reduced the amount of time over targets thought to have Stingers.

More than just combat missions were affected. Casualty evacuation, once predominantly executed by helicopters, was significantly reduced. A Soviet combatant remembered, "Until 1987 all of our wounded were evacuated by helicopter to the hospital in Kabul. The arrival of Stinger missiles put an end to our massive use of choppers. We were forced to cram the injured into armored carriers-fifteen in each one-and send them down the local roads to Kabul."[29] Certainly, the fear of being wounded and not having adequate casualty evacuation capability had a negative effect on the soldiers fighting on the ground."

Without a doubt, the introduction of the stinger changed the nature of the war and increased the military burden that the Soviets had to bear during the conflict. The point I dispute is the simplistic assertation that 'The Stinger Won The War' that seems to have been thrown around so much that it is now just about the only thing people say about the period!

The key point that I am trying to make is that the Soviets learned to deal with the Stinger and although they where never as effective as before, they were still able to use helicopters and planes up untill the end of the war in more or less their initial roles.

Im afraid I am going to cherry pick the MP.net article ruthlessly

Without question, the Stinger had an immediate military impact. Although initial estimates may have been somewhat overblown—claiming the Stinger downed approximately one aircraft per day during the first three months of its deployment—the missile clearly represented an enormous qualitative improvement in the rebels’ air-defense capability.

While the kill rate and number of targets destroyed are still disputed, the missile unquestionably shot down Soviet and especially Afghan aircraft at an unprecedented rate in its first few months of use.

Yousaf presents a detailed accounting of the Stinger’s first ten months in service until his departure from ISI in August 1987. During this time, he claims, 187 Stingers were fired, of which 75 percent hit their target, for a total of approximately 140 downed aircraft. Such detailed statistics must be based on Mujahedin self-reporting, the reliability of which is unknown. Nevertheless, these figures are more reliable than those in an oft-cited September 1987 U.S. analysis, which estimated “the destruction of about 270 aircraft per year.”

In response to the Stinger’s immediate success, the Red Army initially restricted its pilots to less dangerous missions, shunting the rest onto Afghan flyers. The Afghans, however, soon lost their nerve as well. According to Yousaf, they would pretend to go out on missions, fire off their ammunition, return to base, and falsely report success. A former Afghan pilot confirms that he and his fellow “pilots went on strike and refused to fly in areas where Stinger missiles were present.”

Fairly quickly, however, Soviet forces adopted a series of technical and tactical countermeasures that mitigated the impact of the Stinger. In the technical area, Soviet aircraft were retrofitted with improved flares, infrared beacons, and baffles on their exhausts to impede the Stingers’ ability to lock on target. Aircraft also were equipped with a missile radar warning system to notify pilots of the need for evasive action.

Tactically, the Soviets had numerous responses. Fixed-wing aircraft flew at higher altitudes outside the Stinger’s three-mile range, which averted the missile threat but reduced the pilots’ effectiveness, earning them the derisive sobriquet “cosmonauts” from Soviet ground troops. Helicopter pilots pursued the opposite strategy, adopting low-altitude, nap-of-the-earth techniques to hide from the Stingers, which function best when hot aircraft are silhouetted against a cool, blue sky. At the lower altitude, however, helicopters became more vulnerable to small-weapons fire. Interestingly, the same tactical countermeasures had been reported as early as the first year of the war and several times thereafter in response to earlier-model SAMs. However, the Stinger’s introduction apparently triggered a dramatic renewal and expansion of their use.

The Soviets also reportedly shifted many air operations to cover of darkness, as the rebels initially were not equipped with night-vision equipment. They increasingly relied on human intelligence to discover the location of Stingers, then either destroyed the missiles, purchased them, or avoided the locations entirely. Some daredevil Soviet pilots utilized a tactic that was a mirror-image of the rebels’ own: flying in tandem within the Stinger’s range but separated by a large distance, the first of two Soviet aircraft would make itself vulnerable in order to flush a Mujahedin Stinger team from its perch, after which the second aircraft would appear and fire on the exposed rebels. For important air support missions that could not be conducted safely in the presence of Stingers, such as facilitating insertion of special operations forces, the Soviets sometimes substituted long-range suppressive artillery fire, which was effective but required more ground forces and sacrificed the element of surprise.

Despite the army’s claim that the “Stinger was the war’s decisive weapon” —echoed by many others including 60 Minutes, which declared, “The Stinger is generally credited with having won the war for the Mujahedin” —the net effect of Soviet counter-measures eventually was to offset the Stinger. David Isby, an expert military analyst of the Afghan conflict, concluded in 1990 that, “although none of the Soviets’ countermeasures were totally successful, the Stinger... did not succeed in forcing Soviet helicopters out of the sky.” A leading French expert on Afghanistan, Olivier Roy, confirms from his experience among the rebels in late 1988 that, “by 1989, the Stinger could no longer be considered a decisive anti-aircraft weapon.”

As intersting as the videos are (and they really are!), anything that tries to pass an ATGM off as a MANPAD can't be considered authoritive so I won't respond to them. I think I have said enough anyway

As for Suverov, yes, he was right with respect to weapon systems (although he was a lone voice so I agree with the military specialists of the time when they didn't believe him. There was no proof! I am however too young to have been a Soviet hardware affectionado at the time however so I can't speak with any authority about that! The real bit of the book I disagree with is his description of the Nuclear forces and the politburo. He should have taken that out and published it seperately as 'wot I think - speculations of a junior Soviet army officer as to what goes on at the top of some of the most secret organisations in the world'. Very interesting to see his perspective but not in any way authoritative!

Now: Bioweapons

Again some very interesting articles, although I admit I am flagging by this point and have only skimmed them! Without a doubt the Soviet Union had developed a huge range of CW and BW agents for use in Europe or China in the event of a major war.

Although I did know that the Soviets used 'scorched earth' tactics in Afghanistan, I had not heard of allogations of the use of bioweapons. I thought you had meant Chemical weapons as depicted in the film 'The Beast', the use of which was always just rumour. Because of the fact that I know nothing about the subject I won't try to argue a point. I don't know if BW were used or not.