New module - Combat Mission:Afghanistan?!

[John Kettler]

hcrof,

There's a problem with "problematic," in that there are multiple definitions, as shown by the Google search http://www.google.com/search?q=problematic+definition&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a Most of them, though, point toward meaning "a difficult to solve problem," which is what I read it as meaning, too. Thus, the Stinger's introduction completely upset the Russian air power applecart, in turn removing the one truly usable advantage the Russians had over the Muj, with terrible impact on ground ops, morale, survival expectancy if wounded, etc. True CAS went out the window, having an even worse effect on the Russians there (poorer targeting means) than altitude restrictions did on NATO aircraft over Kosovo, where the difference, even with vastly better gear, was dramatic, effectively removing the worst of the NATO air threat from Serb commanders' backs. What both the articles and interviews show is exactly what we were hearing during my aerospace days: Stinger was drawing a lot of blood on the one hand and derailing normal air ops on the other, with major impact on Russian combat effectiveness. Stinger deprived the Russians of their single best card, tipping the game heavily in favor of the Muj. The two things the Muj feared most: the Mi-24 HIND and the Su-25 FROGFOOT, were all but checkmated by the Stinger.

Here's some info on the early Su-25 vs. the Stinger. (Fair use)

http://www.aviation.ru/Su/25/Su-25.html

"The preproduction Su-25 designated T-8 were rushed in Afghanistan accompanied by Sukhoi OKB staff. The feedback was listen to and a number of the field modifications were made to improve the performance and survivability of the aircraft. For example, closely positioned engines of T-8 were both catching fire if one of them was hit by missile or AAA. This resulted in the loss of the whole aircraft. First time VVS encountered Stinger, they lost four Su-25 in one or two days (two pilots were killed). The defense and ECM were specialized for Red Eye and the Soviet first generation shoulder launched missile (SA-7 Grail). Sukhoi figured that upon impact Stinger shreds the rear fuel tank which is located right above the jet exhaust. This starts fire which kills both engines eventually. They installed few millimeters thick steel plate below fuel cell to give an extra protection. Another modification was a steel plate (I think 10 or 15 mm thick) between engine bays. After this modification no Su-25 were lost to Stinger according to Sukhoi team. Only 22 Su-25s were lost in nine(!) years of combat operations in Afghanistan."

I would note here that the failed entry in the AX competition that produced the A-10 in due course, the Northrop YA-9, had the same sort of engine arrangement as the Su-25.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_YA-9

"In service with VVS Su-25 received a nickname "Gratch" (The Rook). This comes from the birds ability to get the food out of hard to reach spots, which is very similar to plane's ability to destroy the hardened targets in hard to reach locations in the mountains. The Afghanistani mujahideens called Su-25 "The German Product" because of their initial disbelieve that something that efficient can be designed by Soviets. It was the most feared and respected fixed wing aircraft."

What we were hearing and reading was that the Muj hated the plane because of its whopping ordnance load and excellent stability as a firing platform. The Su-17 FITTER and MiG-23/27 FLOGGER both apparently had stability issues during weapon delivery at low altitudes in the high mountains of Afghanistan.

What the Su-25 posters fail to realize is the incredible intimidation factor that arises from blowing even one plane or helo from the sky, let alone a bunch and in rapid succession. And simply by depriving the Su-25 of effective low level operation, the Stinger neutralized most of the plane's ordnance: the 30 mm guns, the free flight rockets and to a large degree, the bombs. The reality is that a CAS plane at at 10,000 feet (3 km) can't do its job, not least, because it's very hard to spot targets. True, the plane could carry guided weapons, but they were the exception to the dumb weapon general rule.

As for that other vid issue you mentioned, I don't know exactly what we're seeing there. It looks to be not a Milan, and I'd certainly recognize a Dragon, so I'm wondering if it is a Blowpipe, which is essentially an antiaircraft MCLOS ATGM, complete with a shaped charge warhead.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowpipe_missile

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

hcrof,

Here're some pics of what Stinger type weapons did, even to planes that got back home. From an air defense perspective, when about to be bombed, rocketed or strafed, a "win" occurs when the pilot of the attacking plane suddenly develops urgent business elsewhere, after eating a SAM, forcing breakoff of the attack. So, the Stinger, even against an improved FROGFOOT, doesn't have to kill it in order to exert a powerful debilitating presence on tacair ops.

http://englishrussia.com/?p=1958

Here're several of a FROGFOOT A known to have been hit by a Stinger. The thread itself is incredibly rich in all kinds of grog goodness, to include A-10 vs. Igla-1/SA-14 pic. Page 1 has the purported sortie and loss data in Afghanistan, as well as a fascinating bit on PGM use there.

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=138750&page=2

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

hcrof,

Turning anew to the issue of Russian chemical warfare use in Afghanistan, I believe you'll find this both illuminating and disturbing, a slightly redacted Top Secret SNIE titled The Soviet Offensive Chemical Warfare Threat to NATO, with the pages of interest in the original doc being 1, in which it is flatly stated chemical warfare was being waged there and 12, which provides the details of the what and delivery modes. To actually read this thing, go to the bottom of the document, and click the Original Document link. That opens the SNIE in the CIA's FOIA Viewer.

http://www.faqs.org/cia/docs/26/0000284028/THE-SOVIET-OFFENSIVE-CHEMICAL-WARFARE-THREAT-TO-NATO-%28SNIE-11_17-2-84%29.html

"34. Lethal chemical weapons used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan have included sprays, bombs, rockets, mines and artillery shells. In addition to toxins and incapacitants, such traditional agents as phosgene, diphosgene, nerve agents, mustard, lewisite and toxic smoke may also have been used."

Thus, at the Top Secret level, the CIA, in an assessment issued by the DCI, with direct participation of CIA, DIA, NSA and State's INR, with input from the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, Intelligence of all four main services, concluded toxins and incapacitants were definitely used, in a variety of delivery means, by the Russians in Afghanistan. In my former line of work, that's about as good as it gets in terms of solidity of the information. Getting that many agencies to agree on anything makes herding cats seem easy, so this degree of concurrence is remarkable.

I close with a Toronto Sun article by a reporter who witnessed Russian chemical strikes first hand in Afghanistan and describes what he saw, this in the context of confirmation by Ken Alibek and other defectors that Russia used both chemical and biological warfare in Afghanistan. (Fair use)

http://www.rense.com/politics4/biowp.htm

"Alibek and other Russian defectors also confirmed the Soviet Union used chemical and biological weapons in Afghanistan from 1980-89. While covering the war there, I saw numerous cases of grave injuries or death inflicted on the Afghan mujahedeen by mysterious Soviet weapons. After being sprayed by a fine chemical mist, or exposed to gas, people would turn black and die, bleed profusely from all body orifices, choke and vomit or become disoriented and dazed. Bodies of some victims would putrefy almost immediately."

Regards,

John Kettler

[MikeyD]

Let's not lose sight of the scale and scope of CM sims.

Such weapons as BLU-95 fuel air explosive bombs, GBU-43/B MOAB, even MLRS cluster munitions strikes are well 'above the pay grade' of the U.S. pixeltruppen in CMSF. I'm sure CM:Normady's German company-scale pixeltruppen will only be tangentially associated with the worst of Hitler's attrocities in Europe. And similarly, its a safe bet CM:Afghanistan's teenage draftee infantry will come with little hard knowledge of the 'dirty war' being conducted over their heads.

Still, though it is outside the scope of the title, its good to be reminded 30 years later the lengths to which the Soviets went in trying to win that damned war. I'm old enough to recall the news reports at the time. Some youngsters may not even recall there was a war!

[John Kettler]

MikeyD,

Good points! Every now and then I read about how (fill in age) didn't experience (insert laundry list of significant global events), never heard of (add list), never used (dead tech here) and only read about (yet more things) in their history books. I go back so far I was still among those who did "drop and cover" drills in elementary school and was frankly terrified I might be nuked during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It didn't help that precocious me had just read a great tome called Civil Defense in which thermonuclear destruction radii were superimposed on major cities or that we were very close to Luke Air Force Base, which just happened to house a critical interceptor control facility, capable of running the entire west coast, called SAGE (SemiAutomatic Ground Environment) , its associated BUIC (BackUp Interceptor Control) and F-101 Voodoo interceptors. Nervous time!

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Special note to Steve,

I won't ask for one of these. Yet! Samokhodnya Lazeri (Self-Propelled Laser)!

http://www.dia.mil/history/art/images/field_laser_9.jpg

Soviet Mobile Laser in Afghanistan

by Edward L. Cooper, 1985

"The Soviets continued a large, well-funded program to develop tactical laser weapons in the 1980s. There were reports that the USSR employed mobile laser platforms in Afghanistan against personnel, unprotected targets, and sensors."

From here.

http://www.dia.mil/history/art/series_two.html

DIA used paintings like these to convey intelligence data without compromising the actual imagery.

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Here is a terrific overview, titled The Soviet War in Afghanistan. It's a short but detailed read that covers the essentials of the Soviet experience there, as seen by a retired Afghan Army general and a U.S. Foreign Military Studies specialist. Contains a wealth of material directly applicable to scenario design, such as regiments so weak they were battalions, ammo loadouts, a horrendous disease problem in the Russian troops, severely limited radius of Russian dismounts from the carrier, tactics on both sides, the presence of T-64s as the most advanced tank there, etc. A must read, IMO.

https://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/cbr_ctd/cbr_ctd_52.html

Regards,

John Kettler

[hcrof]

Well we might have to agree to disagree here. I agree that disuading an air attack represents a victory for the SAM operator and that the stinger reduced the effectiveness of Soviet air power from the end of 1986 until more or less the end of the war (although by 1989 it was basically back to normal). However, you talk like stinger provided an iron barrier covering the whole of afghnistan against which the soviets could do nothing!

The two things the Muj feared most: the Mi-24 HIND and the Su-25 FROGFOOT, were all but checkmated by the Stinger.

HUMINT was able to locate many of the missiles so they could be avoided and new tactics (like creating large wolfpacks of a mix of MI-8s and MI-24s) and countermeasures (like flares and armour) ment that relatively few aircraft were destroyed by the stinger after the initial suprise. For example, even according to your own sources, after modification against stinger, not a single SU-25 was shot down! Because of this, the soviets were still able to use their aircraft throughout the war. For close support, artillery was often substituted for CAS in hot locations and even after the introduction of the stinger, there are still countless stories of VDV being inserted by helicopters as before. For example, on the 12th april 1987, 2 battalions of VDV were dropped in the 'Melava' region in Nangarhar province supported by CAS from both MI-8 and MI-24 helicopters. Fighting against an estimated 500 Mujahadin, no aircraft were lost and the ground troops took 2KIA/3WIA(Grau, L. The Bear Went Over The Mountain, Soviet combat tactics in Afghnistan)

Vietnam showed the americans how important helicopters are in a counterinsurgent campaign and the soviets learned this too (eventually!). They still used them extensively after the stinger was introduced so I would say that my understanding of the word 'problematic' is that the problem can be solved

I would argue that the reason the soviets lost the war was not because of any Wunderwaffe imported from the US but the complete inability of the Soviets to commit to the war (I imagine they were very reluctent to weaken their abilities to defend their western border). They didn't provide enough troops, were very reluctent to change Motorised troops to light infantry, didn't do enough to support the troops once they were there but most importantly, they failed to justify the war in the eyes of the conscript troops and therefore the population in general. Gorbachev had already ordered his generals to prepare for withdrawel by 1984 and the escalation in violence in 1984-86 was a last ditch effort to salvage the situation so the troops could leave (I suppose you could call it a a 'surge' ). Based on that, I would say the stinger did not win the war.

[MikeyD]

If CM:Afghanistan is going to resemble CMSF (after all, its the same game engine) I'd suppose/suspect the presence of Stinger would be 'simulated' at scenario design stage by the reduction/lack of available airpower on the Soviet side. In the same way that lack of U.S. airpower in a CMSF scenario could be blamed on a nerve gass SCUD landing squarely on one of our Iraqi airbases. You don't need to model the actual SCUD in the game in order to model the downstream effects of their use.

[John Kettler]

hcrof,

I'm not claiming that Stinger put all Afghanistan air below 3 km high under some sort of lethal dome. Far from it. There's also the matter of how one ISI/CIA favored Muj commander got most of the goodies, yet pretty much did nothing with them. That's in the Charley Rose film commentary I previously provided. This alone would tend to make things better by diluting what Stingers were actually usable. Add in Stinger hunting teams, flares, Hot Brick type jammers, evasive maneuvers, substituting artillery and the situation further degrades. I'd love to read some good accounts in English of Russian ops post Stinger introduction, so please refer me if you know of any. Am definitely going to need to read The Bear Went Over the Mountain, especially after reading the gem of a report the Afghan general and Grau wrote. I'm not saying the Stinger killed everything in sight and won the war singlehandedly. Hardly. Rather, I'm saying it unhinged air ops business as usual, acted like emery dust thrown into a gearbox, applied all kinds of stress to an already overstressed system, caused cascading impacts on tactical options, troop morale, combat survival if wounded, resupply issues,etc., and it dramatically raised the cost of the war when it was already causing severe economic strain and unraveling the social fabric at home.

The U.S. went through something similar during Lam Son 719, where so many helicopters were lost that the very survivability of helicopters in airmobile battle was questioned.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Lam_Son_719

"The number of helicopters destroyed or damaged during the operation shocked the proponents of U.S. Army aviation and prompted a reevaluation of basic airmobile doctrine. The 101st Airborne Division alone, for example, had 84 of its aircraft destroyed and another 430 damaged. Combined U.S./ARVN helicopter losses totaled 108 destroyed and 618 damaged.[77] "

And that was before the SA-7 GRAIL was introduced into the Vietnam War and proceeded to first carve a bloody path then force U.S. and Vietnamese planes to higher altitudes. Sound familiar?

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+SA-7+grail:+man-portable+missile+packs+a+punch.-a0213402273 (Fair use)

"While early models suffered from slow acceleration, the Grail proved very effective against low-flying, slow-moving aircraft, such as helicopters, the A-1, T-28 and A-26. Since few pilots were warned of its arrival in Vietnam, the missile's early engagements enjoyed the advantage of surprise and its targets' lack of infrared countermeasures, such as flares. The first known use of SA-7s in South Vietnam came in May 1972 when one downed an O-2A observation plane and then several of the helicopters involved in the pilot's recovery. Grails were reportedly responsible for downing 16 aircraft in the May-June 1972 Battle for Quang Tri, where their deadly reputation grew. As American aircrews learned the missile's altitude limitations and its tendency to lock onto any heat source, they moved their tactical air missions to higher altitudes. Wariness of the SA-7 also drove attack jets to higher ingress and egress speeds and higher drop altitudes. While the Strela-2 (SA-7a) was fired from behind the target, the Strela-2M (SA-7b), introduced in 1972, could home in on an aircraft engine cowling to engage incoming targets. Grails downed 10 AH-1 Cobras, dozens of UH-1 Hueys, one TA-4 Skyhawk and one AC-130."

MikeyD,

True, but hardly as much in game fun!

Regards,

John Kettler

[Clavicula_Nox]

Do we know anything about the campaign? As it's made by a Russian devteam, I assume it's Russian centric, but maybe there are some Muj missions?

[hcrof]

MikeyD - I think you are right, there is little need to simulate MANPADs in the game as the threat can be introduced by the scenario designer. If they were to include SAM and AA HMGs I would be a happy man though!

John - we seem to be converging on a point here I think we both agree on the effects of the stinger but we diverge on the extent of those effects. Unfortunately, I don't think that anything will ever prove it one way or the other!

I actually have both 'The bear went over the mountain' as well as its companion book 'The other side of the mountain' (From the perspective of the Muj) as .pdf documents if you can bear to read them on a computer screen. PM me your email address if you want them.

More information can be found in this excellent MP.net thread, which is a general thread about the Soviets in Afghanistan but has lots of info about the effect of stingers and military operations conducted under the threat of them.

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?5079-Spetsnaz-had-defeated-the-Mujahidden-by-the-summer-of-1986

One of the posters, 16 OBr SpN was a member of a Spetznaz unit actually fighting in afghanistan and he provides some first hand commentary of the war. Take from it what you will, there is a certain pro Soviet slant to his posts . It does provide an interesting counterpoint to the information found in the US DoD though.

Edit: I found 'The bear went over the mountain' online, here it is:

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%201996/Bear%20Went%20Over%20Mountain%20-%20Aug%2096/BrOrMn.pdf

[John Kettler]

hcrof,

Fabulous SPETSNAZ thread with splendid links (bad juju on captured Stingers and dead advisers on raid in Pakistan, shades of Son Tay)! I now want a stack of specialist references I never knew existed, am recovering from sticker shock triggered by $23.00 for a 1/72 scale BMP-2E model (loaded with etched brass add-ons, hence the cost) on the same site as the books, and am going to have to ask Steve for an exploding camel mod and pack animals. Grau will have to wait, but I do thank you for the info.

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

hcrof,

Read entire thread! That unidentified weapon launch that I thought earlier might be a Blowpipe is now definitely confirmed to be a Milan, thanks to bigger, clearer and longer version of the vid Scythian posted to the Spetsnaz thread. Color stills confirmed presence of Milan in Muj hands, ditto Blowpipe, Stinger and SA-7 or copy thereof. Barrett M107s in Muj hands were news to me, but the evidence is hard to ignore. Numerous statements by various people in that thread notwithstanding, they're flat out wrong on chemical weapon use in Afghanistan, and I've presented the evidence to prove it.

I think, too, that there was a great deal of exaggeration/slamming there regarding Suvorov. I have a stack of his books, and he never claimed all Spetsnaz were as depicted. To the contrary, he made it clear that most were conscripts, describing their brutal initiation rituals, even harsher training and clearly said the globetrotting "professional teams" were the elite of the elite, and it was only here where you found female Spetsnaz, who trained just like the men and were proportionally as numerous. I've seen video of one such woman in VDV uniform shooting an AK like a pro. She could pass as being from numerous European countries, being effectively invisible among such a populace.

Suvorov served in Intelligence, 2nd Department (agent intel), 13th Army, Carpathian Military District, often functioning as the personal rep for the Chief of Intelligence of said Army. He underwent extraordinary physical training, went into the field with them on grueling combat exercises (23 days on skis--see his comment on idiots and skiing), evaluated their readiness, etc., as a controller. From there, he went to Intelligence, Carpathian Military District (a Front in wartime) where, in the Second Directorate, still deeply involved with Spetsnaz, he took intel gleaned from agents and traffic analysis and worked directly with the guys in--wait for it--First Directorate, War Plans! As such, he had access to info the chief informant in that thread can only imagine. After that, he was promoted below zone to captain and sheep dipped via transfer to Tenth Directorate of the General Staff (foreign military advisors) before being sent to become a GRU "diplomat." I think it very interesting that after Suvorov surfaced in the West, Soviet Military Power started talking all about the very things Suvorov was discussing, right down to TVDs in wartime and their specialized tasking.

Regards,

John Kettler

[White Phosphorus]

Some further thoughts on the new game.

I highly recommend anyone planning to play this game start by reading Suvorov's Inside the Soviet Army. It was an essential reference in my Soviet Threat Analyst days, and I firmly believe it's still a must. The Russian way of war requires a radical reframing for those used to the U.S. way. How radical? From a Cold War period journal for Russian officers: "Initiative lies in conformity to the plan."

John Kettler

How would this apply to Afghanistan though? The above quote is really only relevant for the European theater, where the goal is deep rapid advance by mobile formations. Soviet general staff study series published during WWII about select operations give a very interesting insight into the centralization in the Soviet army. When reviewing performance of mobile formations, the reaction of Soviet high command can only be described as shock at the ignorance of Soviet commanders. Ignorance of of both the role of their forces, and the mission that they are to carry out. Basically when given freedom, soviet armored and mechanized formations bogged down at every single strong point they came across, and wasted days trying to storm it, with insufficient infantry support. Instead of bypassing and sticking with the operational plan of actually advancing deep into enemy territory. The solution to that problem was to give them less and less initiative, to force them to get a move on.

Now when it comes to Afghanistan, if "Bear went over the Mountain" is any indication, Soviet doctrine was completely inapplicable to anything over there, and instead was replaced with a freeform exploration of tactics. If there is no deep battle, there can really be no plan to stick to.

[John Kettler]

White Phosphorus,

It's about reframing the way one thinks about military matters, what expectations are rational, what support to expect, etc. To someone used to playing the U.S., it's downright alien, a fundamentally different way of waging war, with Suvorov's book the vital primer.

Consider, for example, a Motor Rifle Division (MRD) on the attack. It consists of, at core maneuver level, of two Motor Rifle Regiment (MRR)s with BTRs and one MRR with BMPs. American practice on the attack would likely be to lead with the BMP MRR, since that is far more powerful than the BTR MRRs, but that's not how it works. The BTR formations have one job and one job only: to somehow, somewhere tear a hole into the enemy's defenses through which the BMP MRR can be inserted "in the liver" as the Russians say. The BMP formation's job is one of exploitation and destruction of the enemy's HQs, fire means, supply nodes, etc., creating an opening through which can then come thundering the Army, Front and TVD forces.

Another huge difference is in troop quality and distribution. This bears careful reading because it so drastically affects combat performance. Spetsnaz are way up at the top, while Motor Rifle troops are almost at the bottom. It doesn't end there, though. Any given commander's best troops are in two places: his reserve, such as an ITB (Independent Tank Battalion) and his reconnaissance units. The idea is to make the most of the limited available high quality manpower by concentrating it ruthlessly in key locations where everything hangs in the balance. Since lousy reconnaissance, especially when fighting a nuclear armed foe, inevitably spells disaster, that one's a no brainer. The reserves are the commander's Sunday punch in the attack and his last hope of changing the outcome in the defense. Thus, the lowest numbered unit in a given formation really is the best of its type, and star performers elsewhere will be identified and moved there or to even higher formations.

This is precisely how Suvorov broke out of the herd and began his dizzying ascent to the Nomenklatura. Because he showed initiative during an alert by smashing down a wall so his tank company could exit a kaserne when a breakdown blocked the exit, potentially trapping the entire Tank Regiment, he was "talent spotted" by the Chief of Intelligence for the 13th Army, relieved of command and sent to Intelligence there. This is the process at work. He describes how a Spetsnaz soldier was found ceaselessly jumping in a Strategic Rocket Force chow line and how tough as nails officers get invited to join Spetsnaz as commanders. Same story. Contrast this with the American leveling approach and the longstanding distaste for elite formations, as seen in the history of the Green Berets. The argument here is the Russian case stood on its head: By taking so many top notch soldiers from the line units for elite formations, the quality of the line units, thus their combat power, is degraded. Arrant nonsense to any Russian officer!

These are but a few examples of what needs to be learned in order to properly fight as a Russian. Even Afghanistan failed to change many of the core Russian behaviors, as seen in the repeated debacles at Grozhny, where the Russians blithely assumed they'd just smash their way in and overwhelm the defenders, but got their teeth kicked in. The Spetsnaz shone in Afghanistan because they were so utterly unlike the usual Russian soldiers in every category: troop quality, specialized training, use of defectors or people who looked like the Muj, physical conditioning, weapons, gear, adaptability, and above all, swift, independent decision making, with even combat exercises pursued to past the limits of endurance.

I say this as someone who "wore a red hat" for over eleven years, who was deeply immersed in all things Russian military, who read their military journals, their officer's manuals, even the formerly classified thoughts of the General Staff on the nature of war in the nuclear age and on the Revolution in Military Affairs as high tech conventional weaponry began to show what it could do. I was a watcher of what they did, how they did it and why, as well as constantly looking to see where they'd be going next in terms of strategy, doctrine, tactics and technology, driven by perceived deficiencies on one hand and changing requirements and opportunities on the other. Fundamentally, the Bear doesn't fight the way the Eagle does. Why? He doesn't see things at all the same way. We forget that at our peril.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Vark]

Question, can that ever be simulated in a game, or will the designers bias creep into the mechanics of the game? I played too many games where the Russians were like any other army, except crapper and more numerous. Their different approach to doctrine was ignored and only their numbers were superior, I would have liked different CRT's to reflect the advantages and disadvantages of the doctrines. For example the Russian military definition of initiative is not that of a Western model and as you have said John is intrinsically linked to their doctrinal approach. To a Russian initiative is the ability of a soldier, in combat to follow orders and achieve his mission, using tactics he has been taught. The mission to the Russians is the be all and end all, which is really a continuation of the Medieval principle of 'maintenance of purpose'. It is not for nothing that the Russians developed the term 'Operational Art' and when we look in disdain at Russian equipment it was designed as a brush for that art, nothing more nothing less. As a USMC general said of their tanks, they cannot do what ours can do, but they can do what you expect a tank to do.

I would love a game in which you could do justice to the Russian concept of war and not have to do with a western model that either grudgingly accomodates them or vastly inflates their capabilities because the game model spectacularly fails to simulate their true strengths. Who cares if Lt Strachwittpeiper's Tiger Company destroyed 22 T-34's, in a morning if he then has to retreat 200km the next day, losing most of his tanks due to breakdowns. So what if the Panther has a super-duper radio and the T-34 had flags, if the Panthers are deploying so rapidly, to constant threats of breakthroughs, that they cannot establish a proper radio net to use it.

Afghanistan though, showed that the Soviet way of war, with vehicles/ air assets and doctrines, designed for sweeping frontal manoeuvres had a very tough time adapting to the battle without fronts. Having said that talk to soldiers in that theatre now and they have doubts if we have adapted our approach to deal with the unique environment.

[Wengart]

While reading The Other Side of the Mountain Mujahideen AARs often site Russian/DRA use of mines as a major factor preventing, and holding up raids for long periods of time. Will CM:A then offer any increase in the simulation of minefields to account for this?

[Clavicula_Nox]

While reading The Other Side of the Mountain Mujahideen AARs often site Russian/DRA use of mines as a major factor preventing, and holding up raids for long periods of time. Will CM:A then offer any increase in the simulation of minefields to account for this?

Couldn't that be simulated by having reinforcements come in later in the mission, or something? I'm not sure how to simulate holding up a raid.

[Wengart]

I'm not necessarily talking solely about holding up a raid but an enhancing the general simulation of minefields, which the Soviets/DRA seemed to use quite liberally to prevent the Muj from having full freedom of movement around an OP/base.

Also, in case anyone wants to read them PDF files of The Bear Went Over the Mountain, The Other Side of the Mountain, and The Soviet-Afghan War: how a superpower fought and lost are contained here: http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/2009/11/06/a-book-that-will-be-good/

[John Kettler]

White Phosphorus, Vark, hcrof and Wengart,

Doctrinal differences can be reflected, but it's going to take reading the relevant period manuals (DIA, Unclassifed) and then figuring it out in game terms. For example, a Motor Rifle squad fights as a single entity, with each man in a designated position, and one whole manpack radio. SL's in the center, flanked by the LMG and the RPG, the latter referred to as the "missile transporter. AK ammo amounts to 90 rounds per man with an AK, this because it's less a fighting load than a mopping up load. The real killing and disruption were to come from NBC and conventional strikes. The Russian were still sorting this problem out at the time of the invasion after watching the wheels fall off it during the Yom Kippur War. Presume ammo loads increased dramatically later in the war.

Tanks mass fire to kill tanks at range (2000 m) or difficult point targets, first a platoon, then a company if needed. Most of the ammo load is HE Frag.

Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters can and do fire missiles, if so equipped, rockets and guns, but they also drop bombs. Big ones--500 kg! Also drop mines.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mil_Mi-24

"The Mi-24's favoured munition was the 80-millimetre (3.1 in) S-8 rocket, the 57 mm (2.2 in) S-5 having proven too light to be effective. The 23 mm (0.91 in) gun pod was also popular. Extra rounds of rocket ammunition were often carried internally so that the crew could land and self-reload in the field. The Mi-24 could carry ten 100-kilogram (220 lb) iron bombs for attacks on strongpoints, while harder targets could be dealt with a load of four 250-kilogram (550 lb) or two 500-kilogram (1,100 lb) iron bombs. Some Mi-24 crews became expert "snipers" dropping or tossing bombs precisely on targets. Fuel-air explosive bombs were also used in a few instances, though crews initially underestimated the sheer blast force of such weapons and were caught by shock waves that rattled their teeth."

Mi-8

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mi-8-afghan.htm

(Fair use)

"When it came to fulfilling combat missions, especially when pinpoint bombing was required, the 'eights' could successfully supplant not only combat helicopters but also tactical bombers. On many occa*sions the Mi-8s were sent to bomb small-size targets or targets which could not be destroyed by fast aircraft. In the spring of 1980 the ground forces knocked the insurgents out of their strongholds on Mt. Sanghi-Douzdan - the famous Mountain of Thieves near Farizbad which Alexander the Great had failed to cap*ture in his time. The mountain was riddled with caves and passages like a rotten log and had sheltered local bandits from time immemorial, hence the name; now it was a major Mujahideen base. The assault lasted a week, with heavy casualties among the Soviet infantry*men. A few months later the rebels again 'took up res*idence' on the mountain. The new storming of Mt. Sanghi-Douzdan which took place on 23rd August 1980 was preceded by a strike delivered by a dozen Mi-8s and involving the use of bombs and rockets. The 500-kg high-explosive bombs, 100-kg incendiary bombs and S-5 unguided rockets did their job. This second time the mountain was swept clear of the enemy in just one day; among the attackers only one person was killed and several were wounded.

In June 1981, in response to the growing number of sallies undertaken by the insurgents in the region of Gulkhana, six Mi-8 helicopters dropped 500-kg HE bombs on mountain passes governing the routes to Pakistan; they destroyed the paths clinging to vertical cliffs and caused landslides, and then scattered anti-personnel mines along the paths that still remained intact. Mining the mountain paths and the vicinities of the insurgents' bases was an effective preventive measure against the enemy's sallies. The Mi-8 could disperse up to 8,500 anti-personnel mines in just one minute, covering a strip 15 to 25 m wide and 2 km long."

Afghanistan mine types

http://www.one-step-beyond.de/en/countries/afghanistan/mines/afghanistan_mines.html

By far the most common Russian type, PFM-1. Delivered by tacair, helicopter and even BM-27.

http://www.one-step-beyond.de/en/countries/afghanistan/mines/afghanistan_mine_pfm-1.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BM-27_Uragan

"The BM-27 can use HE-Frag, chemical, or scatterable mine (PTM-3 or PFM-1) submunition equipped rockets all of which are detonated by electric timing fuses. Each rocket weighs 280.4 kilograms. The warheads weigh between 90 and 100 kilograms depending on type. A full salvo of 16 rockets can be fired in 20 seconds and can engage targets within a range of 35 kilometers.

Because of the size of the warhead, the range of the rocket and the speed that a salvo can be delivered, the BM-27 is very effective at mine laying. Each 220 mm rocket can scatter 312 anti-personnel PFM-1 mines. Minefields can be laid behind a retreating enemy or even be used to trap an enemy by encircling them with mines. Tactics such as this were often used by the Soviets in Afghanistan."

This is without factoring in the MON series directional mines, like this one that won Spetsnaz Mironenko a posthumous HSU.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MON-100

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Afghanistan War docs and books in Scribd format. Much easier to work with, at least on my rig, than PDF.

The Bear Went Over the Mountain

http://www.scribd.com/doc/6737626/Soviets-in-Afghanistan

The Soviet-Afghan War

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22213096/the-Soviet-Afghan-War

AQ's purloined U.S. Army study on lessons learned from Russian experience in Afghanistan.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/16186459/T1-B17-Al-QaedaUBL-Commentary-Fdr-Declassified-Report-Lessons-From-the-War-in-Afghanistan-240

Harvard Master's Thesis by a Russian on Soviet Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan Revisited

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21856864/Soviet-Counterinsurgency-in-the-Soviet-Afghan-War-Revisited

Two Unclassified Cold War era DIA titles for BFC to track down and read:

The Soviet Tank Company(U)

The Soviet Motor Rifle Company(U)

I haven't found either yet at an online dealer, but they should be in any number of military installation libraries. Have my own personal copies from my military aerospace days.

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Of course, there's also this helicopter delivered weapon option. Rockets are another such means.

DIA painting.

SOVIET MI-24 HIND DELIVERING CHEMICAL SPRAY

by Edward L. Cooper, 1986

The USSR maintained the world's largest stockpile of chemical warfare agents in the 1980s. Virtually all conventional systems used by the Soviets--mortars, artillery pieces, helicopters such as these Mi-24 HINDs, aircraft, and long-range tactical missiles--could deliver chemical munitions.

http://www.dia.mil/history/art/images/96_964.jpg

Regards,

John Kettler

[Sergei]

Of course, there's also this helicopter delivered weapon option. Rockets are another such means.

DIA painting.

SOVIET MI-24 HIND DELIVERING CHEMICAL SPRAY

by Edward L. Cooper, 1986

I'm sorry, but my GRU painting shows Afghan children giving flowers to their Soviet defenders. So I don't think your DIA painting is correct.

[John Kettler]

Sergei,

Does it say on the back "Property of the Aquarium..."? If not, it may be a fake. If it is real, then I'm afraid they're going to have to...Continuing the conceit, I think the flowers were given by the Russians to the Afghanis--Vasilek (Cornflower), Tulpan (Tulip), Akatsiya (Acacia), Gzodvika (Carnation), etc. Lends a whole new meaning to "Flower Power" wouldn't you say?! I think the MRL names are much more honest: Grad (Hail) and Uragan (Hurricane).

Regards,

John Kettler