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How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?


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8 hours ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Just leaving this here for any forum member or lurker who wants to help out.

libertyukraine.org

Seems like a place to drop part of my overtime bonus. I'll add it to my trusted list.

It's a promise I gave myself in Feb 22. Whatever I earn outside of my regular pay eaxh month will go to Ukraine. There are many good causes all over the world which deserve attention, but I have chosen this one because it has special significance to me. And I'll continue each month this goes on, doesn't matter how many years it takes. I am in the lucky position that this is financially possible and I know it's not for many others.

The wife is already joking "And how is your true love, Ukraine, today". 

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1 hour ago, Holien said:

I am now looking for ignore button.

Please gents can we keep focus on Ukraine and stop the rabbit holes.

BTW There are others that I am close to pressing the ignore button on (when I can find it....)

Hover over the user's name or picture for a second for the profile menu to come up.  Ignore is at the bottom right.

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1/ Everybody talking about the tires.  Me: hey, they did this to a plane missing an engine!

In fact... now that I look at the other one, it doesn't have any blades on any of the engines.

2/ Nice catch by @vcdgf555. Could be that they put the cope tyres on u/s airframes hoping that these would draw attacks by dressing them up as being worth protecting   Otherwise having to remove them as part of  preflight work on active airframes would be fun

 

Edited by FancyCat
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1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

2/ Nice catch by @vcdgf555. Could be that they put the cope tyres on u/s airframes hoping that these would draw attacks by dressing them up as being worth protecting   Otherwise having to remove them as part of  preflight work on active airframes would be fun

I am skeptical about the logic of drawing attention to those planes by pretending they are protected and playing mind games with attack planners (too clever by half), but I could believe in piling up stuff on derelict planes in an attempt to enchance their radar and visual signature relative to the useful ones. Still a desperate action.

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1 hour ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

I am skeptical about the logic of drawing attention to those planes by pretending they are protected and playing mind games with attack planners (too clever by half), but I could believe in piling up stuff on derelict planes in an attempt to enchance their radar and visual signature relative to the useful ones. Still a desperate action.

These are not the airframes you seek.

 

Comes to mind...

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7 hours ago, dan/california said:

South Korea has been a fabulous success story. Nor did I ever say it was a U.S. mistake, pretty sure we advised against it. And no I am not saying we should have forced the issue. But the fact remains they gave North Korea the worlds most valuable hostage, effectively. 75 years and counting and that is more of a problem every day, not less. I am sure everyone hoped the North would fade away into irrelevance, or become a Chinese province, or, or, just so happens it was a bad bet. I mean even the weather is way better in Busan and similar.

It was never going to be different. Hanyang (now known as Seoul) was the capital of the Joseon kingdom since the 14th Century and was the capital of the earlier Baekje kingdom during the Korean Three Kingdoms period. It is far too important in their history to not be the capital no matter what cold, military logic would say. Also, as an aside Busan is a phenomenal city. It's probably my favorite place I've ever been and if any of you get the chance to go there you absolutely should.

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9 hours ago, dan/california said:

Very little, but the real mistake was made in ~1954. When South Korea rebuilt the old capital, instead starting over a couple of hundred miles south and out of any possible tube artillery range. Keep in mind that Seoul was at least as obliterated as Bakmuht is now. It probably cost more to clean it up than it would have to start over somewhere further south, but the South Koreans were attached to the symbology of Seoul. So they built one of the worlds greatest cities in range of an approximate infinity of North Korean artillery. 

 

If they hadn't done this I suspect the entire history post 1954 would have been very different.

 

In my thinking, the only countries that could apply leverage to try to block more Russian-DPRK cooperation would be South Korea and Japan. They could threaten Russia with more sanctions along with the delivery of weapons to Ukraine if Russia were to transfer more technology to North Korea. I really wish they would be willing to take such steps.

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Fascinating insights into NATO training for Ukraine; what worked and what didn't.

https://twitter.com/Teoyaomiquu/status/1699193558685618235

Quote

Please consider this text as a supplementary piece interjected with opinions - my own and those I spoke to in the field.

I got in touch with not only the 32nd but also the 92nd Mechanized Brigade. The 92nd fought alongside the 32nd and can provide unique insight, as they are experienced and saw firsthand the schism between theory and practice.

Our new infantry brigade did a heroic job in the given circumstances: limited time, resources, and ammunition. My conversations with everyone outside of the 32nd were marked with gratitude, as nobody appreciates people willing to do the job of infantry more than infantry.

Don't doom over this text. My effort is to give another small input into making Western training more effective.

Let me also point out that when dealing with losses, emotions run high, and there is an opening for toxicity to seep in. The disconnect between expectations set by the training and the reality of the Ukrainian battlefield can be explained better with a lack of communication at the higher level than with "Western arrogance". It can still get you angry, but you would be a fool to escape into a simple narrative that relies on a lack of intelligence or empathy. You can not expect Western militaries to be perfectly in tune with the requirements of the Ukrainian battlefield at the institutional level when our own institutions run into similar problems with less distance to the front. If you think Ukrainian training is perfect, I have an illegal bridge to sell you.

You can watch the videos of Western instructors saying farewell to Ukrainian recruits anytime. Twitter replies made by armchair generals do not represent them. I think they very much care.

Background:

The 32nd Mechanized Brigade was formed at the beginning of 2023 and partially equipped with Western equipment with the core of its mechanized infantry utilizing the American M113 armored personnel carrier.
Its infantry battalions underwent training in the spring of 2023 in a NATO country. After the return to Ukraine, the brigade received equipment and ammunition and was fully staffed. During the summer, the 32nd brigade was deployed alongside the 92nd brigade, which had been fighting for the past nine months in the Svatove axis in the northeast of Ukraine.

The deployment quickly became problematic and resulted in heavy casualties, eventually forcing the command to reconsider.

The training:

I’ve spoken to one of the sergeants in the brigade with the call sign “Nestor” about the training they received abroad.

Overall, the training included basic infantry, reconnaissance, and assault tactics.

Nestor said the most interesting and useful part was the reconnaissance training. “We learned how to get close to the enemy and build secure observation posts. It was essential.” They also learned how to adjust artillery and navigation. “Navigation was useful; spotting was interesting, but it was not particularly useful on the battlefield so far.”

However, his overall verdict of the training was mixed: “It was like the instructors were in a vacuum. We received training in infantry tactics, while this war is a war of artillery and drones.”.

On one occasion, Nestor’s commander asked if trainers would at least consider the presence of drones on the battlefield. The answer was a damning “No.”.
“You didn’t take your drones with you, and the only drone we have available is DJI Phantom 4, but we can’t even use it for bureaucratic reasons.” he recalls them saying. So they continued the training as is.

Western-provided training fell short of considering current realities on the battlefield. The brigade’s first deployment in Ukraine was to hold the defense in the Svatove direction. However, Nestor commented: “Our battalion received zero defensive combat training. It was all assault oriented.”

On a positive note, the sergeant says that our infantry learned to move and storm buildings and trenches. “If you consider this basic infantry training, it was good.” The infantry companies spend seven days practicing assault combined arms operations, storming different objectives. One day, it was a small town. Another day, it was an enemy trench. “We went through swamps, mud, and cold nights. Once, our instructor said that living through it on the battlefield would be easier if we experienced these conditions now. He was right.”

But the companies received too little training on surviving the battlefield: “There was no camouflage training. The infantry didn’t learn how to conceal positions, build bunkers, and no defensive combat training.”

In the end, Nestor adds that one of the things that they needed was EOD awareness and training. “You must understand the battlefield is littered with booby traps, mines, and explosive ordinance. We knew it before the deployment. Everyone in Ukraine knows it. We asked trainers if we could get any training on the topic.” But for some reason, the trainers refused to even discuss it. It was a taboo. “We regret the lack of EOD training specifically. It could have saved lives.”

The deployment:

After the training in Germany by a NATO country was complete, and after a short period in Ukraine, they were sent to reinforce Svatove direction.

Problems appeared immediately. Nestor’s battalion was deployed shoulder to shoulder with one of the battalions of the 92nd brigade. The 92nd brigade soldier with the call sign “Zero” explains, “It appears that they were trained on another planet. What was obvious to us was a terra incognito for them.” He continues with a story of one of their first encounters with 32nd infantry: “We were driving 15km from the front line, and I noticed a military Ural (truck), with a full platoon clustered around near one of the small local grocery stores. They acted like they didn’t know it was a war zone. We had to stop and tell them that ZALA (russian) drone was reported around. The platoon commander did not know the enemy had such capabilities.”.

A grave mistake in NATO training was that a company commander stayed in the trenches with the company. While it sounds heroic and may work when facing a poorly equipped enemy, russia is well-equipped and has hundreds of drones. This costly mistake was corrected after they lost a couple of positions. “The company commander has to have the eyes in the sky. He has to have his own drone stream and communicate with platoon or group commanders.” - It was a costly lesson for Nazar’s unit; “It cost us lives.”

I asked why a company commander couldn’t stay in the trench. My friend from the 92nd Brigade explained that when the company commander is in the trench, he becomes another link in the chain of command: “Please understand controlling 100 soldiers in combat is a hard task. The higher-level commander watches a drone stream and makes decisions. He gives an order to the company commander over the radio. The company commander has to understand exactly what is going on to make decisions and pass orders to the platoons. For that, you need to observe the battlefield from the top. Try sitting under tank shelling and yelling over the radio while being yelled over the radio yourself. It is much more efficient when the company commander has his own command and control room with drone streams coming in. He can make calm and weighed decisions looking at the battlefield instead of listening to what is happening, and it is no longer a game of telephone.”

“In the current battlefield, even the group or a platoon commander has to have a tablet with our special map application to be effective, and you can not rely on a stupid enemy anymore. They evolved.” summarizes Nestor, “We knew none of that, and no one could share the experience and knowledge with us. Now we are smarter, but the price was terrible.”

Another capability that was undertrained might surprise: driving. It might sound absurd to some, but those familiar with the battlefield know how hazardous and costly even a simple drive toward or away from the front can be. Our drivers must be more experienced in driving at night; driving during the day is too dangerous. Training for night driving operations is critical to avoid casualties and the loss of valuable equipment. It is also emblematic: It may not seem a top priority for NATO training personnel with a shortened schedule. However, its importance must be communicated just like any other discrepancy mentioned here and elsewhere.

Conclusion:

The disconnect of the NATO training leads to a brigade being unprepared on the battlefield. Specifically, the lack of UAV, defensive, mine awareness, and EOD training has led to unnecessary casualties on the battlefield.

To avoid a similar situation in the future, Ukraine needs to treat NATO training as basic infantry training instead of a complete cycle of brigade/battalion-level preparation. We need to perform post-training exercises and adapt the units to the newest technologies and tactics on the battlefield.

Ultimately, the brigade has gained enough experience to be effective, but the cost could have been much smaller.

 

 

Edited by Vanir Ausf B
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2 hours ago, Teufel said:

Already yesterday’s news but additional take on the ammunition supply by Ben Hodges.

Hm, a little bit of an oddity here.

Gepard usually uses FAPDS or AHEAD ammunition in its anti-air role (and I think that's what has been supplied so far), but the contract, to which this first delivery belongs, is apparently for 150.000 HEI-T and 150.000 HVAPDS.

The imagine, specifically, shows the latter.

I wonder about the talks between Ukraine and Rheinmetall which lead to this choice of ammo types.

Edited by Carolus
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9 hours ago, kevinkin said:

They are just words and thoughts.

That could be said about literally any statement that anyone has ever made. That doesn't make every statement that anyone has ever made acceptable.

I'm not saying it's what you were going for, but it would be very easy for someone to interpret your words as advocating eugenics.

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30 minutes ago, Centurian52 said:

That could be said about literally any statement that anyone has ever made. That doesn't make every statement that anyone has ever made acceptable.

I'm not saying it's what you were going for, but it would be very easy for someone to interpret your words as advocating eugenics.

It's worse than that, he's basically treating the problem of displacement of entire populations of people as an inconvenience on the level of spaying and neutering an infestation of animals. No interest or acknowledgement of the root problems that would solve the issue, just resignation to it and irritation about all these 'dirty foreigners coming in and mucking up the place', is what I got from that comment. Disgusting. 

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16 hours ago, kimbosbread said:

Sure, if you define any government that steals from the poor but has no natural resources as a non-kleptocracy. Consider though that labor and charity money are easy to steal. Poor Central American dictatorships have minimal resources, but the people running these countries still manage to live quite well. That’s kind of a kleptocracy too.

To finish this up, there's a fine line between kleoptocracies and run-of-the-mill corruption.  I don't know enough about Central American countries to comment too much, but I expect that much of the graft comes from some combo of run-of-the-mill corruption (skimming, diverting contracts, etc.), natural resource exploitation (agriculture in this case), and drug related income. 

Anyway, my point still stands.  The more readily available and valuable the natural resource, the weaker the rule of law, the more likely you'll wind up with a kleptocratic state.  This does not mean that countries poor in natural resources have an easy time establishing rule of law societies.  There's plenty of challenges aside from easy access to natural resources.

Steve

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23 hours ago, BlackMoria said:

Speaking as a retired artillery officer....three other reasons to explain this:

1. They have insufficient radios and field phones to communicate with the battery command post.  

2.  The clearing in the trees is too small for proper dispersion of the guns.  Knowing that drones are sweeping treelines for targets, the russians may have chanced putting these guns into a small clearing in the middle of a forest with a trail going into the clearing for the tow vehicles.

3. They lack fire control calculators/computers to calculate fire patterns like converge, linear, etc.   The spacing looks about right for just doing a common bearing and range shoot to all guns and the spacing of the guns is about right for overlapping lethal burst patterns.

Personally, I didn't think the guns were too tight to begin with. There are trade-offs with everything, obviously, and with a gun position you want it to be as dispersed as possible, and no more.

Arguing for wider dispersion is the counter-battery threat, which itself varies by enemy, operational situation, tactical situation, and terrain. In general, the Ukrainians seem to have been following an active CB policy (ie, going after Russian artillery assets whenever they get a chance) over the last ... year? But it is unlikely that policy is consistent across the entire front, due to a lack of ammo, deception measures, and lack of sufficient CB C2 infrastructure everywhere. But as a rule of thumb, I expect the Russians would probably want to be more dispersed than perhaps their doctrine would suggest.

Arguing against wider dispersion are a bunch of factors.

Local defence - I'm not sure how porous the front is, or how often Ukrainian raiding parties are hitting battery positions, but a small tight position is MUCH easier to defend against a ground threat that a dispersed position.

Fire mission command and control - in my experience, each section (2 guns) is managed by a junior officer, and he has to keep shuttling between his guns to ensure they are doing the right things in the right way (bearing and elevation is correct, correct ammo, charge and fuse, etc). If the position becomes too dispersed, either those firing checks have to be reduced or overlooked (with consequent increase in risk), or the pace of fire missions drastically reduced. That's on top of the points @BlackMoria made about limited wire and/or radios. A lot of this can be mitigated with fancy-pants new kit, but these are D-30s. I doubt they are very fancy-pants, and I expect they are using methods and equipment that a gunner from the 1980s would feel intimately familiar with.

Terrain - @BlackMoria has noted that this clearing is quite small, which is true, but FWIW to my eye it doesn't appear to be too small for the number of guns being employed*. It's really hard to eyeball, but it looks to be at least 50m between guns, which is a pretty standard dispersion. Also, the entire clearing isn't available for use due to cresting issues with the surrounding trees - get too close to the trees at the front edge of the clearing and you can't safely depress the barrels enough to engage targets - you'd be firing rounds through the trees just in front of you and, um, that's a really bad idea. That's also why you can't just hide your guns in the forest to begin with.

Edit to add: Terrain part 2 - we can't see the wider area around this position. It could concievably be that this is the only, or one of the few, practical positions for this battery to be. Aside from out in the desert, the battlespace rapidly gets clogged up by all the things you want to be there - ammo and logistics dumps, engineer stores dumps, artillery areas, medical areas, helicopter landing zones, reserve fighting positions, staging areas for units moving forwards and backwards, maintenance area, routes for stuff moving forwards, backwards, and sideways, etc. Given that this area also seems to be heavily wooded and sparsely tracked**, there just mightn't be any other good spots for the guns to be, and the battlespace managers at the higher HQ haven't given this battery commander enough ground to be able to disperse they way he might want to.

 

Interestingly, there seems to be only three guns in this battery. I wonder where the fourth is? I'm guessing it is out of action - either broken, or perhaps destroyed in a previous CB engagement - although it could jut be tucked away somewhere out of sight.

Also, the CB mission as shown seemed focused on the guns themselves, which is fair enough because that's what the unaided eye (or drone cam) can see. But somewhere, not too far away - probably within 100m of the centre gun - is a command post. It's a shame they couldn't identify and target that either instead of one of the guns, or in addition to all of the guns. There is probably also an echelon park nearby - probably not more than 200-500m from the command post - with a bunch of trucks and mechanics and technical equipment and other paraphernalia. Replacing a couple of guns is hard. Replacing a couple of guns AND all that other junk, along with the training of the specialists you find there, is really hard.

 

* although, I suppose you could argue that it really was too small, given that all three guns seem to have been taken out. On the other hand, the Ukrainians seemed to be adjusting between the three guns as if they were three point targets. At that point it wouldn't have mattered if the guns were twice, thrice, or ten times as far apart - once the enemy gunners have the intel and time to accurately adjust between your positions you're screwed, regardless of dispersion. It doesn't matter whether that's a battery of guns or a dug in platoon.

** artillery units need access to good routes - ammo is heavy, and in a sustained battle an artillery unit needs a LOT of trucks coming and going to keep it fed.

Edited by JonS
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4 minutes ago, JonS said:

Personally, I didn't think the guns were too tight to begin with. There are trade-offs with everything, obviously, and with a gun position you want it to be as dispersed as possible, and no more.

Arguing for wider dispersion is the counter-battery threat, which varies by enemy, operational situation, tactical situation, and terrain. In general, the Ukrainians seem to have been following an active CB policy (ie, going after Russian artillery assets whenever they get a chance) over the last ... year? But it is unlikely that policy is consistent across the entire front, due to a lack of ammo, deception measures, and lack of sufficient CB C2 infrastructure everywhere. But as a rule of thumb, I expect the Russians would probably want to be more dispersed than perhaps their doctrine would suggest.

Arguing against wider dispersion are a bunch of factors.

Local defence - I'm not sure how porous the front is, or how often Ukrainian raiding parties are hitting battery positions, but a small tight position is MUCH easier to defend against a ground threat that a dispersed position.

Fire mission command and control - in my experience, each section (2 guns) is managed by a junior officer, and he has to keep shuttling between his guns to ensure they are doing the right things in the right way (bearing and elevation is correct, correct ammo, charge and fuse, etc). If the position becomes too dispersed, either those firing checks have to be reduced or overlooked (with consequent increase in risk), or the pace of fire missions drastically reduced. That's on top of the points @BlackMoria made about limited wire and/or radios. A lot of this can be mitigated with fancy-pants new kit, but these are D-30s. I doubt they are very fancy-pants, and I expect they are using methods and equipment that a gunner from the 1980s would feel intimately familiar with.

Terrain - @BlackMoria has noted that this clearing is quite small, which is true, but FWIW to my eye it doesn't appear to be too small for the number of guns being employed. It's really hard to eyeball, but it looks to be at least 50m between guns, which is a pretty standard dispersion. Also, the entire clearing isn't available for use due to cresting issues with the surrounding trees - get too close to the trees at the front edge of the clearing and you can't safely depress the barrels enough to engage targets - you'd be firing rounds through the trees just in front of you and, um, that's a really bad idea. That's also why you can't just hide your guns in the forest to begin with.

 

Interestingly, there seems to be only three guns in this battery. I wonder where the fourth is? I'm guessing it is out of action - either broken, or perhaps destroyed in a previous CB engagement - although it could jut be tucked away somewhere out of sight.

Also, the CB mission as shown seemed focused on the guns themselves, which is fair enough because that's what the unaided eye (or drone cam) can see. But somewhere, not too far away - probably within 100m of the centre gun - is a command post. It's a shame they couldn't identify and target that either instead of one of the guns, or in addition to all of the guns. There is probably also an echelon park nearby - probably not more than 200-500m from the command post - with a bunch of trucks and mechanics and technical equipment and other paraphernalia. Replacing a couple of guns is hard. Replacing a couple of guns AND all that other junk, along with the training of the specialists you find there, is really hard.

Great post! 

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11 hours ago, kevinkin said:

Yep, the third world needs 100% complete access to birth control. And they should be paid to use it. "Paid to get laid" might work better than "Just say no".  All we can do is try. There is tremendous demographic pressure on the northern hemisphere. It does not relate to Ukraine directly so I will stop.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just_Say_No

Interestingly enough, in certain Central American countries that are rather Catholic birth control is free, women can get their tubes tied for free etc. And fertility rates for Latin America are barely above 2.0!

Completely unrelated to the war other than the weaponization of refugees of course, but the pressure from this will drive many conflicts in this century.

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