Centurian52

As far as I can tell no. I've tried. I always found it very inconvenient having the Game Files and the Data folders in completely different locations on my computer. It meant that I had to go to two completely different places in my overall folder structure if I wanted to install a mod vs if I wanted to add new scenarios or campaigns. Fortunately that's not an issue with the Steam versions of the games. The Game Files and Data folders are together in the same folder.

The WW2 titles are definitely a lot closer. The Korean War was about 5 years removed from WW2, but it's about 30 years removed from the timeframe of CMCW. Nearly all of the equipment that was in service in Korea had been in service since WW2. Very little of the equipment that was in service in Korea was still in service by 1979.

Not in the near future, no. I was one of the ones specifically suggesting that Korea would be the logical place to go next after Downfall, until Steve stepped in and said it wasn't happening. As to why, mainly it comes down to priorities. They're a small team that can only do so much at once*. Given infinite time I'm sure they'll eventually get around to covering every single real and hypothetical war in human history. But infinite time hasn't passed yet. *And I should clarify what I mean by "small". Most people here know that Battlefront is a small company, but I don't think very many appreciate how small. I work for a "small" company with less than 200 employees. Battlefront isn't small like my company is small. I remember Steve saying at one point that Battlefront has about half a dozen employees. Barely more people than you could count on one hand. And somehow this small handful of people has managed to bring us the most realistic tactical wargame of all time. And, while they don't release sales or budget information, I get the distinct impression that they've basically been working with a shoestring budget this whole time. It's hard to overstate just how impressive of an accomplishment Combat Mission really is.

The Chieftain was initially fielded in 1965 and the timeframe is only going back as far as 1976. So we're not exactly getting an early version of the Chieftain. According to Wikipedia (so, grain of salt) the Chieftain Mk 3/3 had the Barr & Stroud TLS (Tank Laser Sight) fitted in 1973, three years before the game's timeframe. By the time we get into the game's timeframe the Mk 5 should be the latest variant, at least according to Wikipedia.

I had heard that inept Soviet-style leadership was a problem ever since large numbers of old Soviet-trained officers were mobilized into the Ukrainian Army in 2022. I take it from you post that it's still a serious problem, but has there at least been some progress towards solving it? Obviously inept Soviet-style leadership is a problem for the Russians too, but if it's possible to widen Ukraine's advantage in competent leadership over the Russians then that would obviously be desirable. Theoretically Ukraine, being a democracy, should be better equipped to resolve problems with incompetent leadership than the Russians. The primary mechanism for that of course is that incompetent leadership is more likely to cause a widespread scandal in a democracy, and scandals are more likely to result in meaningful action in a democracy. So if the leadership issue is causing a widespread scandal, then perhaps that's a good sign?

I'm not authorized to give any actual bones. But having recently peaked at the bone factory I can say that they're hard at work. I think most of the signs of progress that can actually be presented as something visual (things you can take a screenshot of to show off on a forum) generally come fairly late in the overall process.

It should at least be better than the M60A1. It won't be any more likely to penetrate the T-64's armor than the M60, but it has a laser rangefinder, so it will be more likely to hit. I expect it should be about as likely to hit a stationary target as an M60A3, though it won't be as likely to hit a moving target since it has no automatic lead. The Chieftain certainly won't be able to take hits from its direct front, as several armor penetration simulations on youtube have demonstrated. But perhaps a round coming in from a more extreme angle might occasionally skip off the frontal armor. I have seen rounds glance off of the M60's turret from time to time (when hitting at a very extreme angle), and the Chieftain's thicker and more steeply sloped armor can only increase the chances of that happening. We'll have to wait and see if this results in a noticeable increase in survivability. It's possible there will be no noticeable difference at all, but it's also possible that the Chieftain's survivability against the T-62's 115mm gun might be similar to the Sherman's survivability against the Panzer IV's 75mm gun (hits from the direct front will generally penetrate, but hits striking the frontal armor from an angle may only get partial penetrations or spalling).

Interesting. You hear about that sort of thing happening in real life (battering an enemy tank into submission with HE, particularly if you know that you can't penetrate the armor with your AP), but I hadn't realized it was possible in game.

Yes.

Even without considering effectiveness against tanks, this is definitely one of the issues. Perhaps it's realistic for CMSF2 and CMBS, since those games assume short conflicts set at a time when we weren't maintaining massive stockpiles of artillery ammunition. But in the WW2 titles and CMCW the player should be positively swimming in artillery ammunition*. By the earliest point in the WW2 titles industry has already more than caught up with the ammunition expenditure requirements of a massive, high intensity, peer vs peer war. And during the Cold War both the US and the Soviet Union were anticipating another massive, high intensity, peer vs peer war to break out at any moment, remembered what their artillery ammunition requirements were like in WW2, and knew that it would take a couple years for industry to catch up to those requirements, so were maintaining stockpiles of tens of millions of rounds of artillery ammunition that they hoped would last for the first year or two of any war until industry caught up with requirements. *Edit: I now have an image in my head of Scrooge McDuck diving into a pool of artillery shells.

That hasn't been my experience. I have found artillery to be surprisingly effective in the WW2 titles. But I routinely use artillery as an anti-tank asset in the modern titles, where I generally only use it against tanks in the WW2 titles if I don't have many good options (I'll generally try it before trying a head on engagement with my own tanks, but the slow call-in and poor accuracy means it is far from ideal). The better protection of modern tanks means that a single hit may not be as likely to achieve a kill. But since modern artillery is so much more accurate you are likely to get a lot more hits. In the WW2 titles I generally use a heavy barrage set on medium duration with the expectation of getting one or two hits on the tank. In the modern titles I use a heavy barrage set on a short duration with the expectation of getting several hits. If anything artillery is a much better anti-tank weapon in the modern era than in the WW2 era. I'll grant that on the few occasions that I've played against, rather than as, the Americans I did notice that the Abrams seems to be a lot more resilient to artillery than I was expecting (it's certainly a beast from the front, but I didn't think the top armor was all that tough). But the artillery was still generally able to disable it, even if it couldn't get an outright kill.

Also this. But I didn't want to get drawn into too much of a tangent at the time. There's probably no harm in going on that tangent now though. The way I see it there are several different kinds of mistakes that can go down in history. 1. God's-eye-view mistakes: The commander may have made the right decision based on the information they had. But if they had been omniscient (or at least known what we know now) then they would have known not to make that decision. It is unreasonable to judge the quality of the commander based on these kinds of mistakes. But they're still worth identifying and examining since they can be very informative. 2. Actual mistakes: The commander really did make the wrong call based on what they knew at the time (even if from the god's-eye-view it actually turns out to have been the right call). 3. Trade-offs: The commander made a compromise rather than an outright mistake. They understood that their decision would have costs, but had a reasonable expectation that those costs would be balanced by commensurate benefits. Of course it is possible to make the wrong (or suboptimal) trade-offs. So on some occasions a trade-off could also be an actual mistake or a god's-eye-view mistake. But on other occasions a trade-off is just a trade-off. 4. Not-mistakes: It is the historian, not the commander, who has misjudged the situation. Perhaps the historian, or the historian's sources, needed a scapegoat. Perhaps the historian wasn't looking at a decision in the proper context in which it was made, or perhaps they didn't have an adequate understanding of tactics to understand the decision. Perhaps things went awry because the enemy commander did something right, and not because POV commander did something wrong. Or perhaps things went wrong just because of sheer random chance*. All too often the "mistakes" that commanders are accused of are actually trade-offs, god's-eye-view mistakes, or not-mistakes, rather than actual mistakes. Of course commanders do make actual mistakes. They are only human, so a certain error rate is to be expected. And even the best commander can have a bad day. But decades (or centuries, depending on which wars we're looking at) of sloppy history** have left us in a position where we need to re-examine each mistake with a high degree of scrutiny before we can confidently decide whether it was an actual mistake or not. *Outcomes in war are probabilistic, not deterministic. Decisions have to made based on probabilities, not certainties. And that means that it is entirely possible to do absolutely everything right, and still lose. In this case the culprit isn't any mistake, but the residual degree of randomness that cannot be eliminated no matter how hard you try. **I say sloppy history. But historians, like commanders, are also only human. So again, a certain error rate is to be expected. Even the best historians make mistakes about which mistakes they accuse commanders of making.

Those are some pretty severe losses! That makes a certain amount of sense if your Abrams were mostly lost to frontal penetrations (and I believe the weapon mount is a weak point in the frontal armor). A round penetrating the front of the turret, passing through the crew compartment, and then hitting the ammo compartment in the back will put a hole in the blast door between the ammo and crew compartments. If that happens the blowout panels will no longer be the path of least resistance for the ammo detonation and the crew will be toast. You'll get a similar result if the ammo takes a hit during the brief window when the loader has the blast door open to grab a round.

I read a fair amount of tactical doctrine, to the point that I consider it one of my hobbies alongside wargaming (basically my hobbies are 1. learning tactics, and 2. putting tactics into practice). I usually go to the Nafziger collection for WW2 tactics. https://nafzigercollection.com/product/american-tank-company-tactics-fm-17-32/ https://nafzigercollection.com/product/british-and-commonwealth-armored-tactics-in-wwii/ https://nafzigercollection.com/product/british-and-commonwealth-motorized-infantry-tactics-in-wwii/ https://nafzigercollection.com/product/employment-of-tanks-with-infantry-fm-17-36/ https://nafzigercollection.com/product/german-squad-tactics-in-wwii/ https://nafzigercollection.com/product/german-panzer-tactics-in-world-war-ii-combat-tactics-of-german-armored-units-from-section-to-regiment/ https://nafzigercollection.com/product/organization-equipment-tactical-doctrine-of-the-french-army-1939/ https://nafzigercollection.com/product/soviet-armored-tactics-in-world-war-ii-the-tactics-of-the-armored-units-of-the-red-army-from-individual-vehicles-to-battalions-according-to-the-combat-regulations-of-february-1944/ https://nafzigercollection.com/product/soviet-infantry-tactics-in-world-war-ii/ https://nafzigercollection.com/product/soviet-tactical-doctrine-in-wwii/ For the Cold War and modern era there's 'FM 100-2-1: Soviet Operations and Tactics' and 'FM 100-2-2: Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support' for Soviet and Russian tactics. I'd say FM 100-2-1 is most relevant for CMCW and CMBS, since it covers the most common large scale Soviet mechanized operations. FM 100-2-2 is most relevant for CMA, since it has sections on Soviet airborne operations and mountain warfare. For US tactics I thought 'FM 71-1: Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team' and 'FM 71-2: Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force' were fairly helpful. FM 71-1 is probably more relevant to Combat Mission, since there are more company sized scenarios than battalion sized scenarios. https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm100-2-1.pdf https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm100-2-2.pdf https://ia802201.us.archive.org/23/items/fm-71-1-tank-and-mechanized-infantry-company-team/FM71_1TANK AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMPANY TEAM.pdf https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-us-archive/FM71-2(77).pdf I've also read a small handful of manuals published between the Napoleonic Wars and WW1, which cannot be in any way applied to Combat Mission. I just have a general interest in the history of tactical development through the 19th and 20th centuries. One thing I've come to realize though is that everything laid out in every single one of these manuals was learned by someone through direct experience in combat. Doctrine is basically a way of formalizing and remembering lessons learned through experience. It is not the immutable "right" way of doing things as passed down by the god of war. It does not overrule your own experience, and you should feel at complete liberty to develop your own "doctrine" as you go (though taking some inspiration from various formal doctrines here and there is rarely a bad idea). You could theoretically learn everything in any of these manuals the hard way, through your own experience, without ever reading a page from any of these manuals (though I think reading some of these manuals can significantly shorten the learning curve). Having said all that No. I have started to gain some confidence that I'm a good Combat Mission player. But that's after years of playing the games. Skill in Combat Mission, as with everything in life, comes from experience. Even reading doctrine is just a way of letting those who came before you pass on their experience to you. So you get good at Combat Mission by playing lots of Combat Mission. Don't let the fear of mistakes or failure deter you. The fastest way to learn is to fail fast. Get lots of failures under your belt and you'll gain an excellent understanding of what works, what doesn't work, and why. "Fail fast to learn fast" may not necessarily be good life advice, but that's because failure in the real world has consequences. But this is a simulation. There are no consequences for failure here. Of course even after playing Combat Mission for so long, and getting so many failures under my belt, I have never stopped making mistakes. You don't learn to stop making mistakes. You learn to stop beating yourself up over your mistakes, and you learn how to recover from your mistakes. And hopefully you learn to be a tad forgiving to all the commanders throughout history that historians like to routinely berate for making mistakes (because apparently most historians aren't wargamers, so don't know that it's basically impossible to go through an entire battle without making any mistakes).

Hoping that destroying Russia's strategic infrastructure will cause it to collapse sounds to me a lot like hoping that strategic bombing alone would win WW2. It didn't work in WW2, and there's no reason to assume it would work now. Destroying the enemy's strategic infrastructure will make them extremely vulnerable. But you still need to attack on the ground in order to exploit that vulnerability. The stresses of this war might cause the Russian state to collapse. But that's not something we can count on. Frankly it's not entirely clear what it takes to make a state collapse. States seem to regularly hold out when we think they should collapse, or collapse when we think they should hold out. Even if the Russian state does collapse, that still leaves a bunch of stateless troops occupying Ukrainian territory. Those troops will still need to be evicted. They should be easy to evict at that point, since they should be severely demoralized and won't be backed up by the recruitment or logistics infrastructure of a state. But they don't just automatically vanish.